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Article 7 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights2
Respect for private and family life
Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communica-
tions.
Article 12 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights
Freedom of assembly and of association
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association
at all levels, in particular in political, trade union and civic matters, which implies the right
of everyone to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his or her interests.
2. Political parties at Union level contribute to expressing the political will of the citizens
of the Union.
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms3
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes
freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and
observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.
1 This thesis is written in the framework of the VIDI-project Judicial reasoning in fundamental rights
cases – national and European perspectives, supervised by professor J.H. Gerards and funded by
the Netherlands Organisation of Scientific Research (NWO).
2 Hereinafter the Charter. The European Charter of Fundamental Rights proclaimed in 2007, OJ 2010/C
83/02. This Charter contains one general limitation clause in Article 52 which provides:
Article 52:
Scope and interpretation of rights and principles
1. Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by this Charter must be
provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle
of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives
of general interest recognized by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.
3 Hereinafter the European Convention or the Convention.
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Fundamental rights are often drafted in a very general manner. The examples provided
above illustrate the vague or broad nature of fundamental rights. This raises many
questions regarding the exact meaning of these rights. What kinds of situations are
covered by the notion of family life? Does this extend to homosexual relationships?
And what kind of activities are within the scope of the notion of private life? The
wish of a handicapped person to be able to access a beach? Or the right to freedom
of association, does this include the right not to be associated? And what about the
right to freedom of religion? Is any religion protected under the scope of this pro-
vision? These are some examples of the types of questions that require answers for
a proper understanding of the meaning of these fundamental rights. The problem is
that there are no easy answers to these questions, because the text of these provisions
does not provide much guidance. Moreover, these questions often deal with highly
controversial material on which opinions can differ strongly.
If the text is not clear, the question is who determines the meaning of these
provisions? By drafting these vaguely worded provisions the legislator or, in the case
of treaties, the drafting states leave these matters to be decided by judges in individual
cases. As a consequence, in many cases judges are confronted with questions challeng-
ing the scope of fundamental rights. The question is how judges decide these questions
on the meaning of fundamental rights. In other words, how do they interpret funda-
mental rights provisions?4 This question can be understood in two ways. One can
look at the material result of the interpretation of specific fundamental rights provisions
or one can look at the interpretation process and try to understand how judges have
come to a specific interpretation of a fundamental rights provision. While the former
question can be highly interesting, the focus of this thesis is on the latter question,
namely how specific interpretative conclusions can be justified.
A logical question is how one can establish how judges have come to a specific
interpretative decision. Two different phases can be distinguished in the process of
decision-making by judges in general, which is valid for the interpretative process
as well. On the one hand there is the heuristic part of the process.5 This refers to
the process of finding an answer to the question at hand. Different judges can have
different methods for finding an answer, depending on the person of the judge and
his or her experience; other factors might play a role as well.6 It is extremely difficult
4 As indicated by McCormick (2005), p. 121, interpretation can be understood in a wide sense and
in a stricter sense. The wider sense understands interpretation to be any act whereby the law is applied
to a specific case. The stricter sense means that there is some doubt about the meaning of a term
or provision, which needs to be resolved. The term ‘interpretation’ will be used in the stricter sense
throughout this thesis.
5 Smith (2005) p. 77-78. See also McCormick (1978), p. 14-16 and McCormick (2005), p. 208, who
speaks about the process of discovery and the process of justification.
6 Smith (2005), p. 77.
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if not impossible to get a proper understanding of this heuristic part of judicial
decision-making, because even interviews would not provide enough insight into this
process. It would require an analysis of the judge’s brain to fully understand how
this process of finding a specific answer works. This thesis therefore focuses on the
second phase of the judge’s decision-making process. In its judgment a judge or a
court is required to provide reasons for its decision. By providing reasons a judge
is required to produce arguments that justify the decision.7 Outsiders, like other
judges, national legislators, lawyers, academics, but also the general public, can assess
on the basis of these arguments whether they really provide a justification for the
result in a specific judgment. By providing arguments for a specific decision the
judicial conclusions can be more easily checked for their quality and persuasiveness.
This research will therefore focus on the judicial argumentation or more specifically
on the arguments provided for a specific interpretative choice.
Even though an analysis of judicial argumentation can be relevant for any judicial
body dealing with fundamental rights, two specific judicial bodies have been selected
for the research in this thesis. Both the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),8 the latter only in cases
dealing with fundamental rights, will be analyzed in this thesis. Two reasons can be
provided for this choice. First of all, these judicial bodies operate in a complex legal
system. National judges need to pay respect to the national context, but European
judges need to take account of the European context and also of the national contexts
of the different Member States. In addition European judges need to decide matters
in individual cases, meaning that the protection of individual citizens plays a role
as well. This results in a complex exercise for European judges in which they have
to find a way to pay respect to national differences, while at the same time offering
effective protection for individuals. This multilevel background for both the ECtHR
and CJEU increases the need for sound judicial reasoning. The reasoning needs to
convince even Member States that might not agree with a specific outcome. The
implementation of the judgments of both courts depends to a varying degree on the
cooperation of Member States; therefore it is highly important that Member States
respect their decisions.9 Judicial argumentation can play an important role in this
respect.
7 Smith (2005), p. 78 and McCormick (2005) p. 208.
8 Previously known as the European Court of Justice (ECJ). For the sake of clarity this thesis will
employ the current name and abbreviation (Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)) even
when referring to a period when the Court was still called the European Court of Justice. Furthermore,
the focus in this thesis will be solely on the Court of Justice of the European Union. The General
Court (previously called the Court of First Instance) will not be part of the research.
9 The ECtHR depends entirely on the (political) willingness of the Contracting States to cooperate.
Within the EU context there are some legal mechanisms to force reluctant Member States to comply
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The second reason for selecting these two judicial bodies is that their judicial
reasoning has been criticized. This criticism has been directed both at their reasoning
in general,10 but also at specific parts of the reasoning, for example the use of inter-
pretation methods.11 Given the fact that to a large degree the success of both courts
depends on the cooperation of national authorities,12 it is important to confront this
criticism and analyze whether improvements can be made with regard to the judicial
reasoning.13
with CJEU judgments. Article 260 TFEU is an example of such a mechanism whereby the Commission
may bring a Member State that fails to implement a judgment of the CJEU before the CJEU and
request a penalty to be imposed. The question whether the Commission will bring such a case can,
however, be highly political. The effectiveness of the judgments of the CJEU thus also depends in
large part on the (political) willingness of the Member States to cooperate. The fact that cooperation
is not always self-evident can be seen from the critical German attitude, for example, the Solange
judgments in Germany, where the German Constitutional Court ruled that it will only respect decisions
from the CJEU, as long as it provides equivalent protection to the German Basic Law. See, among
others, Craig & De Burca (2008), p. 357-363 for a discussion of the critical position of the German
Constitutional Court. See also Da Cunha Rodrigues (2010), p. 94.
10 The CJEU is often criticized for its unclear reasoning. See for example: Arnull (2006), p. 623, referring
to the uninformative nature of the CJEU judgments; DeWaele (2009), p. 369-380, discusses critcism
at the CJEU that its reasoning is not clear and includes references to many other authors as well.
See also Von Bogdandy (2000), p. 1330, who criticizes the lack of explanation in the reasoning of
the CJEU on why certain rights are recognized. General criticism of the ECtHR is often expressed
not so much at the reasoning of the ECtHR, but at its judicial approach. Accussations of judicial
activism have experienced a recent revival in several countries. See, for example, the critical speech
by Lord Hoffmann (2009), where he criticizes the ECtHR for judicial activism and expanding its
influence without the required legitimacy. This is part of a more general debate on the role of the
ECtHR in the United Kingdom fed by the disagreement with the need to change its regime on voting
rights of prisoners at the order of Strasbourg. Also these general disagreements warrant a close look
at the reasoning of both Courts.
11 Especially in the context of the ECtHR criticism has been expressed at the use of specific interpretation
methods, mainly comparative interpretation. See Carozza (1998); Senden (2009); Drooghenbroek
(2009); Heringa (1996). See also: Krisch (2008), p. 206-207, who refers to criticism at the use of
evolutive interpretation by the ECtHR.
12 See also Krisch (2008), p. 183-184, who describes the effect of the Görgülü judgment of the German
Constitutional Court in which the German court indicated that it should ignore judgments from
Strasbourg which are incompatible with ‘central elements of the domestic legal order, legislative
intent, or constitutional provisions’.
13 See also Garlicki (2009), p. 391, who points to the fact that it is important for the succes of the




1.1 INTERPRETATION VERSUS APPLICATION
In order to set some boundaries for this project, it has been decided that it will only
deal with a specific part of the judicial reasoning: the interpretation process. This
has already been referred to above, but it warrants some more elaborate explanation.
One of the presuppositions of this thesis is that there are two phases in answering
the question whether a certain right has been violated.14 A distinction can be made
between the interpretation phase and the application phase.15 In the interpretation
phase the meaning of a fundamental right will be defined, which results in a more
abstract judicial exercise. It will be determined, for example, what a notion like private
life entails, for instance whether hunting activities are covered by this notion. By
defining the right in question, the court will in the interpretative phase at the same
time decide whether the facts of the case fall within the scope of the specific funda-
mental right complained of. The facts only play a role in this phase to determine
whether they comewithin the scope of the fundamental right invoked. The application
phase will deal with the question whether the right in question has been violated.
In this second, application phase, the facts of the case play an important role. The
question in the application phase is often whether the limitation of the rights in
question was prescribed by law, whether it served a legitimate goal and whether it
was necessary in a democratic society or a variety of these requirements.16
Both phases serve a different goal in the judicial argumentation and complement
each other.17 By defining the right in question, it becomes possible to argue whether
this right has been violated.18 Without knowing what a certain right means it is
difficult to argue that it has been violated. As a result of the different purpose of the
two phases, different methods play a role in the respective phases. In the interpretation
phase, interpretative aids, like textual, teleological or autonomous interpretation play
a role.19 In the application phase techniques like the margin of appreciation and
balancing of rights and interests play an important role.20 One of the differences
14 See elaborately on this topic: Gerards & Senden (2009).
15 See Gerards & Senden (2009). See also: Vanneste (2010), p. 215-217; Faigman (1992), p. 1530-1534;
Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick (2009), p. 6; Schokkenbroek (2000), p. 1; Bernhardt (1995), p. 1416-
1417; Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 285, all of whom refer to the distinction either by explicitly recog-
nizing the distinction or by mentioning the two stages, which indicates that the respective authors
at least recognize the two stages.
16 See second paragraph of many ECHR provisions. See also Article 52 of the Charter.
17 Vanneste (2010), p. 214-215; Gerards & Senden (2009).
18 Gerards & Senden (2009).
19 Comparative interpretation is the only method that plays a role in both phases as will be seen later
on in Chapter 10. The method is, however, used for different purposes in the two phases.
20 On the margin of appreciation, see Yourow (1996) and Arai-Takahashi (2002). On balancing see,
among others: Sottiaux & Van der Schijff (2008). See also Den Houdijker (forthcoming).
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between the two phases is that the interpretation phase is, in general, to a larger extent
aimed at unifying the meaning of the respective fundamental rights;21 the meaning
of the various fundamental rights should not differ by country. The application of
the fundamental rights can differ by country, because of different policy choices for
example.22 The margin of appreciation can thus play a role in the application phase
and grant room for specific national considerations, but this technique should not play
a role in the interpretation phase. As a result of these different roles, these two phases
have been distinguished. It must be admitted that this distinction is not always easy
to make, but in this thesis the aim has been to try to make this distinction as strict
as possible.
1.2 INTERPRETATIVE AIDS
The aim of this thesis is to analyze several interpretative aids used by the CJEU and
the ECtHR when interpreting fundamental rights. Textual interpretation, teleological
interpretation, evolutive interpretation, but also systemic interpretation, play a role
in the interpretation process of both courts. A selection has, however, been made to
analyze those interpretative aids that are most relevant in the multilevel context that
has been described above. Thus those interpretative aids that help the CJEU and the
ECtHR in dealing with the complex exercise of paying respect to national differences
and at the same time offer effective protection for individuals. Comparative interpreta-
tion, evolutive interpretation, autonomous interpretation and teleological interpretation
have been selected for further analysis. This choice will be explained in Chapter 4,
but the main reason behind this selection is their specific relevance for judges deciding
in a multilevel legal system. Methods like textual interpretation are much less helpful
in finding a solution for the complex balance that the CJEU and the ECtHR are
confronted with when interpreting fundamental rights provisions. This does not mean
that other interpretative aids do not play a role in the judicial reasoning. On the
contrary, they do play a role as will be seen in Chapter 4, but their role in this thesis
will be limited.
A specific way of reasoning that will not be addressed in the framework of this
thesis is the use of precedent, because one can doubt whether it should be classified
as a method of interpretation. Rather it could be seen as a specific technique for
reasoning that not necessarily plays a role only in the interpretation process. This
21 Vanneste (2010), p. 215.
22 See also Lord Hoffman (2009), p. 12, who indicates that even if one agrees to adopt uniform abstract
fundamental rights, this does not mean that one agrees to uniform application of those rights.
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form of reasoning, however, does play a role in the judgments of both courts.23 Even
though neither of the two courts is formally bound to obey precedent, precedent does
play an important role.24 On the face of it, the European Convention and its cor-
responding Protocols seem to provide no reason to conclude that the ECtHR applies
a system of precedent in its decisions. The European Convention specifically mentions
that judgments have inter partes effect,25 which appears to indicate that the system
of precedents will play no role at all in the context of the European Convention. The
reality turns out to be rather different.26 The ECtHR has through the years adopted
a system of persuasive precedent. In the case ofMamatkulov and Askarov the ECtHR
held that: ‘While the Court is not formally bound to follow its previous judgments,
in the interests of legal certainty and foreseeability it should not depart, without good
reason, from its own precedents.’27 The reference to ‘good reason’ already indicates
that the system is less rigid than the system of stare decisis in the UK and USA,
because it openly allows for overruling. As noted already, the ECtHR does feel free
to depart from its earlier decisions if there are ‘cogent’,28 ‘good’29 or ‘weighty’30
reasons to be found for deciding differently. No clarification has been given as to
what constitutes cogent, weighty or good reasons. WILDHABER has concluded that
there are many differing opinions as to the use of precedent,31 which might explain
the lack of clarity as to what constitutes a weighty reason.
A similar starting point can be detected in the case of the CJEU, where no formal
obligation for a system of precedent can be deduced from the EU Treaty. Article 267
TFEU could be read to imply a doctrine of persuasive precedent, by allowing the
national court to decide whether a preliminary question is ‘necessary’. This has in
the course of time indeed been interpreted by the CJEU to mean that if a similar
23 For the role of precedent at the CJEU, see: Brown & Kennedy (2000), p. 369-375; Reich (2005),
p. 34-35. For the role of analogy in the reasoning of the CJEU, see: Schermers &Waelbroeck (2001),
p. 18, who argue that reasoning by analogy is a specific form of systemic interpretation; Langenbucher
(1998). For the role of precedent in the ECtHR, see: Harris & O’Boyle &Warbrick (2009), p. 17-18;
Leach (2005), p. 165; Balcerzak (2004-2005), p. 137-143; Mowbray (2009); Wildhaber (2000).
24 For the CJEU, see: Brown & Kennedy (2000), p. 369-375; Reich (2005), p. 34-35. For the ECtHR,
see: Harris & O’Boyle & Warbrick (2009), p. 17-18; Leach (2005), p. 165; Balcerzak (2004-2005),
p. 137-143; Mowbray (2009); Wildhaber (2000).
25 Article 46 European Convention.
26 Gerards (2006), p. 103.
27 ECtHR (GC), Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I,
§ 121.
28 ECtHR, Cossey v. United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A No. 184, § 35.
29 ECtHR (GC), Beard v United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 2001, unpublished, § 81.
30 ECtHR, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A




question has been addressed by the CJEU, the national courts have the discretion to
decide that it might not be necessary to refer a question to the CJEU.32 This implies
that the CJEU follows its own case law, since otherwise every question would have
to presented to the CJEU. National courts may, however, be presented with new facts
and thus consider it necessary to refer, which could persuade the CJEU to depart from
its previous case law.33 If the CJEU is not convinced by the need for overruling,
it has on occasion simply repeated its previous judgments, thereby showing the
willingness to follow its own precedent.34 On other occasions it has clearly stated
that a new line had to be followed.35 On the basis of the literature it is not possible
to provide any criteria for what could constitute a reason for the CJEU to overrule
its previous reasoning.
The doctrine of precedent plays an important role in the context of both courts.36
The method, however, does not play a specific role in helping the courts to cope with
interpreting in the context of a multilevel legal order. The justification for employing
this method of interpretation finds its basis in legal certainty and not in the fact that
judgments are pronounced in a multilevel legal system. Therefore there is no reason
to discuss this method any further in the thesis.
The strong reliance on this method does show the need for both courts to provide
convincing reasoning in its case law, since every case could be used as a precedent
for a future case. This means that not only the outcome of the case can serve as a
precedent, but also its reasoning. Some examples of cases that illustrate this importance
will be discussed throughout this thesis in the context of the discussion on the selected
interpretative aids, namely comparative, teleological, evolutive and autonomous
interpretation.37
1.3 VALUES IN JUDICIAL ARGUMENTATION
In order to analyze the judicial reasoning of the CJEU and the ECtHR when inter-
preting fundamental rights it is necessary to have some frame of reference for the
analysis. There needs to be some understanding of what a proper judicial reasoning
requires. That in itself is a topic on which a whole thesis can be written. The question
as to what values are important for a judicial reasoning has, therefore, been approached
from a more practical perspective. The criticism expressed at the reasoning of the
32 C-283/81,CILFIT v. Ministero della Sanità [1982] ECR 3415.
33 C-28/62, Da Costa en Schaake NV and others v. Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 61.
34 C-28/62, Da Costa en Schaake NV and others v. Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 61
35 C-267/91, Criminal proceedings against Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097.
36 Supra note 23.
37 See for example the case of ECtHR, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series
A No. 26 discussed in Chapters 7 and 11.
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CJEU or the ECtHR mainly focuses on two elements. These elements are not neces-
sarily limited to the interpretative stage of judicial reasoning, but they will be dis-
cussed from that perspective in the context of this thesis.
One of the criticisms expressed is that it is not clear how the judges have reached
their conclusion.38 Either the judgment is so short that hardly any arguments are
provided, or it is not clear how the arguments support the conclusion reached in a
specific decision or the arguments are incomprehensible.39 The aim of a judicial
decision is not only to provide a solution in an individual case but, especially in the
context of the CJEU and the ECtHR, a judicial decision is meant to contribute to
the understanding of the EU or ECHR fundamental rights standards. The CJEU and
the ECtHR set the standards for the European Union (EU) or the Council of Europe
and their judgments play a vital role in that regard. The previous section already
indicated that judgments of both courts have a de facto erga omnes effect and thus
have a potential impact broader than relating only to the parties in a certain case.40
Given the importance of cooperation by national authorities and the fact that it is
not self-evident that they will cooperate, it is crucial that the judgments convince
national authorities.41 One way to convince national authorities is to make sure that
they understand the reasoning and the conclusions drawn in a specific case. This does
not mean that they necessarily have to agree with the outcome. The purpose should
be to make the reasoning insightful so that outsiders can understand and respect the
outcome even if they do not agree. For example, if the ECtHR does not explain or
poorly explains why it has come to the conclusion that an evolutive interpretation
should be adopted in a specific case, it is difficult to convince reluctant national
authorities of this conclusion. It is thus important that a reasoning is insightful and
shows why a certain conclusion has been reached.42
A related concern is that if it is not clear how a certain conclusion has been
reached it is also not clear whether the conclusion is an objective conclusion or
whether the person of the judge played an important role. It seems almost trite to
say, but the CJEU and the ECtHR should not produce judgments on the basis of their
own personal convictions, but on the basis of objective factors. Unlike legislators,
38 Supra notes 10 and 11. Criticism has been expressed at both courts.
39 Supra notes 10 and 11.
40 See for example White (2009), p. 172, who argues in the context of the ECtHR that the audience
has become wider than only the parties of a specific judgment.
41 See Gerards (2009), p. 409-410; Garlicki (2009), p. 394. Especially the ECtHRwith its ever expanding
scope of fundamental rights is facing challenges from the national level. The main criticism is that
the ECtHR should stick to the protection of core fundamental rights and not deal with cases that
have little to do with the core of fundamental rights. Even though the origin of this criticism most
probably does not lie in poor reasoning, sound reasoning might help in diminishing this criticism.
42 Smith (2005), p. 140-141; Pontier (1998), § 2.5; Feteris (1994).
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judges have not been democratically elected on the basis of their opinions. It is their
job to interpret the law and in principle not to change the law. Times have, however,
changed and the judge, especially in fundamental rights cases, is no longer simply
la bouche de la loi.43 There is therefore a fine line between interpreting and applying
the law and changing the law. Fundamental rights are broadly formulated and thus
leave a lot of room for judges to determine the exact meaning. This characteristic
increases the potential for criticism of legislating from the bench. This is in itself
already a controversial issue, on which opinions differ on where to draw the line.
It is, however, open for even more criticism if it is not clear which or whether any
objective factors have played a role in the decision-making. Interpretative aids help
to provide objective factors to argue for a certain conclusion. These interpretative
aids should be applied correctly and carefully, because otherwise it is still not clear
whether the conclusion has been based on objective factors. Criticism has, for example,
been directed at comparative interpretation, which will be dealt with in Chapter 6,
holding that it is always possible to find comparative materials that support your own
position in a case.44 As a result the method becomes open for manipulation, which
damages the credibility of the judgment. It should thus be made clear how and why
a certain interpretative aid has been used, as this makes the decision verifiable for
outsiders. This is not only the case when dealing with comparative interpretation,
but it applies to other interpretative aids as well. Objectivity instead of subjectivity
is thus an important factor, especially in a field where there is already such a fine
line to walk between judicial decision-making and judicial legislating.45 Because
of the fact that both the CJEU and the ECtHR operate in a context in which national
differences can play a controversial role, it is necessary to reduce the impact of the
person of the judge. This is even more so because both courts are made up of judges
from different national settings.46
43 Montesquieu.
44 See further section 6.1.6.1.
45 Sudre (2008), p. 172, argues that providing a justification for a decision helps to reduce partiality
and arbitrariness. Therefore it is important to study this justification process closely in this thesis.
46 Mainly in the context of the ECtHR criticism has been expressed at the fact that judges from perhaps
less democratic countries determine cases on fundamental rights in, for example, the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom. See for example the criticism expressed in the report of a British think
tank entitled ‘Bringing Rights Back Home’ (2011), 43-45, which also addresses other problems
concerning the judges in Strasbourg. This criticism is often voiced in popular discussions on the
ECtHR, as is visible in a recent discussion started by Baudet (2010) in a Dutch newspaper, where
he also criticized the fact that foreign (Eastern European) judges determine the standards applicable
in the Netherlands. The reason that this criticism is mainly directed at the ECtHR and not at the CJEU,
can perhaps be explained by the fact that the CJEU decides as a collegiate body, as will be discussed
in Chapter 3. Regardless of one’s opinion of this criticism, it is important to take note, because it
does present a challenge for the ECtHR that should not be ignored.
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In conclusion two factors play an important role, namely that judgments provide
an insightful reasoning and that the reasoning is as objective as possible.47 This latter
means that the person of the judge should play as little a role as possible.
1.4 METHODOLOGY
Most chapters, especially the chapters on the case law analysis, provide a description
of the methodological aspect of that specific part of the research. Some general
comments can, however, be made at this stage, which explain the methodology behind
this whole research project. The research project has been conducted in three stages.48
Firstly, a legal theoretical analysis will be made of the selected interpretative methods
and principles. Each of the selected interpretative aids will be discussed on the basis
of theoretical literature. The requirements for a proper use of each method and the
pitfalls of each method will be analyzed. This theoretical analysis will result in
questions to be answered in the case law analysis, but also assumptions that will be
tested in the case law analysis. The second stage is the case law analysis in which
the use of the specific interpretative aid in practice will be discussed. The questions
and assumptions developed in the theoretical analysis will form a guide for the case
law analysis, but matters that attract attention outside these questions and assumptions
will also be discussed. The final stage is the synthesis in which the results from the
theoretical and case law analysis will be brought together. The case law analysis might
fill gaps left open in the theoretical analysis, but the theoretical analysis might also
help to provide solutions for problems encountered in the case law. In this final stage
a comparison will also be made between the CJEU and the ECtHR. These courts might
be able to learn from each other in enhancing their judicial reasoning. Finally, this
synthesis will lead to suggestions for directions in which improvement of the use of
the selected interpretative aids should be sought.
1.5 OUTLINE
The methodology as just described has to a large extent determined the outline of
this thesis. The first half of the book will be devoted to a theoretical analysis of
interpretative aids. The second half of the book will address the case law analysis.
Finally, the synthesis will address the results of both the theoretical and case law
analysis.
47 See also Gerards (2002), § 1.3.
48 The methodology is based on an innovative methodological approach adopted in Gerards (2002)
in a thesis concerning the principle of equality.
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Before setting out the theoretical analysis, two chapters will provide an introduction
to both the ECtHR (Chapter 2) and the CJEU (Chapter 3). This introduction will deal
with the adjudicative climate in which these courts have to function. This helps to
put the analyses presented in the remainder of the thesis into context. It may also
be regarded as a discussion of the ‘problematic’ of these courts, a notion introduced
by LASSER.49 This notion refers to the fact that each court in its own way tries to
deal with its institutional and constitutional challenges.50 This ‘problematic’ in-
fluences the judicial reasoning of the court in question and as a result it is a relevant
aspect to discuss in the context of this thesis.
The theoretical analysis will start with a chapter (Chapter 4) on regularly used
interpretative aids. This introduction to different interpretation methods and principles
will start with an explanation of the distinction between methods and principles that
is used throughout this thesis. Subsequently, brief attention will be paid to a variety
of interpretation methods and principles that frequently occur in the case law of both
courts. The selected methods and principles will also be addressed. This chapter
provides the basis for the ensuing discussion on the theoretical aspects of the four
selected interpretative aids in Chapters 5 to 8.
The case law analysis is divided into a discussion of the case law of the ECtHR
(in Chapters 9 to 12) and the CJEU (in Chapter 13). For both courts the selection
of cases will be explained and the case law will be analyzed on the basis of the
questions that have arisen in the theoretical chapter.
Finally a synthesis will try to put the findings into perspective and also try to
compare the approaches by the two courts. Can anything be learned? In which areas
should improvement be sought?
49 Lasser (2004).
50 See also Gerards (2009), p. 407.
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CONTEXT OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION IN THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The European Court of Human Rights is one of the courts closely examined in this
thesis. In order to understand and put the discussion of the different interpretative
aids used by the ECtHR in context, it is necessary to briefly discuss some general
aspects of legal argumentation at the ECtHR.1 After all, for a proper understanding
of the discussion in the remainder of this thesis, it is relevant to have some background
on the character of the European Convention and on the ECtHR, its style of reasoning
and its position vis-à-vis the national Contracting States. These are general aspects
that are not necessarily only relevant in an interpretative context, but can play a role
in any discussion on the reasoning of the ECtHR or in other discussions on the
ECtHR. These aspects will, however, be discussed from the angle taken in this thesis,
namely the interpretation of fundamental rights.
First the character of the European Convention will be introduced, because this
characterization has an important impact on the interpretation process adopted by
the ECtHR. Secondly, the character of the ECtHR and its judgments will be discussed.
The discussion touches upon wider issues, but the question whether the ECtHR can
be seen as more constitutional or more aimed at individual justice can have an impact
on the style of its argumentation. It is therefore relevant to briefly introduce this
discussion as a background to the discussion in this thesis. Thirdly, the style of the
judgments will be addressed. As will be seen in the discussion on the ECtHR and
the CJEU, the style of their judgments impacts on the reasoning used in their judg-
ments as well. Finally, in a supranational context it is necessary to discuss the relation
with the Contracting States and see whether that relation influences the interpretation
process by the ECtHR.
1 For a more elaborate background on the ECtHR, see for example: Van Dijk van Hoof (2006); Harris
& O’Boyle & Warbrick (2009); Ovey & White (2010). See also Gerards (2009), who provides an
elaborate background on judicial reasoning by the ECtHR.
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2.1 CHARACTER OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
In one of the early judgments on the interpretation of the European Convention, the
ECtHR qualified the European Convention as a law-making treaty.2 This qualification
is used to indicate the contrast with treaties that have a more contractual character.3
One of the principal characteristics of a law-making treaty is that it is designed for
a common aim and not designed to create reciprocal obligations.4 The European
Convention is thus designed to achieve the common aim of fundamental rights
protection for individuals.
The distinction between more contractual treaties and law-making treaties has
been discussed in the context of drafting the VCLT, but it was not considered neces-
sary to include this distinction in the text of the VCLT.5 Likewise in international
legal doctrine not all agree on the relevance of this distinction,6 but it cannot be
denied that the ECtHR considers it relevant. The consequence of this qualification
for the interpretation of the European Convention is that the object and purpose of
the treaty play an important role in the interpretation of the European Convention.7
Interpretation of the European Convention should lead to achieving the object and
purpose of the European Convention and not lead to an interpretation that would limit
the obligations for the Contracting Parties to the greatest possible degree.8 The con-
sequences of this qualification will be touched upon in the context of discussing the
different interpretative aids later on in this thesis, but it is important to realize that
it is an important qualification underlying the whole interpretation process of the
European Convention.
2.2 ECTHR A CONSTITUTIONAL COURT?
The question whether Strasbourg should be considered a constitutional court has been
the subject of much debate.9 Former president of the ECtHR WILDHABER argues
that the ECtHR should by now be considered a constitutional court, or at least a quasi-
2 ECtHR, Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A No. 7.
3 See for example, Vanneste (2010), p. 58; Schokkenbroek (2000), p. 3; Matscher (1993), p. 66.
4 Vanneste (2010), p. 61.
5 Commentary to articles of Vienna Convention, Yearbook of International Law Commission, 1966-
Vol. II, p. 219.
6 See Vanneste (2010), p. 58-60.
7 Schokkenbroek (2000), p. 3; Vanneste (2010), p. 66.
8 Schokkenbroek (2000), p. 3; Vanneste (2010), p. 66, both referring to ECtHR,Wemhoff v. Germany,
judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A No. 7.
9 See for example Garlicki (2009), p. 390, who speaks of controversy surrounding this question. See
also Wildhaber (2002) as one of the proponents of this position. See Jackson (2006), p. 777-778
for further references.
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constitutional court.10 GARLICKI takes a more modest stance and claims that there
is a constitutional element in the function and the decision-making of the ECtHR.11
In order to support this assumption he looks at the substance of the European Conven-
tion, which deals with fundamental rights often similar to those laid down in national
constitutional documents. From a procedural perspective it is important that the ECtHR
has been granted the power to adjudicate individual complaints. By means of this
individual complaints mechanism the ECtHR has been able to explain the meaning
of these often generally worded provisions. The meaning of the Convention should
thus be sought in the case law, which has kept the Convention up-to-date and only
to a limited extent in the text of the Convention itself. GARLICKI argues that national
constitutional courts have been through similar developments and in this sense the
ECtHR resembles a constitutional court more closely than traditional international
courts.12 Others have pointed to the remarks made by the ECtHR in its judgments
calling the Convention a ‘constitutional instrument for the European public order’
in order to point to the constitutional character of the ECtHR.13
The debate on the question whether the ECtHR should be seen as a constitutional
court does not primarily focus on the aspects mentioned above, but the real controversy
lies in the question what type of justice should be provided by the ECtHR. Should
constitutional justice be provided or should the primary focus be individual justice?
This debate mainly gained attention in the process of drafting Protocol 14, which
contains some reform measures to cope with the enormous workload of the ECtHR.14
The question is whether the ECtHR should focus on the more important, more con-
stitutional issues or whether the ECtHR should keep on dealing with all individual
complaints. The question has even divided the judges of the ECtHR themselves.15
Some argue that it is not realistic to expect the ECtHR with its current overload of
cases to provide justice in each individual case and claim that the constitutional road
is the only way to save the system from collapsing under its own success.16 It has
not only been suggested that a more constitutional approach is necessary to save the
system, but also to save the quality and consistency of the Court’s reasoning, which
10 Wildhaber (2002), p. 161.
11 Garlicki (2009), p. 390.
12 Garlicki (2009), p. 391.
13 Jackson (2006), p. 761 & 777. See alsoWhite (2009), p. 9, referring to case law, but also to interviews
with ECtHR judges, where most judges could see at least some constitutional elements in the
functioning of the ECtHR.
14 See for example: Greer (2008), p. 684-686 and especially Harmsen (2007), 35-41, for an overview
of the different positions in the debate.
15 See Wildhaber (2002), p. 164, who argues for constitutional justice, but acknowledges that some
of his fellow judges might not agree with this point of view. See Harmsen (2007), p. 38, who refers
to a number of judges opposing the constitutional route.
16 Wildhaber (2002), p. 163; Mahoney (2002-2003).
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suffers from the enormous workload.17 In their view the ECtHR should be given
the possibility to concentrate on ‘major issues of policy, by curtailing, if not elimina-
ting, the need to deal with certain categories of minor or repetitive violations at the
European level’.18 This view has partly succeeded with the introduction of the new
admissibility criterion in Protocol 14, which provides that cases will be declared in-
admissible where ‘the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless
respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto
requires an examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case
may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic
tribunal’. Some degree of selection has thus been introduced by Protocol 14, but it
provides only a limited possibility to select cases.
Proponents of individual justice argue that a curtailment of the fundamental feature
of the system, namely the right of an individual to obtain a judgment of the ECtHR
in their view constitutes an ‘erosion of the protection of human rights’,19 which will
have a strong negative impact in the newer Contracting States. In their view it will
give the impression that certain issues are more important than others and that some
violations can be tolerated.20 Two remarks need to be made in response. Firstly,
it seems wrong to claim that there is at the moment no hierarchy of rights within the
Convention system. Often a distinction is made between violations and serious
violations, the latter even being excluded from the qualification ‘repetitive case’.21
Moreover, the existence of non-derogable rights is already in itself a strong indication
that some rights are considered more important than others. Secondly, with regard
to the claim that a wrong signal will be sent to the newer states, it must be said that
a more constitutional mission for the ECtHR does not end the states’ obligations under
Article 1 of the Convention. Even if the ECtHR will not decide on these violations
the state is still under the obligation to provide redress. If a state fails to do so on
a systematic basis this could lead the ECtHR to consider these cases of value for the
effective protection of human rights and issue for example a pilot judgment,22 thereby
eliminating to a certain extent the fear of sending out the wrong signal. Moreover,
one should not forget that the ECtHR does not operate in a vacuum. The whole
17 Mahoney (2002-2003).
18 Harmsen (2007), p. 36.
19 Joint Response to Proposals to Ensure the Future Effectiveness of the European Court of Human
Rights, signed by 74 NGO’s inMarch 2003. Response can be found at: http://web.amnesty.org/library/
index/engior610082003.
20 CDDH-GDR(2003)024, 12 September 2003.
21 CM(2003)55, Addendum 2 (restricted), 14 April 2003, Proposal A1.
22 See Resolution Res(2004)3 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. See also an
information sheet by the registry of the ECtHR on the pilot judgment procedure available at:
www.echr.coe.int under basic texts’. See also Buyse (2009) for a discussion of the pilot judgment
procedure.
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protection system of the Council of Europe has a role to play in order to achieve the
highest level of protection.
The debate on the way forward for the ECtHR is not as black and white as it might
seem from the discussion above. It is important to note that the debate concerns which
of these two forms of justice should be emphasized and not whether one or the other
should be abandoned.23 The question is thus where to place the balance. That ques-
tion does not need to be answered in this thesis. The purpose of showing the debate
is the battle between the two functions of the ECtHR. In the current situation constitu-
tional justice is most visible in the functioning of the Grand Chamber. The Grand
Chamber will deal with cases selected by a panel of five judges if the case ‘raises
a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or the
Protocols thereto, or a serious issue of general importance’.24 A case may also reach
the Grand Chamber if a chamber relinquishes jurisdiction if the case raises a serious
question the interpretation or application of the Convention, but also when the chamber
fears that its judgment will deviate from earlier cases.25 It is up to the Grand Cham-
ber to determine whether it is necessary to overrule a previous precedent. The function
of the Grand Chamber is to ensure uniformity and to decide the most complex and
controversial cases.26
The five chambers of the ECtHR are much less engaged in constitutional justice.
There are a few mechanisms that help to focus on the most important cases. On the
one hand there is the new admissibility criterion that has been mentioned above that
helps the Court to get rid of cases which have only minor significance both in terms
of damage and in terms of fundamental rights. This provides, however, only a minor
selection mechanism. On the other hand there is also the possibility of adopting a
pilot judgment when a certain issue concerns many applicants. The respondent state
will in such a case be obliged to adopt a national remedy for all applicants.27 The
applicants that have already reached Strasbourg will be obliged to resort to this
national remedy first, unless this remedy turns out not to be sufficient.28 This helps
to prevent many repetitive cases in cases of structural problems. Not every repetitive
issue is, however, suitable for a pilot judgment. Many cases, for example, concerning
the length of their proceedings still reach Strasbourg.29 Chambers are thus still to
23 Harmsen (2007), p. 41, points to the fact that even though the sharp debate might indicate otherwise,
it is mainly a matter of where to place the balance.
24 Article 43 ECHR.
25 Article 30 ECHR.
26 Garlicki (2009), p. 395.
27 Rule 61 of the Rules of Court.
28 Rule 61 of the Rules of Court. For a description of the procedure, see supra note 65.
29 About one third of all violations in Strasbourg concern violations regarding the length of proceedings.
See www.echr.coe.int under reports’.
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a large extent concerned with providing individual redress in cases no matter whether
they are minor or repetitive. Only in a small minority of cases can a chamber judgment
focus on important interpretation or application issues that contribute to the develop-
ment of the Convention.
This difference in focus between the Grand Chamber and the chambers is also
reflected in their judgments. The judgments of the Grand Chamber can be more
abstract and focus more on developing principles underlying the Convention and its
provisions, which is more in line with constitutional justice.30 The chamber judgments
on the other hand, are often less abstract and focus more on the facts of the individual
case as a result of which individual justice plays a more important role in this
regard.31 The following section will deal more in detail with the style of the judg-
ments.
2.3 STYLE OF JUDGMENT
In the more than 50 years since its inception the ECHR has developed its own style
of reasoning and its own style of judgment. While other international courts, like the
CJEU, have had a clear inspirational model, the ECtHR and its judgments have not
been modelled on a particular national legal tradition. In the words of GARLICKI the
ECtHR and the Convention ‘represent a merger of different traditions arising from
different legal systems’.32
The ECtHR operates from a unified structure,33 in contrast to the bifurcated
structure of the CJEU.34 The judicial discourse at the CJEU takes place in both the
CJEU judgments and the opinion of the Advocate General. In the ECtHR there is
only the judgment of the ECtHR and no position of Advocate General has been
created. This unified structure is more common in Europe among national constitu-
tional courts, than the bifurcated structure of the CJEU.35 Each system, however,
has its benefits and drawbacks, and it cannot be said that one system should be
favoured over the other.
30 See for example Harris & O’Boyle & Warbrick, (2009), p. 18, who argue that the judgments of the
Grand Chamber are more authoritive and only the Grand Chamber is allowed to overrule precedent
and thus develop the principles under the Convention.
31 Gerards (2009), p. discusses the strong case-by-case approach of the ECtHR.
32 Garlicki (2009), p. 391.
33 Since 1998 the entry into force of Protocol 11 when the permanent court was installed and the
European Commission on Human Rights was abolished.
34 Terminology from Lasser (2004). Garlicki (2009), p. 391-392, points to an internal dualist structure
within the ECtHR, where the Registry plays an important role in the preparation of the judgments,
but this is rather different from the bifurcation in the CJEU.
35 Garlicki (2009), p. 389-390.
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The ECtHR is generally known for its elaborate judgments.36 In repetitive cases
or cases where only a minor issue plays a role, the judgments can, however, be rather
succinct.37 Even though the ECtHR must address all the admissible complaints there
is a tendency to spend relatively more time and effort on the cases that deal with
important issues or that contribute to development of the case law on the Conven-
tion.38 GARLICKI implies that the elaborative style is born out of the wish to convince
and engage national courts and national authorities, since that is the key to successful
implementation of the Convention.39
An important feature of the ECtHR judgments is that judges are allowed to write
separate opinions, either dissenting of concurring.40 The majority opinion of the
judgment is the result of a collegial decision-making process, in which the minority
is allowed to express a separate opinion.41 As a result the majority opinions suffer
to a lesser extent from the need to reach an agreement with all judges, which might
result in vague and opaque reasoning.42 The style of the ECtHR judgments is, how-
ever, not similar to that of the United Kingdom Supreme Court, where each justice
writes his or her own opinion. The disadvantage of having to reach some sort of
consensus in the majority opinion is, thus, not entirely negated in the Strasbourg
judgments. The main difference between the majority opinion and the dissenting or
separate opinions is its tone. In a dissenting or separate opinion a judge is not con-
strained by trying to find agreement with fellow judges. A dissenting or separate
opinion is therefore often of a much more personal tone than the majority opinions.
By allowing dissenting and separate opinions and by revealing the votes cast in
favour or against a violation the ECtHR aims to be transparent about its decision-
making.43 The majority is forced to express itself clearly and provide reasons for
its decision, because the separate or dissenting opinions can reveal the controversial
issues in an opinion.44 The possibility of these separate opinions in itself thus pro-
vides an interesting tool to enhance judicial reasoning,45 because if both opinions
are published the disagreement will become visible to the outside world. In order
to convince this outside world, especially the majority opinion will aim to provide
a solid reasoning for its contested conclusions. WHITE and BOUSSIAKOU, relying on
36 Ost (1992), p. 284; Garlicki (2009), p. 391.
37 Garlicki (2009), p. 395.
38 Garlicki (2009), p. 395.
39 Garlicki (2009), p. 394.
40 Article 45 ECHR.
41 White (2009), p. 176.
42 Thomassen (2006), p. 686; Mertens & Vermeulen (2008), p. 52 & 60.
43 White (2009), p. 178; Garlicki (2009), p. 395. In decisions there is no such transparency. In decisions
it is only indicated whether the decision was reached by majority or unanimity.
44 Thomassen (2006), p. 686; Mertens & Vermeulen (2008), p. 52 & 60.
45 Thomassen (2006), p. 686; Mertens & Vermeulen (2008), p. 52 & 60.
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LASSER’S terminology, refer to this model as the publicly argumentative model.46
In LASSER’s view the legitimacy of this type of argumentative model ‘stands or falls
in large measure on the logic and argumentation of the signed judgment’.47 OST
similarly argues that dissenting opinions do not undermine the authority and credibility
of the judgment, but, if properly reasoned, even reinforce it. In his view if opinions
are well reasoned the authority of the judgment will result from ‘its intrinsic rationality
rather than from an “argument” of authority’.48 This emphasis on proper reasoning
for the legitimacy of the ECtHR makes it even more important to analyze the judicial
reasoning of the ECtHR.
2.4 SUBSIDIARITY
In the process of interpretation an important factor that should not be left out of sight
is the place of the ECtHR in the European legal landscape. The focus hereby is not
so much on the often debated relation between the CJEU and the ECtHR regarding
the protection of fundamental rights, but on the relation between the European supra-
national court and the national authorities.
This relation between the supranational and national authorities has been codified
at different places in the European Convention. Articles 1 and 13 provide the duty
for national authorities to ensure (at domestic level) the protection of fundamental
rights for everyone within their jurisdiction and, in case of an interference, an effective
(domestic) remedy. Moreover Article 35, which together with Article 34 provides
the criteria for admissibility in Strasbourg, emphasizes the duty for the applicant to
first allow the state to find a solution at national level and only as a last resort to
proceed to the ECtHR. These provisions reflect the subsidiary nature of the European
Convention system by emphasizing the primary role of the Contracting States them-
selves. Despite the fact that this principle of subsidiarity has not been expressly
mentioned in any of the provisions, it has been developed in the case law on the basis
of the above mentioned articles.49
What does this principle of subsidiarity entail? This is a difficult question to
answer due to the fact that the principle has not been explicitly laid down in the
European Convention. The principle dates back to the 16th century and was introduced
by the Catholic Church. Generally this principle refers to the division of powers
between the larger unit and its components; ‘the larger unit should assume responsibil-
46 White (2009), p. 178.
47 White (2009), p. 178, quoting Lasser (2004), p. 338.
48 Ost (1992), p. 284.
49 According to Petzold the principle was not even referred to in the discussions leading up to the drafting
and adoption of the Convention. Petzold (1993), p. 42. Vande Lanotte (2005), p. 180.
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ity for functions only insofar as the smaller unit is unable to do so’.50 Within the
context of the Convention it means that on the one hand this principle determines
the ‘procedural relationship’ between the national authorities and the ECtHR and on
the other hand it provides a limit on the ECtHR in exercising its supervisory function.
These two functions are clearly visible in the case law of the court and reflect im-
portant underlying features of the Convention system. First of all, the Convention
is not intended to be exhaustive; it provides a minimum level of protection.51 Second-
ly, the ECtHR considers the national authorities to be in a better position ‘to strike
the balance between the interests of the community and the protection of individual
interests’.52 In these types of cases the ECtHR will only marginally review the acts
of the national authorities as it cannot replace these domestic authorities. Finally,
according to some authors the purpose of the European Convention is not to achieve
uniformity.53 The European Convention provides a minimum level of protection
and States are at liberty to provide a higher level of protection.54 Contracting States
also have discretion with regard to the way they achieve the minimum level of
protection.
Are these assumptions also valid for the interpretation process? The differentiation
between the Contracting States and the room left for policy or other choices mainly
plays a role in the application phase. The interpretation phase often leads to more
uniformity as explained in the introductory chapter.55 This does not leave the short
discussion above irrelevant. Even though the principle of subsidiarity might not play
an explicit role in the interpretation process, these features of the Convention system
do have an impact on the relationship between the national authorities and the ECtHR
and that relation does play a role in the interpretation process. It explains why the
ECtHR cannot boldly opt for an extensive interpretation of a certain right: the
multilevel setting needs to be taken into account and the fact that the ECHR plays
a subsidiary role is relevant in that context.
2.5 CONCLUSION
The aim of this short chapter has been to provide a background to the discussion in
this thesis, which will focus on the interpretation process. The discussion of the ECtHR
has by no means been limitative – many more aspects can be discussed – but these
are the most important aspects to keep in mind when reading the remainder of this
50 Petzold (1993), p. 41. Vande Lanotte (2005), p. 180.
51 Article 53 ECHR under which Contracting States may provide a higher level of protection.
52 Petzold (1993), p. 60. Vande Lanotte (2005), p. 180.
53 Petzold (1993), p. 60. Vande Lanotte (2005), p. 180.
54 Article 53 ECHR.
55 See also Vanneste (2010), p. 215.
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thesis. The characterization as a law-making treaty is important for the interpretation
by the ECtHR, because it has led to the focus on the object and purpose as will be
discussed in the following chapters as well. The constant struggle of the ECtHR
between general standard setting and providing individual relief is, furthermore,
important, because this is reflected in the style of the judgments. In addition, it might
explain the more individual and less abstract approach in many of the judgments.
Furthermore, the specific style of the judgments, in which dissenting and separate
opinions are allowed, also impact on the judicial reasoning. Finally, subsidiarity is
more indirectly relevant to the discussion on the interpretation of fundamental rights.
It reminds the ECtHR that it operates in a multilevel setting and that it needs the
cooperation of the Contracting states.
The following chapters will first provide a theoretical analysis of different inter-
pretative aids. These aids will be analyzed from a general perspective, but also in
the context of the ECtHR and CJEU. The case law analysis will focus in more detail
on the practice of the ECtHR and the CJEU in using the selected interpretative aids.
Before the theoretical and case law analysis, however, an introduction to the CJEU
will be provided in the following chapter.
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CONTEXT OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION IN
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CASES FOR THE
COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The other court that will be closely studied in this thesis is the Court of Justice of
the European Union. The focus will be on the reasoning of the CJEU in fundamental
rights cases. In order to fully appreciate the analysis of the CJEU case law that will
be provided in the course of this thesis, it is necessary to sketch the context of the
legal argumentation of the CJEU. Much has already been written on the CJEU and
the development of its fundamental rights case law. This chapter does not aim to
summarize all the existing materials.1 Rather, the purpose of the discussion in this
chapter is to highlight those elements that may help put the analysis given in this
thesis in the relevant context.
Two aspects are particularly relevant when analyzing the reasoning of the CJEU
in fundamental rights cases. Firstly, the role of the CJEU in introducing fundamental
rights into the then European Community needs to be addressed. In this discussion
attention should also be paid to the more recent developments with regard to funda-
mental rights in the European Union. Secondly, the argumentative style of the CJEU
more in general needs to be explored. This may help one to understand the reasoning
of the CJEU in fundamental rights cases. In Chapter 4 a general discussion of the
interpretative aids that play a role before the CJEU will provide even more context
for the reasoning with regard to the specific interpretative aids that will be studied
in this thesis. That chapter will address the different interpretation methods and
principles that play a role before the CJEU. By discussing the different interpretative
aids that play a role it will be possible to explain more in depth which methods and
principles have been chosen for further analysis in this thesis.
1 See, among others, on the role of the CJEU in introducing fundamental rights: Craig & De Burca,
2007, chapter 11; DeWitte (1999), p. 859-897; Blanke (2006), p. 265-277;Mancini (2000), p., 81-95;
Coppel &O’Neill (1992), p. 669-692;Weiler & Lockhart (1995), p. 51-94 & 579-627; Tizzano (2008),
p. 125-138; Jacobs (2001), p. 331-341. See furthermore for a discussion of the CJEU among others:
Brown & Kennedy (2000); Arnull (2006).
25
Chapter 3
3.1 THE CJEU AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
The story on how fundamental rights found their way into European Union law has
been told many times already.2 It is, however, worth recalling summarily the different
stages of the development of fundamental rights in the EU context, focusing on those
elements that are of specific interest for the ensuing discussion on the interpretation
of fundamental rights by the CJEU. The discussion will also focus on the recent
developments in the area of fundamental rights as a result of the entry into force of
the Treaty of Lisbon.
The founding treaties of the European Communities did not include a reference to
the protection of fundamental rights in general as it was thought that the European
Communities were mainly an economic entity with no implications for fundamental
rights.3 The treaties, however, did include a few provisions referring to the right to
non-discrimination on the basis of nationality and the right to equal pay for men and
women.4 The division of competences was clear in the sense that the aim of the
European Convention on Human Rights was to protect against fundamental rights
violations and the aim of the European Communities was to promote economic
integration.5 The fact that these themes could partly overlap at some point in the
future, was not anticipated at that time. Already quite soon, however, changes in this
attitude became visible. Not long after the CJEU had confirmed the supremacy of
the then EC legal order,6 the CJEU started to change its attitude towards recognizing
fundamental rights as part of the EC legal order.7 In the well-known case of Stauder,
the CJEU for the first time acknowledged that fundamental rights formed part of the
2 See authors mentioned in supra note 1 and in addition see, among others: Alston (1999); Kühling
(2006), p. 501-547; McCrudden (2002), p. 1-26.
3 Jacobs (2001), p. 332; Siskova (2008), p. 7. Craig & De Burca suggest that this was a reaction to
the failure of establishing a far-reaching European Political Community, Craig & De Burca (2008),
p. 380. Mancini (2000), p. 82-83, refers to an explanation given by Weiler, according to which the
Member States did not want to include a bill of rights in the original treaties as that would have
constituted an invitation to extend the powers of the central authorities to the very limits of those
rights’. Mancini argues that the Member States did not want to become a victim of this power
extending tendency.
4 Tizzano (2008), p. 126 points to these specific rights that were included in the treaties from the outset.
The relevance of these rights in an economic union is perhaps at first sight more apparent, rather
than the relevance of many other fundamental rights.
5 Jacobs (2001), p. 332; Siskova (2008), p. 7.
6 C-26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland
Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 1; C-6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L [1964] ECR 585.
7 Kühling (2006), p. 504-505; Rainer (2008), p. 28.
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general principles of Community law.8 This position was later firmly grounded in
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft and it has been often repeated in subsequent cases.9
What is interesting in the context of this thesis is that the multilevel nature of the
EC legal order played an important role at this stage of the recognition of fundamental
rights by the CJEU. The decisions in which the CJEU announced the supremacy of
Community law, in combination with the low level of attention to fundamental rights
protection at the then European Community level, triggered critical reactions by
national constitutional courts.10 National constitutional courts expressed concerns
about the insufficient protection of fundamental rights, while this protection was
sufficiently afforded at the national level. As a result, acceptance of the supremacy
of EC law would, in the eyes of these national constitutional courts, entail acceptance
of a lower level of protection for individuals under this EC regime. Consequently,
these constitutional courts in their judgments were reluctant to accept the supremacy
of the EC as long as the protection at the EC level did not meet their approval.11
In order to safeguard the supremacy of Community law the CJEU thus had to enhance
the protection of fundamental rights in order to gain support at the national level.12
Through the judgments of the CJEU the fundamental rights doctrine of the CJEU
started to take shape and the interpretation of fundamental rights by the CJEU became
more influential. While, at first, national and scholarly concerns focused on the
insufficient protection of fundamental rights, as a result of the development of funda-
mental rights protection by the CJEU, these concerns in more recent times have
sometimes even shifted in the opposite direction. According to CAROZZA, these worries
consist of fear that the EU fundamental rights law ‘could become broad enough to
8 C-29/69, Erich Stauder v City of Ulm – Sozialamt [169] ECR 419, p. 425.
9 C-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und
Futtermittel [1970] ECR 01125.
10 The challenges were mainly made in Germany and Italy. See for example: Mancini (2000), p. 84-86;
Carozza (2004), p. 37; Coppel & O’Neill (1992), p. 670; Lenaerts & De Smijter (2001), p. 276;
Kühling (2006), p. 504-505; Siskova (2008), p. 7; Craig & De Burca (2008), p. 381; Blanke (2006),
p. 266-267; De Witte (1999), p. 863. De Witte refers to a second explanation why the CJEU had
to address questions concerning fundamental rights, namely the Community’s growing capacity
to affect fundamental rights to an extent unforeseen at the time the European Communities were
created’. De Witte (1999), p. 866.
11 The most famous judgments in this respect were handed down by the constitutional courts of Germany
and Italy in the early 70s after the initial judgments by the CJEU recognizing the protection of
fundamental rights. Mancini (2000), p. 85. He also refers to the fact that the German constitutional
court already in the late 60s before the first fundamental rights judgments by the CJEU expressed
concerns about the protection of fundamental rights within the EC.
12 Weiler (1999), p. 107-108.
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constrain the otherwise constitutionally permissible choices of the Member States
and therefore unduly interfere with their autonomy and sovereignty’.13
Thus, the CJEU constantly has to operate between these two concerns, a pheno-
menon which has been qualified as a manifestation of the more generally ‘ambivalent
constitutionalism’, which lies at the core of the European Union.14 The exercise in
finding a balance between the two concerns by the CJEU necessitates the need for
sound argumentation, among others, when interpreting fundamental rights.15 Given
the important role that argumentation plays in convincing all actors concerned that
the CJEU has found a proper balance between harmonization and diversity, a close
examination of the use of a number of interpretation methods is warranted in this
context.
Apart from the fact that the development of the fundamental rights doctrine has
created the tension mentioned above, the fundamental rights development in the EU
is important from another perspective as well. After all, the development can also
lead to changes in case law, legislation and legal practice at the national level. Member
States can even be forced to provide protection in areas where their national constitu-
tions do not offer protection. The influence within the area of fundamental rights thus
works both ways. The Member States, mostly the national constitutional courts, keep
the CJEU alert to provide a sufficient level of protection. In turn, the CJEU can bring
about change in the fundamental rights protection at the national level. This dialogue
between the CJEU and national courts within the field of fundamental rights thus
is a good example of the mutual influences between legal orders at different levels
and it provides an interesting background for the analysis in this thesis.
The fact that the influence of fundamental rights works both ways can perhaps
partly be explained by the fact that, throughout the years, the CJEU has expanded
the reach of its fundamental rights doctrine to cover also actions by Member States.
In the early years fundamental rights mainly played a role in proceedings challenging
EC legislation or administrative measures by the EC. This could involve challenges
to directives or regulations, but also challenges to the actions of the Commission in,
for example, staff cases.16 Challenges to administrative acts of the EC often con-
13 Carozza (2004), p. 38.
14 Carozza (2004), p. 38, referring to contributions of De Burca and Eeckhout, which discuss the
ambivalent character of constitutionalism at the EU level. He argues that the debate is not about human
rights per se, but about finding the proper balance between human rights protection at the European
level and respecting the autonomy of the Member States.
15 Weiler (1999), p. 102, in this context discusses the fact that fundamental rights protection in a
multilevel system can be a unifying force, but also a source of tension. The meaning of fundamnetal
rights often differs by country and given that fundamental rights concern fundamental (moral) values,
the definition of fundamental rights by the CJEU can be a source of tension. Moreover, it may feed
suspicion of extending the jurisdiction of the CJEU.
16 See for a more detailed account: Craig & De Burca (2008), p. 389 et seq.
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cerned acts of the Commission in competition proceedings.17 In subsequent years
the CJEU extended the scope of fundamental rights to cover not only actions by the
European institutions.18 The CJEU held that Member States are also bound by EU
fundamental rights when they are acting ‘within the scope of application of EC
law’.19 This means, among others, that Member States are required to respect EU
fundamental rights when applying and implementing EU law.20 Also when Member
States derogate from EU law they are bound to respect fundamental rights. Does the
fact that fundamental rights apply to both EU actions and actions of the Member States
matter for the interpretative process? Is the interpretation to be given a different one
when it concerns the interpretation of a fundamental right that is applied by a Member
State or by one of the EU institutions? Although the specific actor may be relevant
in the adjudicative background as a whole, since it does determine the context in
which a decision is made, for the interpretation of a specific fundamental right it will
probably not matter. Even when it concerns the actions by Member States the CJEU
is interpreting EU fundamental rights, and the meaning of these fundamental rights
is the same for the whole EU. The application of these rights, as distinguished from
their interpretation (see Chapter 1 above), on the other hand, might depend on the
specific context in which the rights are applied.21
For another reason, the specific character of the fundamental rights development
in the EU legal system is relevant as well. Given the fact that no references were
made to fundamental rights in the original treaties, the CJEU had to find a different
basis to introduce fundamental rights within the existing situation. General principles
of Community law provided an opening for the CJEU to read fundamental rights into
the then Community system. National constitutional traditions, the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and other international instruments formed sources of inspiration
for establishing these unwritten principles.22 What these sources mean and how the
CJEU invoked these sources, will be explained in detail in the chapter on the analysis
of the case law of the CJEU.
17 See Craig & De Burca (2008), p. 391-394.
18 Coppel & O’Neill distinguish in this context between the defensive use of fundamental rights, which
the CJEU did in its early years when this doctrine only applied to Community acts and offensive
use of fundamental rights, which encompasses extending the scope of fundamental rights to acts of
Member States as well. See Coppel & O’Neill (1992), p. 673.
19 Craig & De Burca (2008), p. 395.
20 See Craig & De Burca (2008), p. 395 et seq for an overview.
21 See Gerards (2011), on the intensity of review by the CJEU.
22 Blanke (2006), p. 267; Craig & De Burca (2008), p. 383; Siskova (2008), p. 8.
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The CJEU had played a pioneering role23 in the area of fundamental rights for two
decades when, in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, the Member States decided to codify
the practice of the CJEU.24 The Treaty of Maastricht, by which also the EU was
established, provided in Article F that the EU shall respect fundamental rights ‘as
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of
Community law’.25 The subsequent Treaty of Amsterdam (1998), which changed
the numbering to Article 6 instead of Article F, added that the EU ‘is founded on
the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States’.26
With the ratification of Article F EU, later Article 6 EU, fundamental rights have
been explicitly recognized by the Member States as forming part of the EU legal order.
Problematic is that the formula of Article 6 EU, which is based on the case law, is
rather open ended. JACOBS has argued that the provision, despite certain positive
aspects, lacks legal certainty since, for example, it does not clarify which rights or
which traditions shall be respected.27 In this context, BESSELINK has pointed to
problems concerning the limitations of the various principles mentioned, when no
limitations clauses have been provided for.28 The open ended nature of this provision
is important in the context of interpretation, since it leaves much room for the CJEU
to define and interpret fundamental rights. As a result, it is even more important for
the CJEU to provide sound reasoning to support its interpretation in fundamental rights
cases in order to guard itself against losing authority due to non-transparent judicial
interpretation. The question whether the CJEU does meet the expectations in this
23 Jacobs (2001), p. 340, cites a report in which reference is made to the pioneering work of the CJEU.
See for a critical discussion of the role of the CJEU in these first decades, the discussion between
Coppel & O’Neill on the one side andWeiler & Lockhart on the other side: Coppel & O’Neill (1992),
p. 669; Weiler & Lockhart (1995), p. 51 & 579.
24 Earlier reference to fundamental rights was made in the preamble to the Single European Act, which
provides: Determined to work together to promote democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights
recognized in the constitutions and laws of the Member States, in the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Social Charter, notably freedom,
equality and social justice.’ In 1977 the European Parliament, Council and Commission formulated
a joint declaration in which they recognized the importance of fundamental rights and the sources
of fundamental rights as recognized by the CJEU (OJ 1977/C 103/1). See also: Dörte Hempfing (2004),
p. 14; Lenaerts & De Smijter (2001), p. 275
25 Article F (2), Treaty of Maastricht, 1992.
26 Article 6(1) Treaty of Amsterdam.
27 Jacobs (2001), p. 339.
28 Besselink (1998), p. 635.
30
Context of legal argumentation in fundamental rights cases for the CJEU
respect and provides a sufficient explanation for its interpretative choices will be
discussed in the case law analysis in Chapter 13.
A significant step forward in granting more visibility to fundamental rights in
the EU has been the drafting of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.29 The Charter
also aimed to increase the legitimacy of the EU by introducing its own bill of
rights.30 Initially the Charter was not binding and the significance was limited to
the political level. As a result of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter
has been given the same status as the treaties. By now, thus, the Charter has been
granted a legally binding status. This means that the Charter from now on really is
one of the starting points for the CJEU when dealing with fundamental rights cases.
In the context of interpretation the existence of the text might play an important role.
Before the existence of the Charter, the CJEU often made references to its own case
law precedents. Whenever the CJEU considered it necessary to deviate from estab-
lished precedent, it either had to provide a proper reasoning to justify a different
outcome or distinguish the case on the basis of the factual situation. Of course this
put a certain burden on the CJEU to argue carefully, but generally it did not prove
to be too difficult to argue that the factual situations in two separate cases were
different. In this regard, it is important that it has been argued by some scholars that
courts are subject to a ‘higher argumentative burden’ when they have to base their
reasoning on binding legal texts instead of solely on legal precedents.31 This assertion
is based on the assumption that all the words in the relevant legal text have ‘the force
of law and will not be presumed as a coincidental creature of law’.32 Of course,
broadly formulated fundamental rights provisions still leave much room for courts
and thereby somewhat diminish the argumentative burden, but even such broad
provisions have a limit to their scope. In that sense the fact that the Charter has
become binding will clearly play a role in the CJEU’s interpretative process.
A relevant question that can be posed in this respect is to what extent the text
of the Charter can potentially increase the argumentative burden for the CJEU. To
be able to answer this question it is necessary to take a closer look at the wording
of the provisions entered into the Charter. The text of the Charter as approved in
200033 consists of a wide range of fundamental rights.34 Most of these rights do
not contain any innovation as to the existing situation before the adoption of the
29 Lenaerts & De Smijter (2001), p. 273; Weiler (2000), p. 95.
30 See Conclusions of the European Council in Cologne 3 and 4 June 1999, Annex IV (150/99 REV 1).
31 See Lutzhoeft (2009), p. 11.
32 Lutzhoeft (2009), p. 11. He claims that even if this assertion is false, words still call for a definition
which tends to be abstract and general, thereby going beyond mere case-to case reasoning’.
33 The text was reaffirmed in 2007 with some slight modifications in some procedural provisions (OJ
2007/C 303/01). This modified version became binding in 2009 (OJ 2010/C 83/02).
34 See De Burca (2001) on the drafting process of the Charter.
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Charter,35 but represent a codification of the existing situation. The preamble also
hints in this direction by speaking of ‘reaffirming’ rights.36 For many rights it is
indeed true that they either resemble rights contained in the European Convention
on Human Rights or rights recognized in the constitutional traditions of the Member
States or rights already recognized in the case law of the CJEU. What is important
to note is that the wording of the Charter rights is not the same as the wording of,
for example, the European Convention.37 According to LENAERTS & DE SMIJTER
the drafting of the Convention has taken ‘over the basic idea behind fundamental
rights states in well-known texts, but without actually copying the latter’.38 The new
and often updated description of these rights has become even more open-ended than
fundamental rights provisions generally are.39 Within the interpretative context the
broad framing of these rights might put only a limited argumentative burden, as
discussed above, on the CJEU to explain its reasoning in the light of the text of the
Charter.
Even though the broad framing of the Charter might not make it very difficult
for the CJEU to argue one way or the other, this of course does not mean that there
are no other factors forcing the CJEU to explain itself properly. The introductory
chapter already indicated that the multilevel background increases the need for sound
judicial reasoning. Even though the CJEU in its early judgments pronounced the
autonomy of the EU legal order and its supremacy, this does not mean that its judg-
ments are always automatically implemented by national authorities.40 With each
judgment the CJEU thus needs to convince national authorities and gain respect for
its judgment. In that respect it is necessary that the CJEU explains clearly how it has
reached a specific conclusion. The point here is, however, to show the potentially
limited influence of the Charter on the interpretation process in terms of the textual
interpretation and the resulting need to use other interpretative aids, such as will be
discussed in Chapter 4 below.
35 Reich (2005), p. 217, refers to the fact that in the field of solidarity rights the Charter does contain
some innovations.
36 See Reich (2005), p. 217.
37 See Lenaerts & De Smijter (2001), p. 281; White (2008), p. 147-148
38 See Lenaerts & De Smijter (2001), p. 281.
39 Lenaerts & De Smijter (2001), p. 282, refer to this new formulation as unconditional and unlimited.
See also White (2008), p. 147-148. Article 2 of the EU Charter provides a good example of the open
ended character of the Charter rights:
Article 2:
Right to life
1. Everyone has the right to life.
2. No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed.
40 Supra note 9 (Chapter 1).
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3.2 THE CJEU AND THE ECHR
Thus, it is clear that fundamental rights have gradually become more prominent at
the EU stage. This increasing attention for the protection of fundamental rights within
the EU has important consequences for the relation of the EU with the European
Convention on Human Rights. In section 3.1 it was mentioned that at their inception
the existence of both a Council of Europe and the then European Communities were
not considered to result in any significant overlap. This perception has changed
dramatically over the years. Especially now that the Charter has become binding, the
question on the relation between the EU and the European Convention becomes
increasingly more relevant. In 1999 SPIELMANN argued that the EU had entered into
competition with the Council of Europe when it came to fundamental rights.41 As
a result, the relationship between the EU and the ECHR is rather complicated. Already
quite early in the process of developing fundamental rights the CJEU has accorded
a special status to the European Convention.42 In the subsequent codification of the
practice of the CJEU in Article 6 TEU, the special status of the European Convention
as a source of inspiration was retained by the Member States. The European Conven-
tion has also served as a source of inspiration for the EU Charter. This is reflected
in the Council decision43 that provided for the creation of the Charter and in the
preamble to the Charter itself, which provides:
This Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the Community and the
Union and the principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they result, in particular, from the
constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the Treaty
on the European Union, the Community Treaties, the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Community
and by the Council of Europe and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities and of the European Court of Human Rights.44
The Charter moreover provides in Article 52(3) that the rights in the Charter which
correspond with Convention rights shall be given the same meaning as in the Conven-
tion context. LOCK has posed the question whether this provision should be interpreted
to mean that the case law of the ECtHR has become binding on the CJEU.45 If that
41 Spielmann (1999), p. 760.
42 See, for more detail, Chapter 13 on the case law analysis.
43 Conclusions of the European Council in Cologne 3 and 4 June 1999, Annex IV (150/99 REV 1).
44 Preamble of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
45 Lock (2009), p. 383-387. See also: Hempfing (2004). Mancini (2000), p. 90-91, refers to authors
on both sides of the discussion. In his view the majority considers the European Convention to be
an integral part of Community law. The problem is, when comparing these views, that some refer
to the case law of the ECHR and some only to the Convention.
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were the case, a hierarchy between the two courts would have been created, with the
ECtHR at the top of that hierarchy.46 He elaborately argues that the ECtHR case
law is an interpretative aid for the CJEUwhen interpreting the Charter, but if it should
have been considered binding, he argues that it would have been expressly provided
for by the Member States.47 LENAERTS & DE SMIJTER come to a different conclusion
and claim that the case law of the ECtHR has become ‘an integral part of the meaning
and scope of these rights’48 and that, as a result, the CJEU is obliged to follow the
ECtHR case law. They, however, do not address the consequences that this would
have for the relationship between these two courts. Apart from the more political
consequences in terms of status, an obligation to follow the case law of the ECtHR
would have quite an impact on the interpretative process before the CJEU. Others
again consider the CJEU not to be bound by the ECtHR case law, unless the EU
accedes to the European Convention.49 In their view both courts are regarded as
co-existing equals.50 This status of mutually respecting courts has been confirmed
by the ECtHR in its Bosphorus jurisprudence.51 The ECtHR acknowledged that the
level of fundamental rights protection in the EU is equivalent to that under the
Convention.52 As the ECtHR indicates in its judgment, ‘equivalent’ means compar-
able and not identical.53 The CJEU is thus allowed (within the boundaries of ‘equi-
valent’) to give its own interpretation and it is not obliged to strictly follow the
Strasbourg case law, at least according to the ECtHR.
46 Lock (2009), p. 383.
47 Lock (2009), p. 386-387.
48 Lenaerts & De Smijter (2001), p. 99.
49 See for example: Jacobs (2007), p. 208; Douglas-Scott (2006); Hempfing (2004); Reich (2005), p.
220, claiming that Lenaerts & De Smijter exaggerate.
50 Lock (2009), p. 386. See also: Douglas-Scott (2006).
51 See Lock (2009), p. 380. In the case of ECtHR (GC), Bosphorus HavaYollari Turizm Ve Ticaret
Anonim Śirketi v. Ireland, judgment of 30 June 2005, Reports 2005-VI, the ECtHR addressed the
responsibility of Member States for powers transferred to international organizations. The ECtHR
held that if Member States act under obligations from an international organization this might be
justified if that organization provides equivalent protection for human rights (equivalent to the
protection under the Convention). The ECtHR also held that the EU provided this equivalent pro-
tection. If no equivalent protection is provided, the Member States will be held responsible under
the European Convention.
52 ECtHR, 30 June 2005, ECtHR (GC), Bosphorus HavaYollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Śirketi v.
Ireland, judgment of 30 June 2005, Reports 2005-VI, § 165.
53 ECtHR (GC), Bosphorus HavaYollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Śirketi v. Ireland, judgment of 30
June 2005, Reports 2005-VI, § 155.
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Finally, it is interesting to note that the institutional relation between these courts
is a purely informal one at the time of writing of this thesis.54 The relationship, as
has been said above, might be formalized in the near future now that the entry into
force of both Protocol 14 on the side of the European Convention and the Treaty of
Lisbon on the side of the EU have made accession of the EU to the European Conven-
tion possible. Discussions on the institutional aspects of this accession are already
taking place at a political level, amongst others, in the European Parliament.55 The
exact shape of this future accession is not clear at the time of writing, but the chances
that it will happen, after some unsuccessful attempts in the past, have significantly
increased with the acceptance of these two documents.
It is important to keep this complex and changing relationship between these two
Courts in mind as a background to the discussion in this thesis, because it does
determine the multilevel context in which both Courts have to adjudicate. It is,
however, questionable whether the potential accession of the EU to the ECHR will
have a direct impact on the use of the interpretation methods and principles by the
CJEU.
3.3 ARGUMENTATION BY THE CJEU
As a background to the discussion in this thesis on the reasoning of the CJEU in
fundamental rights cases, it is useful to have some understanding of the reasoning
of this court in general. For that reason, this section will address the CJEU’s style
of reasoning, its main argumentative techniques and some elements that determine
the argumentative context. In Chapter 4, closer attention will be paid to the interpreta-
tion methods and principles used by the CJEU. Therefore, this section will merely
serve as an introduction. Its aim is to discuss a number of aspects that determine the
context in which the CJEU has to operate.
National courts, be they constitutional courts, supreme courts or any other type
of court, develop their style of reasoning within a specific legal tradition in a national
setting. Their style will thus be heavily influenced by the context of that specific
country. The CJEU had to develop a style of reasoning as a European court in an
organization composed of Member States, which have different legal traditions and,
as a result, different styles of judicial reasoning.56 This not only influences the legal
54 Douglas-Scott (2006), p. 652. One element of this informal relationship is the visits by a delegation
from one of the courts to another court. See www.echr.coe.int under the heading official visits’.
The last visit took place in January 2011 when a delegation from Strasbourg visited the CJEU.
55 See: Draft report on the institutional aspects of the accession of the European Union to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (2009/2241(INI)).
56 See for example: Due (1999), p. 73-74.
35
Chapter 3
argumentative methods used by the CJEU itself, but it also has the effect of making
the CJEU vulnerable to criticism.57
In its search for a suitable judicial style, it is clear that the CJEU has been strongly
influenced by the continental and more particularly the French way of judicial reason-
ing.58 This French influence can be seen by two related characteristics, namely the
style of the judgments of the CJEU and the existence of an Advocate General.59
Judgments by the CJEU are rather brief and succinctly reasoned.60 This is especially
visible if its cases are compared to judgments of highest courts in other legal traditions,
like that of the United Kingdom.61 Although the CJEU has moved away from extreme-
ly terse (single sentence) judgments over the years, its judgments have remained rather
brief.62 In particular, the judgments often lack an elaborate reasoning by the CJEU
in a particular case. In the context of the interpretation of fundamental rights this has
been noted in particular by VON BOGDANDY, who has criticized the lack of reasoning
on why certain rights are really recognized by the CJEU.63
To some extent, this brevity is compensated by the more elaborate reasoning of
the Advocate General.64 The role of Advocate General, according to Article 252
TFEU, is to act in ‘complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court,
reasoned submissions on cases which, in accordance with the Statute of the Court
of Justice, require his involvement’.65 In their opinions the Advocates General are
not bound to address only those questions relevant for deciding the case in the narrow
sense, but the Advocate General can dwell on other questions raised by the case as
well.66 The Advocate General can, for example, show different solutions to the case
and the consequences of a different reasoning.67 LOTH has qualified this difference
57 See for example Brown (2000) who discusses the way in which English and Scottish lawyers perceive
the CJEU, p. 54-55.
58 See among others: Lasser (2004), p. 103 & p. 347-348; Arnull (2006), p. 622; Fennelly (1997), p. 658;
Brown (2000), p. 55.
59 See for an elaborate discussion: Lasser (2004),
60 Lasser (2004), p. 104 et seq; Brown (2000), p 55; Due (1999), p. 79.
61 Brown (2000), p. 55.
62 Brown (2000), p. 54-55; Lasser (2004), p. 305 & p. 318; Shapiro (1999), p. 326; Loth also points
to the fact that the CJEU has tried to improve the French example, Loth (2009), p. 274. Arnull (2006),
p. 623 refers to the fact that the judgments are by common law standards, spectacularly uninform-
ative’.
63 Von Bogdandy (2000), p. 1330.
64 See, among others, on the Advocate General: Brown (2000), chapter 4; Sharpston (2008), p. 20-33;
Ritter (2005-2006), p. 751-774.
65 Since the Treaty of Nice there is no longer the requirement that every case should be accompanied
by an opinion of an Advocate General. In some minor judgments an opinion is not considered to
be necessary.
66 Brown (2000), p. 67-68. See also Ritter (2006), p. 759.
67 Burrows & Greaves (2007), p. 28-29.
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in the style of reasoning as the distinction between ‘authoritive decision-making and
substantial debate’, whereby the CJEU has to decide in an authoritive manner, while
the Advocate General can contribute to the substantial debate.68 This explains why
the Advocate General often is in a position to elaborate on the different issues at stake,
while the CJEU will often not do so.
Although there are clear similarities between the French argumentative approach
and the style of argumentation of the CJEU, an important difference with the French
system is that the opinions of the CJEU’s Advocate Generals are always published,
while this is not the case in the French legal tradition.69 This means that the internal
discourse between the Advocate General and the court, as LASSER has qualified it,
remains confidential in the French situation, while in the case of the CJEU this
discourse is more visible and transparent.70 By publishing both the judgment and
the opinion of the Advocate General more insight is thus granted into the judicial
kitchen of the CJEU. As a result both the judgment and the opinions will be analyzed
in this thesis. Both can shed light on the way the Court of Justice as an institution
approaches the interpretation of fundamental rights.
Apart from the added transparency, the availability and publication of opinions
of the Advocate Generals is beneficial for the interpretation process in another way
as well. The opinion by the Advocate General is an advice to the Court; the judges
are not obliged to follow it. In practice, however, the CJEU often does follow the
Advocate General.71 According to BURROWS & GREAVES, the opinion really forms
the starting point for deliberation of the judges. In that sense the Advocate General
can be quite influential.72 BURROWS & GREAVES argue that the added value of the
opinion consists of the dialogical relationship between the Advocate General and the
CJEU.73 They view this relationship as an ‘ongoing conversation on the interpretation
of Community law’.74 The Advocate General thus contributes to the quality of the
reasoning in the collegial judgments of the CJEU.75
68 Loth (2009), p. 274.
69 Lasser (2004); see also Pinna (2009), p. 178, who argues that the argumentative legitimacy of the
French Supreme Court is reduced as a result of this lack of publication.
70 Lasser (2004). See also Sharpston (2008), p. 23.
71 According to Burrows & Greaves (2007), p. 291, the CJEU only occasionally reaches a decision
that is fundamentally different from the opinion of the Advocate General.
72 Burrows & Greaves (2007), p. 30. See also Brown (2000), p. 69.
73 Burrows & Greaves (2007), p. 292-293.
74 Burrows & Greaves (2007), p. 293. They do, however, also suggest that there is no longer a need
for the position of Advocate General in a mature European Union, p. 297-298. This suggestion is
contested by Sharpston (2008), p. 32, who argues that the expanding jurisdiction of the CJEU opens
up new territory, which needs to be interpreted.
75 Burrows & Greaves (2007), p. 293. See also Ritter (2006), p. 763.
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Another characteristic feature of the form of the CJEU judgments that has been
derived from the continental legal systems is that the CJEU decides as a collegiate
body.76 Decisions are taken by the court as a whole and there is no possibility for
dissenting or concurring opinions.77 This naturally has an impact on the style of
reasoning, since all judges have to agree with the final judgment. This is often noted
as one of the disadvantages of a system without the possibility of dissenting opinions,
since the need for consensus often results in equivocal and vague reasoning.78 As
a result judgments are often less clear and provide less guidance to its audience than
might have been the case if the court was not forced to make any concessions in order
to gain a consensus.79 In this context, the existence of opinions of the Advocate
General counterbalances this lack of dissenting opinions to a modest extent. A dissent-
ing opinion, however, provides a more powerful force to enhance the court’s reasoning,
since the dissenting judge is actually part of the body making the final decision.
Moreover, a dissenting opinion is written with knowledge of the decision to be taken
by the majority. The dissenting judge is therefore able to highlight which specific
points in the reasoning are controversial. An Advocate General is obliged to write
his opinion in advance of the judgment of the CJEU and is therefore not guided by
the debate of the majority. His opinion is a taste of what might be the line of reasoning
of the CJEU, but the CJEU could also argue entirely differently and the focus in its
reasoning could be different as well. The opinion of the Advocate General is thus
not able to fully compensate for the lack of dissenting opinions. The reasoning of
the CJEU in its interpretative process is thus strongly influenced by the collegiate
decision-making.
Another aspect that is relevant to the CJEU’s style of argumentation has been
briefly discussed in the introductory chapter. Both courts to be discussed in this thesis
operate in a multilevel legal system and subsidiarity therefore plays some role. In
the argumentation in fundamental rights cases, the CJEU hardly ever directly invokes
references to subsidiarity. Nevertheless, according to CAROZZA, subsidiarity does play
an implicit role.80 It does so in two ways. Firstly, the CJEU relies on national consti-
tutional traditions and thereby to a certain extent respects national traditions at EU
level.81 Secondly, the CJEU does vary its scope of review depending on the type
76 Brown (2000), p. 54; Due (1999), p. 78;
77 Brown (2000), p. 54; Due (1999), p. 78.
78 Brown (2000), p. 55; Thomassen (2006), p. 686; Mertens & Vermeulen (2008), p. 52 & 60.
79 It is often noted that the possibility of dissenting opinions forces the majority to forcefully and
convincingly defend their argument. This possibility thus provides a stimulating force to improve
the judicial reasoning. See Brennan (1986), p. 430; Thomassen (2006), p. 686; Mertens &Vermeulen
(2008), p. 52.
80 Carozza (2003), p. 53-56.
81 Carozza calls this subsidiarity at work. Carozza (2003), p. 54-55.
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of action under examination. In some cases more room is left to national authorities,
while in other cases the CJEU has adopted a more strict intensity of review depending,
among others, on ‘the rights and interests that are at stake’.82 This latter form of
subsidiarity concerns the application of fundamental rights and will not be further
explored in this thesis. The first, implicit, role of subsidiarity, however, will be
addressed more fully in this thesis, since the importance of national sources to the
interpretation by the CJEU will be analyzed.
Finally, one could question whether the nature of the procedure before the CJEU
influences the reasoning of the court. Questions on EU law find their way to the CJEU
mainly by two distinct procedures, i.e. by way of preliminary questions by national
courts (Article 267 TFEU) or by way of an appeal to a direct challenge brought before
the General Court (previously known as the Court of First Instance) on the basis of
Article 256 in conjunction with Article 263 TFEU. According to CAROZZA a difference
in intensity of review can be distinguished whether the challenge concerns actions
by EU bodies or Member States. In his view the intensity of review is the strictest
when it concerns EU actions. GERARDS, on the contrary, has argued that the intensity
of review depends on a larger number of factors.83 The intensity of review, however,
mainly concerns the application stage of the reasoning, i.e. the stage in which the
CJEU examines the reasonableness of an interference with a fundamental right. The
question is whether elements relating to the nature of the procedure are also relevant
at the interpretation stage. It has already been argued earlier in this chapter that the
CJEU will most likely not interpret the meaning of fundamental rights differently,
regardless of the context.84 Thus the meaning of the notion of, for example, private
life, will be the same throughout the EU, even though the application of this right
to the facts of a specific case might differ depending on different factors. Therefore,
the analysis provided in this thesis will proceed on the theoretical presumption that
the nature of the procedures in which questions of interpretation of fundamental rights
are at stake, do not matter.
3.4 CONCLUSION
The aspects that have been discussed in this chapter determine the specific setting
within which the CJEU has to operate. Both the background of the CJEU’s funda-
mental rights case law and the relevant features of its argumentative approach and
82 See Gerards (2011), p. 100. Carozza (2003), p. 55 claims that the intensity of review depends on
the type of action that is under review.
83 See Gerards (2011), p. 91-101.
84 See section 3.1.
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judicial tradition will serve as a background for the discussions in the remainder of
this thesis and might help one to understand certain differences between the two
respective courts. The following chapter will continue to provide a background for
the subsequent in-depth case law analysis, but the focus will shift towards the inter-
pretative process by discussing in general the different interpretation methods and
principles that play a role. Together these chapters will help one to understand the








Any meaningful discussion of interpretation methods and principles will have to start
by outlining the existing methods and principles being used in the interpretation
process of the courts under analysis in this thesis. This chapter will start by describing
the terminology that will be adopted throughout this thesis. In the literature on inter-
pretation a wide variety of terms are used to refer to different interpretative aids. For
the benefit of the subsequent analysis a distinction will be made between interpretation
methods and interpretative principles. Subsequently, in section 4.2 attention will be
paid to the debate in academic literature on whether there is any hierarchy among
interpretative aids. Subsequent to this theoretical discussion the interpretation methods
will be discussed, followed by a discussion of the most commonly found principles
of interpretation. These are methods and principles of interpretation that are regularly
used in the case law of both the ECtHR and the CJEU. The section aims to provide
a broad overview of the analysis that has been made in academic literature on the
interpretative aids used by those courts. The interpretative aids will all be briefly
discussed from the perspective of legal theoretical literature, both in general and more
specifically in relation to the ECtHR and the CJEU. Some references to case law will
be made in order to disclose the way in which the interpretative aids are founded
in the case law. A thorough case law analysis will be provided in part III of this thesis.
At the end of this chapter, the selection of methods and principles for the analysis
in this thesis will be set out. After a discussion of the different methods and principles
it will be easier to justify the choice for further analysis of a selected number of
methods and principles. The selected interpretative aids will be discussed rather briefly
in this chapter in order to avoid too much overlap with the subsequent chapters.1
Apart from theoretical literature on interpretation (methods), the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties2 (VCLT) will play an important role in the context of this
1 Teleological interpretation, comparative interpretation, evolutive interpretation and autonomous
interpretation have been selected for this thesis.
2 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 22 May 1969, entry into force 27 January 1980
(VCLT or Vienna Convention). The Vienna Convention entered into force after the adoption of the
ECHR and the then EC treaties. The VCLT does not have retroactive effect and is technically not
binding on the CJEU and the ECtHR. The Vienna Convention, however, is generally considered
to reflect the customary rule on treaty interpretation and as a result this convention is relevant to
the interpretation process of both courts. The ECHR has even explicitly acknowledged that it will
be guided by the provisions from the Vienna Convention.
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chapter. Both the CJEU and the ECtHR have to deal with the interpretation of an
international treaty and operate as such in the context of the VCLT. The chapter will
show to what extent the VCLT plays a role in the interpretative process of both of
these courts.
4.1 TERMINOLOGY: METHOD, RULE, PRINCIPLE?
In the literature on treaty interpretation in general and on interpretation by the Court
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) or the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) more in particular, there is no common approach as to the terminology used.
Amethod of interpretation in the eyes of one author could be a principle of interpreta-
tion in the view of another author and vice versa.3 This difference can be illustrated
by taking the difference between MATSCHER and LEACH as an example.4 Both refer
to the European Convention as a living instrument, but qualify the nature of this
interpretative aid differently. MATSCHER refers to it as a method of interpretation,
while LEACH considers the living instrument to be an interpretative principle. Yet
other authors have referred to different terminology by speaking of, among others,
rules or canons of interpretation. In order to provide a useful overview and to avoid
any confusion, it will therefore be necessary to first offer an explanation of how the
terminology will be used throughout this thesis. While it may seem to be a matter
of labels, the qualification can help one to get a better understanding of the nature
of the specific interpretative aids and thereby also the role of these interpretive aids
in the judicial reasoning. This will become clear once the distinction has been
explained.
Based on the literature the following approach seems to provide the clearest
distinction between the various terms.5 A difference will be made between methods
and principles of interpretation.6 In order to qualify as a method of interpretation,
the interpretative aid must be a technique which is used to justify a particular line
3 This confusion is partly caused by the lack of clarity between interpretation and application, which
has been explained in the introduction, Chapter 1.
4 Matscher (1993), p. 68-70; Leach (2005), p. 164.
5 Among others: ECtHR: Ost (1992); Merrills (1993); Matscher (1993); Leach (2005); Ovey & White
(2006). CJEU: Llorens (1999); Brown&Kennedy (2000); Vincenzi & Fairhurst (2002); Lasok (2004).
6 To some extent this distinction seems to be visible as well in a short discussion on the subject by
Fennelly (1996-1997), p. 662. He claims that one should distinguish between the guiding interpreta-
tive principle deployed in search of the meaning of legal texts ... and the range of particular techniques
and source materials upon which reliance may be placed’. Bossuyt (2005), p. 78-79, does not explain
the distinction he makes, but he does adhere to a similar distinction. Mertens de Wilmars (1990),
makes the distinction between methods of interpretation and foundations that serve as a source of
inspiration in the interpretation process (p. 11). This distinction is not elaborately explained, but seems
to be similar to the distinction made in this thesis.
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of reasoning or a particular outcome.7 This technique clarifies which substantive argu-
ment has been used in order to support a specific decision and which helps the judge
to objectify the reasoning underlying this decision. The reference to objectivity here
refers to objectivity in relation to the person of the judge and not in relation to the
elements that play a role in the interpretation methods; some elements might entail
a certain subjectivity, but this is generally in relation to the drafters of the legal text.8
Thus, depending on the choice of specific interpretation method, a legally relevant
substantive argument will always play a role in a judge’s reasoning. The element that
constitutes the core of an interpretation method has been recognized as granting
authority to a certain reasoning on the basis of different reasons, depending on the
theory behind the interpretation method.9 Textual interpretation, for example, is a
method whereby the ordinary or technical meaning of the text of the provision in
question is decisive.10 The substantive element that thus plays a role when using
this method of interpretation is the text of the provision. For reasons that will be
discussed in section 4.3.1 the text can be regarded as an authoritative basis for inter-
pretation according to this interpretation method. The main point to be noted here
is that the method determines which element justifies the outcome of the interpretation.
Similar arguments can be made about, for example, systemic interpretation or teleo-
logical interpretation. A method of interpretation thus provides a technique which
leads to an objectified argument for a reasoning in a certain direction.
A principle of interpretation on the other hand has a different function. It serves as
an objective or aim that can be taken into account when interpreting a provision with
the help of an interpretation method. A principle of interpretation does not provide
an element that will help to determine the meaning of a provision. It will generally
provide an aim that is sought after when interpreting provisions of a certain treaty,
thus it does not refer to the purpose of a specific provision, but the purpose of the
treaty as a whole.11 For example, the principle of effective interpretation does not
reveal which elements should play a role in the reasoning, but it does provide a general
objective for the interpretation process, namely that the interpretation based on
whichever interpretation method should be effective. Similarly, the principle of
7 See McCormick & Summers (1991), p. 511-512. They do not speak about technique’, but about
arguments’. The term technique has been chosen here, because it makes the distinction with the
interpretative principles more clear.
8 See the discussion in the chapter on teleological interpretation, Chapter 5.
9 In American literature on interpretation methods there is strong disagreement on which elements
on which elements may be taken into consideration by judges when interpreting law, for example
in the debate on comparative interpretation, which will be discussed more elaborately in Chapter 6.
10 McCormick & Summers (1991), p. 512.
11 See also Lasser (2004), p. 208.
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evolutive interpretation entails an objective, namely interpretation in line with changes
over time in society. The principle itself does not indicate which substantive arguments
should be taken into consideration in obtaining that objective and therefore it should
be distinguished from a method of interpretation. For both principles that have just
been mentioned, various interpretation methods could be invoked to reach the goal
that has been set by the principles. Perhaps unavoidably, there will be some interpreta-
tive principles that have a more natural link with certain interpretation methods, but
in general the interpretative principles are not strictly linked to the use of a specific
interpretation method. Given the role of interpretative principles of providing a purpose
for the interpretation process, they cannot by themselves support the choice for a
specific interpretation. For example, a judge cannot solely on the basis of the principle
of effective interpretation justify a certain interpretation. Interpretation methods are
needed to base the reasoning on one of the recognized elements, such as text or
system. The interpretative principles can help to make a choice between the potentially
diverging outcomes resulting from different methods of interpretation. Both principles
and methods of interpretation thus complement each other, but each fulfils a different
role in the judicial reasoning.
The existence of interpretative principles has also been discussed by LASSER in
the context of the CJEU.12 It is not clear whether he supports the same distinction
in function between interpretation methods and principles, but he does provide a basis
for the use of interpretative principles. He distinguishes on the one hand the use of
micro-teleological arguments, which is the use of teleological interpretation in its
everyday modus by using references to the object and purpose of a provision or the
treaty as a whole to justify the interpretation of a specific term.13 On the other hand
he distinguishes meta-teleological arguments, which is argumentation on the basis
of principles that have been derived from the treaty system as a whole, in his case
‘the EU legal structure as a whole’.14 These are the meta-teleological principles that
resemble the principles that have been described above. They find their basis in the
object and purpose of the treaty system as a whole. This also explains why interpreta-
tive principles can be different for each treaty system. One of the questions to be
answered by the case law analysis therefore is whether meta-teleological interpretation
is also used in relation to interpretative principles outside the EU context, i.e. in the
framework of the ECtHR.
The present distinction serves as a basis for the classification of interpretative aids
throughout this thesis. The precise meaning of the distinction between methods and
12 Lasser (2004).
13 Lasser (2004), p. 208.
14 Lasser (2004), p. 208.
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principles will become clearer in the course of the discussion of specific interpretation
methods and principles. Firstly, the following section will deal with the question
whether some methods or principles are regarded as more important than other
methods or principles. Subsequently, several relevant interpretation methods and
principles will be discussed.
4.2 HIERARCHY OF INTERPRETATION METHODS?
The distinction discussed in the previous section between methods and principles
revealed that different (types of) arguments can have a different function in the
interpretative process. This section will address the question whether different inter-
pretation methods can differ in terms of argumentative force. The question can be
put differently by asking whether some theoretical hierarchy amongst interpretation
methods can be said to exist. This theoretical discussion is relevant as a background
for the analysis of the use of the different aids by the CJEU and the ECtHR and the
force they accord to the interpretative aids.
The starting point for a discussion on the hierarchy of interpretation methods in
the context of treaty interpretation should focus on the Vienna Convention. Article
31 VCLT provides the general rule of treaty interpretation, which holds: ‘A treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’.15
In its second and third section this article provides what should be considered to
constitute the ‘context’ and what can be taken into account apart from the context.16
15 This provision reflects a compromise between three schools of interpretation. The first considered
the text of the treaty to be decisive. The second school focused on the intention of the drafters. The
final school focused on the object and purpose of the treaty. Shaw (2008), p. 933; Bossuyt (2005),
p. 77. See for an overview of the drafting of the Vienna Convention and the period leading to this
drafting process: Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 301-316.
16 Article 31 VCLT:
General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text,
including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of
the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provisions;
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In its commentary to the Vienna Convention the International LawCommission (ILC)
argued that Article 31 VCLT should not be read as establishing a hierarchy of inter-
pretative norms.17 The ILC held that logic determined the order in which references
to the different interpretation methods were presented and not any hierarchy.18 This
does not mean that the rules on treaty interpretation in the VCLT are devoid of any
hierarchy. First of all, Article 32 VCLT refers to ‘supplementary’ means of interpreta-
tion.19 This means that the interpretation methods included in this article are only
to be used if the methods mentioned in Article 31 VCLT do not lead to a clear
meaning of the term or provision that requires interpretation. Secondly, the ILC does
consider textual interpretation to be the prime method of interpretation.20 The primacy
granted to the text of the treaty provision, thus, means that textual interpretation is,
even if this is not explicitly acknowledged by the ILC, at the top of the hierarchy
of interpretation methods. Any reasoning based on this method will therefore be
considered to have strong argumentative force.
As has already been said, theoretical discussions on (national) interpretation
methods could be relevant for the context of treaty interpretation as well. The question
may be asked whether any hierarchy has been established in the context of national
interpretation methods.21 An interesting example of an attempt to bring order or
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
17 See: Commentary to articles of Vienna Convention, Yearbook of International Law Commission,
1966- Vol. II, p. 220. The International Law Commission was involved in drafting the VCLT and
its commentary reflects many considerations throughout the drafting process that can help one to
understand the final version of the VCLT.
18 See: Commentary to articles of Vienna Convention, Yearbook of International Law Commission,
1966- Vol. II, p. 220. See also Aust (2007), p. 234.
19 Article 32 VCLT:
Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from
the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to
article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
20 See for reference to the primacy of the text: articles of Vienna Convention, Yearbook of International
Law Commission, 1966- Vol. II, p. 220; Bernhardt (1967), p. 495-496; Orakhelashvili (2008), p.
309.
21 According to Alexy no one has succeeded in drafting a catalogue accepted by everyone. Alexy (1989),
p. 247. Franken in the Dutch context claims that textual and historical interpretation should take
precedence in case of multiple options, since these methods emphasize the fact that a judge is bound
by the law. Franken (2003), p. 199.
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hierarchy into interpretation methods has been presented by a group of scholars known
as the Bielefelder Kreis.22 After a study of the use of interpretation methods in many
different jurisdictions, they presented a very simple model of the order in which
different interpretation methods should be considered.23 First, linguistic arguments
should be considered; secondly, systemic arguments; and, finally, teleological argu-
ments. Only if the interpretative result is not clear enough should one proceed to the
next interpretation method. Thus, according to this model, teleological interpretation
may only be used if textual and systemic interpretation do not provide a clear result.
The question is, however, whether and when it is possible to conclude if a result from
textual interpretation is clear. After all, the use of systemic or teleological interpreta-
tion might show that the result is not that clear. Nonetheless, apart from this problem
the model is useful to show that reasoning based on some methods is sometimes
granted more argumentative force than others.24
Both in theoretical literature and in literature on treaty interpretation, no clear
hierarchy among interpretation methods has been found to exist, even though textual
interpretation is often regarded as the primary method of interpretation (which is
perhaps understandable when interpreting a legal text). The problem for our purpose
is that interpretation beyond the purely textual or grammatical meaning of treaty
notions is often necessary, precisely because the text of treaty provisions is often rather
vague. Fundamental rights are generally broadly formulated. An example of this broad
formulation is Article 8 ECHR: ‘everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and correspondence’. Especially the term private life is a broad
term that needs further interpretation; textual interpretation might not be very helpful
in that case. Furthermore, the fact that, in the Vienna Convention, textual interpreta-
tion, systemic interpretation and teleological interpretation are all mentioned as part
of the general rule of interpretation might be an indication that the ILC did not intend
to create a hierarchy of interpretation methods. It only shows that arguments based
on these methods should be given primary consideration.
It will be interesting to see in the case law analysis whether the ECtHR and the
CJEU distinguish between the argumentative force of different interpretationmethods
and whether some form of hierarchy is visible in their argumentation.
22 See MacCormick & Summer (1991) for the outcomes of the study of this group of scholars from
different countries.
23 MacCormick & Summer (1991), p. 531.
24 The study by Bielefelder Kreis revealed that in many jurisdictions textual arguments have a strong
force in justification. MacCormick & Summer (1991), p. 533.
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4.3 METHODS OF INTERPRETATION
There are two ways to start a discussion on interpretation methods, namely either
by taking national constitutional theory as a point of departure, or by starting from
the general international rules of interpretation. The introduction to this thesis and
to this particular chapter already indicated that both the European Court of Human
Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union are international courts showing
strong similarities with national constitutional courts.25 Therefore, both angles can
be legitimate starting points. Given, however, that these courts are international courts
by origin, the starting point of the following discussion will be the international rules
of interpretation, supplemented with relevant aspects of national (constitutional) theory
of interpretation.
As discussed above, general international rules of interpretation have been codified
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).26 The relevant provisions
for treaty interpretation are Articles 31, 32 and 33 of the Vienna Convention. Certain
methods of interpretation can be deduced from these provisions. These methods will
be discussed first, and subsequently, an overview will be given of methods that do
not directly derive from the VCLT, but which are relevant in treaty interpretation.
4.3.1 Textual interpretation
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, as has been said above, clearly emphasizes the
primacy of the text when dealing with treaty interpretation. This primacy stems from
the view that the text reflects the authentic expression of the intention of the parties,
therefore ‘the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the
text, not an investigation ab initio into the intentions of the parties’.27 This authentic
expression of the parties is relevant in the context of treaty interpretation, since it
is a way to ‘establish and preserve the original consensus between State-parties’.28
In a national context, textual interpretation is valued since it pays respect to the
legislator who drafted the legislation. The legislator is democratically elected and
as such represents the will of the people.29 Moreover, in light of the separation of
25 See for the CJEU: Helfer (2003-2004), p, 199-201. For the ECtHR, see Gerards (2009), p. 409.
26 See: Commentary to articles of Vienna Convention, Yearbook of International Law Commission,
1966- Vol. II; Bernhardt (1967), p. 491; Bernhardt (1988), p. 65; Aust (2000), p. 185-186; McRae
(2002), p. 210; Slotboom (2001), p. 576.
27 ILC Commentary to Article 27 of Vienna Convention, Yearbook at 220 (par. 11).
28 Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 318, claims that this primacy of the text is a direct consequence of this
need to preserve the original consensus.
29 MacCormick & Summers (1991), p. 534, briefly describe the underlying values of textual interpreta-
tion.
50
Interpretation methods and interpretative principles
powers the judge should respect the products of the legislator and not take the position
of the legislator.30 The CJEU operates in a composite legal order, but the structure
of the legal order resembles to a limited extent the classical functions of a state, in
the sense that the EU has a representative body, the European Parliament, an executive
body, the Commission and the Council, and a judicial body, the CJEU.31 These
arguments relating to the role of the judge and hence the respect that a judge should
pay to the language used by the legislator could therefore play a role before the CJEU
that is similar to a national context. The ECtHR does not operate in a similar structure
and therefore these arguments do not play much of a role before the ECtHR.32 A
different argument can, however, be made for the ECtHR. The ECtHR depends, among
others, on the national legislator for the effectiveness of its judgments. As a result
the ECtHR will try to respect and even engage in a dialogue with the national legis-
lators.33 One way to show respect for national legislators is by paying respect to
the text of the provisions which they have ratified and thus employ the textual method
of interpretation.
The idea behind textual interpretation is to establish the ordinary or technical
meaning of a notion.34 The main problem that has been stressed in view of the textual
method is that words in themselves do not have an ordinary meaning.35 A strictly
textual approach may therefore be considered arbitrary, as it leaves much latitude
to the interpreter. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention can however be read to contain
a more moderate version of textual interpretation, by including the words ‘in their
context’. This contextual method of interpretation will be discussed in more detail
below.
Given the primacy granted to this method in theory and the problems of the
method, it is interesting to see briefly how the CJEU and ECtHR have dealt with
this interpretative method in practice and how valuable this method is to these courts.
Already before the Vienna Convention entered into force, the ECtHR in theGolder
case36 determined that it should be guided by Articles 31-33 of the VCLT.37 In
30 MacCormick & Summers (1991), p. 534, briefly describe the underlying values of textual interpretation
31 See for a more detailed discussion Lenaerts (2005), p. 563-565.
32 See Gerards (2009), p. 414, who argues that the ECtHR does not have any constitutional counterparts
like in a national system. The ECtHR pays respect and enters into a dialogue with the national
legislator (and national courts as well), according to Gerards. This is, however, not equivalent to
a constitutional counterpart.
33 Gerards (2009), p. 414.
34 MacCormick & Summers (1991), p. 512-513.
35 Lauterpacht (1949), p. 53; McRae (2002), p. 209 referring to McLauchlan.
36 ECtHR, Golder v United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A No. 18, § 29. This case




subsequent cases it has therefore (often) taken the text of the European Convention
to be its starting point, which has at times been expressly stated by the ECtHR.38
It is however apparent from the case law that textual interpretation alone is never
sufficient to provide a clear interpretation of the provisions of the ECHR.39 The case
of Johnston,40 for example, concerned the question whether Article 12 of the Euro-
pean Convention, which grants the right to marry, also included a right to divorce.
Basing itself on the meaning of the notion of marriage, the ECtHR held that no right
to divorce could be derived from Article 12. This judgment is a good illustration of
the approach taken by the ECtHR. The text of Article 12 in itself is rather clear (only
referring to the right to marry), but the ECtHR continued and corroborated its finding
by looking at the context and the object and purpose of the provision in question.
Thereby it sent the message that the text is important, but an interpretation based on
several interpretation methods may be more convincing. In many cases where the
text is less clear than in the case of Johnston, reference to other interpretation methods
will simply be necessary. Textual interpretation in those cases will only play a mar-
ginal role. Examples can be found in cases concerning the interpretation of Article
8 of the European Convention, which provides that everyone’s private and family
life should be respected. Textual interpretation would in this respect not be very
helpful in determining the meaning of private life. Textual interpretation cannot
provide much guidance in deciding whether the right to a person’s reputation should
be covered by the right to respect for someone’s private life, or whether a transsexual
should be able to have his or her gender change officially recognized as part of the
right to protection of one’s private life.
The approach described above shows the limits on the applicability of the textual
approach, especially in the context of these vaguely drafted provisions. Another
characteristic of the European Convention that limits the usefulness of the textual
interpretation is the fact that there are two authentic language versions of the European
Convention: the English and the French. If these language versions differ the ECtHR
has stated that it must ‘interpret them in a way that will reconcile them as far as
possible’.41 In reconciling the two language versions the ECtHR considers it im-
37 Repeated in: ECtHR, Ireland v. United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A No. 25;
ECtHR, Lithgow and others v United Kingdom, judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A No. 102; ECtHR,
Witold Litwa v. Poland, judgment of 4 April 2000, Reports 2000-III; ECtHR (GC), Banković and
others v. Belgium and others, decision of 12 December 2001, Reports 2001-VII.
38 ECtHR, Witold Litwa v. Poland, judgment of 4 April 2000, Reports 2000-III.
39 This has also been defended in the literature by Ost (1992).
40 ECtHR, Johnston and others v Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A No. 112, § 52.
41 ECtHR, Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A No. 7.
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portant that, due to the nature of the European Convention (a law-making treaty),42
the interpretation that best ‘realizes the aim and achieves the object of the treaty’ must
be adopted. In other words: the interpretation which best protects the fundamental
individual rights. At times, textual interpretation could even be ‘overruled’ by the
need to ensure protection of the fundamental individual rights.43 OST discusses the
example ofWemhoffwhere the ECtHR argued that a ‘purely grammatical interpretation
would [result in an interpretation] that would not conform to the intention of the High
Contracting Parties. It is inconceivable that they should have intended to permit their
judicial authorities, at the price of release of the accused, to protract proceedings
beyond a reasonable time. This would, moreover, be flatly contrary to the provision
in Article 6 (1)’.44 In conclusion one could say that the textual interpretation, due
to the specific characteristics of the European Convention, plays only a limited role
in the interpretation process of the ECtHR and the text will generally only serve as
a starting point.
The CJEU, on the contrary, has never explicitly referred to the Vienna Convention
in any of its judgments.45 In the literature it is generally assumed that the CJEU
employs the textual method of interpretation,46 on occasion applying it to show the
limits of its own competence.47 Some authors would even assert that the textual
method of interpretation is the main method of interpretation employed by the
CJEU.48 The main line in the literature, however, is to show the limits of the textual
method in the case law of the CJEU. Several characteristics of EU law have been
mentioned in that regard, most importantly: the multilingual character on the one hand
and the general and open-ended nature of EU law on the other hand.49 This could
explain the fact that the CJEU has displayed a willingness to disregard the wording
42 This special characteristic has been repeated in ECtHR, Ireland v UK, judgment of 18 January 1978,
Series A No. 25, § 239. According to Matscher (1993), p.66, this is a controversial distinction. In
the discussion on the different interpretative principles this characteristic plays a role as well, as will
be seen in the second part of this chapter.
43 Ost (1992), p. 289, referring to the Wemhoff case, ECtHR, Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27
June 1968, Series A No. 7.
44 ECtHR, Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A No. 7, § 4-5.
45 Slotboom claims that the CJEU has suggested that it does interpret EC law in the light of the Vienna
Convention. Slotboom (2001), p. 577.
46 Lasok &Millet (2004); Schermers &Waelbroeck, (2001); Arnull (2006); Brown &Kennedy (2000);
Vincenzi & Fairhurst (2002).
47 C-245/97, Germany v. Commission [2000] ECR I-11621, § 72; C-310/98, Met-Trans and Sagpol
[2000] ECR I-1797, § 32 and § 46.
48 Schermers & Waelbroeck, (2001).
49 See, for the multilingual character: Jacobs (2003), p. 298-299; Shelton (1996-1997), p. 631-632. See
Janssen (2005), p. 173 for the argument that textual interpretation is not very helpful given the open
ended character of EU provisions.
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by allowing the contextual and teleological interpretations to prevail or at least not
to overemphasize the importance of the wording of the text.50 This can be demon-
strated by the famous approach in the Van Gend en Loos judgment,51 repeated in
many subsequent cases, where the CJEU stated that for determining the scope of a
certain provision it is necessary ‘to consider the spirit, the general scheme and
wording’ of a provision.52 At first sight this statement seems reflective of the status
of the text when interpreting EU law, though one should keep in mind that the reliance
on the text is much stronger in the case of secondary EU law, which is often much
more precisely worded.53 What is moreover important is that from this line, one
should not draw the conclusion that this reflects a fixed hierarchy among different
interpretation methods. The CJEU uses diverse approaches and it selects the approach
it ‘consider[s] most appropriate in the circumstances’.54
A particular feature of EU law, as has been mentioned above, is the fact that all
official languages are equally authentic.55 This complicates textual interpretation
as differences will inevitably arise. The textual interpretation method in this type of
case will at most be able to provide an indication for determining the scope of the
provision in question, though in some cases that might not even be possible. Often
the CJEU selects the most ‘liberal interpretation consonant with the objectives of the
provision’; however, examples of different approaches can be found as well.56 The
connection in all these differing approaches appears to be the crucial role played by
the teleological approach, to be discussed below.
In the context of fundamental rights protection the role of textual interpretation
in the case law of the CJEU was virtually non-existent until very recently. This is
understandable, since no binding legal text containing a catalogue of fundamental
rights existed in the EU context. The EU Charter on Fundamental Rights became
binding only in December 2009. As a result of this, textual interpretation might take
on a more prominent role in the interpretation of fundamental rights. The question
is only how prominent this role will be, because a characteristic of fundamental rights
is that they are vaguely worded.
50 E.g. C-22/70, Commission v. Council (ERTA), [1971] ECR 263.
51 C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 3.
52 C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 3, 12.
53 Lasok & Millett (2004), § 659.
54 Arnull (2006), p. 617.
55 Jacobs (2003), p. 302-303, calls this the fiction of equal plurilingual authority, because he claims
that the legislator did not devote its collective attention to all language versions. So it is a fiction
to say that the legislator has approved all language versions.
56 Lasok & Millet (2004), § 662, p. 382-3855, where examples of a more teleological approach, but
also other approaches are discussed.
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The aim of this short overview was to show that both courts take textual interpreta-
tion seriously, but due to a number of characteristics, the nature of fundamental rights
and the multilingual treaties, the usefulness of this method of interpretation may be
somewhat limited.
4.3.2 Teleological interpretation
‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose’ according to Article 31 of the VCLT.’ The latter part of the sentence
is a clear confirmation of the acceptance of the teleological interpretation method
within the framework of the Vienna Convention. The commentary claims that this
has been included for reasons of common sense and good faith.57 This was probably
inspired by the often heard claim that ‘the determination of the ordinary meaning
cannot be done in the abstract’ and thus the object and purpose should be considered
to determine the meaning.58 Teleological interpretation assumes that legislation or
a treaty has been drafted in order to realize a specific social goal.59 This method
aims to realize this purpose for which the measure was designed.60 The question
is how one can ‘find’ this object and purpose that should guide the interpretation.
Different approaches have been established. On the one hand, some authors focus
on the subjective object and purpose, meaning that the object and purpose of a piece
of legislation is the real purpose the author(s) had in mind when creating the text.61
On the other hand, some authors consider the object and purpose to be the intent of
the ‘reasonable author’.62 This will be elaborately discussed in the chapter on teleo-
logical interpretation, but it is important to realize that object and purpose are a
normative construction and thus ‘not a matter of empirical findings’.63 The fact that
there is no clear method to find the object and purpose leaves much latitude for the
judge when employing this method. Some have in this context pointed to the danger
of judges being overly creative and going into the realm of treaty amendment.64
This is why judges should be careful when employing this method of interpretation.
57 Commentary to articles of Vienna Convention, Yearbook of International Law Commission, 1966-
Vol. II
58 Aust (2000), p. 188.
59 Barak (2005), p. 148.
60 Barak (2005), p. 88.
61 Barak, (2005), p. 120; MacCormick and Summers (1991), p. 520.
62 Barak (2005), p. 148.
63 Alexy (1989), p. 241. See also Barak (2005), p. 89.




In this context the Vienna Convention limits the teleological method of interpretation
by giving primacy to the text, which basically means that the object and purpose
‘cannot be invoked to contradict the text’.65
The means used to establish the object and purpose will be influenced by the
question whether one takes a subjective or objective approach. Depending on the
approach chosen, the means could be taken as broad or as narrow as one wishes them
to be. For example, this method could correspond completely with a textual method
of interpretation if one takes the text to evidence the object and purpose of a certain
treaty.66 On the other hand, if other, even extrinsic,67 means are allowed to be taken
into account, the result could be the exact opposite of the result deriving from a textual
interpretation. Given this latitude for judges in determining the object and purpose
and the different sources that are potentially available for judges to find this object
and purpose, it is necessary for the court to clearly justify the choices made in employ-
ing teleological interpretation in order to avoid any suspicion of subjectiveness on
the part of the judge.
The section on the division between methods and principles already referred to
the difference between meta-teleological interpretation and micro-teleological inter-
pretation.68 Meta-teleological interpretation refers to arguments based on meta-teleo-
logical principles, which will be explained more clearly in section 4.4.2.1. Argumenta-
tion in this case thus falls into the category of principles, as described above. Micro-
teleological arguments are arguments based on the technique as described at the
beginning of this section and as such micro-teleological interpretation can be con-
sidered a method of interpretation. The focus in this version of teleological inter-
pretation is on the object and purpose of a specific provision or a piece of legislation
and not the nature of the treaty system as a whole.69 When speaking about teleo-
logical interpretation in this thesis, reference is made to micro-teleological interpreta-
tion. If reference is made to the principle of meta-teleological interpretation this will
be stated explicitly.
In section 4.3.1 it has become clear that for the European systems, for several reasons,
the textual method has only a limited role to play. The object and purpose are much
65 Jacobs (1969), p. 338.
66 This position is taken by the ILC in its Commentary to articles of Vienna Convention, Yearbook
of International Law Commission, 1966- Vol. II, p. 220.
67 Jacobs (1969), p. 337. He does not explain this term, but from the context one can discern what he
means when referring to extrinsic means. Intrinsic means are the text and related documents’;
extrinsic means are therefore means that lie outside the realm of the treaty. Unfortunately he does
not provide an example of this latter type of means.
68 These concepts have been described by Lasser (2004).
69 Lasser (2004), p. 207-208.
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more important in deciding on the interpretation of a certain provision. This method
plays an important role in coping with the challenges of decision-making in a
multilevel legal system. Teleological interpretation and the principle of meta-teleo-
logical interpretation allow the supranational courts to take into account the character
of the treaty and its provisions. On the one hand, the principle of meta-teleological
interpretation serves as a basis for many interpretative principles that are helpful in
a multilevel legal system, which will be shown when discussing these principles below.
The characteristic of the European Convention, for example, as a law-making treaty
helps to defend the approach of the ECtHR that the European Convention should
not be interpreted in a manner that would restrict the obligations of the Contracting
States to the greatest degree.70 On the other hand, a micro-teleological approach
allows the judges to take the purpose of the treaty into account when interpreting
a specific provision. By taking into account the purpose of the treaty even when
interpreting specific terms, helps to take note of the multilevel characteristic of the
European systems even in those specific cases. This method will be part of the
extensive research throughout this thesis, which means that only a summary overview
of teleological interpretation needs to be provided here.
The CJEU is widely known for applying the teleological method of interpretation.
It is this approach that has subjected the CJEU to accusations of judicial activism.71
This is not the place to discuss whether these accusations have any truth in them or
not, but it is important to keep in mind that the approach chosen by the CJEU has
not been accepted without resistance.72 The famous statement in the Van Gend en
Loos case73 is reflective of the importance attached to the object and purpose. The
CJEU does not refer to object and purpose, but instead refers to the spirit of the
treaty.74 Reference to the spirit of the treaty is one of the main considerations for
the CJEU when determining the scope of a provision. Contrary to the systemic
approach,75 which considers the place of a provision in the relation to other parts
of the Treaty depending on the context, the teleological method considers ‘the whole
purpose, the aims and objectives of the Community and the Union’.76 The CJEU
has not seen itself limited by the text of the treaties, among others due to its multi-
70 Interpreting in a restrictive manner in favour of state sovereignty used to be the common approach
in treaty interpretation. Bernhardt (1999), p. 14.
71 Llorens (1999), p. 382.
72 In the theoretical discussion on the different interpretation methods and principles employed by the
CJEU, the accusations of judicial activism directed at the CJEU will be addressed as well.
73 C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 3.
74 C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 3.
75 This method of interpretation will be discussed in the following section 4.3.3.
76 Vincenzi & Fairhurst, (2002), p. 107.
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lingual character, which has on occasion led the CJEU to overrule the wording of
a certain provision.77 A more detailed account of when the CJEU uses this method
will be given below. Many questions will need to be answered in order to get a
complete picture of the use of teleological interpretation, among others when will
this method be applied and in what cases will this method be left aside? How can
the object and purpose be determined? Which documents will be taken into account
in this process? The preamble provides many indications of the objectives of the EU
Treaty78 and one may wonder whether this is often taken into consideration when
determining the object and purpose. The same question could be raised for the travaux
préparatoires.
The nature of the European Convention allows for the ECtHR to apply the teleological
method as the system of the European Convention is based on the aim to progressively
improve the protection of fundamental rights throughout Europe. The ECtHR has
stressed this in the cases of Wemhoff and Golder by stating that the character of the
European Convention as a law-making treaty warrants an interpretation ‘that is most
appropriate in order to realize the aim and achieve the object of the treaty, not that
which would restrict to the greatest possible degree the obligations undertaken by
the Parties’.79 The focus on the role of the European Convention as a bill of rights80
has firmly established the importance of the teleological method of interpretation
within the ECtHR. This also follows from the Soering and Kjeldsen judgments which
state that any interpretation has to be in conformity with the ‘general spirit of the
Convention’.81 Similar to the CJEU this has in some cases led the ECtHR to override
the result of a textual interpretation,82 but in many cases this method will simply
confirm the wording of a particular provision.
Teleological interpretation features in virtually all judgments of the ECtHR, and
object and purpose have constantly been ‘identified as the “protection of individual
human rights” and the “maintenance and promotion of the ideals and values of a
democratic society”’.83 This is still rather vague and abstract; the case law analysis
77 E.g. C-22/70 Commission v. Council (ERTA), [1971] ECR 263 and Vincenzi & Fairhurst, (2002),
p. 107.
78 The same applies to the EU Treaty.
79 ECtHR, Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A No. 7, § 8; ECtHR, Golder v
United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A No. 18, § 36.
80 Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick (2009), p. 6.
81 ECtHR, Soering v United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161, § 87, quoting from
ECtHR, Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pederson v Denmark, judgment of 7 December 1976, Series
A No. 23, § 53
82 Ost (1992), p. 293.
83 Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick (2009), p. 5-6.
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will disclose in more detail how this has been applied in concrete situations. In these
concrete situations, how will a less abstract object and purpose be defined? Which
sources will be taken into account? Is the ECtHR consistent in using the different
means to establish the object and purpose? If yes, can any criteria be extracted? These
and other questions will be dealt with in the course of this thesis, specifically in
Chapters 5 and 9.
4.3.3 Systemic or contextual interpretation
The basis for the systemic or contextual method of interpretation in the context of
treaty interpretation can also be traced back to the first sentence of Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention, which provides that the wording must be read in its context. The
term ‘contextual interpretation’ has in the literature been used interchangeably with
the term ‘systemic interpretation’. Since both seem to refer to the same method, the
terms will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis. In order to determine the
interpretation to be given to a specific provision, when applying this method, regard
must be had to the bigger picture in which the provision is placed: the context.
According to the Vienna Convention the context includes (in addition to the text,
including its preamble and annexes): firstly, ‘any agreement relating to the treaty which
was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty’84
and secondly ‘any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty’.85 The underlying consideration here is that the context cannot
be based on any unilateral documents; all parties should have had some direct or
indirect influence.86 While these documents, referred to in Article 31 VCLT, can
certainly be relevant, systemic interpretation could also be seen in a more limited
manner. By looking at, for example, the place of the provision in the system of the
treaty, or by looking at treaty elements like headings and paragraphs, the context could
be determined as well.
The main advantage of contextual interpretation is that it can provide the necessary
support for the textual interpretation method; some would even say that the textual
interpretation necessarily involves employing the systemic method of interpretation,
84 Article 31 Vienna Convention.
85 Article 31 Vienna Convention.
86 Commentary to articles of Vienna Convention, Yearbook of International Law Commission, 1966-
Vol. II. See also Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 342-343, who refers to examples from practice that
underline this requirement that instruments should represent some form of agreement between states
in order to be considered as a relevant part of the context.
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since a term cannot be fully understood in the abstract.87 The assumption behind
systemic interpretation is that the system is made up of a coherent set of legal rules
and systemic interpretation is meant to guard this coherence.88 Different provisions
cannot be seen entirely separately from each other or from, for example, the preamble
and thus have to be interpreted by taking them into account. The structure of the
system as a whole thus influences the way in which the specific provisions should
be understood.89
The question is to what extent this method can be used to interpret a specific
notion. To put it differently, what is the relation with textual interpretation? According
to ORAKHELASHVILI, contextual interpretation can only play a limited role and it does
not have ‘primary relevance in interpreting the treaty text’.90 Only if ‘the meaning
of the word or phrase positively admits of more than one signification, raises the issue
of compatibility with the object and purpose, or undermines the meaning of another
clause in the same treaty’ is there, in his view, room for contextual interpretation.91
Thus, only in a limited number of situations can contextual interpretation be used
to deviate from the ordinary meaning of the provision in question.92
The method of systemic interpretation has been adopted by the ECtHR as early as
in the Belgian Linguistic judgment93 and subsequently in the Golder case.94 In the
case of Golder the ECtHR stated that ‘the provisions of the Convention and its
Protocols must be examined as a whole’95 and ‘the process of interpretation is a
unity, a single combined operation’.96 In other words, the provisions of the European
Convention and its Protocols must be interpreted in relation to each other. Most often
87 Aust (2000), p. 188. Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 339 considers systemic interpretation to be a ramification
of textual interpretation.
88 This method is also used by national judges, in that context reference is made to the need to maintain
the coherence of the system. These arguments are, however, also valid in the context of treaty
interpretation. See MacCormick & Summer (1991), p. 535; Franken (2003), p. 198; Cliteur (2005),
p. 169.
89 See Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 340 who refers to the fact that mutually contradictory outcomes should
be prevented. Cliteur (2005), p. 169.
90 Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 340.
91 Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 340.
92 Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 340.
93 ECtHR, Case “Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in
Belgium” v. Belgium, judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A No. 6, A/6, § 1.
94 ECtHR, Golder v United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A No. 18, § 30; recently
confirmed in among others ECtHR,Witold Litwa v. Poland, judgment of 4 April 2000, Reports 2000-
III, § 58.
95 ECtHR, Case “Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in
Belgium” v. Belgium, judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A No. 6, § 1.
96 ECtHR, Golder v United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A No. 18, § 30.
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this method has been used when a certain matter was governed in detail by a specific
Protocol which had not (yet) been ratified by the respondent state in question.97 In
other cases this method has been used where more than one provision of the European
Convention could govern the matter. The ECtHR has dealt with these cases by
regarding the European Convention as a whole. It has held that that interpretation
must ‘be in harmony with the logic of the Convention’.98 This entails that, if a right
is not recognized under a specific provision, the ECtHR cannot read this right into
a more general provision, since that would undermine the coherence of the European
Convention. The case of Schalk and Kopf presents a clear example of this approach.99
The question in this case was whether Contracting States are obliged to allow for
same-sex couples to marry. The applicants argued their case from the perspective
of Article 12 of the European Convention, under which they argued that their right
to marry was violated. They also invoked Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8,
under which they argued that they were discriminated against on the basis of their
sexual orientation. The ECtHR held that since Article 12 ECHR did not oblige
Contracting States to open marriage up for same-sex couples this choice is left to
the Contracting States. In the context of Article 14 and Article 8 the ECtHR held
that:
[T]he Convention is to be read as a whole and its Articles should therefore be construed in
harmony with one another ... Having regard to the conclusion reached above, namely that
Article 12 does not impose an obligation on Contracting States to grant same-sex couples
access to marriage, Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, a provision of more general
purpose and scope, cannot be interpreted as imposing such an obligation either.100
Even though the ECtHR has stated that the Convention and its Protocols must be
considered as a whole, the context it looks at will differ from case to case. Sometimes
it can mean simply looking at the other paragraphs of the provision in question; on
other occasions it stretches to cover the European Convention and the Protocols itself.
The systemic method of interpretation is frequently used by the CJEU as well, which
is quite understandable considering that EU law consists of an extensive body of
primary and secondary legislation. The importance of this method is already apparent
from the above repeated statement in the Van Gend en Loos judgment101 where
the CJEU referred to the spirit, general scheme and wording of a provision as relevant
97 Merrils (1993), p. 73; Ovey & White (2006), p. 44.
98 ECtHR, Leander v Sweden, judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A No. 116, § 78.
99 ECtHR, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, judgment of 24 June 2010, unpublished.
100 ECtHR, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, judgment of 24 June 2010, unpublished, § 101.
101 C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 3.
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for determining the scope of the provision. The provision in question should thus
be interpreted in relation to the treaty as a whole, for example, by taking the place
of a provision in a particular chapter under consideration and or by looking at the
EU system as a whole.102 According to BROWN & KENNEDY ‘it is natural to stress
the interrelationship of the individual Treaties and their provisions as component parts
of the total scheme’.103
The question is whether this method is also relevant in the context of the inter-
pretation of fundamental rights. REICH has argued that ‘systemic interpretation makes
little sense in legal systems that do not rely on codification,... [because] judge made
law cannot aim to be systematic, since there is no theoretical reference point to which
interpretation could turn’.104 While it is not true that the whole EU system is based
on judge-made law, the fundamental rights doctrine in the EU was until recently
entirely based on judge-made law.105 The entry into force of the EU Charter might
make reference to this method of interpretation valuable or even necessary.
4.3.4 Subjective or historical interpretation106
By applying the subjective or historical method of interpretation a court or judge tries
to discover the intentions of the author of the text.107 In the context of treaty inter-
pretation the term ‘subjective’ interpretation is often used,108 yet in some national
contexts the term ‘historical’ interpretation is more regularly used for referring to
the same method of interpretation.109 For the purpose of this thesis the term ‘his-
torical’ interpretation will be employed, since it illustrates most clearly what type
of argument plays a role in this kind of interpretation. Reference is made to the
intention the drafters had when they drafted the text, which is an historical argument.
The term ‘subjective’ interpretation leaves out this historical aspect and only focuses
102 Many different examples from the case law of the CJEU can be given; however due to lack of space,
reference is made to Brown & Kennedy (2000), p. 334 where some examples from the case law have
been enumerated.
103 Brown & Kennedy (2000), p. 334.
104 Reich (2005), p. 29.
105 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed explanation.
106 Villiger (2009), p. 421, employs this terminology. Toufayan (2005), p. 7, also uses both terms
interchangeably.
107 Bernhardt (1995), p. 1420; Brown & Kennedy (200), p. 330; Llorens (1999), p. 379; Vincenzi &
Fairhurst (2002), p. 103
108 See for example, Ayral (2003), p. 15; Aust (2007), p. 231; Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 304.
109 See for example, in the Dutch context: Franken (2003), p. 196; Janssen (2005), p. 191; Cliteur (2005),
p. 171; Smith (2005), p. 145-146.
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on the intention of the drafters, which could also change over time and be derived
from, for example, subsequent actions.110
While the text is regarded as a factor that reflects the intention of the drafters,
adherents of this method of interpretation also take note of other documents that reveal
the intention of the drafters, which in some cases can be more important than the
text.111 Beside the text of a treaty, the most important other document that reflects
the intention of the drafters of a treaty is the travaux préparatoires.112 The Vienna
Convention allows for these documents to play a role in the interpretation process,
but only as a supplementary means of interpretation.113 This means that they may
only be resorted to if the text of the provision remains unclear even after using the
primary interpretation methods contained in Article 31 VCLT.114 Given the position
of one of the crucial elements of this interpretation method in the Vienna Convention,
one can conclude that this method is not given a prominent role.
There are several reasons why the travaux préparatoires have only been given
a supplementary role in the VCLT. Most authors emphasize the fact that the travaux
préparatoires must be used carefully.115 One of the problems is that often the tra-
vaux are not publicly accessible, which raises the question whether in those cases
110 Historical interpretation closely resembles subjective teleological interpretation as discussed in Chapter
5. It is discussed separately because it is often recognized in its own right in theoretical literature.
111 McRae (2002), p. 216.
112 See Bernhardt (1995), p. 1419, who notes that this method of interpretation prevailed for a long period
before the drafting of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. McRae (2002), p. 216, also
refers to the travaux préparatoires as important evidence of the intention of the drafters. See also
Aryal (2003), p. 15, referring to Lauterpacht who argued that the travaux préparatoires are a legitim-
ate and desirable means to ascertain the intentions of the parties’. Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 384, is
more sceptical of the relevance of the travaux préparatoires and argues that they reflect the intentions
of the parties at the preparatory stage, but not their intentions with regard to the final text.
113 Article 32 VCLT:
Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from
the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to
Article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
114 Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 383 is rather absolute in his statement. He also refers to judicial practice
that reveals that the ICJ often found reference to the travaux préparatoires not necessary or even
not possible given the secondary status of these documents in the VCLT, see p. 387- 389. Aust (2007),
p. 245, however, defends the statement that even if the ordinary meaning of a provision is clear,
if the ordinary meaning is in contradiction with the travaux préparatoires, these latter documents
will be used to correct’ the ordinary meaning. According to his opinion, this is also the way these
documents are used in practice.
115 Aust (2007), p. 247. See also: Villiger (2009), p. 446; Bernhardt (1999), p. 14-15.
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they may be resorted to. The VCLT does not provide any guidance on this question,
so each court should decide for itself whether non-publicly accessible travaux may
be relied upon.116 As will be shown below, this question seems to be answered in
the negative by the CJEU. Furthermore, even if they are accessible, travaux prépara-
toires are notoriously unreliable.117 Reference is made to the incompleteness of the
travaux, the fact that they are often contradictory or that they contain self-serving
statements for political purposes.118 As a result the travaux can be misleading and
should be used carefully.
A final problematic aspect of relying on travaux préparatoires is whether they
should be used in the context of multilateral treaties where states may accede at a
later stage, like the EU or the ECHR.119 The states that accede to a treaty at a later
stage have not been able to influence the travaux préparatoires. Both AUST and
ARYAL agree with the ILC that travaux préparatoires can also be invoked in cases
between parties that did not take part in the preparatory negotiation process.120 In
their view, parties acceding to a treaty either had the opportunity to take notice of
the travaux préparatoires because they are publicly available or the parties could
have requested to see the travaux before acceding to the treaty.121 Therefore the
travaux can be relied upon even in the case of multilateral treaties. BERNHARDT,
however, argues that in the context of multilateral treaties travaux préparatoires should
have a minor role.122 These problematic aspects affect the historical method of inter-
pretation, because the travaux préparatoires play such a crucial role in the context
of this method.123 The method, therefore, does not play a very prominent role in
the interpretation of the treaties central to this thesis as will be discussed below.
The use of this method of interpretation in respect of the ECHR system is also rather
limited due to the specific nature of this system, namely a system progressively trying
to reach a certain goal.124 This feature shows an inherent inclination towards a more
dynamic kind of interpretation rather than a historical one. Already in its early cases
the ECtHR has referred to the European Convention as a living instrument, thereby
116 Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 383.
117 Aryal (2003), p. 37; Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 383-386; McRae (2002), p. 218.
118 See, among others, Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 383-384.
119 See Aust (2007), p. 247; Aryal (2003), p. 40-41.
120 Commentary to articles of Vienna Convention, Yearbook of International Law Commission, 1966-
Vol. II, p. 223. See also: Aust (2007), p. 247; Aryal (2003), p. 40-41
121 Commentary to articles of Vienna Convention, Yearbook of International Law Commission, 1966-
Vol. II, p. 223.
122 Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 387, referring to Bernhardt (1963). See also Bernhardt (1999), p. 14.
123 Bernhardt (1999), p. 14-15.
124 This follows amongst others from the wording of the preamble referring to further realization of
human rights’ and to the first steps for the collective enforcement’.
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reducing the relevance of the historical interpretation.125 This phrase has been re-
peated in numerous subsequent cases and has become one of the fundamental features
of the European Convention.
Within the confines of the system of the European Convention the travaux pré-
paratoires are the main (if not only) representatives of the historical method of
interpretation. Despite the fact that the principle of dynamic interpretation126 contra-
dicts the historical interpretation, the ECtHR has made use of the travaux préparatoires
on some occasions.127 In order to get a feeling of how the ECtHR uses the travaux
préparatoires as an element of the historical interpretation, reference will be made
to some cases of the ECtHR. In the Johnston128 case the travaux préparatoires
served to show the limits of interpretation for the ECtHR. The ECHR held that a right
to divorce could not be read into the European Convention as no such intention could
be deduced from the travaux préparatoires. On different occasions the ECHR referred
to the travaux préparatoires in order to support an interpretation already sustained
by other interpretation methods.129 In some instances where reference is made to
the travaux, this is done by the dissenting judges to a certain case in order to support
(generally) a more restrictive interpretation.130 Of course for many issues the travaux
préparatoires do not provide any help, simply because the drafters could not anticipate
all societal developments. This factor, beside the principle of evolutive interpretation
clearly limits the usefulness of the travaux préparatoires.
This quick glance at the case law warrants the question whether there are any
reasons behind the decision whether to resort to the travaux préparatoires or not.
It would also be relevant to analyze in the case law when the ECtHR ignores or
sidesteps the travaux préparatoires and in what kind of situations it respects them.
The question is whether there is a consistent line in this respect. Even though historical
interpretation will not be part of the case law analysis, these questions are also relevant
in the context of evolutive interpretation, because if the travaux préparatoires are
applied this means that there is no room for an evolutive approach.
125 ECtHR, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A No. 26, § 31.
126 This principle will be discussed in the following section.
127 See Lawson (1996) for an elaborate account of the role of the travaux préparatoires in the 80s and
90s.
128 ECtHR 18 December 1986, Johnston and others v Ireland, A/112, § 52.
129 For example: ECtHR (GC), Banković and others v. Belgium and others, decision of 12 December
2001, Reports 2001-VII, § 65; ECtHR, Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pederson v Denmark, judgment
of 7 December 1976, Series A No. 23, § 50; ECtHR, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v
Belgium, judgment of 23 June 1981, Series A No. 34, § 65.
130 See for example the dissenting opinion of Judge Thór Vilhjálmsson in the case of ECtHR, Sigurdur
A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A No. 264.
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Within the EU legal system the role of the historical interpretation method is even
more limited. Due to ‘the dynamic character of the Treaties as laying down programs
for the future the reference to the travaux préparatoires tends to diminish as the dates
of concluding the Treaties recede into the past’.131 Not only does this specific feature
of the Treaties play a role in the use of historical interpretation, the accessibility of
the travaux préparatoires is a highly important limitation in the context of the CJEU,
as indicated above. There are no published travaux préparatoires of the Treaties,
which has led Judge Kutscher to state that: ‘Documents which are not generally
accessible must, ..., be ruled out as aids to interpretation for constitutional
reasons’.132 This seems to be the line taken by the CJEU, as hardly any reference
to the travaux préparatoires can be found. Interpretation concerning secondary
legislation, however, might involve a reference to the subjective intention of the
parties, as the preparatory documents are sometimes available for secondary legis-
lation.133 For reasons of transparency, preparatory works are more regularly published
and it has been asserted that this might change the approach of the CJEU in the
future.134 The question is whether that statement is true, because publishing the
travaux préparatoires does not change the dynamic character of EU law.
In conclusion, one could say that the historical method of interpretation in the
context of these European systems is limited to the question whether the courts refer
to the travaux préparatoires in their interpretation in order to shed any light on the
(subjective) intentions of the drafting parties. It is clear that due to the characteristics
of both systems this method plays a limited role. Despite that limited role it would
be interesting, as has been mentioned above, to get more insight into the role of these
documents in the interpretation process. Historical interpretation as a method will
not be studied more closely in this thesis, but the role of the travaux préparatoires
will be addressed in the context of evolutive interpretation and teleological interpreta-
tion.
4.3.5 Comparative method of interpretation
The comparative method of interpretation has been developed by supranational courts
like the CJEU and ECtHR and does not follow from the Vienna Convention.135
Comparative interpretation means interpretation where the judge in question uses
131 Brown & Kennedy, (2000), p. 332.
132 Arnull (2006), p. 614 referring to a report of a Conference in 1976.
133 Brown & Kennedy (2000) p. 333; Llorens (1999), p. 379; Schermers & Waelbroeck, (2001), p. 16;
Lasok, & Millet, (2004), § 671.
134 Arnull (2006), p. 615.
135 One could argue that one version of comparative interpretation does flow from the Vienna Convention,
but that argument will be explored in the context of Chapter 6.
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foreign or international materials in order to find the meaning of a specific pro-
vision.136 Under this method reference can be made to the laws of Member States,
as well as laws of third countries, or treaties that are outside the framework of the
treaty in question. There is no common understanding of which materials can and
cannot be relied on in the context of comparative interpretation.137 Also the purposes
of relying on these materials may differ. Foreign materials can be used to support
a certain interpretation, but they can also be decisive in establishing a certain inter-
pretation, the choice depending on the court employing this method. Both the CJEU
and the ECtHR have mainly referred to the laws of the Member States in order to
support a specific interpretation, so this section will focus on that type of comparative
interpretation.138
Why has this method been invoked by the supranational courts under study? One
possible explanation might be that relying on the laws of the Member States to argue
in favour of or against a specific interpretation may help in engaging the Member
States in the enterprise of fundamental rights protection in Europe. It certainly helps
the supranational courts to check whether sufficient ground can be found for a specific
interpretation. The supranational courts are, on the one hand, faced with a mix of
Member States that differ on many levels, for example, socially and culturally. On
the other hand, effective protection of fundamental rights requires a high level of
protection for all individuals within the jurisdiction of the respective court. This
constitutes a certain tension, since it will not always be easy to convince all Member
States of the need to afford a specific type of protection. The use of comparative
interpretation might prevent the CJEU and ECtHR from running ahead of theMember
States and as a result risk losing its credibility.
The comparative method will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6. For that reason,
only a short introduction will be provided here in order to indicate what is meant
when the respective courts resort to this method.
In the context of the European Convention, the comparative method of interpretation
(also referred to as the ‘consensus method’)139 is one of the most important methods
in the interpretation process. The term ‘consensus’ refers to a crucial element of the
method, i.e. the laws of the Contracting States will be compared in order to check
whether a consensus on a certain issue can be found. If this consensus can be found,
the ECtHR will adopt the interpretation in line with the consensus. If, however, no
such consensus can be found, Contracting States will often be able to decide for
136 Alexy (1989), p. 239.
137 See section 6.1.1.
138 Chapter 6 will explore other versions of comparative interpretation as well.
139 For example: Heringa, (1996).
67
Chapter 4
themselves whether they will provide protection or not (or in some cases the ECtHR
will adopt an autonomous interpretation; see for a discussion section 4.4.1.3 below).
In the case of Schalk and Kopf, for example, the ECtHR had to decide whether Article
12 of the European Convention entailed an obligation to allow for same-sex
marriages.140 In order to be able to answer that question, the ECtHR took into
account the situation in the different Contracting States and concluded that no con-
sensus could be found concerning the acceptation of same-sex marriages.141 This
sounds rather straightforward, but if one examines the way the ECHR has employed
this method in its case law, many questions arise. What can be considered a con-
sensus? Is this established on the basis of a simple majority? Are there any criteria
for establishing a consensus? Could the use of the consensus approach lead to a lower
degree of protection after the accession of many new Contracting States? How does
the comparison itself take place? Is there a checklist that will be applied in each
instance of comparing? Will all Contracting States be considered? Is the consequence
of the existence or non-existence of a consensus always the same?When will national
differences (not) be allowed? It is questions such as these that will be considered in
more detail in Chapters 6 and 10 of this thesis.
The involvement of the comparative method in the general interpretation process
before the CJEU is often less explicit in its judgments. In the context of interpretation
of EU law in general it has been said that notions of EU law have an independent
meaning, but that inspiration may be drawn from national interpretations.142 In the
specific context of fundamental rights the comparative method of interpretation plays
a rather prominent role, because the CJEU introduced the whole concept of funda-
mental rights into, at that time, Community law by labelling them general principles
of Community law, derived from the constitutional traditions of Member States.143
In other words, the domestic constitutions serve as one of the sources for the concept
of fundamental rights in EU law. This again raises many questions, some similar to
the ones noted above for the ECtHR and some different. How does the CJEU deter-
mine whether something can be considered common to the constitutional traditions
of the Member States? Will a majority be sufficient to support the finding of a
common principle? What is the effect of the enlargement of the EU on this consensus
finding? How does the comparison take place? Who undertakes the comparison: the
CJEU, Advocate General or maybe a third body? What if no common tradition can
be found? What is or might be the influence of the EU Charter on this method? This
140 ECtHR, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, judgment of 24 June 2010, unpublished.
141 ECtHR, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, judgment of 24 June 2010, unpublished, § 58.
142 Llorens (1999), p. 380.
143 See Chapters 3 and 13.
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is just a short and by no means exhaustive insight into the kind of questions that come
up and that will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 13.
4.3.6 Conclusion
In the previous sections a short overview of different interpretation methods has been
presented, most of which have their basis in the Vienna Convention. The aim has
been to indicate briefly what the methods entail and to what extent the use of these
methods is relevant in the context of fundamental rights interpretation by
(supra)national courts. Teleological interpretation and comparative interpretation both
seem to play an important role in the interpretation of fundamental rights before the
CJEU and the ECtHR. Other interpretation methods, like textual interpretation,
systemic interpretation or historical interpretation, often appear to provide outside
boundaries for the interpretation of fundamental rights, but they may be less helpful
in determining the specific meaning of a provision. For example, the often vaguely
worded fundamental rights provisions can have many different meanings, so textual
interpretation is hardly helpful, except when the linguistic opposite of the wording
of the provision is argued. In that case textual interpretation can often be used to set
the boundaries of what can be achieved by means of interpretation. Historical inter-
pretation plays only a limited role in the context of both the CJEU and the ECtHR,
since both courts deal with treaties with a dynamic character. Systematic interpretation,
however, does play a more prominent role in the interpretation process. This method
helps the courts to understand the provisions in their context and respect the treaty
as a coherent whole instead of a collection of separate provisions.
4.4 PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION
The second part of this chapter will provide an overview of the most important
principles of interpretation employed by the ECtHR or the CJEU. Most bodies inter-
preting treaties use similar interpretation methods, which are often methods that are
also regularly employed in a national context. The use of interpretative principles
depends, much more than is the case with interpretation methods, on the context of
the specific treaty. Interpretative principles, as explained in section 4.1, entail an
objective of the interpretative process. They are, therefore, closely related to the
character of the treaty in question. As a result it depends on the specific treaty as
to which interpretative principles are relevant. Some interpretative principles, thus,
might not play any role in a specific treaty context, for example, the principle of
uniform interpretation; not every treaty might aim towards harmonization. A discussion
of the different principles that play a role in the context of the CJEU and the ECtHR
is necessary to complete the interpretative framework of both courts, which exists
for both interpretation methods and principles. As has been said, contrary to interpreta-
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tive principles, interpretation methods do not say much about the character of a treaty.
For that reason, adding interpretative principles to the framework of interpretation
helps to emphasize the specific character of a particular treaty.
The preliminary understanding that not every court employs the same interpretative
principles explains why the second part of this chapter is structured on the basis of
the two courts and not, like the first part, on the basis of interpretative principles.
For both the CJEU and the ECtHR the most important interpretative principles found
in the literature will be discussed; the list is not intended to be exhaustive. The aim
is to discuss briefly what these interpretative principles entail and, insofar as is
possible, their relation with interpretation methods. The chapter will provide an
overview of a number of principles, not all of which will be used for the analysis
in this thesis. The selection of principles and methods to be examined specifically
for the case law of the CJEU and the ECtHR will be explained at the end of the
present chapter (section 4.5).
4.4.1 European Court of Human Rights
The ECtHR has developed several principles that play an important guiding role in
the interpretation process. Some of these principles are qualified in the literature as
interpretation methods (e.g. autonomous interpretation), but on the basis of the dis-
tinction made in section 4.1, for the purpose of the analysis in this thesis, these
interpretative aids are qualified as interpretative principles. The most relevant ones
within the context of interpretation will be discussed in this chapter.
4.4.1.1 Principle of evolutive interpretation
The European Convention on Human Rights provides long-term guarantees against
human rights violations in Europe. Societies do, however, change over the course
of time, which could result in changes in societal and human rights standards as well.
If the meaning of these Convention guarantees were fixed at the time of the adoption
of the Convention, the Convention runs the risk of losing its relevance in modern
society. A certain degree of flexibility when interpreting the Convention would help
the European Court of Human Rights to keep the Convention alive. The ECtHR has
incorporated this flexibility into the Convention system by qualifying the Convention
as a living instrument which needs to be interpreted in light of present-day con-
ditions.144 This is called the evolutive approach or is referred to as the ‘living instru-
144 The first time that the ECtHR recognized this principle was in the case of ECtHR, Tyrer v. United
Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A No. 26.
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ment doctrine’. Both concepts are used interchangeably by the ECtHR,145 but this
thesis will adhere to the term ‘evolutive interpretation’. In this section the recognition
of evolutive interpretation and the basis for this interpretative principle will briefly
be discussed. Chapter 7 will address the meaning of the principle of evolutive inter-
pretation in more detail.
The question is how this principle found its way into the reasoning of the ECtHR.
After all, the text of the Convention itself does not explicitly provide for an evolutive
approach. The preamble does refer to ‘the maintenance and further realization of
human rights’, but that is a rather broad reference that does not explicitly refer to
an evolutive approach. Despite this lack of clear textual support the ECtHR has
consistently said in its case law that the Convention is a living instrument that should
be interpreted in an evolutive manner. Indeed, the concept is entirely developed in
the case law. The first case in which the ECtHR recognized an evolutive approach
was in 1978, in Tyrer v United Kingdom.146 In this case a schoolboy complained
about corporal punishment and claimed that this violated Article 3 of the Convention
(prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment). The boy was sentenced
to three strokes of the birch on his bare posterior in the presence of his father. The
question before the ECtHR was whether this constituted degrading treatment. Without
providing any reasons for invoking a new approach, the ECtHR recalled that ‘the
Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in light of present-day
conditions’. It is not entirely clear whether the evolutive approach had a major
influence on the outcome of the Tyrer case, but the ECtHR did decide that the corporal
punishment constituted degrading treatment. More important for the present discussion
is that the qualification of the Constitution as a living instrument has become a
standard part of the reasoning in many subsequent cases and it has developed into
one of the most important concepts in the interpretation process of the ECtHR.147
The principle of evolutive interpretation provides a good example of one of the
interpretative aids that are referred to in different qualifications by various authors.
In section 4.1 the example has already been given of MATSCHER who, contrary to
LEACH, qualifies evolutive interpretation as an interpretation method.148 HELFER
and RIGAUX also understand evolutive interpretation to be an interpretation
method,149 while PREBENSEN seems to acknowledge that evolutive interpretation
should be qualified differently by referring to the ‘doctrine’ and ‘principle’ of evolutive
interpretation.150 These differences create confusion, most importantly regarding
145 Mowbray (2005), p. 64.
146 ECtHR, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A No. 26.
147 Prebensen (2000), p. 1123; Mowbray (2005), p. 60.
148 Matscher (1993), p. 68-70; Leach (2005), p. 164.
149 Helfer (1993); Rigaux (1998), p. 41.
150 Prebensen (2000), p. 1123- 1124, 1126. See also summarily Jacot-Guillarmod (1995), p. 61.
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the role that evolutive interpretation plays in the reasoning of judgments. As has been
explained in section 4.1, a method of interpretation provides a technique that leads
to an interpretative outcome, while a principle of interpretation only provides an
objective for the interpretative process. Qualifying evolutive interpretation as a method
of interpretation, thus, wrongly implies that a judge with the help of this principle
alone can interpret a specific provision. An interpretative principle, however, can play
an important role in the interpretative process, but only as a supplement to one or
several interpretation methods.
Interestingly, the fact that the ECtHR introduced an evolutive approach through
its case law did not attract much controversy.151 This does, however, not mean that
there are no debates on evolutive interpretation; the case is quite the contrary. The
debates on evolutive interpretation focus on how the ECtHR invokes evolutive inter-
pretation in its cases.152 Evolutive interpretation, in short, means that provisions
of the Convention will be interpreted in accordance with contemporary standards.
The principle does not give much guidance as to which element should be taken into
account when interpreting in an evolutive manner, unlike textual or systematic inter-
pretation. One could argue that the reference to present-day conditions is equal to
a reference to the situation in the different Contracting States. That is, however, a
limited understanding of present-day conditions. It would be analytically more helpful
to regard the relation between ‘present-day conditions’ and looking at different
Contracting States as a strong link between a version of comparative interpretation
and the principle of evolutive interpretation. Thus, a better perspective would be to
view this as an example of the interconnectedness between interpretation methods
and principles, since separating this method and principle respects their different roles.
Moreover, in theory different interpretation methods could play a role in determining
the present-day conditions. For example, the contemporary meaning of a certain term
may have changed,153 or the object and purpose could be viewed in a contemporary
light. There might, for instance, be a different understanding of the purpose of the
protection of one’s private life in 2010 than what would have been the purpose of
protecting one’s private life in 1960. Furthermore, the adoption of a new protocol
could lead to a different context, which through a systemic interpretation could have
an impact on a specific interpretation.
A related question is whether the principle of evolutive interpretation is used in
practice to supplement these interpretation methods or whether it is mainly used in
151 Prebensen (2000), p. 1124.
152 See for example Mowbray (2005), p. 71; Matscher (1993), p. 69-70; Bernhardt (1999), p. 21-23,
refers to some critical questions, but also to some problems that are directed at the interconnectedness
with comparative interpretation.
153 Linderfalk (2008), p. 111, discusses that with the passing of time words are given new meanings.
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combination with comparative interpretation. The case law analysis provided in
Chapter 11 will be able to provide an answer to this question.
In this thesis, most attention will be paid to the question what it really means to take
an evolutive approach. In Chapter 7 a theoretical perspective will be taken in order
get a basic understanding of the different aspects that play a role in evolutive inter-
pretation. The role of evolutive interpretation in the interpretative framework will
also be addressed. Chapter 11 will subsequently deal with the case law analysis and
shed some more light on the evolutive approach in practice. The question is whether
the ECtHR addresses all concerns that emerge from the theoretical analysis or whether
there are areas for improvement.
4.4.1.2 Principle of practical and effective rights
The special nature of the European Convention as a law-making treaty granting rights
to individual citizens, compels a different approach towards the rights that have been
laid down in the document than would be the case for purely contractual treaties.154
The ECtHR has explicitly acknowledged this special character of the European
Convention by stating in Wemhoff that ‘given that it is a law-making treaty, it is also
necessary to seek the interpretation that is most appropriate in order to realize the
aim and achieve the object of the treaty, not that which would restrict to the greatest
possible degree the obligations undertaken by the Parties’.155 The ECtHR has
adopted, among others, the principle of practical and effective rights in order to ensure
the relevance of the enumerated rights and to prevent the document from becoming
a dead letter. Numerous cases contain a reference to this doctrine by stating that the
European Convention does not protect rights that are theoretical and illusory, but
serves to protect rights that are practical and effective.156 This description by the
ECtHR already indicates that it is an objective that is taken into consideration when
interpreting Convention rights, but not a technique on how to interpret these rights.
Some consider teleological interpretation to be synonymous with effective interpreta-
154 See among others Matscher (1993), p. 66; Greer (2006), p. 195-196; Mahony (1990), p. 65; Rietiker
(2010), p. 246, who all argue that the ECtHR has a character distinct from reciprocal contractual
treaties between states.
155 ECtHR, Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A No. 7.
156 A HUDOC-search over the first six months of 2010 rendered at least 30 judgments in which the
ECtHR invoked a reference to the principle of practical and effective rights. The ECtHR did not
in all these cases invoke these references in the interpretative phase, but for example, in ECtHR,
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, judgment of 7 January 2010, unpublished and in ECtHR, Vanjak v




tion,157 but others consider it to be an aspect of teleological interpretation.158 The
latter qualification is in line with the division described earlier in this chapter and
respects the role that the method and this principle play in the interpretation process.
The ECtHR seems to agree with this position, since in Stoll they referred to the
‘principlewhereby the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are not theoret-
ical or illusory, but practical and effective’.159
The use of this principle is not confined to one particular right. It is a general
principle, which is applicable to all rights laid down in the European Convention.160
The ECtHR has even applied it to the institutional provisions of the Convention in
order to prevent rigid legal formalism from occurring.161 In the case of Klass and
others, for example, the ECtHR held that the concept of ‘victim’ as contained in
Article 34 of the European Convention (then Article 25) must be applied in a manner
that renders the Convention enforcement machinery effective. The ECtHR emphasized
that: ‘The procedural provisions of the Convention must, in view of the fact that the
Convention and its institutions were set up to protect the individual, be applied in
a manner which serves to make the system of individual applications efficacious.’162
The European Convention itself does not provide any basis for the principle; it
has been introduced and developed in the case law of the ECtHR. This does not mean
that it is a principle that only features in ECtHR case law. On the contrary, it is a
recognized principle of treaty interpretation more generally.163 It has not been
included explicitly in the VCLT, but according to the commentary to the VCLT, the
principle of practical and effective rights is embodied in the reference to ‘good faith’
and ‘object and purpose’ contained in Article 31 VCLT.164 The use of this principle
is also visible in the case law of, for example, the International Court of Justice and
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.165 Nevertheless, the principle of practical
157 Aust (2007), p. 231.
158 See Fitzmaurice (2010), p. 202.
159 ECtHR (GC), Stoll v. Switzerland, judgment of 10 December 2007, unpublished.
160 Schokkenbroek (2000), p. 7.
161 See Merrils (1993), p. 113-114; Schokkenbroek (2000), p. 2.1 8.
162 ECtHR, Klass and others v Germany, judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A No. 28, § 34.
163 Fitzmaurice (2010), p. 202 refers to the fact that this principle has been acknowledged by the
International Law Commission. In the context of treaty interpretation, this principle is often referred
to as the principle of effet utile’ or the principle of effectiveness’, which is similar to the principle
of practical and effective rights. Given that the ECtHR uses the terminology of practical and effective
rights’ this terminology will be used here as well.
164 See: Commentary to articles of Vienna Convention, Yearbook of International Law Commission,
1966- Vol. II, p. 219.
165 See Rietiker (2010), p. 256.
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and effective rights ‘has taken its most prominent place’ in the context of the European
Convention.166
The commentary by the ILC already provided a justification for the use of the
principle of practical and effective rights, namely that this is inherent to interpreting
a treaty in good faith in line with the object and purpose of a treaty. The ECtHR has
provided a similar justification for its use of the principle of practical and effective
rights.167 In Soering the ECtHR held that: ‘the object and purpose of the Convention
as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings require that its pro-
visions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effect-
ive’.168 Along the same lines, the ECtHR held in Osman that interpretation of Con-
vention provisions must be compatible with ‘the requirements of Article 1 of the
Convention and the obligations of Contracting States under that Article to secure the
practical and effective protection of the rights and freedoms laid down therein’.169
Both justifications, one more explicit than the other, refer to the object of the European
Convention, namely the protection of fundamental rights for individual human beings.
Interestingly, the principle of meta-teleological interpretation, as explained in section
4.1, thus plays an important role in this justifying the use of the principle of effective-
ness.
As has been mentioned, the principle of practical and effective rights has been devel-
oped in the case law of the ECtHR and it is therefore useful to discuss one of these
cases as an illustration of what this principle actually entails. TheAirey case constitutes
a famous example of the application of the principle of practical and effective
rights.170 The case concerned a woman who wanted to obtain a decree of judicial
separation from her abusive husband. Due to her low income she was unable to pay
the costs of such legal proceedings and since there was no legal aid available this
left her without any access to court. The ECtHR concluded that there was a positive
obligation on the Irish state to provide legal assistance forMs. Airey in order to ensure
her effective access to court. An important element in this case is that it clearly shows
166 According to Rietiker (2010), p. 256, who refers to Koskenniemi, who argues that in the context
of human rights treaties the principle of practical and effective rights has been used to a wider extent
than in the context of other treaties.
167 Schokkenbroek (2000) referring to the case of ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7
July 1989, Series A No. 161, § 87 and ECtHR McCann and others v United Kingdom, judgment
of 27 September 1995, Series A No. 324, § 146.
168 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161, § 87.
169 ECtHR (GC), Osman v. United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports 1998-VIII.
170ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A No. 32.
75
Chapter 4
that this principle can be used as a basis for the positive obligations doctrine.171
The ECtHR has often applied this concept in order to establish a positive obligation
on the side of the state.172 The underlying idea is that states cannot offer effective
protection by ‘simply remaining passive’.173 Simultaneously, this case exemplifies
the perceived risks that are connected to this principle. The principle almost auto-
matically leads to extensive interpretation of the rights laid down in the Conven-
tion.174 This is due to the fact that the emphasis is placed on the question of what
can be achieved on the basis of these rights and how to ensure their (maximum)
effectiveness for the protection of individual human beings.175 The perspective of
the individual leads to an emphasis on extensive interpretation, since that is generally
beneficial for the protection of their rights. This perspective is also visible in the
ECtHR’s judgments, for example in Vilho Eskelinen. The ECtHR in this case recalled
its case law in order to establish whether an old criterion on the basis of which the
court could determine whether Article 6 was applicable to civil servants had to be
changed. The ECtHR observed that: ‘It is important to note that the Court emphasized
that in applying a functional criterion it must adopt a restrictive interpretation, in
accordance with the object and purpose of the Convention, of the exceptions to the
safeguards afforded by Article 6 § 1 ... This was to limit the cases in which public
servants could be denied the practical and effective protection afforded to them.’176
Adopting a practical and effective approach thus often leads to a restrictive interpreta-
tion of the exceptions in the European Convention and an extensive interpretation
of the rights therein.177
One of the dangers of interpreting in a practical and effective manner is therefore
that it stretches beyond interpretation into law making, since it seems to provide ‘a
carte blanche for unlimited judicial legislation’.178 There are, however, limitations
to this doctrine which prevent the abovementioned consequences. First of all, one
should not forget that this principle is a principle of interpretation and therefore the
text and system of the Convention still play an important limiting role when it actually
comes to determining the meaning of certain Convention notions.179 In the case
171 See also Mowbray (2005), p. 72, who refers to the case of ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, judgment
of 13 June 1979, Series A No. 31.
172 Mowbray (2005), p. 72.
173 Mowbray (2005), p. 78.
174 Vande Lanotte (2005), p. 183; Schokkenbroek (2000), p. 6; Merrills (1993), p. 102.
175 Merrills (1993), p. 106, where he even asserts that the aim of the Convention is to ensure maximum
effectiveness.
176 ECtHR (GC), Vilho Eskelinen and others v. Finland, judgment of 19 April 2007, unpublished, § 48.
177 See also Vande Lanotte (2005), p. 183, who refers to ECtHR (GC), Mamatkulov and Askarov v.
Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I.
178 Merrills (1993), p. 119.
179 Merrills (1993), p. 199-120.
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of Johnston, for example, the question was posed whether effective protection of
family life (Article 8 ECHR) imposed a positive obligation on the state to permit
divorce.180 The ECtHR held that, since it concluded under Article 12 of the Conven-
tion that it did not entail a right to divorce, the interpretation of Article 8 could not
be isolated from the interpretation of Article 12. Thus the system of the European
Convention prevented the ECtHR from adopting a rather extensive interpretation.
Moreover, the object and purpose and the relation with the Contracting States play
an important role in the interpretation process and can limit the judicial discretion
under the principle of practical and effective rights.181
Despite the danger of judicial law making, the principle itself has not been sub-
jected to much criticism in academic literature. This could be the result of sensible
use of the principle by the ECtHR.182 The principle in itself is widely accepted,
even beyond the context of the European Convention as has been discussed above,
but the use of this principle in individual cases can be criticized for going too far.
If criticism is voiced it could be because in a specific case the reliance on one of
the interpretation methods is not convincing to more conservative critics. This might
result in criticism being directed at the method of interpretation and not necessarily
at the principle of practical and effective interpretation.
Hence, it has been shown that the principle of practical and effective interpretation
plays a prominent role in the interpretation process of the ECtHR. The principle has,
however, not been selected for further analysis in the context of this thesis – priority
has been given to other meta-teleological principles. The purpose of this discussion
therefore only has been to briefly provide an overview of the role of this principle
in the context of the ECtHR.
4.4.1.3 Principle of autonomous interpretation
One of the characteristics of the interpretation process of the ECtHR is that some
notions are granted an autonomous or ‘European’ meaning.183 This means that some
notions of a Convention provision are granted a ‘status of semantic independence:
the meaning is not to be equated with the meaning that these very same concepts
possess in domestic law’.184 The description clearly demonstrates that this is a prin-
180 ECtHR, Johnston and others v. Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A No. 112.
181 Merrills (1993), p. 118-120.
182 Mowbray claims that the ECHR has been careful not to impose undue burdens on states. Mowbray
(2005), p. 78.
183 Schokkenbroek (2000), 2.1 p. 9; Ost (1992), p. 305.
184 Letsas (2004), p. 282.
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ciple of interpretation and not a method of interpretation.185 The description refers
to a goal or objective, namely to grant an autonomous or European meaning, but it
does not provide any indication as to what this meaning should be. The content of
this autonomous meaning should be established by relying on interpretation methods.
A logical follow-up question is which interpretation methods are mostly used to
establish an autonomous meaning. This will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 8 from
a theoretical perspective and Chapter 12 on the basis of a case law analysis.
The use of the principle of autonomous interpretation can be justified by reference
to the Vienna Convention, which provides in Article 31(4) that terms may be given
a special meaning. On top of that, regardless of the rules on treaty interpretation, the
Vienna Convention has made an exception for treaties adopted in the context of an
international organization; in that case the rules of the specific organization pre-
vail.186 According to GANSHOF VAN DER MEERSCH this provision alone would justify
the principle of autonomous interpretation, given the object and purpose of the
European Convention, which has been concluded in the context of the Council of
Europe.187
The ECtHR also justifies the application of this principle in the interpretation
process by emphasizing that, if it were to take a different approach, states would be
able to circumvent or escape responsibility under the European Convention.188 It
would leave the European Convention dependent on national classifications, which
would seriously undermine the credibility of the European Convention as a minimum
level of protection of fundamental rights. The case of Engel189 is one of the leading
examples of the application of this principle in the case law of the ECtHR. It con-
cerned the question whether penalties for military disciplinary offences could be
considered criminal in the sense of Article 6 ECHR. The government claimed that
they could not, since national law classified these offences as disciplinary. While
respecting the national distinction between disciplinary and criminal charges, the Court
did not leave it at that. It established, despite this distinction, its own criteria to
ascertain whether something qualified as a criminal charge, regardless of the national
classification. The ECtHR has adopted a similar approach in many subsequent cases.
Even though the ECtHR regularly employs the principle of autonomous interpreta-
tion, it has not developed a general theory underlying this principle.190 Neither does
185 For authors referring to autonomous interpretation as a method of interpretation, see Kastanas (1996),
p. 344; Matscher (1993), p. 73; Sudre does not classify it as a method of interpretation in so many
words, but considers it an interpretative technique. Sudre (1998), p. 94.
186 Article 5 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
187 Ganshof van der Meersch (1988), p. 205.
188 Letsas (2004), p. 282; Sudre (1998), p. 94; Merrils (1993), p. 71.
189 ECtHR, Engel and others v. the Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A No. 22.
190 Schokkenbroek (2000), p. 9.
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the European Convention itself provide any reference to the principle of autonomous
interpretation. Likewise, it is difficult to establish exactly how the ECtHR uses this
principle: when it is applied and how the autonomous meaning is determined. What
interpretation methods play a role in establishing an autonomous meaning? The
theoretical chapter on autonomous interpretation will aim to provide a more in-depth
analysis of the meaning of and theory behind this principle. The relation with inter-
pretation methods and other principles will be the main focus of the case law analysis
in Chapter 12.
4.4.1.4 Democracy in the European Convention system
The preamble of the European Convention expressly refers to an effective political
democracy as the best form in order to maintain respect for fundamental rights. Not
only the preamble, but also certain provisions contain references to a democratic
society. To be more precise certain restrictions on the Convention rights are only
allowed when they are ‘necessary in a democratic society’.191 These examples reflect
the presence of the concept of democracy in many facets of the Convention.192
Several examples of the use of this concept have been discovered in the case law
of the ECtHR. First, and most important for our subject, according to some authors
democracy is to ‘justify and lend shape to, and priority among, the rights and freedoms
guaranteed’.193 In other words: democracy is used as a guiding principle for the
interpretation of the vague Convention terms.194 The problem is that the examples
given by these authors usually do not concern the interpretative phase of the judgment,
but the application phase.195 Democracy plays a role in underlining the importance
of certain interests that need to be balanced against each other in the application phase.
It is understandable that mainly examples of the application phase are discussed, since
many ECHR provisions contain an explicit reference to ‘democratic society’ in the
limitation clause. An important function of the notion of democracy is thus to enable
the ECtHR to make a distinction between justified and unjustified restrictions of the
Convention rights.196 In this sense democracy plays a role in the application of the
European Convention as well. Only in cases on Article 3 First Protocol, which
concerns the right to free elections and is consequently directly linked to democracy,
does the concept play a role in the interpretation phase. Finally, the concept plays
191 See article 8, 9, 10, 11 of the European Convention.
192 Mahony claims that even though it is not mentioned in other articles, democracy is a notion that
permeates the whole Convention system. Mahony (1990), p. 64.
193 Marks (1995), p. 231; Vande Lanotte (2005), p. 198.
194 Vande Lanotte (2005), p. 198.
195 See Chapter 1 on an explanation of the distinction between interpretation and application.
196 Marks (1995), p. 231.
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a role in ‘grounding certain rights that are directly connected to elections’.197 For
example, the eligibility to stand for elected office (Gitonas v Greece),198 the freedom
of expression of opposition politicians (Incal v Turkey)199 and participation in Euro-
pean parliamentary election (Matthews v UK).200
Even if democracy does not usually play an explicit role in the interpretation phase,
it is a notion that is strongly intertwined with the protection of human rights. As such
it is a background principle that does determine the context of all ECtHR judg-
ments.201 Indeed, the concept of democracy has been given a prominent place in
the Convention by the drafting states.202 Considering the moment of drafting the
Convention, in the aftermath of WWII, it is not surprising that the concept of demo-
cracy was used in order to clearly mark the contrast with totalitarianism.203 The
aim of the European Convention was to ‘preserve the rule of law and the principles
of democracy, and “[to] forestall any trend to dictatorship before it [was] too
late.”’204 Throughout the years the concept of democracy has not only been used
in order to stress the contrast with totalitarianism, but the concept of democracy has
also been used to contrast this concept with a regime in which there is an ‘absence
of adequate safeguards against arbitrary exercises of power’.205 Nevertheless, despite
the importance of this concept for the development of the European Convention, the
ECtHR has not identified a theoretical basis for the model of democracy that it
applies.206
The aim of briefly referring to the concept of democracy in the context of this
chapter has been to show the variety of principles that play an explicit or implicit
role in the interpretative framework, even though only a selection of these interpreta-
tive principles will be analyzed in the remainder of this thesis.
197 Marks (1995), p. 231.
198 ECtHR, Gitonas v Greece, judgment of 1 July 1997, Reports 1997-IV.
199 ECtHR (GC), Incal v Turkije, judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports 1998-IV.
200 ECtHR (GC), Matthews v. United Kingdom, judgment of 18 February 1999, Reports 1999-I. The
given examples are discussed by: Mowbray (1999), p. 713.
201 Mahony (1990), p. 64, refers to the Preamble and democracy and human rights on the basis of which
he claims that democracy and human rights are inseparable. Furthermore, he argues that indeed
democracy can play an implicit role in the interpretation of the European Convention, since any
theory of interpretation or review by the ECtHR must be compatible with that basic underpinning
of political theory [referring back to political democracy which he was referring to in that paragraph]’.
Mahony (1990), p. 81.
202 Mowbray (1999), p. 705.
203 Marks (1995), p. 211.
204 SeeWheatley (2007), p. 780, quoting from Robertson, Human Rights in Europe (2nd edn, Manchester
University Press, 1977).
205 Marks (1995), p. 212.
206 Ten Napel (2009), p. 465; Greer (2000), p. 18; Mowbray (1999), p. 723.
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4.4.1.5 Human dignity and personal autonomy
In addition to the concept of democracy there is another substantive principle that
plays a role in the interpretation process: the notion of human dignity. This principle
has not been explicitly included in the text of the European Convention, but it has
found its way into the case law of the ECtHR.207 In the words of the ECtHR human
dignity constitutes the ‘very essence’ of the European Convention.208 It is a value
or principle underlying all rights protected by the European Convention and as a result
the principle plays a role in the interpretation process.209 According to MCCRUDDEN
the principle played a role in cases on ‘the right to a fair hearing, the right not to
be punished in the absence of a legal prohibition, the prohibition of torture and the
right to private life’.210 In recent cases the concept has also been invoked in the
context of racial discrimination.211
The ECtHR regards human dignity thus as the essence of the European Convention,
but there is no general understanding of the content of this concept of human dig-
nity.212 It would require a thorough analysis of the different cases in which human
dignity plays a role in order to get an understanding of the meaning of this concept.
That would stretch beyond the purpose of this chapter and this thesis, which merely
is to indicate that human dignity has become an important principle in the interpreta-
tion process.
In recent cases the concept of personal autonomy has been playing an increasingly
important role in the case law of the ECtHR, especially in the context of the interpreta-
tion of Article 8, the right to respect for private and family life.213 The question
is whether this notion is a corollary of human dignity or whether it is a separate
concept. Both views can be defended and both views can be found in the case law
of the ECtHR.214 Once again, it would go far beyond the purpose of this chapter
to discuss the positions in the debate about human dignity and personal autonomy
in more detail. The purpose of mentioning the notions of human dignity and personal
autonomy in the present context is to indicate that the ECtHR might develop more
207 McCrudden (2008), p. 683, indicating that the European Convention is an exception compared to
other post-Second World War human rights texts, the majority of which includes explicit references
to human dignity.
208 ECtHR, Pretty v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 April 2002, Reports 2002-III. See further:
McCrudden (2008), p. 683 and Koffeman (2010), p. 6-7.
209 McCrudden (2008), p. 683 and Koffeman (2010), p. 6-7.
210 McCrudden (2008), p. 683.
211 McCrudden (2008), p. 690.
212 McCrudden (2008), p. 724, argues that this is a more general problem connected to the judicial use
of the concept of human dignity.
213 See on the concept of personal autonomy the case law of the ECtHR: Koffeman (2010).
214 Koffeman (2010), p. 5-8.
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substantive principles that play a role in the interpretation of the provisions of the
European Convention. They play a role in the interpretative framework, in addition
to interpretative principles like evolutive and autonomous interpretation.
4.4.2 Court of Justice of the European Union
A discussion of the principles that guide the Court of Justice of the European Union
and its Advocates General in the interpretation process is much more difficult and
complex than is the case for the ECtHR. Several reasons can be put forward to explain
this. First of all, the CJEU does not adjudicate in fundamental rights cases only. It
has a wide jurisdiction and deals with a highly diverse range of cases. Debates on
the interpretation methods and approach adopted by the CJEU therefore not necessarily
focus on the interpretation of fundamental rights and are simply not always relevant
in the context of fundamental rights. When studying the literature, it is thus necessary
to constantly question whether the assumptions are also applicable in the process of
interpreting fundamental rights. In some cases it might not even be possible to draw
any conclusions without an extensive study of the case law itself. Especially in the
context of the CJEU, it is therefore crucial to undertake a thorough case study in order
to draw appropriate conclusions – indeed, this will be done for a number of selected
principles in Chapter 13.
A second complicating factor is that fundamental rights have a different status
in the EU legal order than within the European Convention system. For the CJEU,
fundamental rights – being classified as general principles of (EU) law – serve two
main functions. On the one hand they serve as guiding interpretative criteria in the
interpretation process of all EU law, insofar as they are relevant.215 On the other
hand they figure in a ‘much more immediate fashion as a direct yardstick by which
to gauge the legality of Community acts’.216 The difficulty for the present discussion
lies in the fact that, within EU law, fundamental rights serve as interpretative criteria,
while this research endeavours to establish which interpretative criteria guide the
interpretation of exactly these fundamental rights. They are both the question and
the answer in this discussion, which does not provide much clarity as to their precise
function for the interpretative reasoning by the CJEU.
A final complicating factor is that, with regard to fundamental rights within EU
law, many authors do not speak about interpretation. Instead they refer to the elabora-
215 AG Omega § 61 Referring as well to Weiler & Lockhart (1995), p. 51 & 579; Reich (2005), p. 32.
Steiner (2006), p. 115
216 AG Omega § 61. Referring as well to Weiler & Lockhart (1995), p. 51 & 579 who speak about
fundamental rights serving as a principle of validation. Steiner (2006), p. 115.
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tion or development of fundamental rights.217 This could be just a terminological
matter due to the fact that fundamental rights within the EU have for a long time
not been codified in any binding document. At the same time, due to this different
terminology, it is difficult to get a grip on the exact manner of interpretation or
development of fundamental rights by the CJEU. How does this Court determine the
exact meaning of fundamental rights? Why are some rights protected and others not?
The answer to such questions might become easier to discern since the EU Charter
on Fundamental Rights became binding in December 2009, but whether this will really
be the case depends on the attitude the CJEU will take towards the Charter. The
discussion on the interpretation process of these rights has remained somewhat unclear,
as has already been said above, due to the function of fundamental rights in the EC
system. The discussion generally does not extend beyond the claim that teleological
and comparative interpretation play an important role, followed by a discussion of
the outcome of the different relevant cases. Therefore it remains vague how the CJEU
derives concrete rights by using these different methods and what justifications have
been provided for the concrete outcomes.218
Due to these factors the discussion below still might leave many questions un-
answered. The case law analysis will try to find answers to these questions. The
discussion below is interesting nonetheless, since it will provide food for phrasing
more specific questions and assumptions that can be tested in the case law analysis.
4.4.2.1 Principle of meta-teleological interpretation
An important factor that becomes clear when researching the interpretation process
of the CJEU is that the teleological method plays a crucial role. In section 4.1 mention
has already been made of the concepts of micro-teleological interpretation and meta-
teleological interpretation. These concepts have been introduced by LASSER.219 As
has been indicated, micro-teleological interpretation is a method of interpretation that
is used to establish the object and purpose of a specific provision or piece of legis-
lation, i.e., at a rather concrete level of abstraction. Meta-teleological interpretation
takes place at a much higher level of abstraction and deals with the treaty system
as a whole. Meta-teleological arguments produce certain principles that underlie the
treaty system as a whole and should therefore be taken into account in the interpreta-
tion of any provision of the treaty or any other form of legislation under this treaty
system.
217 See for example: Groussot (2006), p. 11, but he uses both terms; Blanke (2006), p. 267, who refers
to the judicial methodology of the development of fundamental rights. Steiner (2006), p. 117.




The meta-teleological principle should thus be distinguished from the micro-
teleological principle of interpretation: even though the latter is also employed both
by the CJEU and the Advocates General, it is the former that shapes the interpretative
approach of both institutions.220 On the basis of a case law analysis, LASSER has
been able to distinguish four meta-purposes that recur in many cases and which also
feature in many different discussions on interpretation by the CJEU (not always placed
in a similar setting as LASSER does). According to LASSER, effectiveness, uniformity,
legal certainty,221 and legal protection are the meta-purposes sought after by the
CJEU. These purposes ensure ‘the appropriate nature and structure of the Community
legal system’. The problem with the analysis by LASSER for the purpose of this
research project is that it does not concentrate on fundamental rights, but on the EU
legal system as a whole. It therefore needs to be established in our own case law
analysis whether the assumptions of LASSER also hold in a fundamental rights context.
The teleological method of interpretation will be discussed in a later chapter.
Below, the principles of effectiveness and uniformity will be singled out and discussed
in some more detail and they will be related to the other principles and methods of
interpretation.222 One aspect of the principle of uniformity is the ‘practice of giving
concepts an autonomous Community definition’.223 The principle of uniformity will
therefore be referred to as the principle of autonomous interpretation.
4.4.2.2 Principle of effectiveness (effet utile)
The principle of effectiveness, or effet utile as it is also called in the EU context, has
been identified by LASSER as one of the main meta-teleological principles.224 Other
authors have employed descriptions in line with this qualification by referring to the
principle of effectiveness as an extension or application of the teleological method.225
Some authors regard the principle of effectiveness and the method of teleological
interpretation to be one and the same.226 However, this qualification whereby the
principle of effectiveness and the method of teleological interpretation are considered
220 Lasser (2004), p. 209-210.
221 This discourse is closely related to that of uniformity and often appears simultaneously. Lasser (2004),
p. 219.
222 Legal protection is not that relevant in the context of interpreting fundamental rights as they offer
legal protection themselves. Therefore this meta-purpose cannot provide much guidance for the content
of these rights. It seems to be rather a principle of application and in that context relevant for the
duties upon courts of the different Member States. This purpose will therefore not be dealt with in
the subsequent discussion.
223 Millett (1989), p. 164.
224 Lasser (2004), p. 212.
225 Tridimas (1996), p. 208; Millett (1989), p. 181; Fennelly (1996), p. 674.
226 Reich (2005), p. 30; Groussot (2006), p. 12; Schermers (2001), p. 21.
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as one concept ignores that even though principle and method might be closely
connected, they have a different role to play in the interpretation process, as has been
described in section 4.1. In this thesis, therefore, the principle of effectiveness and
the method of teleological interpretation will be considered as related, but separate
concepts.
The principle of effectiveness derives from international law and entails that treaty
provisions should be interpreted in such a way as to attain its object and purpose and
gain practical value.227 A clear basis for this principle has not been provided in
the founding treaties. As has been said, LASSER has justified the use of this principle
on the basis of meta-teleological consideration. In other literature on the CJEU, not
much attention is given to the question whether any basis can be found for the use
of this principle. If any attention is paid to this aspect at all, the fact that it is a
recognized principle in international law is regarded as sufficient justification for the
use of the principle.228 Another question is what this principle means in the context
of the CJEU. The CJEU has recognized this principle as one of the general principles
of law, but it has not provided an explanation of the meaning of this principle.229
Nor has a clear, detailed description of this principle been provided in the literature.
This does not lead much further than that under this principle maximum effect should
be granted to EU law, which still remains rather vague. LASSER also refers to the
principle of effectiveness as a ‘vague and multifarious concept’.230 His analysis of
a number of Advocate General opinions shows a pattern, that when the argument
of effectiveness comes into play in an opinion this tilts ‘the debate into ever higher
levels of Community institutional policy’.231 Thus the effectiveness of the EU system
as a whole is sometimes brought into play. The examples given in the literature often
refer to the effectiveness of EU law in relation to the Member States.232According
to this notion, a certain EU provision cannot be interpreted in such a way that it would
grant Member States the opportunity to hamper the effectiveness of EU law. The
question is whether, in the context of the interpretation of fundamental rights, the
CJEU employs this principle as well and whether, in that context, it also focuses on
the effectiveness for the purpose of EU law or effectiveness for the purpose of
individual protection. This is difficult to establish on the basis of the literature and
should therefore be established on the basis of a case law analysis. It is relevant to
analyze if considerations based on the effet utile play any role at all in the interpreta-
227 Commentary to articles of Vienna Convention, Yearbook of International Law Commission, 1966-
Vol. II, p. 219. See also: Kutscher (1976), p. 39; Millett (1989), p. 180.
228 See for example Brown & Kennedy (2000), p. 343.
229 Tridimas (2005), p. 418.
230 Lasser (2004), p. 212.
231 Lasser (2004), p. 213, where he provides some examples as well.
232 See Tridimas (2005), p. 418-419.
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tion of fundamental rights, because the principle seems to provide a useful tool for
the supranational judge to argue why in a certain case preference should be attributed
to individual protection. In other words, it can provide the European judge with a
tool for determining when the balance between the best individual protection and
respect for national differences should tilt in the direction of the former.
4.4.2.3 Principle of autonomous interpretation
The principle of autonomous interpretation means that terms of EU lawmust be given
‘an independent and uniform interpretation’, independent from the Member States.233
Or, as the CJEU has put it: terms must be given a ‘Community meaning’.234
This principle finds its basis in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
which provides that a term may be given a special meaning.235 Moreover, Article 5
of the Vienna Convention ensures that account must be taken of the articles of
interpretation of the Vienna Convention, but subject to the specific rules of the
organization within which the treaty has been adopted, in this case the EU.236
Although the CJEU never seems to have stated that it considers itself bound by the
Vienna Convention, it is still useful to know, since we are dealing with treaty inter-
pretation, that a basis can be found within the general principles of treaty interpreta-
tion.
Despite its basis in the Vienna Convention, some additional justification is needed
for the employment of the principle by the CJEU. As has been stated above, uniform-
ity is an important consideration in this respect. This argument is relevant in the
broader EU law context and plays an important role in that respect, but it is question-
able whether in the area of fundamental rights this notion of uniformity is equally
relevant. Fundamental rights concern controversial moral and social issues, which
can be closely connected to the identity of a state. An autonomous interpretation of
fundamental rights may therefore have quite some impact, which could warrant a
careful use of the principle of autonomous interpretation in, for example, a moral
context.237 On the other hand a certain level of uniformity might be needed to ensure
233 Millett (1989), p. 177.
234 Reich (2005), p. 27 referring to the CJEU in the case of Levin (C-53/81,D.M. Levin v Staatssecretaris
van Justitie [1982] ECR 01035).
235 Article 31(4) Vienna Convention on the law of treaties. This has also been explained in section 4.4.1.3.
dealing with the ECtHR.
236 According to Ganshof van der Meersch this provision in itself allows for an autonomous interpretation
in accordance with the object and purpose of the treaty. Ganshof van der Meersch (1988), p. 205.
237 This could be the case in cases like Grogan (C-159/90, The Society for the Protection of Unborn
Children Ireland Ltd v Stephen Grogan and others [1991] ECR I-04685), where the CJEU had to
deal with a highly controversial topic like abortion and the spread of information on abortion.
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sufficient protection of fundamental rights and therefore autonomous interpretation
should not be ruled out per se. The amount of caution that should be exercised by
the CJEU also depends on the way this autonomous interpretation is established.
Reference has already been made to the fact that the CJEU establishes fundamental
rights on the basis of national constitutional traditions. According to KÜHLING, the
CJEU does take the constitutional traditions of the Member States into account by
resorting to the comparative method when trying to establish an autonomous interpreta-
tion.238 This comparison does not bind the CJEU and the teleological method still
plays a role, but in KÜHLING’S view the CJEU would always need to respect the ‘core
values of a Member State’.239 In other words the limits of autonomous interpretation
will be determined by the Member States. This raises the question whether this is
truly autonomous interpretation. Are the national constitutional traditions only used
as a starting point or are they decisive in establishing fundamental rights?
In the context of fundamental rights the CJEU is not only confronted with Member
States, but also with the interpretations of the ECtHR. In many cases the CJEU adopts
the interpretation given by the ECtHR, but in some cases the CJEU has adopted an
interpretation autonomous from the ECtHR.240 These interpretations provide an
additional difficulty for the CJEU to take into account, because given the importance
of the ECtHR one could argue that the CJEU cannot lightly ignore the interpretations
of the ECtHR.241 It therefore raises interesting questions. The main question is in
what kind of situations the CJEUwill adopt an approach autonomous from the ECtHR.
What kind of justifications is provided when the CJEU interprets autonomously from
the ECtHR?
The discussion in the literature provides a rather limited view of how the auto-
nomous interpretation works in the case law practice of the CJEU and more particular-
ly in the context of fundamental rights. A more detailed theoretical discussion and
a case law analysis are therefore necessary to find a more detailed answer to the two
most prominent questions: What role does the principle of autonomous interpretation
play in this context and how is such an autonomous meaning established? Is it truly
autonomous interpretation?
4.4.2.4 Principle of evolutive interpretation
Just like in the case of the ECtHR in the context of the EU the question is relevant
whether there is some judicial mechanism for the CJEU to keep EU law in line with
238 See for just one example of many: Kühling (2006), p. 505.
239 Kühling (2006), p. 506.
240 Douglas-Scott (2006), p. 648.
241 See also Lasser (2009), p. 216, referring to the pressure the CJEU must feel from the ECtHR.
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the needs of a changing society, because the EU is a long-term project which is
supposed to resist the test of time. Interestingly enough, evolutive interpretation does
not seem to play a very prominent role in the case law of the CJEU.242 At least
on the basis of the literature, it seems correct to conclude that this principle does not
play an explicit role. The evolutive character of EU law is often stated as a fact of
life, given the nature of EU law as a programme for the future.243 BROWN refers
to ‘the dynamic character’ of EU law,244 TRIDIMAS argues that the ‘European Com-
munity is by its nature a dynamic entity’,245 ALBORS LLORENS states that ‘EC law
is evolutionary law’246 and KUTSCHER claims that the character of EU law demands
an evolutionary approach.247 What is striking about these references, when compared
to literature on the ECtHR, is that hardly any author qualifies evolutive interpretation
as a method of interpretation.248 Most authors view evolutive interpretation as a
characteristic of the EU legal order. This is in line with the division and qualification
made in this thesis. As explained in section 4.1 on evolutive interpretation by the
ECtHR, the principle does not indicate which substantive argument should be con-
sidered in order to interpret a specific provision. It is merely an objective that should
be considered when employing different interpretation methods. Viewing evolutive
interpretation as a characteristic which is automatically taken into account when
interpreting fundamental rights is rather similar to viewing it as an interpretative
principle. In both cases one acknowledges that an evolutive approach can or should
be taken, but that interpretation methods are needed to provide a range of interpretative
options.
It has already been said that the CJEU itself hardly ever refers to evolutive
interpretation. It could be that it is considered to be so obvious that an evolutive
approach should be taken when interpreting EU law that this is implicit in the reason-
ing of the CJEU. But even if this is inherent in the CJEU’s approach, it is interesting
to know exactly how the evolutive interpretation is established. In the EU literature,
evolutive interpretation is often linked with the method of teleological interpreta-
tion.249 Is this the only method used to establish evolutive interpretation or do other
methods of interpretation play a role as well?
242 In literature on the CJEU and evolutive interpretation the term dynamic interpretation is more
commonly used; however, for consistency in this thesis the term evolutive interpretation will be used.
243 Brown (2000), p. 332; Groussot (2006), p. 4; Millett (1989), p. 163; Tridimas (1996), p. 205 & 208
where he refers to the dynamic interpretation of EC law.
244 Brown (2000), p. 332.
245 Tridimas (1996), p. 205.
246 Albors Llorens (1999), p. 379.
247 Kutscher (1976), p. 38.
248 Reich (2005), p. 31.
249 See for example Reich (2005), p. 31; Schermers (2001), p. 20-21.
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The fact that evolutive interpretation does not play an explicit role in the case
law of the CJEU perhaps explains why no specific description of evolutive interpreta-
tion is given. This means that, unlike in the ECtHR context, there is no standard phrase
that EU law should be interpreted in line with present-day conditions. The exact
meaning of evolutive interpretation therefore remains unclear. The theoretical and
case law analyses should bring more clarity in this respect.
The previous discussion focused on interpretation before the CJEU in general. An
important question in the context of this thesis is, however, whether evolutive inter-
pretation plays any role when interpreting fundamental rights. It is hard to deny that
the CJEU has employed an evolutive approach (albeit perhaps not explicitly) in other
fields, for example, regarding the increasing role of the European Parliament.250
The question remains whether the CJEU has considered it appropriate to adopt this
approach as well in dealing with fundamental rights? GROUSSOT has argued that ‘the
CJEU appears as the reflector of common constitutional or legal values rather than
the guide of dynamic and new legal trends’.251 In his view the evolutive approach
is linked to the comparative interpretation method, because ‘a lack of consensus
between the laws of the Member States may impede the elaboration of a general
principle’.252 This finding makes the question by which method the CJEU establishes
an evolutive interpretation even more interesting, especially since it was found above
that teleological interpretation is mainly associated with evolutive interpretation.
4.5 CONCLUSION
The main aim of this chapter has been to sketch the interpretative framework of the
ECtHR and the CJEU. An important distinction has been made between interpretation
methods and interpretative principles. Both have an important role to play in the
interpretation process and they can often complement each other in order to reach
an interpretation of a certain provision. The aim has been to point out the most
important interpretation methods that have been discussed in the literature on both
European Courts. In addition, for each court the most important interpretative prin-
ciples have been discussed. Some can be found at both courts, like evolutive and
autonomous interpretation, but others, like the principle of human dignity, only play
a role at one of the courts.
250 Tridimas (1996), p. 208 uses the case of Les Verts (CJEU C-294/83, Parti écologiste "Les Verts"
v. European Parliament [1986] ECR 01339) as an example.
251 Groussot (2006), p. 132.
252 Groussot (2006), p. 132.
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The remainder of this thesis will only deal with two interpretation methods and
two interpretative principles that have been selected for further analysis. The criterion
for selection has been the question whether these interpretative aids in some way help
judges specifically address the multilevel context in which they have to operate. Both
courts under analysis in this thesis have to deal with the tension between, on the one
hand, providing individual fundamental rights protection, and, on the other hand, trying
to respect national legal systems as well.
Teleological interpretation and comparative interpretation have been selected as
relevant interpretation methods. Comparative interpretation has been added, since
it helps the courts to get a clear picture of what the state of affairs is in the different
Member States. This can help the courts to adopt interpretations that might be more
easily accepted by the Member States. Teleological interpretation has been selected,
since through this method of interpretation judges are able to take into account the
multilevel nature of the European systems when interpreting specific terms. The
purpose of the system is to protect fundamental rights in a multilevel legal system,
namely the EU or the Council of Europe and through teleological interpretation this
can be taken into account. Meta-teleological reasoning that has been discussed in this
chapter provides a basis for interpretative principles that respect the object and purpose
of the system.Meta-teleological reasoning will, however, not be discussed separately,
but some of the principles based on this form of reasoning will be discussed. These
selected principles are the principles of evolutive and autonomous interpretation.
Evolutive interpretation has a strong link with comparative interpretation and therefore
a discussion of this method of interpretation would not be complete without also
discussing evolutive interpretation. Furthermore, autonomous interpretation is the
expression of the above described tension in interpretative terms. Autonomous inter-
pretation means that a uniform European interpretation will be sought in order to
provide individuals the same level of protection. It is therefore very interesting to
see whether any pattern in the use of this principle can be established on the basis
of both the literature on and case law analysis of both courts.
The analysis of these methods and principles will be divided in two stages. First,
the interpretative aids will be analyzed on the basis of a theoretical discussion. This
theoretical discussion will provide a more thorough analysis of these methods and
principles, but it will also raise many questions that will be used as a basis for the
subsequent case law analysis. The case law analysis will aim to answer many of the
questions raised in the theoretical chapters. In the end this combination of theoretical




This chapter aims to continue the discussion on the teleological method of interpreta-
tion that was started in Chapter 4. The idea is to provide more depth to the discussion
on this particular method of interpretation. Some more theoretical background should
generate information on the basis of which questions can be formulated for the case
law analysis. Another aspect that will be dealt with in this chapter is the connection
between this specific method of interpretation and the relevant principles of interpreta-
tion, like evolutive and autonomous interpretation.
In Chapter 4 the teleological method of interpretation has been briefly introduced.
The chapter briefly touched upon the reference to the teleological method in the
Vienna Convention. The Vienna Convention formulates teleological interpretation
as interpretation according to the object and purpose of a treaty, which is a common
way of phrasing this method of interpretation. It has also been shown in that short
discussion that the teleological method is widely used by both courts under review
in this thesis. The primary purpose of this chapter is to provide a thorough overview
of the teleological method. Moreover, the question why this method can be regarded
as a legitimate method of interpretation will be discussed.
In Chapter 4 a distinction was introduced between meta-teleological reasoning
and micro-teleological reasoning. Meta-teleological reasoning refers to reasoning based
on certain principles that have been derived from the object and purpose of a specific
treaty. The qualification as meta-teleological interpretation refers to the origin of these
principles, namely in the object and purpose of the treaty in question. Micro-teleo-
logical interpretation, on the other hand, has been qualified as a method whereby a
provision or a specific notion in the treaty is interpreted in light of the object and
purpose of the treaty in general or the object and purpose of the provision in question.
This micro-teleological reasoning is what is known as teleological interpretation in
the sense of being an interpretation method.1 The following discussion will focus
on this understanding of teleological interpretation as a method of interpretation. Meta-
teleological interpretation will be addressed by discussing some of the interpretative
principles that have been derived from the object and purpose of the treaty. In the
context of this thesis evolutive interpretation and autonomous interpretation have been
identified as such interpretative principles. They will be discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.
1 See Lasser (2004), p. 207-208.
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5.1 A THEORETICAL POINT OF VIEW
The theoretical discussion on the teleological method of interpretation will be struc-
tured according to four questions that can be posed with respect to this method of
interpretation.2 As a starting point, the question what it means to interpret according
to object and purpose will be discussed in section 5.1.1 Subsequently section 5.1.2
will deal with the expression ‘object and purpose’. Thirdly, attention will be drawn
to the matter of establishing the object and purpose of a piece of legislation (in this
case a treaty) in section 5.1.3. Finally, the criticism or drawbacks of this method will
be discussed in section 5.1.4. These questions will be discussed from a theoretical
angle, drawing from insights of both the discussions about the national and inter-
national contexts.3 In addition, these insights will be related to the specific context
of a multilevel legal order, like the European Convention and the EU. Both the
national and international theoretical debates are relevant, since the EU treaty and
the European Convention are not ‘classical’ international treaties and they might have
some characteristics that are more similar to a national constitution.4 Therefore,
presenting both international and national views might help to improve the understand-
ing of teleological interpretation before the CJEU and the ECtHR, not least because
in both discussions different aspects appear to be emphasized.
2 Similar questions have also been posed in the literature. Even though the author does not explicitly
ask these questions, Jonas & Saunders try to answer most of the questions posed here in this thesis
as well. Jonas & Saunders (2010), p. 577-582. Similarly, Buffard & Zemanek (1998) address questions
of terminology and methodology for the use of the notions object and purpose’.
3 Even though the notion of interpreting according to object and purpose’ has existed in some form
or another for centuries in international law, the concept of object and purpose has not received much
systematic attention and Klabbers claims that little is known about this concept. Klabbers (1997),
p. 139-140 and 159. Since 1997 some more attention has been paid to this concept by a few recent
authors, but the attention remains somewhat limited. See for some recent contributions: Buffard &
Zemanek (1998); Linderfalk (2007); Jonas & Saunders (2010). Therefore the main theoretical elements
will derive from a theoretical discussion within a national context.
4 In his article on analogies between constitutional law and international law, Helfer (2003) argues
that it can be valuable to learn from discussions in a national constitutional context for problems
existing at the international level. One should, however, be careful not to transpose national constitu-
tional solutions too easily. He discusses several themes in which relevant analogies can be found
between the national and international level.
The discussion here in this thesis also takes into consideration discussions on teleological interpretation
of national legislation. The discussions on teleological interpretation do not always make a clear
distinction between constitutions and other national legislation (see for example Barak (2005), p.
xi). Therefore discussions on teleological interpretation of legislation might be reflected in the




5.1.1 Interpreting by reference to object and purpose
Teleological interpretation starts from the assumption that legislation is rationally
drafted with a certain purpose5 or that legislation serves as an instrument to achieve
‘certain legal, social or economic goals’.6 According to this method, any interpretation
has to be compatible with this particular purpose.7 To put it differently: ‘the meaning
of a legal rule should be established on the basis of the good the rule aims to promote
or the evil it seeks to avert.’8 It means that the consequences of interpreting a legal
text in a certain way must contribute to the realization of the goals and purposes of
this legal text.9 Thus, the purpose of a measure provides an interpreter with an
evaluative basis to prefer one interpretation over another.10 The question is why this
legislative purpose should be taken into account. In the light of the division of powers
this purpose should play a role when determining the meaning of the text as well.
If a judge were to ignore the purpose for which a specific text has been drafted, this
judge could be accused of taking the place of the legislator by redesigning the legal
text.
This automatically brings up the following question: exactly what purpose should
be considered for this type of argument? Should it be the (subjective) purpose of the
author of the legislation in question, or a more objective purpose? Different theoretical
views have been developed to answer this question and there certainly is not one
5 This is the reason why this method is sometimes referred to as purposive interpretation as well, e.g.
Barak (2005). Cueto-Rua (1981), p. 178, draws an analogy between a legislator and a carpenter: both
use their tools as an instrument to achieve a certain purpose. See further MacCormick (2005), p.
133-134. He emphasizes that legislation does not accidently come into being; they are the product
of legislative decisions’.
6 Feteris (2005), p. 459. See also Barak (2005), p. 220.
7 Even though teleological interpretation encompasses both the object and purpose of a legislative text,
when dealing with the question whether a subjective or objective approach should be taken, generally
only the purpose is referred to. This might be explained by the fact that the method is sometimes
called: purposive interpretation. Alternatively this might be explained by the claim of Buffard &
Zemanek, who claim that within traditional teleological interpretation the distinction is superfluous’.
Buffard & Zemanek (1998), p. 323. A short discussion, however, on the notion of object and purpose
will follow in the next section of this chapter.
8 Feteris (2005), p. 460 paraphrasing Fuller, Positivism and the Fidelity to the Law- A Reply to
Professor Hart’, 71 Harvard Law Review 1958, 630-672.
9 Feteris (2005), p. 460-461; see also MacCormick (2005), p. 134. The latter author considers this
interpretation method a manifestation of consequentialist reasoning, which he discusses in his book
on legal reasoning. It would stretch beyond the purpose of this thesis to discuss consequentialism
here.
10 MacCormick and Summers (1991), p. 514.
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correct answer.11 In itself this is already a complicated matter to be dealing with,
but it is further complicated by the lack of a generally accepted definition of subjective
and objective purpose of a piece of legislation. In order to provide a convincing answer
to the question posed above, it is therefore necessary to first explain what will be
regarded as subjective and objective purpose in the context of this thesis.
Some authors conceive the subjective purpose of a piece of legislation to be the
real purpose the author(s) (or drafters) had in mind when creating the text.12 It is
a historical and static fact that cannot really change in time.13 Societies, however,
do develop, therefore situations might occur which were not foreseen by the drafters.
In some situations it might be possible to make an educated guess as to what the
purpose of the drafters would have been had they taken these developments into
account. The term ‘subjective purpose’, however, does not refer to the purpose the
author14 of the legal text would have had if he/she had thought about such a matter.
This is considered a ‘hypothetical intent’, which is deemed to fall under the scope
of the concept of ‘objective purpose’.15 This form of hypothetical intent does not
reflect the true intent of the author of the legal text, because it is a guess about what
this author would have intended if certain circumstances would have occurred.16
Only the real purpose or true intent of the author counts as the subjective purpose.
The meaning of the notion of ‘subjective intent’, however, is still debated. LINDER-
FALK, for example, appears to regard subjective purpose as a slightly broader concept
than the ‘real purpose’ or ‘true intent’ of the author.17 By claiming that it is not
11 See Barak (2005b), p. 93, for references to some discussions on the question whether the purpose
is subjective or objective. MacCormick & Summers (1991), p. 519, also refer to the fact that the
question whose purpose should be taken into consideration is a hotly disputed issue.
12 Barak (2005), p. 120, this purpose of the authors includes: the values, objectives, interests, policy,
aims and function that the authors sought to realize’. MacCormick and Summers (1991), p. 520. See
also: Jonas & Saunders (2010), p. 581.
13 Barak (2005), p. 120.
14 Barak (2005), p. 120 argues that when the author of a legal text is a collective body, the shared
purpose or intent of that entity counts and not the purpose or intent of all its individual members.
15 Barak (2005), p. 121.
16 Barak (2005), p. 121, refers to three forms of hypothetical intent. Only the first can, in some circum-
stances count as subjective purpose, because in that case it will come as close as possible to the real
intent. According to Barak the first sense refers to the situation where the real intent is unknown,
but where the hypothetical intent can be established on the basis of the legal community’s life
experience. The second way to understand hypothetical intent, is when the author never thought about
a certain fact, but if she or he had, then the author would have had this in mind. In this case one
should guess at the intent of the author and therefore this cannot be qualified as the subjective purpose.
The third way of understanding hypothetical intent is the intent the author would have had as a
reasonable person’. Only the first understanding can count as the real intent and thus as the subjective
purpose.
17 Linderfalk (2007), p. 205 and 228-229 (footnote 6).
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possible to reconstruct the intent of the author with absolute certainty, he also includes
a rational reconstruction of the purpose of the original legislator. The fact that the
real purpose of the original legislator will sometimes have to be based on a reconstruc-
tion of ‘the legal community’s life experience’ is not denied by those who adhere
to a strict explanation of the subjective purpose.18 The question is, however, whether
according to LINDERFALK a hypothetical reconstruction of the purpose of the original
legislator is also included under the term ‘subjective purpose’, i.e., a reconstruction
of what the legislator or drafter would have thought if they had thought about the
matter. That is the point where LINDERFALK could differ from other authors, but it
does not become clear whether that is what he proposes. Thus, in fact it is not possible
to say for certain whether LINDERFALK really adheres to a broader understanding of
the subjective purpose, or whether he just confuses hypothetical (and thus objective)
intent and subjective intent. Regardless of this debate, the notion of ‘subjective intent’
will for the purpose of this thesis be considered to be the purpose the original author
had in mind when drafting the treaty. Even though this may be a reconstruction of
the actual purpose, a hypothetical intent will not be included under the concept of
‘subjective purpose’.
It might be interesting to note that some scholars have claimed that the subjective
purpose of the author at the time of creating the legislation does not form part of the
teleological method of interpretation, since they only consider the objective purpose
to be relevant for teleological interpretation.19 This does not necessarily mean that
the purpose the original lawmaker had in mind cannot play any role in the interpreta-
tion process at all. In the context of the Vienna Convention reference has been made
to three schools of interpretation: the textual school, the subjective school and the
teleological school.20 The textual school emphasizes the importance of the text in
treaty interpretation. The subjective school considers the intentions of the parties to
be of primary importance. This closely resembles the subjective purpose that has been
discussed in the context of this chapter.21 The teleological school only refers to the
objective purpose as discussed below, and considers the subjective intent to be
irrelevant to teleological interpretation.
The concept of objective purpose has been described by many to constitute the
intent of the ‘reasonable author’22 or an ‘ideally rational author’23 of a legal text.
ALEXY considers objective teleological arguments to be based on ‘rational aims or
18 See Barak (2005), p. 121.
19 Smith (2005), p. 152. Jacobs makes the same distinction. Jacobs (1969), p. 303.
20 See, among others, Shaw (2008), p. 932-933; Vanneste (2010), p. 221-225.
21 Vanneste (2010), p. 223, indeed argues that this method has a strong teleological component.
22 Barak (2005), p. 148.
23 MacCormick & Summers (1991), p. 520.
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on objectively prescribed aims in the framework of the valid legal order’.24 BARAK
adds that the objective purpose reflects ‘the need of society’ and is an ‘expression
of a social ideal’.25 It is clear that the objective purpose is thus ‘disassociated from
the original lawmaker’.26 The objective purpose is, however, not disassociated from
the text of the treaty to be interpreted; in fact the objective purpose can only be
achieved if the text allows this.27
The preference for one of the two different concepts of purpose depends on one’s
view of the importance of each of these concepts. One’s view on the importance again
depends on one’s position in the theoretical debate on the proper role of the judge
in the legal order.28 In general one could say that in a view where the subjective
intention prevails, the role of the judge in the interpretation process is rather narrow.
By using the intention of the author of the text in determining the meaning of a certain
term the judge has to respect the role of the original legislator and supposedly limit
its own discretion.29 This prevents a judge from becoming too activist. Adherents
of the more objective component of teleological interpretation have a different per-
ception of the role of the judge. They allow a judge to establish what a rational
lawmaker would consider the purpose to be, which might have even changed over
time, as will be discussed below. The judge in this view is thus granted much more
discretion to establish the object and purpose in comparison to a judge who is only
allowed to determine the purpose the original lawmaker had in mind.30
The preference for either the subjective or the objective purpose also depends
on the type of legislative text that needs to be interpreted. BARAK holds that in
constitutional interpretation the objective purpose should prevail.31 While the focus
of this thesis is on supranational treaties, this statement has some relevance, since
the European Convention and the EU treaties are sometimes considered to contain
constitutional elements.32 LINDERFALK, on the other hand, in discussing teleological
interpretation of treaties, claims that in treaty interpretation only the subjective purpose
should be taken into account, because of the specific role of the treaty parties in
24 Alexy (1989), p. 241.
25 Barak (2005), p. 148.
26 Linderfalk (2007), p. 228-229.
27 Barak (2005), p. 148.
28 For a good overview see Barak (2005), p. 221 et seq.
29 The term supposedly is used since Dworkin has shown that this method leaves a lot of implications
to be made by the judge. Dworkin (1986), ch. 9.
30 See also Vanneste (2010), p. 225.
31 Barak (2005), p. 96.
32 See for example Helfer (2003), p. 199-201 where he discusses the constitutional character of the
European Union. On the ECtHR see Gerards (2009), p. 409-412, with further references.
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international law.33 A different position has been taken by BERNHARDT, who focuses
on the interpretation of international human rights treaties. In his view this type of
treaties requires an objective teleological approach, due to their special character.34
The question is which position is most relevant for the treaties that the CJEU and
ECtHR are supposed to interpret when dealing with fundamental rights. This is,
however, a matter that cannot be determined on a general basis for both legal orders
at the same time. Therefore the relation between the subjective and objective purpose
will be discussed below, when dealing with both legal orders separately (see sec-
tion 5.2).
5.1.2 Object and purpose?
In the discussion above on the meaning of the teleological method of interpretation,
no attention was paid to the expression ‘object and purpose’ itself. While this concept
is also part of teleological interpretation at a national level, much more discussion
on this expression has taken place in an international context.35 Therefore, before
dealing with the question how to establish the object and purpose, it is important to
give the meaning of this concept a moment of thought.
Within international law, reference to the object and purpose of a treaty is a
common approach, but the notion itself remains rather vague. One of the main ques-
tions is whether the object and purpose are distinct or synonymous notions,36 and
whether they can change over time. This is mainly relevant in order to be as trans-
parent as possible about this method of interpretation. If the meaning of the different
notions involved is clear, it is much easier to check whether this method is applied
in a legitimate manner.
International practice does not provide many clues as to the meaning of the
expression ‘object and purpose’. Within the scholarly debate, two alternatives have
been defended. On the one hand the position has been taken that the notions ‘object’
and ‘purpose’ can be used interchangeably and that no distinction between the two
should be made.37 This position is mainly based on English and German theoretical
discussions. The expression ‘object and purpose’ should thus be considered to refer
33 Linderfalk (2007), p. 205. This claim is supported by Klabbers, who claims that object and purpose
can only be the result of parties’ intentions’. Klabbers (1997), p. 150. Linderfalk even claims that
the distinction between objective and subjective purpose does not exist in international law.
34 Bernhardt (1988), p. 68 and 71.
35 See for example: Klabbers (1997); Buffard & Zemanek (1997); Linderfalk (2007), p. 207-211.
36 Klabbers (1997), p. 140; Buffard & Zemanek (1997), p. 342; Linderfalk (2007), p. 207-211.




to one notion, which is the general aim of a treaty.38 On the other hand it has been
argued, based on the French theoretical debate, that the two notions should be dis-
tinguished. According to BUFFARD & ZEMANEK ‘purpose’ refers to the aim of a treaty
and ‘object’ refers to the ‘legal instruments created for achieving the aim’.39 Accord-
ing to this view, connecting the ‘object’ to the ‘purpose’ of a treaty provides a link
between the aim of the treaty and its actual provisions and is therefore a restraint
on unfettered interpretation.40 On this ‘bifurcated’ reading of object and purpose,
however, other views have been expressed as well. KLABBERS has considered, for
example, the object to refer to an ‘immediate goal’ and the purpose to refer to a more
distant goal.41
While both positions seem to have some value, it seems that in the international
debate the former reflects the view of the majority.42 In the context of this thesis
object and purpose will therefore be used as a single notion. It is interesting to
consider this point in the case law analysis and try to find out whether the European
Courts make a distinction.
A different matter is whether the object and purpose remain the same over time. This
question is strongly connected to the issue of taking a subjective or objective teleo-
logical approach. If a subjective approach should prevail, it seems inherently im-
possible that the object and purpose can change with the passage of time. Subjective
teleological interpretation, as has been determined above, refers to the intent of the
original legislator and will therefore not change over time. In cases where an objective
teleological approach is followed, reference will be made to the rational or reasonable
legislator. Perceptions of what the rational or reasonable legislator thinks or intends
can change in time and therefore the object and purpose ascribed to a treaty may
change.43 This phenomenon has been called ‘emergent’ purpose.44 The extent of
the change depends on the level of abstraction at which the object and purpose are
discussed. The higher the level of abstraction, the more stable an object and purpose
are. Therefore a more abstract object and purpose will not change much throughout
the existence of a treaty. At a lower level of abstraction the object and purpose might
38 Buffard & Zemanek (1998), p. 323.
39 Buffard & Zemanek (1998), p. 332.
40 Buffard & Zemanek (1998), p. 332.
41 Klabbers referring to Elisabeth Zoller, La bonne foi en droit international public, 1977. Klabbers
(1997), p. 144-145.
42 See mainly references by Klabbers (1997), 145-148.
43 Linderfalk also acknowledges that the object and purpose of a treaty can be subject to change, but
is unsure in which cases this could be the case. Linderfalk (2007), p. 211.
44 Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 344; Vanneste (2010), p. 224; Jacobs (1969), p. 320, argues that the doctrine
of emergent purpose is widely recognized in the context of interpretation of constitutional documents.
98
Teleological interpretation
change in time, because when interpreting a provision the context of the legal issue
that needs to be resolved needs to be taken into account. Both the legal issue and
the context are subject to change and can therefore influence the object and purpose
of a treaty.45 When reviewing the case law of both the ECtHR and the CJEU it is
interesting to try to find out whether the object and purpose have gone through a
change and whether this has been justified in some way or another by the respective
courts.
5.1.3 How to determine the object and purpose
The question of how to determine the object and purpose is closely tied to the previous
question on whether the subjective or objective reading of purpose should be adhered
to. Depending on the choice of subjective or objective approach, different indicators
might play a role in establishing the object and purpose. Subjective purpose refers
to the actual purpose of the author of the legal text, while the objective purpose
involves a search for the purpose of a reasonable author. It is therefore relevant to
reflect on the different theoretical views on what can be considered an appropriate
way to establish the (subjective or objective) object and purpose.
While both national and international theoretical literature on the teleological
method have been consulted, for this discussion the international context will be most
relevant. The national context is really different with regard to the type of documents
that can and should be considered in determining object and purpose. Despite the
fact that the European Convention and the EU treaty are particular kinds of treaties,
they remain international treaties that have been established in a manner distinct from
national constitutions. The role and reliability of, for example, preparatory documents,
like travaux préparatoires, is different from the role and reliability of preparatory
documents in the national context.46 Guidance on how to establish object and purpose
should therefore be found in international legal theory, rather than in legal theory
that is directed at national or constitutional interpretation. This matter has, however,
not been extensively addressed in international law literature.47 As a result this section
will only provide a rather general overview of different aspects that could play a role
in determining which documents may be consulted for the purpose of teleological
45 Klabbers (1997), p. 149-150.
46 Travaux préparatoires are often referred to as not reflecting the intentions of the parties in a reliable
manner. Moreover, the fact that some State Parties join later and are not represented in the travaux
préparatoires is an additional factor leaving them less relevant. Both factors differ from a national
context. See Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 382-387, on a critical dicussion of the value of the travaux
préparatoires.
47 Klabbers (1997), p. 156.
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interpretation. The next sections, dealing with both courts individually, will address
the specific situation of each court.
As often in the context of this thesis, the Vienna Convention provides a good starting
point for a discussion on how to determine the object and purpose of a treaty. Articles
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention refer to different types of documents that can
be consulted in the interpretation process. These include agreements or instruments
created after the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by all parties and subsequent
agreements or practice between the parties. The preparatory works only have a
subsidiary place in the interpretation process. The category of supplementary means
of interpretation appears not to be limited. Many different documents could be
included on the basis of this provision.48 The commentary to this provision, however,
refers almost exclusively to the travaux préparatoires.49 It therefore seems that on
the basis of this provision mainly the travaux préparatoires are allowed as a secondary
source in the interpretation process. In order not to exclude relevant evidence, the
term travaux préparatoires has not been defined and a general reference has been
chosen.50
The question whether a subjective or objective teleological approach will be taken
to interpret a certain treaty determines to some extent the documents that may be taken
into consideration. For a subjective approach, the travaux préparatoires play a signi-
ficant role, since they reflect the intentions of the original legislators.51 The fact that
preparatory works are regarded as supplementary tools for interpretation reveals their
limited relevance in the interpretation process. This implies that the Vienna Conven-
tion, at least, does not support an entirely subjective approach.52
In order to establish the objective purpose, and also to some extent the subjective
purpose, the text of the treaty plays a significant role. The main elements of the text
of the treaty that should be considered are the title, the preliminary provisions, but
also the preamble of a treaty.53 They provide strong indicators of its object and
48 Aust (2000), p. 200.
49 Commentary to articles of Vienna Convention, Yearbook of International Law Commission, 1966-
Vol. II, p. 222-223.
50 Commentary to articles of Vienna Convention, Yearbook of International Law Commission, 1966-
Vol. II, p. 223.
51 Villiger (2009), p. 444, indicates that the travaux préparatoires are often relied upon to take a
subjective approach. See also Barak (2005), p. 135-136 and 140, referring to the legislative history
as a factor that helps to establish the subjective purpose.
52 McDougal claims that the reference to object and purpose in the Vienna Convention does not support
reference to the actual subjectivities of the parties’, but that the text reflects the real object and
purpose. McDougal (1967), p. 272-273.
53 Klabbers (1997), p. 156-157; Buffard & Zemanek (1998), p. 328. The Vienna Convention also refers
to the relevance of the preamble in art. 31.
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purpose.54 The category of documents that is relevant to establish the objective
purpose of a treaty can, however, be much broader than the text and its preamble.
While other documents might be accepted when establishing the objective purpose,
the further removed the documents are from the actual text of the treaty, the more
important it is that a proper explanation is given why these documents are consulted.
After all, a (too) lenient approach to the use of different documents might generate
accusations of judicial activism. The only problem is that no general guideline can
be given as to what can be considered as ‘too lenient’. This depends on one’s perspect-
ive on the role of the judge. How to deal with this problem will be discussed below.
A different aspect that, rather obviously, plays a role in determining the most appro-
priate documents for reference, is the availability of documents. The availability not
only has consequences for the type of documents that can be consulted, but also for
the interpretative approach that will be taken (objective or subjective). If, for example,
the travaux préparatoires have not been published, they cannot be consulted, which
means that a subjective approach seems hardly possible. Especially in the case of
multilateral treaties where not all parties have taken part in the negotiation process,
it might not be reasonable to use the travaux préparatoires to establish the object
of the treaty. More recent parties to the treaty cannot be held to comply with docu-
ments they have never been able to discuss.55 In this context it should be noted that
DWORKIN has argued against the use of authorial (legislative) intent in interpreting
legislation, albeit in the national context rather than in the context of international
law, mainly because of the problems involved in basing authorial intent on legislative
history.56 These difficulties primarily arise in the context of establishing the subjective
purpose. In the context of establishing the objective purpose the availability of (pre-
paratory) documents is not much of an issue, because of the prominent role of the
preamble, the text, the title and general clauses of a treaty.
Apart from these factors, KLABBERS holds that common sense and intuition can
be ‘useful indicators’ of object and purpose.57 This is probably true and these indi-
cators might be helpful, but they are far from being objective indicators. Reliance
on common sense and intuition makes an interpretation entirely dependent on the
person of the judge. That is not a very desirable situation and preference should be
given to objective indicators that lie outside the person of the judge. Common sense
54 See Klabbers (1997), p. 156, who lists several indicators of the object and purpose on the basis of
an analysis of cases by international courts. See also: Villiger (2009), p. 428; Orakhelashvili (2008),
p. 343.
55 Aust (2000), p. 199.
56 Dworkin (1986), ch. 9; MacCormick (2005), p. 135, referring to Dworkin; Barak (2005), p. 228,
also referring to Dworkin.
57 Klabbers (1997), p. 155.
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and intuition may lead to the right direction, but references to documents are still
always needed in order to test or support that initial assumption.
5.1.4 Criticism related to method in general
It has already been mentioned casually before, but it is such an important aspect that
it warrants a separate discussion: the critique on the teleological method of interpreta-
tion. In the literature the main point of critique is that this method could lead the judge
into the realm of treaty amendment instead of treaty interpretation.58 This is mainly
the case when judges try to establish the objective purpose of a treaty.59 The sub-
jective purpose reflects the purpose of the drafters and as a result interpretation taking
into account only subjective purpose will not lead to accusations of judicial legislating.
As has already been said above, this is different for the objective purpose, since that
notion reflects the purpose of a rational legislator and refers to the needs of society.
People might have different views on what would be the purpose of a rational
lawmaker and the needs of society. If judges adopt a progressive view on what would
be the purpose of a rational legislator this may lead judges to adopt a progressive
or extensive interpretation of the treaty in question and invoke accusations of judicial
legislating.60 An additional factor is that the objective purpose can change over time,
as explained in section 5.1.2. This ‘extreme’ form of teleological interpretation entails
that judges will establish the present purpose of the treaty, rather than the historical
aims.61 Especially in situations where the present objective purpose deviates from
the subjective (historical) purpose, judges could be criticized for revising the treaty.
Others have warned against the risk of slipping into policy making.62 Both statements
refer to the same fear, namely that of judicial activism.63 This fear of activism con-
cerns only the actual use of the method and not the method itself, which is considered
an essential part of treaty interpretation.64 VANNESTE even argues that as a result
of the ‘open texture’ of fundamental rights provisions reference to the object and
58 McRae (2002), p. 222; Shaw (2008), p. 933; Villiger (2009), p. 428.
59 Vanneste (2010), p. 225.
60 See Bernhardt (1995), p. 1420.
61 Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 343.
62 Hartley (2003), p. 79-80. See also Vanneste (2010), p. 225, referring to Jacobs (1969), p. 343.
63 See Tridimas (1996), p. 199-200, for criticism on the use of teleological interpretation by the CJEU.
See also Albors Llorens (1999), p. 373, referring to the criticism directed at the teleological approach
by the CJEU.
64 Benhardt (1995), p. 1420, argues that some form of teleological interpretation is necessary for treaty
interpretation (he argues against using teleological interpretation to interpret the treaty in its most
extensive meaning). See also Shaw (2008), p. 933, who argues that treaty interpretation has to take
the object and purpose into account.
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purpose is essential to establish an interpretation.65 Any suggestions for improving
this method of interpretation should therefore concern the actual use of this method.
The question then is what can be regarded in this context as judicial activism.
It is almost impossible to answer this question in a neutral manner. The difficulty
lies in the vagueness of the term ‘activism’. It is a term that is often used in the legal
debate, but which has not been clearly defined and thus remains fuzzy. The term is
strongly linked to the perception of the role of the judge in the judicial process.66
The meaning of judicial activism is therefore dependent on one’s (theoretical) view
of the proper role of the judge. Someone with a traditional view on the role of the
judge has a different perception of activism than someone with a view on the role
of the judge based on constitutional dialogue.67 Trying to determine what would
be regarded as judicial activism in the context of teleological interpretation would
thus entail imposing a certain theoretical view of the role of the judge. That is,
however, not the purpose of this chapter. It is necessary to emphasize what can be
learned from this, namely that judicial activism is not a neutral or objective term.
If that is the case, how can accusations of judicial activism be prevented when
determining the scope of fundamental rights? Due to the normative and subjective
character of the criticism of judicial activism, such accusations can never be fully
prevented. They can be reduced to a minimum, however, if the method is applied
in a careful manner. By providing a reasoning that covers all aspects of a teleological
argument, it is much harder to accuse a judge of activism, regardless of the definition
of activism that is used. At least someone claiming these accusations would have
to provide more than the general claim of judicial activism, which makes it harder
to defend these accusations. What this entails for the actual interpretation process
will be dealt with after the separate discussions of both courts.
5.2 TELEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION IN THE ECTHR AND CJEU
5.2.1 CJEU
In Chapter 4 a short introduction to the use of the teleological method of interpretation
by the CJEU has been provided. Reference was made to the famous statement of the
CJEU that, when interpreting a certain provision, it is necessary ‘to consider the spirit,
the general scheme and wording’ of that provision.68 The teleological method of
interpretation is frequently employed by the judges and Advocates General and it
65 Vanneste (2010), p. 253.
66 See model developed by Cohn & Kremnitzer (2005).
67 For an elaborate explanation see the model of Cohn & Kremnitzer (2005).
68 As first stated in: C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 3, 12.
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has become a hallmark of the adjudication process before the CJEU. The observation
that the method plays such an important role in the interpretation process is inter-
esting,69 but a crucial question for our purpose is whether this is also the case when
the CJEU deals with fundamental rights. It has been noted before that discussions
in the literature on the interpretation methods of the CJEU seldom deal with the
interpretation of fundamental rights. This complicates a discussion of the role of
interpretation methods when interpreting fundamental rights without a thorough case
law analysis.
Fundamental rights have a special status within EU law.70 The main sources for
establishing these fundamental rights are the European Convention on the one hand
and the common traditions of the Member States on the other hand. Due to the
importance of common traditions in this respect, the comparative method plays a
central role when interpreting fundamental rights.71 The question is, then, whether
the comparative method is considered sufficient in this regard by the CJEU or whether
there is still a role to play for the teleological method of interpretation. According
to different authors, the CJEU should not apply a purely comparative approach. The
results of the comparative analysis will have to be considered in the light of the object
and purpose of the EU treaty before a certain interpretation will be accepted.72 In
this context the teleological method clearly plays a role, but the relation with the
comparative method is not entirely obvious. What if both methods contradict each
other? Will the teleological method ultimately prevail, or will the CJEU respect the
common traditions on fundamental rights? It is interesting to examine this relation
between the two methods in the context of fundamental rights, which will be done
in detail in Chapter 13.
Since the teleological method plays a role in the context of fundamental rights
too, some further questions should be dealt with as well. The two most important
ones are: how are the object and purpose established and does the CJEU take a
subjective or objective approach? These questions are intertwined, since the answer
to the first to some extent determines the answer to the second. In addition, the
question arises as to what kind of documents the CJEU takes into account when
applying the teleological method. Some references have been made to the type of
69 Brown & Kennedy (2000), p. 339; Tridimas (1996), p. 204; Arnull (2006), p. 612; Millett (1989),
p. 170-171; Albors Llorens (1999), p. 382.
70 See Chapter 3. The introduction of fundamental rights into the EU legal order can be qualified as
an example of a teleological approach as well. Reading fundamental rights into the general principles
of the then community law can be justified by the object and purpose of the community itself. The
question is whether the CJEU justified the introduction of fundamental rights by using teleological
arguments. This will be seen in the case law analysis in Chapter 13.
71 See Chapter 13.
72 Kühling (2006), p. 506; Blanke (2006), p. 268.
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documents that have been consulted for establishing the object and purpose of the
former EC treaties.73 The preamble and opening provisions are important factors
in determining the object and purpose. Some substantive provisions even refer to more
detailed aims.74 It is not a subject that has received much attention and it is therefore
difficult to draw any conclusions with regard to the use of other material on the basis
of this information. A type of material that has been discussed by many authors is
the travaux préparatoires.75 The role of this material has been discussed briefly in
Chapter 4, the main conclusion from that discussion being that the travaux prépara-
toires of most of the treaties have never been published, which is why they do not
play a role in the interpretation process.76 This conclusion has important implications
for the use of the teleological method of interpretation by the CJEU, namely that a
subjective approach is hardly possible or acceptable. The CJEU should really adopt
an objective teleological approach and as a consequence not attach much value to
the intentions of the original legislator.77
5.2.2 ECtHR
Despite the fact that it is primarily the CJEU that is well-known for its use of the
teleological method, it is a central feature in the interpretation process of the ECtHR
too.78 In its interpretation process the ECtHR often emphasizes the object and purpose
of the European Convention in order to justify a certain interpretation.79 If the method
plays such a vital role in the interpretation process, it is necessary to discuss its
theoretical meaning and validity in more detail.
BERNHARDT has argued that the special nature of human rights treaties requires
the ECtHR to take an objective approach to interpretation.80 The ECtHR has con-
firmed this in its own case law by claiming that it does not consider itself bound by
the understanding of the parties at the time of ratification.81 A further indication
of a mainly objective teleological approach is the strong emphasis on an evolutive
approach. This approach will be discussed separately in Chapter 7 hereinafter. For
now it is interesting to note the link with this principle of interpretation and its
influence on the ECtHR’s objective teleological approach. The ECtHR does not limit
73 Arnull (2006), p. 612; Brown & Kennedy (2000), p. 339.
74 Arnull (2006), p. 612.
75 Hartley (2006), p. 79; Albors Llorens (1999), p. 379.
76 See Kutscher (1976), p. 21.
77 Hartley (2006), p. 79; Kutscher (1976), p. 38.
78 Ost (1992), p. 292; Matscher (1993), p. 65.
79 Schokkenbroek (2000), p. 4.
80 Bernhardt (1988), p. 68 & 71. Confirmed by Orakhelashvili (2003), p. 535.
81 Bernhardt (1988), p. 68-69; Orakhelashvili (2003), p. 535; Ovey & White (2006), p. 46.
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itself to a purely objective teleological approach; however, this is a point which will
be developed further below in relation to its use of the travaux préparatoires.
The crucial document in establishing the object and purpose of the ECtHR must
be the preamble.82 The preamble to the European Convention clearly states the aims
of the European Convention, which according to some are so obvious that simply
common sense would be enough to establish them.83 The literature does not refer
to much more than the preamble as the main indicator of the object and purpose of
the European Convention. One would, however, expect that, over the years of its
activity, the ECtHR in one or the other case relied on other documents to establish
the object and purpose of the European Convention or one of its provisions. The
literature does not really provide an answer to this question. If the case law analysis
indicates that the ECtHR has indeed relied on other documents in addition to the
preamble, some questions become relevant. Have these documents been internal to
the European Convention, or have they referred to external documents?What justifica-
tions have been provided if other documents than the preamble have been consulted?
These are relevant questions that should be considered in the case law analysis, since
they shed light on how the ECtHR uses teleological interpretation.
The academic literature did devote attention to the use of one other type of
document in the context of the interpretation process, namely the travaux prépara-
toires.84 The role of these documents will also be discussed in the chapter on the
principle of evolutive interpretation (Chapter 7). Here it may suffice to say that the
role of the travaux préparatoires will be rather limited, but cannot be ignored. The
travaux have been published and have in some cases been consulted by the ECtHR,
as will further be explained in the case law chapter (Chapter 9). Only in some cases
have they played a decisive role in the interpretation process. Against this background
one cannot defend that the ECtHR relies on an exclusively objective teleological
approach. It seems from the examples that have been provided in the literature on
the limits of the evolutive approach that the travaux préparatoires will be decisive,
or at least important, in cases where a certain interpretation would lead to the pro-
tection of a new right.85 One could read from this that the ECtHR adopts a subjective
teleological approach when the court itself feels that the boundaries of its own inter-
pretative role have been reached. It will be interesting to see whether other situations
can be found in which the preparatory works play an important role, which is one
of the questions that have been studied in the case law analysis.
82 Harris (1995), p. 6; Gerards (2007), p. 15 refering to Ost and Prebensen; Sudre (1998), p. 111.
83 Klabbers (1997), p. 155.
84 See for example: Orakhelashvili (2003), p. 537; Ost (1992), p. 289; Ovey & White (2006), p. 40.
85 Prebensen (2000). For further discussion see Chapter 6.
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In his discussion of the evolutive approach of the ECtHR, PREBENSEN claims that
reference to the travaux préparatoires has been made when no common ground could
be found among the different Contracting States. This link between the two methods
is an interesting one to consider in the case law analysis as well, since it would imply
that the use of the travaux préparatoires is linked to the outcome of the comparative
method. Only in those cases would a subjective approach be considered.
The criticism of the ECtHR for using the interpretation method has manifested
itself in accusations of judicial activism. Some rather harsh criticism has been voiced
by dissenting judges in the ECtHR. Judge FITZMAURICE, for example, has pleaded
strongly in favour of a subjective teleological approach and considered the intentions
of the parties to be the only guide in order to establish the object and purpose.86
Such accusations of judicial activism are, different from the criticism levelled at the
CJEU, not necessarily only directed against the use of the teleological method. Still,
improvements in the interpretation process should also concern this method of inter-
pretation in order to enhance the interpretation process as a whole.
Just as for the CJEU, thus, there are many questions that have remained unanswered
(or have only been rather vaguely addressed) in the literature on the theoretical use
and desirability of the method. The case law analysis can provide some interesting
answers to these questions, mainly on the questions how the ECtHR establishes the
object and purpose and what documents play a role in that process. Before presenting
the results of the case law analysis, however, some suggestions for improving this
method of interpretation will be discussed first.
5.3 WHICH WAY FORWARD?
The chapter on comparative interpretation, Chapter 6, will show that many suggestions
for improvement of the use of comparative interpretation have been given in the
literature.87 This can be mainly attributed to the fact that the comparative method
itself is highly contested and that suggestions really need to be presented to enhance
the legitimacy of the method as such. Such harsh criticism has not been levelled at
the teleological method of interpretation. Hardly anyone objects as a matter of prin-
ciple to the use of this method of interpretation for determining the meaning of a (part
of a) legal text. What has been criticized is the use of this method; more specifically
the use of the objective (emergent) purpose has led to accusations of judicial legis-
lating and judicial activism, as indicated in section 5.1.4. It is difficult to rebut such
accusations, since it is not clear what the source of these accusations is. Judicial
86 Ost (1992), p. 292.
87 See section 6.1.7.
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activism is a rather vague term and therefore the source of the accusation can be a
variety of things; it could be that someone is unhappy with the judgment or its
outcome, or that someone actually thinks the judge has gone beyond his or her role.88
Given the importance of the method for the interpretation process of both courts,
it is important to try to address this criticism. After all, that might help to enhance
the legitimacy of the use of the method. It should, however, be emphasized that it
is not possible to completely eliminate accusations of activism, especially because
of the normative and subjective character of many of such accusations. The question
whether a judge has acted within the confines of his or her role, depends on the
perception one has of the proper role of a judge, which may be a different one for
different scholars. These differences are inherent to any legal system, which means
that they will not disappear by improving the method of teleological interpretation.
The challenge for judges is thus not to try to have everyone agree on a specific
interpretation, but to use their interpretation methods in such a way that even critics
agree that the interpretation has been established in an acceptable manner.
This chapter has shown that answering specific questions as to the use of the
teleological interpretation method by the courts can shed light on the use of teleo-
logical interpretation. Most importantly, the question how the object and purpose of
a treaty are established should be answered in any judgment relying on teleological
reasons. Providing insight into how the object and purpose are established makes it
easier to assess whether the court has overstepped its boundaries, for example, by
relying on documents that should not play a role in the interpretation process. By
being rather vague about the object and purpose the court can also read a broad range
of notions into a certain provision. If the court is clearer about the object and purpose,
this might restrain the court and keep it from reading too much into the object and
purpose. The question is, however, whether such care as to asking and answering
these questions is really visible in the interpretative practice of the CJEU and the
ECtHR. Do these courts justify their choice for a specific object and purpose? How
explicit are their choices when using teleological arguments? Are they clear on the
documents they use for determining the object and purpose?
This constitutes the main respect in which improvements to the courts’ reasoning
can possibly be made. Specific suggestions can only be made after a case law analysis
that provides more insight into the practice of establishing the object and purpose.
This does not mean that paying attention to this aspect will silence all critics, but
critics might have less reason to criticize the interpretation process and be forced to
argue on substantive issues. That would already be an achievement.




This chapter has indicated that teleological interpretation is a generally valued method
of interpretation. In its non-controversial version it provides a tool for understanding
the meaning of the text against the background of the intention of the parties who
drafted the treaty. In its more controversial version it still provides a background to
interpret the treaty, but the connection with the intentions of the original parties is
missing. The purpose of the treaty or one of its provisions in that case is then deter-
mined in an objective manner, which means that it might even change over time. Some
argue that only the objective purpose has a place in the interpretation of international
human rights treaties, but the question is whether that corresponds with the actual
practice of teleological interpretation by supranational courts such as the CJEU and
the ECtHR. Legal literature on both European Courts has found that the objective
purpose plays an important role in the context of teleological interpretation, but it
remains rather unclear how this object and purpose are established. That is a vital
question to be answered in the case law analysis, especially since it has been indicated






Recent years have shown a great deal of scholarly interest in the use of comparative
law by judges.1 The debate on this method of interpretation is rather broad and
therefore this chapter will not reflect all aspects of that debate. Given the topic of
this book, the focus will be on comparative interpretation in the field of fundamental
rights, which is one of the areas where judges have been quite willing to look across
borders.2 The discussion will draw on both national and international discourse on
the method and its use.
The term ‘comparative interpretation’ will be used in this book, rather than the
term ‘consensus interpretation’ or ‘common ground method’. These latter terms have
been used in the ECtHR context, but the term ‘comparative interpretation’ fits better
in a wider context. The term ‘comparative interpretation’ has been used in the context
of the general debate on this form of interpretation in judicial decisions. Therefore
the general terminology will be used, rather than the specific ECtHR terminology.
The chapter will first deal with different aspects of the general debate on comparat-
ive interpretation. This discussion will take place against the background of supra-
national adjudication. For that reason, some specifically national aspects have been
left out of the discussion. Many aspects of the general discourse on comparative
interpretation are also relevant for both European Courts, but the second part of this
chapter will address some more specific aspects that are relevant only for either the
CJEU or the ECtHR. Especially in the latter part of this chapter, dealing with both
European Courts, it will be become clear that many questions remain and need to
be addressed in the case law analysis.
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the answers that have been given in academic
literature to several theoretical questions on comparative interpretation. What does
comparative interpretation mean? Why do courts invoke this method? How can the
1 See for a selection of the articles produced on this topic: Slaughter (1994); Choudhry (1998); Harding
(2003); Slaughter (2003); Tushnet (2003); Dorsen (2005); Jackson (2005); Waldron (2005); Young
(2005); Higgins (2006); Tsen-Ta Lee (2007); Khushal Murkens (2008).
2 See Kentridge (2004), p. 235, who argues that the field of human rights is particularly suitable for
comparison, among others, because many human rights derive from their common ancestor, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See also: McCrudden (2003); Örücü (2003); McCrudden




use of this method be justified? What is the role of this method in the interpretative
framework? Has any criticism been expressed? This discussion will help one to
understand the benefits and pitfalls of this method. A thorough analysis of the theoret-
ical literature on this interpretation method will result in raising more specific and
refined questions that provide the basis for the case law analysis in subsequent
chapters. A better understanding of the theoretical aspects of the method, in combina-
tion with information as to its use in the case law of the courts under study, will
ultimately help in suggesting areas for improvement.
6.1 COMPARATIVE INTERPRETATION IN MORE DETAIL
6.1.1 What is comparative interpretation?
Comparative interpretation refers to the fact that judges sometimes make references
to or use arguments based on materials or information derived from foreign legal
systems.3 This entails that, by means of a comparative study, one or more foreign
solutions to an interpretation problem will be considered.4 In general this often occurs
in the case of a new interpretation of a specific right or when courts are confronted
with the question whether a certain right exists within their jurisdiction (the creation
of a new right).5 When applying this method of interpretation, it is not the text or
purpose of the provision, but the outcome of a comparative study that supports a
certain choice of interpretation. In other words, the comparative analysis justifies or
supports a certain line of reasoning in a specific case.
Comparative interpretation is the common name for a variety of different methods
of employing foreign materials in judgments. There is no uniform way of applying
comparative interpretation. Due to this lack of a blueprint for the use of the method,
every court may have a different conception of what it entails. This difference can
be, for example, at the level of the sources to be used for the comparison, but it can
also be that different courts use comparative interpretation for different purposes. The
common denominator is, however, that the argument invoked by a judge is based
on or inspired by at least one foreign source. An explanation for the variety in the
forms of comparative reasoning could be that the method has mainly been developed
3 Alexy (1989), p. 239.
4 Llorens (1999), p. 380. Comparable descriptions can be found in: Brown (2000), p. 337; Harris (1995),
p. 9; Ovey and White (2006), p. 48; Matscher (1993), p. 74; Ost (1992), p. 305; Schermers, (2001),
p. 13-15.
5 Gerards (2006), p. 112. This is also the case in the United States; see for example the use of foreign
materials in Lawrence v Texas. In this case the question was whether it was unconstitutional to prohibit
consensual homosexual private conduct. The Supreme Court concluded that it was.
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in judicial practice.6 The subsequent academic discussion struggles to ‘make sense
of [a] relatively fast-moving’ form of judicial reasoning.7
The following sections will address some more specific aspects of what it means
to employ comparative interpretation. Even though there is not one version of this
method, some general remarks can be made on this method of interpretation.
6.1.2 General basis for comparative interpretation?
There are only a few international treaties or constitutional documents that explicitly
allow for comparative arguments to be taken into consideration. A famous example
is the South African constitution, which contains a specific section that allows (some
argue: requires)8 the Constitutional Court to take international and other foreign
experiences into account when interpreting the constitution.9 Most courts, however,
do not operate on the basis of a document that explicitly allows for taking foreign
experiences into account. The question whether a basis for this practice exists should
therefore be answered in the specific context of each particular court as there might
be implicit factors within the system in which a particular court functions that allow
for this form of reasoning.
Due to the fact that the courts central to this thesis are supranational courts
interpreting treaties, the provisions in the Vienna Convention should briefly be
considered. In Chapter 4 it was briefly stated that the Vienna Convention does not
mention the comparative method of interpretation, but that statement should not be
understood as to mean that it does not allow for such interpretation. The Vienna
Convention in Article 31(3)(c) provides that ‘any relevant rules of interpretation law
applicable in the relations between the parties’ shall be taken into account when
interpreting a treaty.10 This indicates that international and supranational courts do
have to take ‘international’ materials into account, but the extent of this provision
is not entirely clear. First of all, what kind of international rules are referred to under
this provision? There is no definite answer to this question, but a convincing argument
has been made to understand this as a reference to ‘all rules that spring from any
6 McCrudden (2007), p. 372.
7 McCrudden (2007), p. 372.
8 Huscroft speaks about the mandatory approach in the South African Constitution. Huscroft (2006),
p. 6.
9 § 39 (1). See also Huscroft (2006), p. 6; Bentele (2008), p. 7. Huscroft also refers to the New Zealand
Constitution and argues that they have a permissive approach.
10 See elaborately on this provisionMcLachlan (2005). He discusses the principle of systemic integration
(principle that all treaties are part of the system of international law and must be interpreted against
that background), which underlies this provision and provides some examples of the use of this
principle in the recent practice of international courts. It would stretch too far beyond the purpose
of this thesis to discuss this principle in depth; therefore this principle will only be mentioned.
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of the formal sources of international law’.11 This means that the reference includes
‘treaties, customary norms and general principles of international law’.12 Some
authors have adopted a more limited understanding of this reference and exclude one
of these sources.13 No basis for such exclusion can be found in the text, object and
purpose or the intention of the drafters of the Vienna Convention, which is the reason
why doing so would be somewhat arbitrary.14 A second question is what can be
understood by the reference to ‘the parties’. Does this refer to the parties to the
specific dispute or all the parties to the treaty that requires interpretation? Traditionally,
the reference to ‘the parties’ has been understood to mean all the parties to the treaty
that had to be interpreted.15 LINDERFALK has noticed a change in understanding of
this provision towards reading the reference to ‘the parties’ as a reference to the parties
to the specific dispute.16 For the purpose of this section it is not necessary, however,
to provide a definitive answer to these questions raised by Article 31(3)(c). It is
sufficient to show that this provision provides only a limited basis for using comparat-
ive material. First of all, this is true because following the traditional understanding
of Article 31(3)(c) only those international rules ratified by all parties can be used
for interpretative purposes. This will be the case especially for a multilateral treaty
that leaves only a limited number of materials. Moreover, the provision does not
provide a clear basis for references to national law. Article 31(3)(c) accordingly
provides only a limited basis for comparative interpretation.
An important question that should thus be answered when looking at both Euro-
pean systems is whether the respective treaties provide a more explicit legal basis
for invoking comparative arguments. This will be discussed when addressing the
European Court of Human Rights and Court of Justice of the European Union later
in this theoretical chapter (see sections 6.2 and 6.3 respectively). In the chapters on
the case law analysis this question will also be addressed in order to understand what
the ECtHR and the CJEU themselves consider to be the basis for their use of com-
parative arguments (see Chapters 10 and 13).
11 Linderfalk (2007), p. 177.
12 Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 366.
13 Linderfalk (2007), p. 177-178, discusses some authors that have adopted a more limited understanding
of this provision.
14 Linderfalk (2007), p. 177-178.
15 Linderfalk (2008), p. 345. See also Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 368.
16 Linderfalk (2008), p. 345. He invokes different interpretation methods, such as text, context and the




6.1.3 ‘Internal’ and ‘external’ comparative interpretation
In order to understand comparative interpretation it is necessary to address what is
actually meant with ‘references to a foreign source’.What kinds of sources are referred
to and what does the term ‘foreign’ stand for in the context of comparative interpreta-
tion? Often, when invoking foreign references, judges rely on foreign court decisions
or international documents, mainly treaties. Depending on how comfortable judges
in a specific jurisdiction are with referring to foreign materials the list of foreign
sources could be longer or shorter. Part of the answer on what counts as ‘foreign’
depends on the specific context in which the method is used. Nevertheless, some
general, more abstract remarks can be made. In this thesis, a distinction will be made
between an internal and an external component of comparative interpretation for two
reasons.17 First of all, such a distinction might provide an analytical tool in the
discussion on comparative interpretation before international or supranational courts.18
Secondly, it is questionable whether both forms of comparative interpretation can
be employed on the basis of the same justification, a question that will be explored
further in section 6.1.5 below, which will make clear that the justification for the
choice of either an internal or an external comparison will depend on the purposes
for which comparative interpretation is employed. Therefore there might be cases
in which both components are in need of a different justification, as will be seen
below. Some further background is, however, needed before this argument can be
clarified in more detail.
The internal componentmeans, on the one hand, that the comparative study limits
itself to a comparison between the countries that fall within the jurisdiction of the
court in question. For the courts central to this thesis that means a comparison between
the Member States of either the European Union or the Contracting States to the
European Convention of Human Rights.
17 The literature has not explicitly discussed this distinction. This could perhaps be because many
discussions on comparative interpretation focus on national constitutional courts and as a result this
distinction is much less relevant. Bernhardt (1999), p. 36, argues that comparative law normally refers
to comparison of national law, but that a different dimension should be added for references to
international law. This is thus a different distinction, but at least he acknowledges as well that
comparative law might have different dimensions.
18 A different analytical tool in discussing comparative interpretation has been introduced by Slaughter
(1994), p. 103-112. She distinguishes between horizontal, vertical and mixed vertical-horizontal
communication between courts. Horizontal refers to courts that are of similar status, like national
courts referring to other national courts. Vertical refers to courts of different status, like a reference
by the ECtHR to the United States Supreme Court. Mixed vertical-horizontal communication refers




The external component of comparative interpretation refers to the use of sources
that are not covered by the internal component of this method. In general that means
reliance on documents or on information derived from outside the jurisdiction of the
court in question. References under the external component can either consist of
references to other national jurisdictions, like the United States or Canada, or refer-
ences to international documents, either treaties or soft law instruments, like
‘Guidelines for Community Noise’ issued by the World Health Organization.19 None
of these sources of law are within the jurisdiction of either the ECtHR or the CJEU
and they may therefore be qualified as external sources. References to Council of
Europe documents also count as external references for both courts. This is particularly
important in the context of the ECtHR. Even though the membership of the Council
of Europe and the European Convention overlap, Council of Europe instruments are
like any international legal instrument and only bind the parties that have ratified
the specific instrument. Therefore these instruments can be considered as external
to the ECHR.
The question which sources are external and which are internal can be answered
differently for both the ECtHR and the CJEU. Including references to, for example,
Russian law and Turkish law in a comparison fall, in the case of the ECtHR, within
the internal component, while for the CJEU it would fall into the external component.
The jurisdiction for both courts is different, which implies that the division between
the internal and external component of comparative interpretation will also be a
different one.
As has been mentioned before, the relevance of this distinction is related to the
justification provided for invoking this method of interpretation.20 The question is
whether both components can rely on a similar justification. Perhaps a different or
more elaborate justification may be necessary when invoking references under the
external component. This question can only be answered in relation to a discussion
of the different purposes of comparative interpretation, since the answer depends on
the purpose for which comparative interpretation is used. The following section will
therefore first consider different purposes of comparative interpretation; subsequently,
we will return to the question of justification.
19 This was the case in ECtHR, Fägerskiöld v. Sweden, decision of 26 February 2008, unpublished.
20 The fact that in the United States the search for a consensus among the 52 states is much less
controversial than looking for a broader consensus inWestern civilization is already a small indication
that there is a relevant difference between these two components. See for a discussion on this method
and the lack of controversy of a national consensus in the USA: Jacobi (2005), p. 2. The situation
is however not entirely comparable, since the Supreme Court is a national constitutional court and
the present discussion concerns supranational courts.
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6.1.4 Purposes of comparative interpretation
Various purposes for invoking comparative arguments have been identified in the
literature. A preliminary remark should, however, be made. The discussion here does
not concern references to international or foreign materials compelled by the facts
of the case. Therefore comparative references for the purpose of explaining a foreign
contract, for example, will not be included.21 The use of comparative material that
is relevant for this study concerns those cases where the court in principle is not forced
to look at comparative arguments, but does do so on its own accord.
In some instances references to foreign materials are included only for rhetorical
purposes22 or, as Justice Scalia has called it, for ‘ornamentation’.23 In these instances
the reference to foreign materials is not different from a reference to ‘Shakespeare
or the Bible’24 or ‘a newspaper article or a law review article’.25 This kind of
reference can be seen as part of a certain style of elaborate writing, without having
a substantive meaning. This type of use is generally not controversial, although some
authors have argued that if this is the actual and only purpose of the reference, then
it has no place in judicial reasoning.26
A second common purpose of comparative interpretation is to draw inspiration
from courts that have dealt with similar problems.27 Even though the implementation
and application of fundamental rights differs according to the country, there seems
to be a strong agreement on the existence of ‘general principles of human and constitu-
tional rights’.28 Most constitutions and international human rights treaties contain
rather similar lists of rights.29 Constitutional courts and also international human
rights tribunals are often confronted with similar factual situations that present similar
interpretative problems. From that perspective it might be helpful to look abroad to
find and design creative solutions for interpretative problems in one’s own legal
system.30 Moreover, it might shed some light on ‘new’ issues which might already
21 McCrudden (2007), p. 377 lists different categories of cases where judges resort to international or
foreign law on the basis of the facts of the case. He concludes that these instances are not contro-
versial.
22 McCrudden (2007), p. 378.
23 Yoo (2004), p. 2.
24 McCrudden (2007), p. 378.
25 Yoo (2004), p. 3.
26 McCrudden (2007), p. 391 referring to Justice Scalia in Roper v Simmons (2005).
27 Slaughter (2003) referring to Justice Ginsburg, p. 199. See also McCrudden (2003), p. 9, referring
to Justice Barak of the Supreme Court of Israel.
28 McCrudden (2007), p. 372.
29 McCrudden (2007), p. 372.
30 Slaughter (2003), p. 201.
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have been addressed in other legal systems,31 such as new technological challenges
to the current fundamental rights protection. Comparative interpretation thus provides
a way to learn and benefit from other experiences.32 Foreign materials employed
for this purpose have only persuasive value, which means that these materials will
only be used to support a certain solution (which can be based on other arguments
as well) and do not have any binding force. Nevertheless, this is still a controversial
way to use comparative arguments. CHOUDHRY, for example, refers to the argument
advanced by legal hegemonists who claim that the USA has nothing to learn from
foreign experiences.33 Likewise, US Supreme Court Justice Thomas has argued in
Knight v Florida that the fact that you need to resort to foreign materials may weaken
the court’s own argument.34
Thirdly, a related, though somewhat separate function of comparative interpretation
is that it provides an opportunity for judges to ‘test his or her value-judgment against
the judgments of other judges who have grappled with similar provisions’.35 In this
case the emphasis is not on the learning factor of foreign experiences, but on the
simple fact that foreign courts have taken a similar path. If judges are able to show
that courts in different jurisdictions have chosen a similar solution, this might help
to increase the objectivity of a particular decision.36 Especially in the field of funda-
mental rights, where provisions are drafted in a very general manner, judges can be
easily accused of being overly judicially creative in their interpretation process.37
Using comparative arguments to indicate that other judges have considered a similar
solution can be one way to objectify the chosen solution in a specific case. A different
way of viewing this purpose is to argue that sometimes foreign or international
citations can add authority to a particular decision.38 Many courts in the world have,
for example, included references to the United States Supreme Court in their decision
as a way to enhance the force of their argument.39
31 Tsen-Ta Lee (2007), p. 149.
32 Tsen-Ta Lee (2007), p. 149; Bentele (2008), p. 8.
33 Choudhry (1998), p. 832.
34 Knight v Florida.
35 Kentridge (2004), p. 236.
36 See for a similar argument on objectifying the decision of judges: Jackson (2005), p. 119. See also
Kentridge (2004), p. 236. McCrudden (2003), p. 1 refers to term distancing devices’ which has
been introduced by Raz. McCrudden argues that a continuing concern for human rights judges is
to interpret independent of the personal taste of the judges’.
37 Kentridge (2004), p. 236.
38 Slaughter (2003), p. 201; Slaughter (1994), p. 119. Even though Scalia does not support this type
of argument, he considers that this can be a purpose of comparative references, Scalia (2004), p. 309.
39 See Fontana (2001), p. 549, referring to Chief-Justice Rehnquist who remarked that new constitutional
courts in their early days often looked to the USA to develop their own law.
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Depending on whether a court employs the comparative method in a decisive or
persuasive manner, this can be a more or less controversial form of comparative
interpretation as well. Both proponents and opponents of comparative interpretation
agree that decisive use of foreign material is inappropriate, but some strong critics
of this method even find persuasive or informative use of foreign materials inappro-
priate.40 In their view either the references to foreign material are decisive (which
is unacceptable in their view) or they have no place in a judicial opinion, since they
are irrelevant.41
Fourthly, references to foreign materials can be used to keep up with ‘evolving
national and international standards’.42 This does not mean that courts necessarily
have to follow this development. The fact that there are clear tendencies (sort of
consensus) among different human rights standards, however, might be a reason for
a court to ask ‘why the laws of other nations have developed as they have and, further,
to identify the material differences between those nations and the court’s own juris-
diction that demand a different approach’.43 An example of using comparative inter-
pretation for this purpose can be found in some of the death penalty (Eighth Amend-
ment) cases in the United States Supreme Court. In the case of Roper v. Simmons
the Supreme Court had to address the question whether it was constitutional to impose
the death penalty on a juvenile offender who was at the time of committing the crime
older than 15, but younger than 18.44 In answering that question the majority took
different factors into account, such as the developments within the different states,
but they also looked outside the United States.45 The majority of the Justices of the
Supreme Court observed that:
Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under
18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the only country in the
world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty. This reality does
not become controlling for the task of interpreting the Eight Amendment remains our respons-
ibility. [reference is also made to the United Nations on the Rights of the Child] ... only seven
countries other than the United States have executed juvenile offenders since 1990: Iran,
40 Bentele (2008), p. 9. See also Sitaraman (2009), p. 27 who discusses authoritative use of foreign
law and claims that this is a rather controversial form of comparative interpretation. He provides
the example of the Argentina Supreme Court in the 1920s as one of the rare examples of this type
of comparative interpretation.
41 Dorsen (2005), p. 522.
42 Tsen-Ta Lee (2007), p. 151.
43 Tsen-Ta Lee (2007), p. 152.
44 Roper v Simmons 2005. The death penalty had already been declared unconstitutional for juvenile
offenders of 15 years or younger in Stanford v Kentucky (1989).
45 A similar approach was taken in Atkins v Virginia (2003) where the Supreme Court had to answer
the question whether it was constitutional to execute mentally retarded persons.
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Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo and China. Since
then each of these countries has either abolished capital punishment for juveniles or made
public disavowal of the practice. In sum it is fair to say that the United States now stands
alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty... The opinion of
the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and signi-
ficant confirmation for our own conclusions.46
Even though the majority opinion seems to grant only a confirmatory status to the
(unanimous) world opinion and stresses this more than once,47 the reference to the
opinion of the world community here was rather controversial. In a dissenting opinion,
Justice O’Connor held that it is legitimate to take foreign materials into account, but
she argued that in this case the national consensus was not clear, and therefore foreign
materials could not serve a confirmatory role. Justice Scalia, one of the main oppo-
nents to the use of modern foreign materials in judicial opinions,48 moreover argued
in his dissenting opinion to the case that the reference to the world opinion was more
than just confirmatory. He observed that:
Though the views of our own citizens are essentially irrelevant to the Court’s decision today,
the views of other countries and the so-called international community take center stage.49
Moreover, he argued that:
More fundamentally, ..., the basic premise of the Court’s argument --that American law should
conform to the laws of the rest of the world-- ought to be rejected out of hand.50
This example from the US case law clearly shows that using comparative arguments
for confirmatory purposes can be quite controversial, even more so when the world
opinion is less clear-cut as was the case in Roper v Simmons. In the European context
such a search for consensus seems to be less controversial.51 On the contrary, it is
often argued that the existence of a consensus might increase the acceptance of an
46 Roper v Simmons (2005).
47 Brand argues that the place of the reference to foreign materials in this opinion did put special
emphasis on this material, since it was placed just before the final statement in the case. Brand (2006-
2007), p. 429.
48 See for example Scalia (2004); Dorsen (2005). Scalia only considers old English law to be a legitimate
foreign source for interpretation.
49 Roper v Simmons (2005), dissenting opinion Scalia.
50 Roper v Simmons (2005), dissenting opinion Scalia. Also discussed in Choudhry (2006), p. 3.
51 The term consensus’ here refers to an internal’ consensus, namely a consensus composed of
Member States of the organization in question. The distinction between internal and external comparat-
ive interpretation has been addressed earlier in this chapter; see section 6.1.3. and will be addressed
in more detail in section 6.1.5.
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interpretation by either the CJEU or the ECtHR, depending of course on how these
courts establish a consensus.52 The fact that a consensus takes account of the legal
situation in the Member States, as set out by the democratically elected legislature,
helps to increase the acceptance of the interpretation by these supranational courts.
It helps to build a bridge between the national and supranational level by engaging
the Member States in their reasoning.53 This is considered especially valuable in
a multilevel legal context where the success of the supranational legal order to some
extent depends on the cooperation of and acceptance by the Member States.
Finally, comparative interpretation can be helpful in situations where, for example,
due to a newly enacted bill of rights or treaty or constitution there is not yet a rich
body of case law.54 This is what happened in South Africa and some argue that this
is one of the reasons why Canada has a very open attitude towards foreign
materials.55 For the European Courts, this purpose may seem to be of less relevance,
given that the treaties they have to deal with are already well-established. Nevertheless,
the Court of Justice of the European Union may use this purpose as a justification
for comparative interpretation in using the rather new EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights, for example by using references to Council of Europe materials that may be
helpful to explain the meaning of specific provisions on social and economic rights.
An important question resulting from this discussion relates to which purpose is or
which purposes are important for the ECtHR and CJEU. Probably, more than one
of the purposes discussed here can be found relevant to the context of these courts,
but an interesting question might be if one of them is more important and pertinent
than others. Such issues will be addressed below on the basis of theoretical literature,
but the issues will also be discussed in Chapters 10 and 13 on the basis of a case
law analysis.
Firstly, however, now that different purposes of comparative interpretation have
been identified, the question why it is important to distinguish between the internal
and external component of comparative interpretation should be addressed.56
52 Carozza (1998), p. 1227-1228, discusses the fact that the effectiveness of the ECtHR judgments
depends on the acceptance by Member States. Especially in the early years it was helpful in that
respect to ground the controversial decisions in the practice of the Member States themselves.
53 Mahoney (2004), p. 147; Lenaerts (2003), p. 879.
54 McCrudden (2003), p. 14; Harding (2003), p. 414.
55 Harding (2003), p. 414. The Charter of Rights in Canada is of a rather recent date, namely 1982.
56 The overview presented here is not exhaustive. It represents a description of the purposes mostly
mentioned in the literature or most relevant for the discussion. See further, for example, Sitaraman
(2009) who discusses nine different purposes of comparative interpretation with varying degrees of




6.1.5 The distinction between internal and external component revisited
The previous discussion highlighted different purposes of comparative interpretation.
The question is how this affects the debate on the justification of the use of either
the internal or the external component of comparative interpretation. If the first purpose
of drawing inspiration is concerned, for example, this does not seem to make much
of a difference. When judges rely on comparative interpretation in order to draw
inspiration from solutions that have been adopted in different legal systems, after all,
it does not really matter whether they derive such inspiration from external or internal
sources. The purpose of drawing inspiration can justify both the use of the internal
component and external component of comparative interpretation. It is, however,
important that a justification is provided for the documents or instruments referred
to for this purpose. That may be more difficult in the context of external comparative
interpretation.
A different situation arises when judges are looking for a trend or a consensus
in order to support a certain argument, like in the example of Roper v Simmons that
has been discussed in section 6.1.4. The question in this case was whether imposing
the death penalty on a minor who was between 15 and 18 years old when committing
a crime was contrary to the Eight Amendment which prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment. In its reasoning the Supreme Court referred to a national consensus, i.e.
a comparison of the legislation of the different states. This reference to a national
consensus can be regarded as what has been called in this thesis the internal com-
ponent of comparative interpretation. The reference to a national consensus as such
was not controversial at all in this judgment. The only question was whether the
national consensus had sufficiently evolved to draw any conclusions from it.57 On
the basis of several other arguments the majority of the Supreme Court finally con-
cluded that imposing the death penalty in this situation would violate the Eighth
Amendment, including a reference to an international consensus to support that view.
This is thus an example of the external component of comparative interpretation. As
explained in the previous section, the use of exactly this external material was highly
controversial in both academia and in practice, which proves that it really makes a
difference if either internal or external sources are being used if comparative interpreta-
tion serves a confirmatory purpose.
How can this difference in acceptance between the use of internal and external
comparative interpretation be explained? Most likely, basing a new or extended right
on the basis of an ‘internal’ consensus is considered to be justified by the fact that
the consensus is formed by the Member States that fall within the jurisdiction of the
57 See dissent by O’Connor, who considers that there was no sufficient evidence of a strong change
in the national consensus since the last judgment on the same subject matter.
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court in question. The court in question takes into account the practice in its own
legal order. This territorial aspect cannot, however, justify the search for an external
consensus. A different justification is therefore needed in order to legitimately employ
the external comparative method for the purpose of finding a consensus.
On what legitimate basis may a court then take into account such purely external
references? What kind of justification can be given for doing so? An attempt will
be made to provide an answer to this question in section 6.1.7 of this chapter.
Subsequently, the case law analysis in Chapters 10 and 13 should provide more insight
into the use of external and internal references by both courts, more specifically in
whether the courts acknowledge that a different justification is needed for these
different components.
6.1.6 Criticism of comparative interpretation
There has been quite some criticism on the use of comparative interpretation. The
criticism to be discussed in this section will focus on general criticism that can be
distilled from the different theoretical discussions on comparative interpretation. The
discussions on the ECtHR and CJEU will reveal some specific criticisms directed
at the use of the method by these courts.
The criticism can be divided into roughly two categories. On the one hand, there
are those who criticize the use of comparative interpretation per se. They claim that
this is not a legitimate method of interpretation at all. On the other hand, there are
those who criticize the current use of the method and focus on methodological issues.
The two categories are related, but deserve separate attention, since not every solution
might be able to silence critics on both sides.
6.1.6.1 Criticism of the legitimacy of comparative interpretation as a method of
interpretation
The most fundamental criticism voiced against comparative interpretation is that it
should not be used as a method of interpretation at all. This criticism has mainly been
expressed in the context of national discussions on the legitimacy of comparative
interpretation. This means that if this criticism were to be translated to the context
of the European supranational courts it would be directed mainly to the external
component of this method, since in the national context the discussion focuses on
the use of foreign or international (thus external) materials. Most famous for its strong
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opposition against the use of comparative interpretation is the United States.58 The
opposition identifies two major objections against the use of comparative references
as an interpretative tool. First of all, some people argue that invoking foreign materials
constitutes a ‘threat’ to the sovereignty of the legal system of the court employing
these references.59 This threat might be realistic if courts were to refer to foreign
materials as binding precedent.60 There are, however, no known examples of courts
relying on foreign precedents as binding. Foreign precedents are at the most regarded
as providing persuasive force of argument.61 Assuming that opponents of comparative
interpretation also consider persuasive references a threat to national sovereignty, what
is it that they are afraid of? Opponents mainly appear to be concerned about the lack
of democratic legitimacy of these foreign materials, which ‘have no democratic
provenance, they have no democratic connection to this legal system, to this constitu-
tional system, and thus lack democratic accountability as legal materials’.62 For
example, Chief Justice Roberts of the US Supreme Court focused on the lack of
democratic legitimacy of the foreign judge of a particular case that was being referred
to: ‘[n]o President accountable to the people appointed that judge, and no Senate
accountable to the people confirmed that judge, and yet he’s playing a role in shaping
a law that binds the people in this country...’63 The main problem according to the
opponents is thus that no one can be held accountable for the arguments based on
foreign references.64
The question is, of course, whether this criticism (or perhaps a different version
of it), may also be relevant for the ECtHR and the CJEU. After all, it can hardly be
58 The main judicial characters in this discussion in the United States are Justice Breyer defending the
use of comparative references and Justice Scalia passionately trying to eradicate this type of reasoning.
The difference in opinion is mainly due to a different theory of constitutional interpretation. Their
view of what the constitution is plays an important role here as well. Scalia considers that constitution
to be a code of detailed historical rules, while Breyer considers the constitution to be a charter of
principles. In the latter case it might make more sense to look abroad to other constitutions that have
dealt with the same broad principles. This discussion of the nature of the document does not play
any role in Europe and therefore this is not a relevant difference for the general discussion in this
thesis. For differing views on what is the Constitution, see Barber & Fleming (2007).
59 Choudhry (2006), p. 7-8; Bentele (2008), p. 8-9. Tsen-Ta Lee (2007), p. 133; Tushnet (2003), p. 257.
A similar argument has been presented in Dammann (2001), p. 531. At one point a bill had been
introduced to prohibit judges from incorporating foreign references in their judgments. The text was
never adopted, but is an indication of the strong opposition. Choudhry (2006), p. 11.
60 Bentele (2008), p. 9.
61 Slaughter (1994), p. 124; Bentele (2008), p. 9, who claims that courts consider foreign law to provide
at most persuasive reasons.
62 Choudhry (2006), p. 8, citing from Dorsen (2005), p.540.
63 Choudhry (2006), p. 9, referring to Roberts. See also: McCrudden (2007), p. 389.
64 McCrudden describes a similar argument. He speaks about circumventing national democratic
controls’. McCrudden (2007), p. 389.
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the ‘sovereignty’ of these European systems or their democratic legitimacy that is
being threatened. Rather one could argue that the sovereignty of the States could be
limited by the fact that a European consensus could force a minority of States in a
certain direction. One might also contend that national sovereignty is being limited
when a consensus outside Europe is used to determine the direction in which Europe
is heading. The question is, however, whether the perceived threat to national sover-
eignty in the European context is typically associated with comparative interpretation
as such, or whether it is an inherent aspect of any form of interpretation taking place
in a supranational legal order. After all, whether an interpretation by the CJEU or
ECtHR is based on a teleological argument or a comparative argument does not matter
for the fact that a specific State in some situations no longer has the last say on
fundamental rights issues. In the European situation this ’threat’ to national sovereignty
is thus not necessarily specific for comparative interpretation.
If the European Courts, however, invoke references to international and foreign
materials and use them as a basis for a far-reaching or controversial interpretation,
they run the risk that Member States will complain about introducing obligations that
they never agreed to.65 This risk may arise in particular when supranational courts
rely on the external component of comparative interpretation, since in that case
materials foreign to the Member States play a role in the final interpretation. In that
sense, relying on foreign or international material could present a threat to sover-
eignty.66 The discussion below in the following section will deal with this problem
in more detail.
The second objection put forward by opponents of the use of comparative arguments
concerns the role of the judge and judicial activism.67 As has been explained before,
in Chapter 5, the notion of judicial activism is often used to express discontent with
a judicial decision, which renders the term rather subjective.68 Therefore, the term
will be used here only to illustrate the type of rhetoric used to direct criticism at this
method.
Under the objection of judicial activism, opponents show themselves concerned
that judges overstep the borders of the proper judicial role by looking beyond the
65 Like Turkey in the case of ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November
2008, unpublished. See Chapter 10 for a full discussion of this case.
66 McCrudden discusses this argument in the national context and claims that reliance on not accepted
international obligations circumvents the democratic mechanism designed to approve these international
obligations. McCrudden (2007), p, 390.
67 Choudhry (2006), p. 6-7; this argument is advanced by Justice Scalia in his conversation with justice
Breyer on the use of foreign material in US Supreme Court cases, Dorsen (2005).
68 Cohn and Kremnitzer (2005), p. 334. See also Chapter 5 for a more extensive discussion.
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national borders.69 There are two aspects to this argument. First of all, the question
is whether comparative material can be a legitimate source of constitutional interpreta-
tion. The answer depends on which theory of interpretation one adheres to. Original-
ists, for example, do not consider comparative interpretation to be a legitimate method
of interpretation. In their view judges in the interpretation process should strive to
find the original meaning of the constitutional provision, i.e. the meaning the provision
had at the time it was adopted. Comparative references cannot shed any light on the
meaning of these constitutional provisions and, as a result, they arguably cannot be
considered to constitute a legitimate method of interpretation. In the originalists’ view,
judges should refrain from invoking foreign materials in their reasoning, since other-
wise they would go beyond their role as a judge. Yet other interpretative schools
consider comparative interpretation to be a legitimate method of interpretation.70
This means that it is really dependent on one’s theoretical starting point if one regards
the use of comparative interpretation per se to stretch beyond the proper role of the
judge. Accusations of judicial activism are therefore difficult to address. Just mention-
ing the justification for comparative interpretation and addressing the methodological
concerns that will be discussed below, might not convince these strong opponents
that comparative interpretation is a legitimate interpretation method within their own
theoretical framework. It might convince them that, however, within a different
theoretical framework, comparative interpretation is a legitimate method of interpreta-
tion.
A third objection to comparative interpretation is related to criticism of the use of
this method. Crudely put, some argue that relying on (objective) comparative refer-
ences masks the fact that judges are actually imposing their own (subjective) legal
preferences.71 Judges can simply pick the references that support their own opinion
and use these references as a justification for this result.72 In this sense the method
‘permits courts to achieve desired results while pretending they are engaged in a legal
enterprise’.73 The problem, according to opponents, is basically that comparative
69 McCrudden refers to this argument as well and describes that comparative references upset the balance
between constraint and discretion by granting more discretion to judges. McCrudden (2007), p. 387.
70 For example the interpretative theory that focuses on a moral reading of the constitution. Dworkin
is one of the most famous proponents of this theory. It has also been called the philosophical
approach’. See, for example, Fleming & Barber (2007), p. 26-33.
71 Choudhry (2006), p. 6-7 and Dorsen (2005), p. 531, where Justice Scalia refers to the fear of manipula-
tion.
72 This phenomenon has been called cherry-picking’. See for example: McCrudden (2003), p. 5 &
(2007), p. 388; Bentele (2008), p. 13-14; Tsen-Ta Lee (2007), p. 147; Dorsen (2005), p. 530, where
Justice Breyer acknowledged that there is a certain element of selectivity in the citations of foreign
sources.
73 Choudhry (2006), p. 7.
126
Comparative interpretation
arguments can be used to support any argument. This criticism is strongly intertwined
with criticism of the methodological aspects of comparative interpretation. The
difference is that some point to the methodological shortcomings, but still think it
is an appropriate method of interpretation, even though it should be improved. Others
consider the methodological shortcomings to constitute a reason to dismiss the whole
method. The difference is thus one of consequences, but not necessarily one of
substance. The following section will deal more in detail with the methodological
problems that are connected with the use of comparative arguments.
6.1.6.2 Criticism of the use of comparative interpretation
The previous section already showed that there are serious methodological concerns
regarding comparative interpretation. The problem is that no consistent application
of this method has been developed, which leads to all sorts of criticism. Generally,
the criticism of the use of the method can be divided into two categories. The first
category of criticism is directed against the use of the comparative method for all
the purposes listed in section 6.1.4. The second category is more limited and is
directed at the specific use of the comparative method when it is applied to find a
consensus or a trend. The criticism in this latter category has most prominently been
expressed in the context of the European Courts. It will, however, be addressed in
the more general discussion here, since the criticism applies to both courts in a similar
fashion.
The main problem that has been noted in this first category is a problem of
selecting the relevant sources.74 The question is how judges can select foreign sources
without being accused of ‘looking over the heads of the crowd and picking out his
friends’.75 This phenomenon has also been described as the risk of ‘cherry-picking’,
which refers to the fact that, without any guidance on where to look, judges can just
pick the cherries they like best.76 Of course, it is impossible for judges to analyze
every relevant national judgment or piece of legislation, not only because of a simple
lack of time, but also due to lack of accessibility. A certain amount of selectivity will
therefore always be present in any use of comparative interpretation.77 The question
is, however, how to avoid accusations of deliberate cherry-picking. As has been
explained in the previous section, these accusations can ultimately affect the legitimacy
of the method. The problem of cherry-picking has not only been mentioned with regard
to the sources used for comparative interpretation, but also with regard to the ‘sub-
74 McCrudden (2007), p. 388; Tsen-Ta Lee (2003), p. 145; Bentele (2008), p. 12-14.
75 McCrudden (2007), p. 388 referring to Scalia in Roper v Simmons.
76 Supra note 72.
77 Tsen-Ta Lee (2007), p. 145.
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stantive issues concerning which the court is willing to look at comparative
material’.78 This criticism has been voiced most strongly by Justice Scalia in the
American context. He claims that the proponents of comparative interpretation only
use this type of argumentation when it suits their purposes.79 He claims that once
a court starts invoking this method, it should be consistent and always invoke this
method, no matter which substantive issue it is dealing with. The Supreme Court has
not used this type of reasoning in abortion cases and Justice Scalia claims that this
is because comparative material would not support the majority opinion on abortion
issues.80 In cases on the death penalty, however, the Supreme Court has been willing
to look abroad and has found support for its position in foreign materials. Such
differences in approach seem to support the concern expressed by Justice Scalia.
The problem of deliberate cherry-picking has been noted as one of the concerns
of this method in the European Courts as well.81 Whether this is really an issue in
the European Courts, however, is an aspect that can only be answered in the case
law analysis. Specific attention will thereby be paid to the question whether comparat-
ive interpretation is reserved for certain types of substantive issues or whether it is
used in a wide variety of cases.
A different problem often noted in relation to comparative interpretation is that
there is a danger of misunderstanding or misinterpreting foreign materials.82 This
danger is rarely presented as an argument against the use of this method as such;
rather, it is regarded as one of the challenges any court has to confront when applying
it. The proper understanding of legal materials creates a particular problemwhen legal
materials in a different language are involved.83 Either judges have to use reliable
translations into, most likely, English or French, or they are limited to studying
systems of which they are familiar with the language. But even leaving the language
obstacles aside, it is difficult to correctly understand legal concepts in a foreign system.
A correct understanding does not only require knowledge of the foreign legal system,
but also an understanding of the particular social, cultural and political context of
this legal system.84 This does not make comparative interpretation impossible, but
it does call for a careful approach to comparative materials.85 The question then
78 McCrudden (2007), p. 388.
79 McCrudden (2007), p. 388.
80 McCrudden (2007), p. 388.
81 See Gerards (2006), p. 120.
82 Bentele (2008), p. 14. Markesinis & Fedtke (2005), p. 112-116 referring to the problems that one
might not have precise information and not always up-to-date information. Tsen-Ta Lee downplays
this argument. He argues that judges should be careful when citing foreign law as in other cases where
they are dealing with an area they do not know much about. Tsen-Ta Lee (2007), p. 148.
83 Bentele (2008), p. 14.
84 Kahn-Freud (1974), p. 27; Bernhardt (1999), p. 34; Baudenbacher (2003), p. 524.
85 Tsen-Ta Lee (2007), p. 148.
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arises whether the court in question has sufficient resources to undertake a thorough
examination of the comparative materials. Alternatively, such an analysis might be
left to a different actor, for example the parties arguing the case.86 If that is done,
however, questions may again arise as to the objectivity of the materials that are being
advanced by the parties, once again evoking a risk of cherry-picking.
One further category of criticism is directed at the specific way comparative interpreta-
tion is used in order to find an (evolving) consensus.87As mentioned above, this
criticism has mainly been expressed in the context of the European Courts. The
problem is that it is unclear how a consensus will be established.88 Which countries
will be taken into consideration; all Member States, some Member States, other
countries or international material? What is being compared; is it legislation, case
law, policies or anything else? What is necessary to constitute a consensus; is a real
consensus needed or is a majority sufficient? What are the consequences of finding
a consensus? A lack of transparency on how judges employ this form of comparative
reasoning may have the result that judges can be accused of cherry-picking in this
context as well.
An additional problem is that, without some kind of guideline, it is easy to play
with the ‘level of generality’ at which a consensus is being sought.89 If the question
is whether a certain right exists in different countries, this can be framed either at
a very specific level or at a rather abstract level. Depending on the specific issue or
specific question, framing a right more specifically or more broadly can influence
the finding of a consensus. This can be clarified with an example from the United
States Supreme Court. InWashington v. Glucksberg the Supreme Court had to decide
whether the state of Washington could constitutionally ban assisted suicide.90 Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion and asked whether the history and
traditions of the United States supported a ‘right to commit suicide, which itself
includes a right to assistance in doing so’.91 He thus framed the right on a rather
abstract level and concluded that no support could be found – as a result he found
that the ban should be held to be constitutional. Justice O’Connor, in her concurring
opinion, framed the right at a lower level of abstraction and claimed that the question
86 Bentele refers to the advantage of parties including comparative materials in their argument. Bentele
(2008), p. 17.
87 The relation with evolutive interpretation will be discussed in Chapter 7.
88 Carozza (1998), p. 1224-1225; Heringa (1996), p. 139. It is hard to find an explicit discussion of
this specific question in the context of the CJEU.
89 See for a general discussion on different levels of generality: Tribe & Dorf (1993).





was whether ‘a mentally competent person who is experiencing great suffering [has]
a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstance of his or her
imminent death’.92 Even though she did not think that this case concerned ‘great
suffering’, she concluded that support could be found for such a more specific right
in the history and traditions of the United States. This example shows that the framing
of the question can have an important impact on the finding of a consensus. Therefore
it is important that this aspect is taken into consideration when employing this form
of comparative interpretation.
A final problem with the search for a consensus has been expressed in the context
of the ECtHR. The problem is that the search for a consensus,93 a common ground
or common denominator, in practice does not entail that there should be absolute
agreement among all the consulted sources, nor that all Member States have to adhere
to the same practice.94 As a result, Member States who belong to a numerical minor-
ity could be forced to adhere to an interpretation that is based on the practice in other
Member States that together form some kind of numerical majority. If only a limited
number of Member States can constitute a ‘consensus’, this could be problematic
for reasons of sovereignty and legitimacy that have been referred to above. This makes
it more difficult to use the method to attain one of the purposes noted in section 6.1.4,
i.e. to increase the acceptance by involving the Member States. When an interpretation
is based on the practice of only a small group of Member States, it might not increase
the acceptance of that interpretation in the other Member States. The problem of
acceptance could also present itself when there is a clear consensus of a considerable
number of Member States, yet one or more Member States explicitly take a different
position. These Member States might not easily accept an interpretation based on
a consensus. A reasoning based on different arguments or different interpretation
methods could be preferable in those situations.95
This problem of acceptance can be even more apparent when courts rely on an
external consensus. The problem has already been briefly referred to above in section
6.1.5. A consensus based on international materials might include materials that have
not been signed or ratified by all the Member States in question, or it might include
soft law instruments.96 Despite the fact that states might have expressly rejected these
international instruments, parts of them can become binding upon states in an indirect
manner, i.e. through comparative interpretation by the ECtHR or the CJEU. The
question is whether Member States will accept this type of reasoning in all circum-
92 Justice O’Connor.
93 The use of this term is misleading, but is often used and therefore will be used here as well.
94 Roper v Simmons was a rare example in this respect.
95 Carozza (1997), p. 1228-1229; Jacobi (2005), p. 80-81; Gerards (2006), p. 117.
96 Drooghenbroeck (2009), p. 811.
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stances. At least it puts courts to the task of explaining why this type of consensus
is really relevant for their reasoning. An important question therefore also is whether
the European Courts, if they do use this type of external comparative interpretation,
provide sufficient reasoning as justification.
6.1.7 Solutions for addressing the criticism
What do these criticisms mean? Should the comparative method of interpretation be
abandoned as a whole, or are there any solutions that can address this criticism in
a satisfactory manner? The majority of commentators on comparative interpretation
do not call for a total ban on the use of the method. They rather focus on trying to
reduce the methodological shortcomings that have been mentioned above. Especially
in the context of multilevel adjudication this method can provide a bridge between
the supranational and national level. The challenge is thus to discover why and how
comparative interpretation should be considered.97
The methodology and normative underpinnings of comparative interpretation, accord-
ing to CHOUDHRY, have not been sufficiently addressed in discussions on comparative
interpretation.98 In his view, ‘to say that courts ‘rely upon’ or ‘use’ foreign juris-
prudence because it is ‘useful’ or ‘helpful’’, does not explain why or how such juris-
prudence is helpful’.99 The explanation that relying on foreign materials can be
helpful, also fails to justify why it might be appropriate to seek support for a specific
reasoning in international or foreign materials. ‘In short, the practice of comparative
constitutional law has outgrown the conceptual apparatus that legal actors use to make
sense of it’.100 In other words, there is a desperate need for a justification for the
different purposes of comparative interpretation.
From this perspective, improvements to comparative interpretation can be suggested
at two levels: firstly, at a theoretical level, trying to develop a justification for using
this method, and secondly, at a practical level, in order to mitigate the shortcomings
of this interpretation method. This section will address one of the attempts that have
been made to address the first challenge, namely the theoretical challenge. Suggestions
for improvement on a practical level will be discussed in Chapters 10 and 13, after
the case law analysis has shed more light on the problems that actually present
themselves in the application of the method by the European Courts.
97 Choudhry (2006), p. 3.
98 Choudhry (2006), p. 14. He speaks more in general about constitutional migration, but this includes
constitutional interpretation as well.
99 Choudhry (2006), p. 10.
100 Choudhry (2006), p. 10.
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An interesting attempt to justify comparative interpretation that has gained broader
attention has been made by CHOUDHRY.101 He argues for a specific mode of
comparative interpretation, which is called dialogical interpretation.102 Dialogical
interpretation is a mode of comparative interpretation under which the court that
invokes comparative references, engages in a dialogue with the comparative
materials.103 This entails that comparative references under this mode are used as
a means for self-reflection. By ‘comprehending a foreign system as being organized
around a core set of normative and factual assumptions [this] leads to a deeper
understanding of that system’.104 At the same time it increases self-understanding
about the normative and factual assumptions underlying the judge’s own system. This
mode of interpretation contains three steps for judges to apply. First, a judge has to
identify the assumptions underlying its own legal system. The presumption is that
if courts engage in the question why other courts reason in a particular way, courts
will turn that question onto themselves as well. The second step involves ‘comparing
the assumptions underlying the domestic and comparative jurisprudence’.105 The
main question to be answered here, by the court, is why are there any differences
or similarities? Finally, the court, in the third step, has to make a choice between
different interpretative options. After the first two steps a judge will be able to justify
whether it will embrace the similarities or the differences found. This means that the
judge will either argue that there are too many differences and, accordingly, the
approach of the foreign legal system does not fit with the underlying values of the
legal system of the country in question, or these steps could lead the judge to conclude
that there are important similarities and that the foreign solution does fit within the
legal system he is dealing with. Whichever option is chosen, the judge’s reasoning
will be based on an increased understanding of his own system.
One of the main advantages of this dialogical mode of comparative interpretation
is that it is not based on controversial normative claims like, for example, universalist
interpretation. This latter mode of interpretation is based on the premise that trans-
101 Choudhry (1998); Choudhry (2006). See also Harding (2003), Jackson (2005) and McCrudden (2007)
who also discuss some form of dialogical interpretation. He builds on similar ideas advanced by
Glendon, Ewald and Frankenberg. Choudhry (1998), p. 836.
102 He also presents two other modes for comparative interpretation, namely universalist interpretation
and genealogical interpretation. Dialogical interpretation, however, is the mode he is advocating.
Universalist interpretation is based on the assumption that there are certain transcendent legal principles
and courts can use comparative interpretation to find these principles. Genealogical interpretation
relies on the link that exists between particular countries and justifies comparative interpretation from
that perspective. This link can, for example, be between a former colony and its former ruler.
Choudhry (1998).
103 Choudhry (1998), p. 836.
104 Choudhry (1998), p. 837.
105 Choudhry (1998), p. 857.
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cendent legal principles exist and that, for that reason, comparative materials may
always be relevant to understanding one’s own legal system.106 Dialogical interpreta-
tion does not seem to make any normative claims as to a universality of legal norms
or principles, rather focusing on comparative interpretation as a means to stimulate
self-understanding.107
There are several jurisdictions in which this mode of interpretation is already
applied in some form; South Africa and Canada are two common examples.108 The
case of The Queen v Keegstra of the Canadian Supreme Court provides a good
example to illustrate the dialogical mode of interpretation.109 This case concerned
a high school teacher who was fired for expressing wilful hatred against Jews in the
classroom. The teacher challenged the Statute on which his conviction was based
as violating his freedom of expression. Chief Justice Dickson writing for the majority
held the Statute to be constitutional. He did agree that the Statute violated the teacher’s
freedom of expression, but on the basis of Section 1 of the Canadian Charter, he found
that interferences were allowed as long as they were prescribed by law and justifiable
in a free and democratic society. The Court in Keegstra thus had to address the
question whether the statute was justified in a free and democratic society. Next to
various considerations based on the Charter itself, for example relating to the harm
caused to society by the talk and on the objective of the statute in question, the
Canadian Court discussed foreign materials to help it to find an answer to the question
whether the infringement was justified. Chief Justice Dickson first extensively dis-
cussed the American approach to hate speech by looking at American precedents and
the literature discussing this American approach. He subsequently explicitly addressed
the reasons for looking at the American approach and why it did not consider this
approach applicable to the Canadian situation:
The question that concerns us in this appeal is not, of course, what the law is or should be
in the United States. But is important to be explicit as to the reasons why or why not Ameri-
can experience may be useful in the s. 1 analysis of [the statute]. In the United States, a
collection of fundamental rights has been constitutionally protected for over two hundred
years. The resulting practical and theoretical experience is immense and should not be
overlooked by Canadian courts. On the other hand, we must examine American constitutional
law with a critical eye ... Canada and the United States are not alike in every way, nor have
the documents entrenching human rights in our two countries arisen in the same context.
It is only common sense to recognize that, just as similarities will justify borrowing from
the American experience, differences may require that Canada’s constitutional vision depart
106 Choudhry (1998), p. 890.
107 Choudhry (1998), p. 892.
108 See Choudhry (1998), p. 855-865 and Harding (2003), p. 413-417 who discuss examples of this
dialogical method in practice.
109 The Queen v Keegstra (1990). See also Harding (2003), p. 425-426.
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from that endorsed in the United States ... Equally, I am unwilling to embrace various
categorizations and guiding rules generated by American law without careful consideration
of their appropriateness to Canadian constitutional theory. Though I have found the American
experience tremendously helpful in coming to my own conclusions regarding this appeal,
and by no means reject the whole of the First Amendment doctrine, in a number of respects
I am dubious as to the applicability of this doctrine in the context of a challenge to hate
propaganda legislation.110
The majority opinion continued to explain why it would not be appropriate to follow
the American approach, concluding that:
Where section 1 operates to accentuate a uniquely Canadian vision of a free and democratic
society ... we must not hesitate to depart from the path taken in the United States ... such
independence of vision protects rights and freedoms in a different way ... the special role
given [to] equality and multiculturalism in the Canadian Constitution necessitate a departure
from the view, reasonably prevalent in America at present, that the suppression of hate
propaganda is incompatible with the guarantee of free of expression.111
What becomes clear by these quotations is that the American approach helped the
judges understand the main values underlying the Canadian system and how they
shape their own approach to protecting human rights. The majority opinion also cited
international materials and showed that these materials valued the same principles
that ‘infused’ the Canadian Charter.112 The emphasis was thus on understanding
the characteristics of the Canadian legal system by looking at other approaches.
The dialogical mode of interpretation raises an important question with regard to the
extent of this interpretative mode. Is this mode of interpretation relevant for all the
purposes of comparative interpretation that have been discussed in section 6.1.4 or
is this only relevant for some of these purposes? The aim of the dialogical mode of
interpretation is to justify the relevance of comparative argumentation in specific cases.
As has been mentioned by CHOUDRY, the fact that foreign experiences might be
helpful may not provide a sufficient justification to use comparative interpretation
in particular situations. However, when looking for a consensus, or when looking
for inspiration to support a certain solution at national level, the dialogical mode is
helpful, since it stresses that it is necessary to explain why this foreign experience
or reasoning is relevant (or not) in one’s own legal system. This can only be explained
on the basis of a reason coming from one’s own system.
110 The Queen v Keegstra (1990).
111 The Queen v Keegstra (1990).
112 The Queen v Keegstra (1990).
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On the other hand, when the purpose of looking abroad is to find a rich body
of case law, because, for example, there is a vacuum left by a dark period in history
in one’s own jurisdiction, then there is not really a need to apply dialogical interpreta-
tion.113 In the case of South Africa, for example, after the end of the Apartheid era
there was a need for neutral case law, which could not be found in South Africa
itself.114 The whole purpose of looking abroad in this situation was to fill this
vacuum and use the experience from abroad. Self-reflection would have been almost
contradictory in these circumstances and thus dialogical interpretation would not make
sense in this context.
If the purpose is to simply show that others have taken a similar path and to use
that as an additional argument to support a certain interpretation, which is based on
other interpretative arguments, then there is no need or use to resort to the dialogical
mode of interpretation either. It is the numerical information that is relevant then,
not so much the substance of the solution that has been found in these foreign systems.
However, if the argument becomes more substantial than solely providing a numerical
example of other systems that have adopted a similar solution, dialogical interpretation
becomes increasingly relevant. Once again, dialogical interpretation may then help
to explain why substantive arguments from foreign systems can be relevant for one’s
own system based on reasons from within one’s system.
Dialogical interpretation, in conclusion, thus may be relevant when there is a need
to justify the use of substantive solutions from another legal system. The fact that
these solutions are ‘helpful’ is not sufficient to explain why these foreign solutions
may play an important role in the interpretation of provisions of one’s own legal
system.
The question is whether this mode of interpretation is also relevant for the CJEU
and the ECtHR. That question will be tentatively answered after a discussion of these
specific systems in section 6.4. A more informed answer will be provided after the
case law analysis.
6.2 COMPARATIVE INTERPRETATION AND THE ECTHR
The general discussion has provided various insights that are also relevant for com-
parative interpretation by the ECtHR. The present discussion will add some specific
insights on the use of comparative interpretation in the Convention system. Questions
that were left unresolved or insufficiently resolved for the ECtHR in the general
discussion on the use of the method relate to whether any basis for comparative
113 McCrudden (2003), p. 14.
114 Bentele (2008), p. 6.
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interpretation can be found in the Convention and to whom undertakes the comparison
– is it the judges themselves, is it a special research unit or is it even an external
party? The main question that still needs to be answered, moreover, is what role
comparative interpretation plays in relation to other interpretative methods and prin-
ciples in the interpretative framework of the ECtHR.
The preamble of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that it is
‘resolved, as the governments of European countries which are like-minded and have
a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to take
the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the
Universal Declaration’. This statement provides some justification for the ECtHR
to make comparative references,115 but it seems to provide a basis only for the
internal component of comparative interpretation. The reference to European countries
and their common heritage cannot really be seen as a basis for invoking references
from outside the context of the European Convention. The text of the Convention,
thus, does not seem to provide an additional basis for relying on the external com-
ponent of comparative interpretation. The question is whether the ECtHR in its
reasoning provides a basis for this component of comparative interpretation. This
question will be addressed as part of the case law analysis.
A second question to be addressed relates to who undertakes the comparative
study? This is not a subject that has received much attention in scholarly literature,
but it is important for the use of this method. In previous years the ECtHR appears
to have had hardly any resources for systematic comparative research at its dis-
posal.116 Comparative research took place in a rather informal manner, depending
on the knowledge of the judges themselves.117 In recent years, a research unit has
been established, which undertakes comparative studies.118 It is not entirely clear,
however, whether this research unit is sufficiently equipped to undertake systematic
and thorough comparative studies; in particular, it is relevant that systematic studies
are only conducted in respect to cases to be decided by the Grand Chamber, which
only constitute a small proportion of all the cases decided by the Court.119 The role
of the parties and third parties, like NGOs, should not be forgotten either. They can
115 Ost (1992), p. 305.
116 Bernhardt (1999), p. 35; Mahoney (2004), p. 148.
117 Bernhardt (1999), p. 35.
118 See the website of the ECtHR : http://www.echr.coe.int under “The Court”. The judge-rapporteur
in a specific case decides whether the research unit will be asked to draw up a comparative study.
See Myjer (2005), p. 1058 and (2007), p. 567, discussing the procedure before the Grand Chamber.
119 Mahoney writes in 2004, when the unit was already established, that the court does not have the
facilities or staff to undertake proper comparative research.
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provide valuable contributions in terms of comparative interpretation.120 MAHONEY
even claims that this is one of the successes of the institution of intervention.121
These observations on who performs a comparative study lead to an additional method-
ological question, namely the question as to when comparative materials are used
by the ECtHR in its judgments. Are comparative materials considered to be an integral
part of every case; are references only made in cases where one of the parties refers
to comparative materials; or is there even a more arbitrary explanation for their use,
namely that it depends on the individual judges’ knowing of any relevant comparative
materials?122 This question has not been given much attention in scholarly literature,
but it is relevant to know whether there is any consistency in the use of comparative
interpretation. Given the case load of the ECtHR it is highly unlikely that a comparat-
ive study will be done for every case, not even now that the judges no longer have
to conduct comparative studies themselves. Even for a research unit it would be too
much to supply comparative information in every case. The question thus remains
whether any pattern can be found in the use of comparative interpretation.
Finally, an important aspect that should be discussed is the role of comparative
interpretation in relation to other interpretative methods and principles in the inter-
pretative framework of the ECtHR. It is hard to ignore the close relation between
comparative interpretation and evolutive interpretation. The ECtHR uses comparative
interpretation to establish present-day circumstances.123 In other words, comparative
interpretation may be used to provide the evidence that is needed to substantiate an
evolutive interpretation. The principle of evolutive interpretation in itself cannot
generate a result: it points in the direction of a certain outcome or approach. In
combination with comparative interpretation, it is possible to put some flesh on the
bones of this approach. Both interpretative aids thus perform complementary functions
in the interpretative framework. Examples of this interaction will be discussed in the
chapters on the case law analysis. It will be shown there that the ECtHR mostly looks
for a consensus to establish present-day circumstances.124 Whether this consensus
will be considered to be a sufficient basis to support a novel interpretation will depend
on the strength of interpretative arguments that point in a different direction. Some
general situations that indicate the limits of an evolutive approach, and thus the limits
of the comparative evidence, will be discussed in Chapter 7.
BERNHARDT has argued, furthermore, that comparative interpretation could also
play a useful role in relation to autonomous interpretation.125 He has contended
120 Bernhardt (1999), p. 36; Mahoney (2004), p. 149.
121 Mahoney (2004), p. 149.
122Bernhardt (1999), p. 35.
123 Prebensen (2000), p. 1128; Mahoney (2004), p. 139.
124 Helfer (1993), p. 134-135; Rigaux (1998), p. 41.
125 Bernhardt (1999), p. 37.
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that comparative considerations should be only one element in the whole interpretation
process, stressing that their role should be more prominent than it presently is.126
The question as to the present role of comparative interpretation in relation to auto-
nomous interpretation will be discussed in Chapter 10. The more theoretical question
whether comparative interpretation should play a role in substantiating an autonomous
interpretation will be discussed in the chapter on autonomous interpretation.
The case law analysis will take the relation between the different methods and
principles as one of its focal points. Only after this analysis, conclusions can be
reached as to whether the use of this method can be improved.
6.3 COMPARATIVE INTERPRETATION AND THE CJEU
The CJEU has been referred to as a ‘working laboratory for comparative law’.127
The fact that the judges and Advocates General come from different legal systems
and the fact that the cases to be decided by the CJEU are rooted in different legal
systems have lead the CJEU, according to some, to almost naturally adopt a comparat-
ive approach.128 The question can be raised, however, as to whether there is a con-
crete legal basis for the CJEU to rely on comparative materials in interpreting the
EU treaties. Can an explicit reference be found in the TFEU or is there any other
basis for comparative interpretation? A subsequent question is how the CJEU employs
this method in the context of fundamental rights, especially if seen in relation to the
question as to who supplies the comparative materials. Finally, the relation of com-
parative interpretation with the other methods and principles discussed in this thesis
should be addressed in the context of the CJEU too.
One of the problems in answering all of these questions is that the CJEU is not
very explicit in its use of comparative interpretation.129 Indeed, the method has often
been mentioned in academic literature, but it has not been analyzed at a sufficiently
detailed level to answer all the questions that have been raised in the context of this
chapter. This section will therefore be able to provide a basic theoretical analysis,
but at the same time it will raise more questions than it will be able to answer.
126 Bernhardt (1999), p. 37.
127 Hilf (1986), p. 550, referring to Pescatore. See also Lenaerts (2003), p. 876.
128 Lenaerts (2003), p. 874, who also adds that the multilingual character of EU law leads the CJEU
to adopt a comparative approach. See also Colneric (2007), p. 316.
129 Lenaerts (2003), p. 873, points to this problem. Colneric (2007), p. 316, argues that the use of the
comparative method by the CJEU can be compared with the tip of an iceberg.
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General discussions on the use of comparative materials by the CJEU have pointed
to Article 19 TEU as a basis for a comparative approach.130 This provision grants
jurisdiction to the CJEU to ensure that the law is observed. When interpreting and
applying the treaty the CJEU needs to make sure that the law is observed. The
argument holds that comparative arguments help to establish what ‘the law’ is. In
the context of fundamental rights a specific basis for comparative arguments is
provided in Article 6(3) TEU, which states that the national constitutional traditions
and the European Convention are a source for EU fundamental rights.131 Article 6
TEU is only relevant for the practice of the CJEU since the early 90s when this
provision was included in the treaty. Article 19 TEU, on the other hand, provides
a very broad justification for the use of comparative interpretation. The question is
whether the CJEU in its case law provides a justification for its use of comparative
arguments. This will probably be the case in its case law after the coming into
existence of Article 6(3) TEU, because this provision provides a clear basis at least
for the use of internal comparative interpretation. The question is therefore mainly
directed at the case law from before 1992 and aims to find out whether the CJEU
provided a justification for its comparative approach in those cases.
In the introduction on the CJEU (provided in Chapter 3), attention has already
been drawn to the fact that references to national constitutional traditions and other
international instruments play an important role in the process of establishing the
meaning of fundamental rights by the CJEU. The question is how the CJEU uses
this comparative method. It has been noted in this regard that the CJEU is not explicit
in its use of comparative interpretation.132 It is therefore difficult to draw any con-
clusions on the use of the method on the basis of theoretical literature alone.133 It
is clear that the CJEU refers, at least, to national constitutional traditions and the Euro-
pean Convention, but that still raises many questions. What are these national constitu-
tional traditions? Is a consensus required? LENAERTS has argued that the CJEU is
looking for the solution which best suits the EU, but the question is whether that is
also the goal of the comparative method in the context of fundamental rights.134
Does the CJEU look at all Member States or just a limited number? Do they rely
on other materials as well? These are just a number of questions that cannot be fully
130 See Lenaerts (2003), p. 876-877. See alsoWasensteiner (2004), p. 30. Article 19 TEU is the equivalent
of former Article 220 EC.
131 Lenaerts (2003), p. 877 and Singer & Engel (2007), p. 499, make a similar point. Reference is also
made to Article 340 TFEU, which concerns non-contractual liability. This provision explicitly refers
to comparative interpretation.
132 Lenaerts (2003), p. 873, points to this problem. Colneric (2007), p. 316, argues that the use of the
comparative method by the CJEU can be compared with the tip of an iceberg.
133 See Wasensteiner (2004), p. 41.
134 Lenaerts (2003), p. 879.
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answered at this moment, but which will be further explored in the chapter presenting
the results of the case study.
An important source of external comparative interpretation at the CJEU is the
European Convention. Literature suggests that references to the ECHR and its cor-
responding case law play an important role in the reasoning of the CJEU. It is,
however, not clear exactly how these references play a role and to what extent they
are used in the reasoning of the CJEU. Are they used as inspiration or simply incor-
porated in the reasoning? These aspects have not received much attention in the
literature. One aspect that has received much attention is the question why the CJEU
relies on the European Convention. Legal commentaries suggest that there may be
more strategic underlying reasons for paying particular respect to Strasbourg.135
These reasons can mainly be found in the complex relationship between the EU, the
European Convention on Human Rights and to some extent also the Member States
of the EU. Until the CJEU had entered the field of fundamental rights, there was
hardly any overlap of jurisdiction. This changed when the CJEU started to introduce
fundamental rights in the EU. This resulted in jurisdictional overlap between the
European Court of Human Rights and the CJEU, which had to be dealt with in a
satisfactory manner.136 Given that the ECtHR is a specialized court which already
dealt with fundamental rights adjudication at the time the CJEU started to engage
in this type of adjudication, it seems quite natural that the CJEU in principle adheres
to the interpretations provided by the ECtHR. This is true, even though this might
be less obvious in terms of international public law since this case law is not binding
for the EU.137 More important than the binding character of the ECHR is that the
ECtHR and the CJEU are considered to be both ‘engaged in a common project of
European integration’.138 Both courts are interested in finding common fundamental
rights norms.139 As a result it is easier for the CJEU to take account of the case
law of the ECtHR, which represents rights accepted by all Member States, than to
delve into a comparison between the different Member States. A judgment by a well-
respected international court grants much authority to the reasoning of the Court.
Moreover, it provides a rather objective input, since not oneMember State’s approach
is favoured.
Another, related reason to approve the approach of the European Convention is
that the EU Member States are at the same time Contracting States to the European
Convention. As a result they can be held responsible for fundamental rights violations
135 See among others: Jacobs (2007), p. 209 & 211; Douglas-Scott (2006), p. 652-653.
136 Douglas-Scott (2006), p. 652.
137 Jacobs (2007), p. 208; Reich (2005), p. 214.
138 Douglas-Scott (2006), p. 653.
139 Douglas-Scott (2006), p. 653.
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which follow from the implementation of EU law or any other action of the EU.140
The CJEU would put Member States in a rather difficult situation if it were to interpret
EU law in conflict with the case law of the ECHR.141 Apart from the fact that it
would be difficult, it would also be highly impractical and counterproductive if two
different standards of fundamental rights protection were in force at the same time.
It has also been argued that the references to the ECHR have helped the EU gain
legitimacy, since it lacked a catalogue of fundamental rights of its own.142 By incor-
porating references to the ECHR the EU has been able to establish itself as a ‘fully
established democratic community which respects human rights’.143
Thus, from a strategic perspective (i.e. in order to gain more authority for the
protection of fundamental rights at the EU level and to prevent a clash of juris-
dictions), it is logical and justifiable that the CJEU has opted for respecting the ECHR.
But still questions remain as to the way in which the CJEU relies on references to
the European Convention and the ECtHR.
A relevant question in order to get a full understanding of the use of this method
is also who undertakes a comparative study. From the literature it becomes clear that
the Advocate General has an important role to play in this regard.144 The question
is to what extent the CJEU relies on the study by the Advocate General. Furthermore,
it is interesting to get a grasp of how the Advocate General uses the comparative
method. In addition to the role of the Advocate General, reference is made in theoret-
ical literature to the research and documentation unit, which undertakes comparative
studies for the benefit of the CJEU judgments.145 This unit operates on a request
by the CJEU and prepares a note on the comparative study on a certain subject.146
The notes are not public documents and it is thus difficult to get an understanding
of how this study is undertaken.147 This difficulty is increased by the fact that the
CJEU is rarely explicit in its references to comparative materials, as has been noted
before. As a result it is impossible for an outsider to understand which materials have
been used, which countries have been taken into account, etc. This lack of trans-
parency does not add to the argumentative force of this method. The question is
whether the case law reveals a similar picture or whether in the actual use of the
140 See cases like ECtHR (GC), Matthews v. United Kingdom, judgment of 18 February 1999, Reports
1999-I; ECtHR (GC), Senator Lines GmbH v. Austria and others, decision of 10March 2004,Reports
2004-IV; ECtHR (GC), Bosphorus HavaYollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Śirketi v. Ireland, judgment
of 30 June 2005, Reports 2005-VI.
141 Jacobs (2007), p. 209. Van den Berghe (2010).
142 Douglas-Scott (2006), p. 653.
143 Douglas-Scott (2006), p. 653.
144 See Faircloth Peoples (2008). Colneric (2007), p. 316.
145 Singer & Engel (2007), p. 508-511.
146 Singer & Engel (2007), p. 508-511.
147 Singer & Engel (2007), p. 508-511.
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method the CJEU and its Advocates General provide insight into the comparative
materials that play a role when using this method.
A final aspect of this method that should be addressed is its relation with the other
method and principles under discussion in this thesis, because that helps to understand
the interpretative framework of the CJEU. Not many references are made to the
relation of comparative interpretation and other interpretative aids. LENAERTS has
discussed the relation between teleological interpretation and comparative interpreta-
tion. He claims that the CJEU uses comparative interpretation to build a bridge
between the solution that best suits the object of the EU and that is still acceptable
to the Member States.148 Especially in a multilevel legal order, this is a valuable
connection between these two methods. The remarks, however, have been made in
the context of the comparative interpretation by the CJEU in general and not in the
specific area of fundamental rights. The question is thus whether these conclusions
apply to that area as well. The case law analysis should help to answer this question.
Once the case law analysis has clarified how the CJEU uses comparative interpreta-
tion, there is another question that should be answered. The question is whether the
coming into force of the Charter on Fundamental Rights will change the use of
comparative interpretation. It will only be possible to answer this question when the
present use of comparative interpretation has been discussed in more detail in the
case law analysis.
6.4 CONCLUSION
This chapter aimed to provide an overview of what the method of comparative
interpretation entails and which challenges are presented by this method. Two different
versions of comparative interpretation have been identified, namely internal comparat-
ive interpretation and external comparative interpretation. This distinction has proven
to be important, because a different justification can be necessary for the different
versions. In the literature many references have been made to the use of internal
comparative interpretation by both European Courts. In the context of the ECtHR
this version has been justified by reference to the Preamble which refers to the
‘common heritage’ of the European states. For the CJEU, Article 6 TEU provides
a clear basis for an internal comparison, since express reference is made therein to
constitutional traditions of the Member States. The fact that these courts rely on an
internal comparison has not been subject to heavy criticism, but the way in which
these courts use references to an internal comparison has been heavily criticized. Many
methodological issues have been raised in the current chapter, which need to be
addressed in the case law analysis.
148 Lenaerts (2003), p. 879.
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External comparative interpretation, on the other hand, is highly controversial in
theoretical literature on the use of foreign sources by national courts. In discussions
on the use of this version of comparative interpretation by the European Courts this
method does not seem equally controversial, but it is fair to add that this version of
comparative interpretation has not received as much attention as the internal version.
The main question that has been posed in the debates on external comparative inter-
pretation is what justification can be found to legitimize the use of foreign materials.
Even though the use of external materials is not as controversial in the European
debate as it is, for example, in the American debate, it is useful to learn from this
debate and enhance the legitimacy of arguments based on external comparative
interpretation.
Dialogical interpretation has been suggested as a relevant option for both European
Courts to enhance the legitimacy of comparative interpretation. The fact that references
to foreign materials can be helpful is not enough to justify the use of these materials;
therefore a different justification is needed. Dialogical interpretation is based on the
idea that looking at foreign systems helps a judge to learn about the values underlying
his or her own system. Looking at foreign systems thus eventually leads to arguments
based on one’s own system to choose one interpretation or the other and this choice
is then not based on arguments coming from a foreign system. As a result dialogical
interpretation can be helpful in justifying the use of foreign (external) materials, but
it can also explain why a certain trend among the Member States of either the EU
or the Council of Europe will be followed, while other trends will be ignored. In both
cases the reasons for doing that will come from the system itself. The question whether
this is actually a relevant solution can only be answered after a thorough analysis
of the present situation. Only then will it be possible to see if dialogical interpretation
would fit the interpretative framework of these courts or whether a different answer




PRINCIPLE OF EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION
In Chapter 4 the guiding principles in the interpretative framework of both European
Courts have been identified. Evolutive interpretation is one of these principles, which
derive from a meta-teleological perspective on the treaty in question. The aim of this
chapter will be to shed some light on the principle of evolutive interpretation. What
does evolutive interpretation mean? How and when can an evolutive interpretation
be established? Why do judges sometimes resort to evolutive interpretation? Can any
conclusions be drawn on the nature of this interpretative aid? What is the relation
of this principle with other interpretative principles and methods discussed in this
thesis? Answers to these questions will provide a better understanding of this inter-
pretative principle. The present chapter will take a theoretical perspective on these
questions and Chapters 11 and 13 will address these and other questions on the basis
of a case law analysis.
In order to be able to understand the theoretical discussion of the principle, it is
necessary to provide a preliminary understanding of evolutive interpretation. The
problem with evolutive interpretation is that most people can imagine what it might
mean, but no one seems to have a clear understanding of what it actually entails. This
chapter therefore aims to clarify the meaning and implications of the principle. It will
start from the presumption that evolutive interpretation refers to the fact that judges
might interpret a treaty in light of (legal) circumstances ‘prevailing at the time of
interpretation’.1 This presumption will be developed more fully throughout this
chapter, but as a common starting point it may help to place the discussion in context.
Another aspect that should be addressed at the beginning of this chapter is the
nature of evolutive interpretation. According to the division made between interpreta-
tion methods and principles in Chapter 4, evolutive interpretation should be considered
as an interpretative principle. After all, as has been explained in section 4.4.1.1,
evolutive interpretation refers to the general objective that the text in question is not
interpreted in a static, but in a dynamic manner. The understanding of a text can thus
change over time, according to evolutive interpretation. This changed understanding
1 This is part of a description provided by the ICJ in Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16, § 53.
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can be the result of, for example, technical changes, moral changes or cultural changes.
Thus, evolutive interpretation as such does not provide a substantive argument on
which a choice for a specific interpretation can be based.2 It refers to a goal that
should be reached, rather than providing a technique that can be used to establish
an evolutive interpretation. In order to take an evolutive approach, a court will need
one or more interpretation methods to provide a basis for an interpretation in the
concrete case at hand. Thus, evolutive interpretation needs to be achieved by, for
example, using textual interpretation, teleological interpretation or comparative
interpretation. The question is whether in the academic literature on evolutive inter-
pretation, the nature of this interpretative aid is discussed and what the outcome of
that discussion is. That is one of the aspects that will be discussed in this chapter.
This chapter will present some theoretical observations from both an international
law perspective and a national (constitutional) law perspective. It is appropriate to
do so, since the European Court of Human Rights as well as the Court of Justice of
the European Union are international (supranational) courts, but both courts also have
characteristics of national constitutional courts.3 Subsequently, the discussion on
evolutive interpretation as used by both courts, which has already been briefly intro-
duced in Chapter 4, will be continued. In section 7.1, the academic literature will
be explored on the evolutive approach taken by both the CJEU and the ECtHR,
addressing the questions that have been posed at the beginning of this introduction.
The discussion will, however, remain a theoretical one. The case law analysis provided
in Chapters 11 and 13 will address in more detail the use of evolutive interpretation
in the case law of both courts. It can be noted here that there will be an imbalance
in the discussion of the theoretical literature on the use of the principle by the respect-
ive courts. This is unavoidable, since the approach by the ECtHR has been subjected
to much more theoretical analysis than that of the CJEU.
7.1 SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION
Before discussing evolutive interpretation from both an international and national
perspective, there is one element relevant for the discussion that needs to be addressed.
It has been mainly discussed in national literature on evolutive interpretation, but in
the context of this thesis it will be relevant for the discussion from an international
perspective as well.
2 This point is also made by Scalia (1997), p. 45.
3 See Mahoney (1990), p. 59, who acknowledges as well that national constitutional discussions can
be relevant for a discussion on the ECHR. See also Helfer (2003) for a discussion on the analogies
between international courts, like the ECtHR and national constitutional courts.
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Evolutive interpretation has been introduced above as interpretation in light of
(legal) circumstances ‘prevailing at the time of interpretation’.4 This might seem to
leave little room for different forms of evolutive interpretation. Nevertheless, dis-
cussions on the question whether evolutive interpretation is allowed have led to an
understanding by some that evolutive interpretation can roughly be divided in two
different forms.5 The first form has been called ‘meaning originalism’ which means
that by applying this form of evolutive interpretation the meaning of the provision
stays the same, but the application can change according to the needs of the time.6
This means in practice that, for example, the meaning of the provision on freedom
of expression will stay the same, but that this protection will also be afforded to people
expressing themselves through newmedia, like the internet.7 KAVANAGH has described
this first form of evolutive interpretation as a way to take account of ‘changes in the
social environment’ or ‘changes in social facts’.8 In general, technological, scientific
and economic developments are often mentioned as examples of the type of changes
that can be taken into account under this form of evolutive interpretation. The under-
lying idea is that these developments do not change the values that a certain provision
is intended to protect. A constitution would become a dead letter if these kinds of
developments could not be taken into account.9 By only looking at the application
of the provision in an evolutive manner, the original understanding of the drafters
of the provision is respected. That is why this form of evolutive interpretation is
acceptable even for originalists.10
The second form of evolutive interpretation concerns taking into account ‘changes
in the moral values’.11 Morals can change in society over time as well. Many people
have, for example, different attitudes than 50 years ago towards homosexual relation-
ships. The question is who should decide to take these changes into account. Should
judges be able to decide for themselves to take account of these changes when
4 Supra note 1.
5 These two forms are in one way or another recognized by Scalia (1997), p. 45 and Kavanagh (2003),
p. 80. Roosevelt III (2006), p. 52 only recognizes one of these forms.
6 The term is introduced by Roosevelt III (2006), p. 52. Roosevelt III (2006), p. 52, introduces the
terms application originalists’ and meaning originalists’ . The latter indicates that the meaning
of the constitution stays the same, but the application might change. Application originalists’ on
the other hand indicates that both the meaning and the application remain the same. Kavanagh (2003),
p. 82-83, is skeptical of the explanation provided by, what Roosevelt III calls, meaning originalists.
She claims that even if the application changes (often this means that it is applied in a broader context)
this does involve moral change.
7 Scalia (1997), p. 45.
8 Kavanagh (2003), p. 80-81, quoting Lawrence Lessig when speaking of changes in social facts’.
9 Kavanagh (2003), p. 81.
10 Scalia (1997), p. 45.
11 Kavanagh (2003), p. 80.
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interpreting constitutional provisions? Or should theMember States as treaty legislators
determine whether the fundamental rights protection should be extended to also cover
these changes in moral values? The difference with regard to the first form of evolutive
interpretation is that in the first form the developments are more of a factual nature;
it is hard to deny the role of the internet in modern society, while in this second form
the developments are of a moral nature and the question whether these developments
should be protected depends on a (potentially controversial) value judgment. The
underlying assumption of those that criticize this form of evolutive interpretation is
that interpretation in light of these moral developments in society actually changes
the original meaning of the provision in question.12 The question is thus who should
be able to determine that these changes in the moral values of society have an impact
on the meaning of fundamental rights provisions. Depending on one’s answer to that
question, some people will find this second form of evolutive interpretation to be
legitimate, while others will find this form unacceptable. The different views on the
question whether a judge may take these moral changes into account in the interpreta-
tion process make this second form of evolutive interpretation a more controversial
one.
The division between the two forms of evolutive interpretation presented here is not
as black and white as it seems. There might be overlap between the two forms of
evolutive interpretation. In practice therefore it might be better to present it as two
ends of a scale with many points in between. The purpose of the division has been
to show that one of the forms is not controversial, while the other one is. When further
on in the discussion reference is made to the ‘extent’ of evolutive interpretation,
reference is really being made to one of these points between evolutive interpretation
as taking into account developments in social facts on the one hand and moral values
on the other. A ‘narrow’ version of evolutive interpretation in this sense means that
only developments in social facts are taken into account, while a ‘broad’ version of
evolutive interpretation indicates that both developments in moral values and social
facts will be taken into account.
A final question that warrants attention before discussing evolutive interpretation from
the specific perspective of the courts under study is what it means to interpret in an
evolutive manner for the level of protection afforded. Does interpreting fundamental
rights in an evolutive manner automatically entail a higher level of protection? In
other words, does evolutive interpretation always mean progress? When the notion
of evolutive interpretation is mentioned, it is often related to change and development,
though not many authors have addressed this question explicitly. One of the opponents
12 This argument is made by Scalia (1997), p. 45-46.
148
Principle of evolutive interpretation
of evolutive interpretation has argued that, apart from some exceptions, evolutive
interpretation is used to argue for more personal freedom and consequently it results
in more restrictions on the government.13 That would be an indication that an
evolutive interpretation generally leads to a higher level of protection, but it is ques-
tionable whether this is not a theoretical presumption that might be rebutted by
studying the case law in which the principle is actually applied. Indeed, there may
be good reason to question the presumption that evolutive interpretation always implies
a higher level of protection. By allowing an evolutive interpretation of a specific right,
this might come into conflict with the fundamental rights of another person. For
example, if in present-day society there is a trend towards more protection of the
private life of celebrities and this trend finds its way into legal judgments, this might
result in a lower protection for the freedom of expression of the press. The question
whether a higher level of protection is afforded therefore depends on one’s perspective
on the case and the side one is taking. However, whether or not evolutive interpreta-
tion implies progression in the sense of offering additional rights protection, will be
an interesting element to investigate in relation to the case law of the courts under
study, the CJEU and the ECtHR.
7.2 EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The rules of interpretation provided by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
have already been introduced in other chapters.14 It should be recalled that these
rules serve as the generally accepted international rules of interpretation.15 In that
light it is warranted to discuss whether these rules allow for evolutive interpretation.
The text of the articles of the Vienna Convention on treaty interpretation already
provides some clues for the present discussion. The general rule laid down in Article
31 of the Vienna Convention provides that: ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’.16 This article further
provides that the following elements are part of the context as well and should
therefore be taken into account:
13 Scalia (1997), p. 41-42, who argues that evolutive interpretation as a result does not increase flexibility,
but increases inflexibility. This argument results from his perspective, namely that of the government
and not the individual.
14 Mainly Chapter 4.
15 Commentary to articles of Vienna Convention, Yearbook of International Law Commission, 1966-
Vol. II; Bernhardt (1967), p. 491; Bernhardt (1988), p. 65; Aust (2000), p. 185-186; McRae (2002),
p. 210; Slotboom (2001), p. 576.
16 Art. 31 VCLT.
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(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty
or the
application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement
of the
parties regarding its interpretation17
By referring to subsequent agreement or practice, these sections indicate that a certain
form or extent of evolutive interpretation is allowed by the Vienna Convention. A
further indication that an evolutive approach is permitted by the Vienna Convention
is that the travaux préparatoires are stated to be a supplementarymeans of interpreta-
tion, which only come into play if the general rule of interpretation, as laid down
in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, does not provide a sufficient answer to the
interpretative question.18 Subsequent practice or agreement will thus be considered
before recourse is sought in the travaux préparatoires.19
The relevant question for the topic of evolutive interpretation is what subsequent
agreement or subsequent practice can be held to mean.20 The concept of ‘subsequent
agreement’ appears to refer to some sort of agreement to modify the treaty, which,
however, does not need to be as formal as an amendment to the treaty.21 According
to AUST this agreement ‘can take various forms’, like a decision, a resolution, a de-
claration or a memorandum of understanding.22 It seems warranted to conclude that
this element does require some activity by the State Parties, but it is not really clear
in which form such activity should take place or whether consent by all parties is
necessary to be able to speak of ‘subsequent agreement’.
‘Subsequent practice’, on the other hand, requires some action as well, as is im-
plied by the term practice. However, this notion is less explicit and seems to require
action of a different manner. Subsequent practice refers to the way the treaty is applied
by states in reality, which might differ from the wording of the treaty itself. AUST
argues that this is one of the most important elements of treaty interpretation and states
that it is well-established in the jurisprudence of international tribunals.23 Unfortunate-
ly, it is not entirely clear what kind of practice is considered to be relevant, for
17 Art. 31 3 a & b VCLT.
18 Art. 32 VCLT. Letsas (2010), p. 257, argues that this indicates that an evolutive approach is considered
more important than a static approach.
19 Bossuyt (2005), p. 81; Shaw (2008), p. 935; Bernhardt (1995), p. 1419-1421
20 The listing of both concepts separately suggests that these are two different concepts. Orakhelashvili,
however, claims that there is not much difference between subsequent agreement and subsequent
practice for the purpose of interpretation. Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 355.
21 Aust (2007), p. 239.
22 Aust (2007), p. 239-240 discusses different examples.
23 Aust (2007), p. 241.
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example if the notion only refers to enacted legislation, or to judicial practice or
factual practice by states as well. For subsequent practice to be relevant as an element
of treaty interpretation it is not necessary that all states are actually engaged in that
practice; tacit agreement on the reasonableness of the practice appears to be suffi-
cient.24 VILLIGER adds that no state should raise an objection, so the lack of an
objection might be understood as tacit agreement.25
While these two elements indicate that evolutive interpretation is not alien to
international law and to the Vienna Convention, they only provide a limited basis
for evolutive interpretation. ‘Subsequent agreement’ is a very narrow form of evolutive
interpretation, since it requires active agreement from the states on the topic to be
interpreted. That will hardly ever be the case. ‘Subsequent practice’ provides more
leeway, because it does not require an explicit agreement and tacit acceptance of a
practice is sufficient to provide a basis for interpretation. However, this still makes
it a difficult basis for interpretation. Tacit agreement implies that states should not
object to a certain practice, but the question is whether adopting a different approach
qualifies as an objection. For example, if some states within the EU of Council of
Europe adopt a different approach, does this qualify as an objection against the
approach by other states, and can this be considered as an objection to evolutive
interpretation? Given the size of both organizations there is a realistic chance that
there is some diversity in the practice of the Member States. From that perspective,
the interpretative principles contained in the Vienna Convention provide a rather
limited and rather unclear basis for evolutive interpretation.
These elements contained in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention are, however,
not the only indications that an evolutive approach is allowed under international law.
Several authors refer to the Namibia Advisory Opinion in which the International
Court of Justice concluded that ‘an international instrument has to be interpreted and
applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of
interpretation’.26 Implicit in this conclusion is a reference to Article 31(3)(c) VCLT,
24 Aust (2007) p. 243; Villiger (2009), p. 431.
25 Villiger (2009), p. 431.
26 Paragraph 53 of Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(SouthWest Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1971, p. 16, provides: ... the Court is bound to take into account the fact that the concepts
embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant-"the strenuous conditions of the modern world" and "the
well-being and development" of the peoples concerned-were not static, but were by definition
evolutionary, as also, therefore, was the concept of the "sacred trust". The parties to the Covenant
must consequently be deemed to have accepted them as such. That is why, viewing the institutions
of 1919, the Court must take into consideration the changes which have occurred in the supervening
half-century, and its interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent development of law,
through the Charter of the United Nations and by way of customary law. Moreover, an international
instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing
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but also a rather explicit reference to the notion of evolutive interpretation.27 In
addition, BERNHARDT has argued that the prominent role of teleological interpretation
for treaty interpretation brings along a certain evolutive influence.28 He claims that
if treaties are drafted with the purpose of ensuring long-lasting commitments to
guarantee fundamental rights, it is contrary to that purpose to ignore new developments
when interpreting that treaty.29 These arguments provide an interesting theoretical
basis for the use of evolutive interpretation, since they do not necessarily require
agreement among the Member States for an evolutive approach to be established.
The question is what elements do need to be present in order to establish an evolutive
approach. That aspect is not clear for both of these theoretical bases. Nevertheless,
both arguments show that some form of evolutive interpretation is accepted under
international law.
The words ‘some form of’ evolutive interpretation have been deliberately chosen
here to indicate that while there might be general agreement that evolutive interpreta-
tion can play a role in treaty interpretation, it is often debated how far a court may
take this evolutive approach.30
It is difficult to make general comments on the extent of evolutive interpretation, since,
according to CHRISTOFFERSEN, the extent will depend on the ‘specific treaty’s terms
and nature and object as well as the parties’ intention’, but also the facts of the
case.31 The parties’ intention, in this quote from CHRISTOFFERSEN, seems to refer
to the intention of the original State Parties. Thus the question whether they intended
the treaty to have an evolutive meaning can influence the extent of evolutive inter-
pretation.
Even though not much can be said in general about the extent of evolutive inter-
pretation, some authors have signalled areas of concern connected to the use of
evolutive interpretation in treaty interpretation.32 First of all, the legitimacy of
evolutive interpretation is closely related to the understanding of the role of an
at the time of the interpretation.’
27 Bernhardt (1999), p. 16 and Christoffersen (2009), p. 48 referring to an Advisory Opinion of 1971.
Prebensen (2000) also refers to this Advisory Opinion and uses it to show that the approach by the
ECtHR is not new in international law.
28 Bernhardt (1999), p. 16.
29 Bernhardt (1999), p. 16-17. This viewpoint is supported by Wessel (2004), who argues that treaties
in which dynamic obligations (meaning obligations that have been designed for an ongoing relation-
ship) have been laid down must be interpreted differently from end-game treaties. This latter type
of treaty has, for example, been designed to end a conflict.
30 Bernhardt (1999), p. 16, considers this to be the real problem.
31 Christoffersen (2009), p. 49-50, referring to McLachlan.
32 Bernhardt (1999), p. 21-24.
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international judge.33 If one considers that an international judge should be a very
cautious and conservative one, then one will probably have a stricter view of the extent
of permissible evolutive interpretation. This close relation is due to the fact that by
interpreting in an evolutive manner, an international judge to some degree may change
the law. As has been explained in section 7.1, adopting an evolutive approach can
in some situations lead a judge to an interpretation that goes beyond the original
understanding of the provision in question. A modest use of evolutive interpretation
will probably not generate discussions on the division of competences between the
State Parties (as legislators of treaties) and an international or supranational court.
Depending on the degree of evolutive interpretation, however, the question might
arise whether the decision to adopt a new evolutive approach is still within the
province of an international or supranational court or should be left to the State
Parties.34 It is in this debate that accusations of judicial activism are sometimes
made.35 However, as also has been explained in relation to other interpretative
principles and methods, the term judicial activism is in itself not very helpful in this
context, since it is a rather vague term and different people have different conceptions
of this term.36 A discussion using the term judicial activism as a starting point might
therefore lead to confusion, because not everybody has a similar understanding of
this term. It would be more constructive to discuss the question what the limits of
an evolutive approach should be, taking into account the particular position of inter-
national and supranational courts and the potentially far-reaching effects of evolutive
interpretation.
Secondly, some criticism is levelled that is of special relevance for human rights
treaties, which is arguably the most prominent area where evolutive interpretation
plays a role in international law.37 It is sometimes argued that when interpreting
human rights treaties the practice of states at the domestic level plays a crucial role,
especially if it is held that an evolutive approach is acceptable if a ‘widespread
practice’ exists.38 Inter-state practice is much less important to determining such
widespread practice than national practices are.39 This can certainly put the inter-
national judge in a challenging position, since he will have to answer the delicate
33 Bernhardt (1999), p. 22.
34 Mahony (1990), p. 60.
35 Mahony (1990), p. 62.
36 Cohn and Kremnitzer (2005), p. 334.
37 Bernhardt (1999), p. 12, claims it is the most important area where this principle plays a role;
Christoffersen (2009), p. 48, does not deny this, but claims it is not the only area.
38 Bernhardt (1999), p. 23. Prebensen (2000), p. 1126, claims that this is only natural in the context
of human rights treaties.
39 Bernhardt (1999), p. 23.
153
Chapter 7
question when it is legitimate to conclude that such a ‘widespread practice’ exists.40
This concern is related to the previous one, but it addresses the question when there
is enough proof to legitimize an evolutive interpretation. There is no magic formula
to answer the question when a widespread practice can be said to exist; it depends
on the specific treaty context, possibly even on the specific case. Therefore this matter
will be discussed more in depth when discussing the respective courts.
Finally, it is interesting to note that while not much discussion focuses on the
question of exactly how to establish an evolutive interpretation, the reference to state
practice indicates that comparative arguments will most likely play a role. This may
help to explain the strong link between evolutive and comparative interpretation which
is addressed at several places throughout this thesis. This link will be discussed below
when addressing the question how both European Courts establish an evolutive
interpretation.
In conclusion one can say that international law in itself does allow for evolutive
interpretation. A narrow version can be based directly on the Vienna Convention,
but the ICJ approach allows for a broader version of evolutive interpretation. Most
important for evolutive interpretation, however, is the context of the specific treaty.
It is relevant in that regard whether there is a basis for evolutive interpretation in the
specific treaty, what kind of treaty it is, the text of the provisions and other factors
that might indicate that an evolutive approach can be adopted under a specific treaty
regime. It is good to acknowledge that there is general support for evolutive interpreta-
tion in international law, but it is also widely accepted that this form of reasoning
has to fit the treaty context. That can only be determined on a treaty-by-treaty basis.
The debates in international law did reveal possible areas of concern that might be
relevant for the interpretation of any treaty, namely the role of the international judge
and the level of proof required for an evolutive interpretation. These aspects also
should receive attention in the analysis of the use of evolutive interpretation before
both European Courts. The next section will first address the theoretical discussion
from a national perspective.
7.3 EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION AND NATIONAL LAW
It has already been mentioned that both the Court of Justice of the European Union
and the European Court of Human Rights have some features in common with a
national constitutional court.41 Therefore a theoretical discussion on national constitu-
40 Bernhardt (1999), p. 23.
41 Supra note 25 (Chapter 4).
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tional matters can be relevant in furthering our understanding of evolutive interpreta-
tion. Many national constitutional courts are confronted with the question whether
they should interpret the constitution in light of the intention of the drafters of the
document or in light of current circumstances.42 In some countries this debate leads
to more controversy than in others,43 but the question appears to be relevant for most,
if not all, constitutional courts.
References to evolutive interpretation are often captured in metaphors, like the
‘living constitution’44 or the constitution as a ‘living tree’.45 These metaphors in-
dicate that a constitution is not static and can grow or develop over time though
judicial interpretation.46 The opponents of this type of reasoning do not focus on
metaphors, perhaps because the image of a ‘dead constitution’47 would probably
not attract many supporters. Opponents of an evolutive approach are often termed
originalists, named after the specifically American ‘originalist’ theory of constitutional
interpretation.48 There are different versions of originalism, but a common character-
istic is that they all consider that the constitution has a fixed meaning, which is based
on either original meaning, original intentions or hypothetical intentions.49 One would
assume that much of the debate focuses on the question whether an evolutive approach
is legitimate, but this does not seem to be the case. All originalists, even US Supreme
Court Justice Scalia, acknowledge that some development should be allowed for or,
at least, is inevitable in constitutional interpretation.50 This is the first form of
evolutive interpretation as discussed in section 7.1, where it is explained that this
42 See Jackson (2006), p. 927-937, who discusses the German, Canadian and Australian experience.
43 See, for example, the difference between the USA and Canada. In the latter an evolutive approach
to constitutional law is hardly controversial. See for example Miller (2009), p. 332.
44 This is the American metaphor; see Rehnquist (2006), p. 401.
45 This is the Canadian metaphor; see Jackson (2006), p. 926.
46 Kavanagh (2003), p. 55-56. See also Huscroft (2004), p. 417; Scalia (1997), p. 38. This discussion
concerns the debate between those who adhere to a living constitution and originalists. In the USA
at least there are also those that do not engage in the rhetoric of this debate. Scholars like Dworkin
focus on a moral reading of the constitution. This could lead to the same interpretation as the one
based on an evolutive approach, but scholars taking this moral approach will support their reasoning
by relying on moral arguments and not on arguments referring to the living constitution.
47 Term referred to by Rehnquist (2006), p. 401.
48 Justice Scalia is the most famous proponent of this theory. See for example: Scalia (1997) or Scalia
(1989).
49 Waluchow (2007), p. 52-73.
50 Rehnquist (2006), p. 402; Jackson (2006), p. 942. See also Scalia (1989), p. 861-864, where he
discusses the fact that originalism in its purest form is a medicine that many find too hard to swallow.
He admits that he is a so-called faint-hearted originalist by discussing the hypothetical example of
whether a statute permitting flogging as a punishment (which was not considered cruel and unusual
punishment at the time of the Framers) would now be ruled unconstitutional.
155
Chapter 7
uncontroversial form concerns taking into account changes in social facts. It has been
mentioned there that changes in technology or other changes of a more factual nature
may be taken into account in all readings of evolutive interpretation. The debate on
evolutive interpretation thus focuses on the second form of evolutive interpretation,
namely whether judges are allowed to take changes in moral values into account.
It is difficult to discuss these issues relating to the extent of evolutive interpretation
in a general manner, since the debate on evolutive interpretation is closely connected
to the role of the judge in a specific constitutional system.51 The difference between
the USA and Canada may exemplify that the attitude towards evolutive interpretation
depends on the national context. In Canada, there is hardly any controversy on
evolutive interpretation.52 It is accepted as a form of interpretation without much
discussion or resistance. In the USA, on the other hand, there is much debate over
the concept of evolutive interpretation.53 Judging solely by the age of the bills of
rights in these countries, one might expect that evolutive interpretation would not
be much of a problem in the USA, because their bill of rights is over two hundred
years old and evolutive interpretation of any extent could thus be highly relevant.
One might expect it to be a controversial matter in Canada where the charter on
fundamental rights is barely 30 years old. Given that the reverse is true, there must
be other factors that play a role in determining to what extent evolutive interpretation
is accepted in a national legal system.
Various authors have stated that, for example, the nature of a constitution and
the authority granted to a constitution in a specific country could influence the extent
of legitimate evolutive interpretation.54 Another factor that plays an important role
is the role of the judge in a specific society and the perceived democratic legitimacy
of a judge.55 Both factors are related, since one’s views on the nature of the constitu-
tion influences one’s perspective of the role of the judge in constitutional interpreta-
tion. A constitution, but also a bill of rights,56 defines and limits the power of a
government. It depends on one’s view of what a constitution is trying to protect
whether one considers that a judge should easily defer to the legislator in constitutional
51 Jackson (2006), p. 925.
52 Miller (2009), p. 332.
53 The clearest example of this controversy being the opposition of Scalia against evolutive interpretation,
Scalia (1997), p. 45.
54 Waluchow (2007), p. 53 argues that theories of constitutional interpretation [... ] are not easily
separated from theories concerning the very nature, point and authority of constitutions’.
55 Jackson (2006), p. 925 argues that different views on democratic legitimacy, rule of law, judicial
constraint and judicial competence’ have an impact on the discussion on evolutive interpretation.
56 In some countries a separate constitution and bill of rights exist, but in others this is combined in
one document. Both are part of the constitutional make up of a country in the broad sense and
therefore they will be treated as equal for the discussions here. Waluchow (2007), p. 53, also uses
both terms interchangeably.
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cases or whether a judge should be able to have more leeway in deciding constitutional
cases. WALUCHOW illustrates this difference by discussing the fictional Judges Ronnie
and Antonin.57 Judge Ronnie believes the constitution aims to protect minorities
against the will of the majority. From that perspective Judge Ronnie might not consider
himself strictly bound by the will of the legislator as a representative of the will of
the majority. Judge Antonin, on the other hand, thinks that the constitution is designed
to protect everyone from the arbitrary exercise of government power. As a result Judge
Antonin has more respect for the will of the legislator and is careful not to display
arbitrary judicial activism himself. This general example may explain the connection
between the view of the nature of a constitution and the perceived proper role of the
judge.
The nature of a constitution can also refer to the character of the constitution,
which can be relevant for the discussion on evolutive interpretation. In the debate
in the USA, for example, opponents and proponents of evolutive interpretation have
different views on the character of the constitution. Some regard the constitution as
a ‘narrow set of negative restraints on policy makers’,58 while others view the
constitution as a set of abstract constitutional principles, which have a ‘broader reach
than the framers’ concrete intentions’.59 Those who support the latter view, might
be more inclined to leave room for judicial evolutive interpretation, because these
abstract principles might change over time. The question is whether such stark con-
trasts exist in the European context as well. Even if the contrasts are not as strong,
differences with regard to the nature of the constitution might have an impact on the
extent of evolutive interpretation one finds acceptable.
The second aspect that influences the attitude towards evolutive interpretation,
as mentioned above, is the role of a judge.60 This is often discussed in the context
of the concerns on evolutive interpretation, which will be addressed below.
The remainder of this section will address a number of arguments for and against
evolutive interpretation that can be distilled from the national debate about constitu-
tional interpretation. Not much attention has been paid in the literature on national
constitutional law to the advantages of evolutive interpretation.61 Some advantages
57 See Waluchow (2007), p. 53 for a more extensive illustration.
58 Barber & Fleming (2007), p. 21.
59 Barber & Fleming (2007), p. 21.
60 One could imagine, for example, that historical attitudes towards the judiciary and the legislator also
play a role or that other more sociological factors could play a role as well, but that would require
a whole different type of research.
61 Miller (2009), p. 331-332, does address the point that in the Canadian context there has not been
much reason to defend the evolutive (sometimes also called progressive’) approach, due to lack
of challenges to this approach.
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have, however, been briefly mentioned. First of all, it has been argued that an
evolutive approach enables judges to adapt the constitution to ‘modern needs and
circumstances’.62 It ensures that the constitution stays effective even if it was drafted
generations ago. It thus, secondly, provides for some flexibility when interpreting
the constitution. The constitution does not become stuck in rigid historical interpreta-
tion.63 Finally, it has been argued that it is the task of judges to do justice. According
to some scholars, that means that they have to be open to, or even actively consider,
the possibility for improvement and therefore should be willing to adopt an evolutive
approach.64
The concerns about evolutive interpretation, on the other hand, have been discussed
extensively.65 The most important concern is somewhat similar to that in international
law concerning the impact of the use of the method in relation to the role and the
competence of the judge. The question is how far a judge should be allowed to change
the constitution by means of (evolutive) interpretation. The basis for this concern is
the division of powers between the judiciary and the legislature. Originalists fear that
the (non-elected) judiciary will develop into a third legislative branch, which is not
considered to be acceptable from a constitutional perspective.66 Changes to the consti-
tution should be made by the democratically elected legislator (or by any other
competent organ, depending on the constitutional system of the relevant state), but
they are not within the province of the courts. An additional aspect is that judgments
of highest courts can, generally, only be overturned by the legislator through constitu-
tional amendment, which in most constitutional systems is a cumbersome matter and
therefore in most situations not a realistic option.67 If courts change the meaning
of the constitution bymeans of interpretation and such change is considered unaccept-
able by the democratically legitimized organs, this means that it can be very difficult
to undo the consequences of the court’s decisions. Arguments have been advanced
to mitigate this criticism, which will be addressed below, but it is difficult to complete-
ly rebut this concern, since it ultimately depends in large part on the constitutional
conception of the role of the judge. It does, however, challenge proponents of an
evolutive approach (judges and academics alike) to show that there are certain con-
straints on evolutive reasoning – it should not be regarded as a licence for ‘unlimited
moral adjudication by a free-wheeling judiciary’.68
62 Kavanagh (2003), p. 56.
63 Jackson (2006), p. 958. Huscroft (2004), p. 415, refers to the need for flexibility as well.
64 Kavanagh (2003), p. 68.
65 Among others: Rehnquist (2006), Scalia (1989) and (1997).
66 Kavanagh (2003), p. 69.
67 Huscroft (2004), p. 415, refers to this cumbersome process. See also article V of the United States
Constitution for an example of the amendment process in one specific constitutional context.
68 Kavanagh (2003), p. 72.
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A number of arguments have been raised to show that there are certain constraints
for judges when they invoke an evolutive approach, which should mitigate the con-
cerns of opponents of evolutive interpretation that evolutive interpretation leads a
judge to go beyond his or her legitimate role. In this context it is useful to recall the
metaphor discussed at the beginning of this section, namely ‘living constitution’ and
‘living tree’. It has been argued in constitutional theory that the latter metaphor is
a more appropriate reflection of evolutive interpretation.69 The understanding of the
constitution as a ‘living tree’ indicates that the constitution can grow, but that it is
at the same time grounded in its roots: ‘the tree is rooted in past and present institu-
tions, but must be capable of growth to meet the future’.70 This aspect is missing
in the ‘living constitution’ metaphor, which perhaps explains to a certain extent the
fear for unguided judicial reasoning in constitutional systems where this metaphor
prevails as a means to describe evolutive interpretation.71 Such metaphors themselves
cannot be regarded as real constraints, they just represent a concept. In theoretical
literature, however, several actual constraints have been mentioned in order to show
that judges will not simply impose their own moral conceptions when invoking
evolutive interpretation. The most important constraint is the text of the constitution
itself. Even if the constitution is drafted in a general manner, the constitution cannot
be interpreted to mean just anything.72 Judges have to interpret a constitutional
provision within the context of the text and structure of the constitution.73 Further-
more, precedents impose an important constraint on courts as well. Of course, the
extent to which this will really be the case will depend on whether the court in
question does indeed adhere to some form of system of precedent. Both the European
Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union for reasons
of legal certainty, whilst not formally obliged to respect precedent, at least try to
adhere to their own precedents.74 Therefore they can be expected to find some
restraint in the need to carefully connect each novel interpretation to the decisions
and judgments the courts already rendered in the past.
A final general constraint that has been mentioned is that judges have to adjudicate
within a specific legal culture.75 This is perhaps not a constraint in the legal sense,
69 Jackson (2006), p. 941-954.
70 Jackson (2006), p. 948.
71 Choudhry (2006), p. 19-20, briefly refers to the value of the right metaphor in shaping thought about
a specific issue.
72 Kavanagh (2003), p. 70.
73 Huscroft (2004), p. 427, speaks about limits inherent to the Charter or Constitution. He also refers
to Dworkin who refers to constraints of structure and precedent as well, p. 428.
74 See in the context of the CJEU: Brown & Kennedy (2000), p. 369-370. In the context of the ECtHR:
Mowbray (2009), p. 180, who cites an official of the ECtHR Registry, who claims that the ECtHR
adheres to a limited form of stare decisis.
75 Kavanagh (2003), p. 71.
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such as the constraints constituted by the constitution and by precedent, but it rather
can be considered to come down to ‘professional pressures’ or ‘internal constraints
on judicial decision-making’.76 Justice Brennan of the United States Supreme Court
has called this constitutional integrity.77 Every legal culture has specific norms on,
for example, how to decide a case or ‘the degree of deference that should be accorded
to parliament’.78 Judges have to adjudicate within their particular legal and constitu-
tional cultures and they will thereby be restrained in their (evolutive) reasoning.
Another argument against evolutive interpretation that has sometimes been brought
forward is that there is no general guiding principle for evolutive interpretation and
that, as a result, the whole process of evolutive interpretation is unclear.79 The lack
of clarity in the process can lead to a lack of clarity with regard to the solution that
is adopted on the basis of an evolutive approach. If it is unclear how judges have
reached a certain (perhaps controversial) interpretation this might affect the force of
the argument and ultimately it might affect the willingness to accept the interpretation.
To be more precise, it is unclear, according to SCALIA, whether a judge should consult
the ‘chats at the country club’ or Aristotle when interpreting a constitutional text in
an evolutive manner.80 The problem for SCALIA seems to be that each theory of
interpretation incorporating an evolutive perspective on the constitution holds a
different view of what documents and developments should be considered as consti-
tuting sufficient foundation for evolutive interpretation.81 He seems to imply that
this could mean that every judge trying to interpret the ‘living constitution’ will be
taking different elements into account and as a result it becomes an unguided, un-
predictable and unprincipled form of interpreting a constitution. At a certain level,
SCALIA might be correct in the sense that judges should try to be consistent in the
elements they consult in order to establish an evolutive interpretation and they should
provide sound reasons to consult certain documents or materials. The fact, however,
that different theories can exist on which documents or developments should be taken
into account and different theories might emphasize different elements in these
documents, should not in itself render evolutive interpretation useless. It does require
76 Kavanagh (2003), p. 71.
77 See Brennan (1989), p. 435, who argues that judges are limited by precedents, the text to be inter-
preted, regard for the public opinion and institutional integrity. See also Huscroft (2004), p. 428,
referring to Brennan. See also De Blois (1994), p. 41-42, who points to similar factors that relate
to the legal cultural environment of the judge, which limit their freedom of discretion.
78 Kavanagh (2003), p. 71.
79 Scalia (1997), p. 44-45.
80 Scalia (1997), p. 45.
81 Scalia (1997), p. 45, this becomes especially clear when he claims that originalists might not always
agree, but at least they agree on what they are looking for.
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proponents of an evolutive approach to address this criticism. The question is how
judges in the European Courts establish an evolutive interpretation and whether that
is done in a consistent and reasonable manner.
The discussion on evolutive interpretation in the national context has provided some
interesting insights that are relevant for the discussion on the use of the method of
evolutive interpretation by both European Courts. Firstly, the discussion showed that
the permissible extent of evolutive interpretation depends on many different factors,
such as the nature of the constitution or charter to be interpreted and the national
perception of the role of the judge. Secondly, two major drawbacks of evolutive
interpretation have been discussed. One notable concern is that it is not clear in
situations where judges take an evolutive approach, how far judges may take this
approach. In addition, concerns have been voiced against the fact that it is unclear
how judges reach an evolutive interpretation. It has also become clear that more
specific answers on the question what evolutive interpretation entails should be
answered in the context of the relevant court. The remainder of this chapter will aim
to provide some theoretical answers to questions that are left open. Chapters 11 and
13 will subsequently address how both courts deal with evolutive interpretation in
practice.
7.4 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The previous general theoretical discussion made two aspects of evolutive interpreta-
tion very clear. First of all, both in the international and national discussion the context
of the specific treaty or constitution is crucial for answering many questions on
evolutive interpretation. Secondly, the main concern with evolutive interpretation,
again also in the national and international context, is that the judge should not
overstep its role. The aim of this section on the European Court of Human Rights
is to answer the questions that have been listed in the introduction to this chapter
and to discuss the limits of evolutive interpretation in the context of the European
Convention.
7.4.1 Basis and justification for evolutive interpretation
Even though some references to evolutive interpretation can be found in the Vienna
Convention, the discussion in section 7.2 revealed that this Convention only provides
a limited basis for such interpretation. The question is therefore whether the specific
European Convention context offers a more general basis for the use of this interpretat-
ive principle. The introduction to evolutive interpretation in Chapter 4 already men-
tioned that the preamble of the European Convention refers to the ‘maintenance and
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further realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms’.82 The same phrase
has been incorporated in Article 1 of the Statute of Council of Europe. Although this
does not provide a very clear or explicit basis for evolutive interpretation, at least
the term ‘further realization’ may be understood to have an evolutive connotation.
A further indication that an evolutive approach is warranted under the Convention
system is provided by the text of the Convention itself. According to PREBENSEN,
the Convention is drafted in the present tense and it contains rather general standards
that should be defined by judicial interpretation.83 This has led PREBENSEN to assume
that the drafters could not have expected the open-ended provisions in the Convention
to be treated as ‘fossilized instruments’.84 Others have argued that it was the intention
of the drafters to guarantee the protection of Convention rights for the future and that,
for that reason, an evolutive approach is needed.85 In addition, it has been argued
that the object and purpose of the European Convention (or human rights treaties
more in general) require an evolutive approach as they would otherwise more or less
be defeated.86 Some have criticized this argument. In the view of FITZMAURICE,
evolutive interpretation goes beyond the classical starting point of international law,
i.e. the notion that state consent should play an important role in its interpretation.87
In her view the argument based on the special nature of human rights treaties is not
sufficient to justify an approach that is contrary to this notion of state consent. A
different justification would thus be necessary to justify evolutive interpretation.
Nevertheless, most authors seem to accept that an evolutive approach can be based
on the general aims underlying the Convention as a whole. One of the oft-noted
advantages of an evolutive approach is that it offers a tool to make the Convention
into an effective human rights treaty. The principle of effective protection in that sense
provides a basis for an evolutive approach, since an interpretation that is according
to present day standards and opinions will be essential to ensure that the Convention
rights are applied in a practical and effective manner.88 These are theoretical explana-
tions for the basis of evolutive interpretation in the Convention system. Chapter 11
will try to analyze whether the ECtHR itself has felt the need to explain the basis
of evolutive interpretation.
82 Preamble of the ECHR.
83 Prebensen (2000), p. 1124-1125.
84 Prebensen (2000), p. 1125.
85 Ovey & White (2006), p. 47; Mahony (1990), p. 65. Christoffersen (2009). In this context it should
be noted that Prebensen argues that an originalist interpretation of the convention would be practically
impossible. Prebensen (2000), p. 1125.
86 Mahony (1990), p. 65. Harris (1995), p. 7; Van der Meersch (1988), p. 202.
87 Fitzmaurice (2008), p. 132.
88 Bernhardt (1999), p. 23.
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7.4.2 Meaning and nature of evolutive interpretation in the context of the
Convention
In Chapter 4, the ECtHR’s characteristic reference to an evolutive approach has already
been introduced. The ECtHR claims that the Convention is a ‘living instrument; which
should be ‘interpreted in light of present-day conditions’.89 The introduction on
evolutive interpretation by the ECtHR indicated that the nature of this concept is
understood in slightly different ways by different authors.90 The focus in this chapter
will be on those authors that imply that evolutive interpretation is not an interpretation
method, but plays a distinctive role in the interpretation process as a guiding prin-
ciple.91 PREBENSEN is one of the authors that seems to embrace this position.92
In his elaborate discussion on evolutive interpretation, he qualifies it as a principle
or a doctrine of interpretation.93 Moreover, he argues that the ECtHR in establishing
an evolution often resorts to comparative arguments.94 This seems to indicate that
evolutive interpretation does need support from other types of arguments, or at least
that other interpretative methods are needed to establish an outcome that fits in well
with the general idea of evolution. In the same vein, MAHONEY has acknowledged
that an evolutive approach needs ‘some methodology or evidence’ in order to be
effected in a concrete case placed before the Court.95
However, only a few authors do make some kind of a distinction betweenmethods
and principles of interpretation. The troubling consequences of this lack of any
distinction have already been pointed out earlier, in section 4.1.96 When such a
distinction is omitted, the distinct role of methods and principles will not be fully
appreciated and as a result the two concepts may be confused. For example, the
principle of evolutive interpretation may be confused with themethod of comparative
interpretation.97 This is problematic, since each of these concepts has its particular
characteristics, aims and values, but also its own particular problematic aspects. All
of these should be assessed and valued in their own right. By confusing concepts,
the critique on the comparative interpretation may find its way into the discussion
89 ECtHR, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A No. 26.
90 See section 4.4.1.1.
91 Prebensen (2000); see for example: p. 1123 and Mowbray (2005); see for example: p. 71.
92 Prebensen (2000), p. 1123.
93 Prebensen (2000), p. 1123-1124, 1126
94 Prebensen (2000), p. 1127. Mowbray (2005), p. 69 also refers to evolutive interpretation as a doctrine
and principle and refers to comparative interpretation as factors that the court takes into account.
95 Mahoney (1990), p. 73. He claims that the ECtHR has found this objective evidence in a comparative
approach.
96 See section 4.1.
97 Helfer (1993), p. 134-135; Rigaux (1998), p. 41; Janssen (2003), p. 187 , De Blois (1994), p. 55;
Van de Lanotte (2005), p. 194.
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on evolutive interpretation. This might be problematic if the specific criticism levelled
at comparative interpretation is not really pertinent to the principle of evolutive
interpretation, especially if the criticism is so serious that it invites completely
abandoning or avoiding the principle. The samemay be true for criticism that is aimed
at the principle of evolutive interpretation, but which is directed at the method of
comparative interpretation. It is thus very important to carefully distinguish between
principles and methods, in particular between the principle of evolutive interpretation
and the method of comparative interpretation.
The main question that results from this discussion is whether the ECtHR itself
acknowledges the difference in nature between evolutive interpretation as an inter-
pretative principle supporting interpretation methods. Even though the ECtHR might
not address that question explicitly, some indicative answers may be found in its case
law. For example, it might be examined if the ECtHR always refers to an interpretation
method when trying to establish an evolutive interpretation and, if so, which interpreta-
tion method. If this is carefully done, it may be gleaned from this if the ECtHR does
in fact distinguish between the evolutive principle as providing general guidance to
its interpretation and the methods of interpretation as providing the tools to translate
the general notions underlying the Convention into a concrete interpretation of a
provision in a case at hand. The discussion above already indicated that comparative
interpretation generally plays an important role in the Court’s case law and it may
be expected that there is at least a close connection between comparative and evolutive
interpretation. The following section will discuss a theoretical perspective on how
the ECtHR establishes an evolutive interpretation. An interesting question is whether
the assumptions discussed in the literature correspond with the results of the case
law analysis.
7.4.3 How is evolutive interpretation established?
In the previous section, it was argued that in order to establish an evolutive interpreta-
tion one or more interpretation methods are needed. Often evolutive interpretation
is linked to comparative interpretation.98 On the basis of the literature on the Court’s
interpretative methods, it would seem reasonable to conclude that other interpretation
methods only play a limited role in the context of evolutive interpretation.99 Even
though it is not often mentioned as a relevant method in establishing an evolutive
interpretation, micro-teleological interpretation could in theory play a role as well
98 Mahony (1990), p. 73-74; Prebensen (2000), p. 1128.
99 Some authors argue that the consensus only serves as a rhetorical instrument and that the ECtHR
is not really interested in an evolution towards a common standard. Letsas (2007), p. 79.
164
Principle of evolutive interpretation
in establishing an evolutive interpretation.100 Through the course of time the object
and purpose of a provision might change and thus an evolutive approach can be
supported by a changed understanding of the object and purpose of a specific provi-
sion. In that case the evolutive approach would be supported by a teleological inter-
pretation and not a comparative interpretation. Despite the fact that a case law analysis
should reveal the actual practice of the ECtHR in establishing an evolutive interpreta-
tion, it seems warranted to conclude for now that comparative interpretation plays
the main part in this regard and not teleological interpretation.
The next question is then how comparative interpretation can be used by the Court
as an instrument to establish an evolutive interpretation. Most authors claim that the
ECtHR relies on the internal component of comparative interpretation to find a
consensus among the Contracting States.101 Attention has already been devoted to
the fact that it is not clear how the ECtHR employs references to an internal con-
sensus.102 The most important concern for the present discussion is that it is not
clear when there is a sufficient consensus for an evolutive interpretation. Is a majority
of Contracting States sufficient or is there another requirement? This is also an aspect
that can be analyzed in the Court’s case law.
Assuming that the ECtHR does rely on a consensus to establish an evolutive
approach, this can be criticized from a perspective of the need for substantial reasoning
in fundamental rights cases. Behind the reliance on conditions in the Contracting States
to establish an evolutive interpretation lies a presumed respect for state sover-
eignty.103 In the view of one author this respect can be motivated by the following
consideration: ‘it is better to defer to state consent which is a valid source of state
obligation than to allow individual judges to impose new obligations upon sovereign
states’.104 This argument resembles the argument in the national context that judges
should in some cases defer to the democratic legislator, who has a stronger legitimacy
than the courts to determine ‘new’ rights and obligations. However, LETSAS has argued
that this is not a valid argument in the context of fundamental rights.105 The content
of fundamental rights in his view should not be determined by sovereign states and
the eventuality of their agreement or disagreement on certain issues, but on the basis
100 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of micro-teleological interpretation.
101 The authors do not qualify their description as internal comparative interpretation, but it does boil
down to that type of comparative interpretation. See: Bernhardt (1999), p. 20;Mahoney (2000), p. 69;
Rigaux (1998), p. 41; Helfer (1993), p. 135. For a description of internal comparative interpretation,
see Chapter 6.
102 A number of practical concerns on the practice of invoking consensus arguments have been noted
in section 6.1.6.2.
103 See section 6.1.4. on comparative interpretation.
104 Letsas (2007), p. 72.
105 Letsas (2007), p. 73.
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of substantive arguments.106 Therefore, according to LETSAS, consensus should not
play a role in determining an evolutive interpretation. He has even argued that in the
reasoning of the ECtHR an internal consensus does not really determine the evolutive
interpretation. In his view, the ECtHR establishes the evolutive interpretation by
looking for a ‘moral truth of ECHR rights’. In LETSAS’ view this conclusion can be
drawn for three reasons.107 First of all, he argues that the ECtHR does not take a
comparative study seriously, which would have been the case, in his view, if they
did fully rely on a consensus. Secondly, he argues that the reasoning of the ECtHR
is based on substantive arguments and not arguments based on a common denominator.
Finally, he argues that the ECtHR emphasizes the value of an evolutive approach
by arguing that it leads to ‘a better understanding of ECHR rights’.108 These three
factors lead LETSAS to conclude that the ECtHR does not rely on the common de-
nominator when establishing an evolutive approach. This is interesting in the light
of the view taken by different authors, who claim that evolutive interpretation is based
on comparative interpretation. It will be interesting to see if the ECtHR itself pays
attention to this specific issue of the reasonableness of using a comparative approach
to establish evolutive interpretation, either expressly or implicitly (i.e. by just using
comparative interpretation without showing evident concern for the lack of substantive
reasoning). This particular aspect will therefore be part of the case law analysis in
Chapter 11.
7.4.4 When does the ECtHR rely on evolutive interpretation?
While the previous section dealt with the question as to the methods that the ECtHR
employs to establish an evolutive approach, the question here is in what cases and
circumstances the ECtHR uses an evolutive approach. Not much guidance can be
found in the literature on the type of situations in which the ECtHR refers to evolutive
interpretation. PREBENSEN distinguishes three situations in which evolutive interpreta-
tion plays a role in the interpretation process.109 In two of those situations the ECtHR
adopts an evolutive interpretation and in one of these situations there appear to be
reasons to opt for a different interpretation. The majority of cases where the ECtHR
adopts an evolutive approach is where this is in line with the text, context, and object
and purpose of the provision in question.110 In these cases, according to PREBENSEN
the ECtHR relies on a ‘sufficient degree of convergence’ between the Contracting
106 Letsas (2007), p. 73.
107 Letsas (2007), p. 79.
108 Letsas (2007), p. 79.
109 Prebensen (2000), p, 1128-1136.
110 Prebensen (2000), p. 1128.
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States; thus a consensus among a significant number of Contracting States.111 This
has been mentioned most often as the primary method to establish an evolutive
interpretation in the previous section. The argument made by PREBENSEN is that in
this type of case the text, object and purpose, and context do not present any obstacle
for taking an evolutive approach. The evolutive approach in these cases thus supports
or underlies the use of other means of interpretation, which may also be taken as a
sign that the comparative method is not the only one to be used in establishing an
evolutive interpretation. In the second type of case, the ECtHR relies on an evolutive
approach, while supplementary means, often the travaux préparatoires, point towards
a different direction. PREBENSEN discusses some important cases in this respect and
concludes that these show the prudence of the ECtHR in dealing with travaux prépara-
toires. In his view, it would be improper to grant decisive weight to the travaux
préparatoires when the primary means of interpretation do not indicate an interpreta-
tion, because the travaux préparatoires are not necessarily the clearest expression
of the intention of the drafters and not all present Contracting States participated in
the drafting process.112 Thus, an important hypothesis might be that the ECtHR
may overrule the normal function of supplementary means of interpretation if it
favours an evolutive approach. Whether this hypothesis is a correct one, will be
examined in the context of the case law analysis.113
The final situation distinguished by PREBENSEN is when evolutive interpretation
is outweighed by primary means of interpretation. In these cases the ECtHR considers
that adopting an evolutive interpretation would imply that it would go beyond its role
and might lead to a creation of rights that were originally not included in the European
Convention. One of the examples provided by PREBENSEN is the case of Johnston.
In this case the question was whether Article 12, which includes a right to marry,
also included a right to divorce. The ECtHR held that the text of this provision referred
only to the marriage as such and not its dissolution. It put most emphasis, however,
on the object and purpose of the provision as they could be gleaned from the travaux
préparatoires, and which revealed that a right to divorce was deliberately omitted
by the drafters of the Convention. PREBENSEN argues that the reason for the Court
not to use an evolutive approach in this case was that the text of Article 12 was very
clear and prevented a different interpretation; the travaux préparatoires thus only
played a supplementary role. The question is whether these are the only categories
111 Prebensen (2000), p. 1128.
112 Prebensen (2000), p. 1135-1136.
113 Letsas (2010), p. 265, argues that it is not clear why the ECtHR relies on an originalist interpretation
in the case of ECtHR (GC), Banković and others v. Belgium and others, decision of 12 December




visible in the case law or whether a different division should be made on the basis
of the analysis in Chapter 11.
Apart from showing different situations in which the ECtHR seems to rely on the
principle of evolutive interpretation, the division made by PREBENSEN also indicates
the limits which the ECtHR seems to have set itself for employing this approach.
It becomes clear, for example, that the ECtHR does not adopt an evolutive interpreta-
tion if the primary means of interpretation, i.e. the text, context, and object and
purpose, would contradict this evolutive interpretation. This does limit the ECtHR
to some extent in pursuing an evolutive approach, but it does leave some leeway as
well, since one can differ, for example, about the exact meaning of the text or the
exact intention of the drafters. Furthermore, reference has already been made to the
fact that many authors signal that the existence of some sort of consensus plays an
important role in establishing an evolutive approach. This provides an additional limit
to the Court’s use of the evolutive principle, since it will not be easy to rely on the
principle if there is clearly no consensus visible on what the ‘new’ interpretation
should be. Chapter 10, in which an analysis is made of the case law on comparative
interpretation, will also deal with the question whether any trend can be found on
when the ECtHR considers a consensus sufficiently established.
7.4.5 Evolution upwards?
In the general theoretical part the question was already put forward whether an
evolutive interpretation automatically generates a higher level of protection of the
fundamental right that is being interpreted. It is interesting to see whether anything
can be said about this in the specific context of the ECHR. The term evolutive
(interpretation) refers to a gradual development of societal and legal standards. In
the general international context, as well as in the Council of Europe, this may refer
to an upward adjustment of the fundamental rights protection, but it may equally be
conceivable that application of this principle leads to a negative adjustment of the
rights protection. It is questionable, however, whether this is really desirable from
the perspective of fundamental rights protection and whether such lowering of
standards will be accepted by the ECtHR. Put differently: is it really to be expected
that the ECtHR uses the principle as a basis for taking a more restrictive approach
towards individual rights protection, if that reflects the state of affairs in Europe as
it has evolved over time? In the light of the enlargement of the Council of Europe
with many new democracies and the present day challenges posed, among others by
terrorism, this is not just a theoretical issue. The principle of evolutive interpretation
itself is neutral in this respect and, as a result, it is impossible to conclude on the
basis of its sheer meaning whether the possibility of ‘levelling down’ should be
included or excluded. It is therefore necessary to consider whether other factors within
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the Convention system might offer an answer to this question. The literature does
not provide any decisive answer to this question.114 Some authors claim that it is
a realistic possibility, which is proven by the fact that ‘levelling down’ in some
situations actually has taken place in the case law of the ECHR.115 More recently,
however, a number of authors have claimed that such use of the principle is out of
the question since the preamble of the Convention supports a one-way dynamic by
referring to the ‘maintenance and further realization’ of the Convention rights.116
PREBENSEN adds in the context of this discussion that the enlargement of the Council
of Europe with many new democracies will probably not lead to a devolution of
standards, although it might slow down the evolution towards effective protection
of (new) rights.117 Especially since various authors seem to disagree on this issue,
it will be interesting to see whether the ECtHR has expressed itself on this issue in
its case law, in order to find out if and to what extent the ECtHR is aware of this
risk of lowering the level of protection and, if so, how it deals with it.
7.4.6 Conclusion
Much has been written about the importance of evolutive interpretation in the inter-
pretative framework of the ECtHR. Specific answers can, however, not be given to
the questions that have been raised. For example, it is clear that comparative interpreta-
tion plays an important role in relation to evolutive interpretation, but exactly what
role this is cannot be established on the basis of the theoretical literature alone. Also,
the situations in which the ECtHR establishes an evolutive interpretation are not really
clear from the literature. Hopefully the approach of this thesis, in which specific
questions are formulated on the basis of a theoretical analysis, will help to elucidate
specific aspects of the ECtHR’s approach, in particular the meaning and use of the
principle of evolutive interpretation.
7.5 COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
In stark contrast to the abundant literature on evolutive interpretation at the ECtHR,
not much has been written on evolutive interpretation at the CJEU in general, nor
in the context of its case law on fundamental rights. However, section 4.4.2.4 already
referred to the way in which evolutive interpretation is incorporated in the EU system
114 See Vande Lanotte (2005), p. 195 for many references.
115 Vande Lanotte (2005) referring to the case of ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July
1989, Series A No. 161, p. 195. Also Prebensen (2000), p. 1136.
116 Schokkenbroek (2000), p. 17; Vande Lanotte (2005) 195; Prebensen (2000), p. 1137;Mahony (1990),
p. 67.
117 Prebensen (2000), p. 1137.
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as a whole. In academic literature, reference is often made to the dynamic character
of the Treaties or the evolutionary nature of EU law.118 The programmatic nature
of EU law as a project for the future to enhance European integration legitimizes an
evolutive approach to interpretation. The changing objectives of the EU and the
broadening of the aim of European integration to fields beyond purely economic
integration allow, if not require, the CJEU to take an evolutive approach.119 Apart
from this positive basis for an evolutive approach, there is also a negative reason to
rely on an evolutive approach, being that a static or originalist approach is often not
possible for the CJEU. The simple reason for this is that the travaux préparatoires
of many EU treaties are still not accessible and cannot be used as a basis for inter-
pretation.120 This accessibility problem also directs the CJEU in the direction of
an evolutive approach, rather than an originalist approach.
An important question is whether the CJEU applies an evolutive approach in the
context of fundamental rights as well. One could argue that introducing fundamental
rights into the EU system already evidences an evolutive approach by the CJEU.121
The codification of the fundamental rights case law of the CJEU in Article 6 of the
Treaty of Maastricht on the one hand, and in the Charter on Fundamental Rights on
the other indicates that the Member States approve of this evolutive approach by the
CJEU. The question then becomes whether this evolutive approach will change now
that the Charter on Fundamental Rights has become binding. Will the CJEU take a
strict approach to the text or an evolutive approach and read the text in light of
changing circumstances? It is difficult to predict an answer to that question as the
text is of a relatively recent date and it is not yet necessary to interpret the text in
the light of changed circumstances. However, the preamble of the Charter does provide
food for arguing that the CJEU will adopt an evolutive approach when dealing with
the rights included in the Charter. Reference is made to the fact that the Member States
are ‘resolved to share a peaceful future based on common values’. Moreover, the
preamble refers to the fact that according to the drafters of the Charter, ‘it is necessary
to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights in the light of changes in society,
social progress and scientific and technological developments by making those rights
more visible in a Charter’. Both citations indicate that the Charter is focused on the
future and that changes in, among others, society and science might influence the
protection of fundamental rights. This is not clear proof that the CJEU will adopt
an evolutive approach, but it could be an indication.
118 See for example: Millett (1989), p. 163 & p. 171; Brown (2000), p. 332; Reich (2005), p. 25 & p.
31; Arnull (2006), p. 621; Schermers (2001), p. 12 & p. 21; Tridimas (1996), p. 205; Pollicino (2004),
p. 289.
119 Pollicino (2004), p. 289. See also Maduro (2007), p. 12.
120 Arnull (2006), p. 614-615.
121 Maduro (2007), p. 11.
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Several questions still remain to be answered as regards the use of evolutive
interpretation by the CJEU, which have not been addressed explicitly in legal literature.
For example: When does the CJEU use evolutive interpretation, how does it establish
an evolutive interpretation and which methods play a role in this regard? The case
law analysis might provide more insight here, but it is probable that the CJEU will
not be expressly employing an evolutive approach.
Some assumptions, however, have been made in the literature which do shed some
light on the interpretative approach of the CJEU. For example, many authors notice
a close relation between evolutive interpretation and teleological interpretation, and
some have even gone so far as to consider the two concepts to be equivalent.122
Even though there may indeed be a close link between the teleological method and
the evolutive principle, it is not clear from the literature how and to what extent teleo-
logical interpretation may help the CJEU to establish an evolutive meaning. Is teleo-
logical interpretation used as a basis for evolutive interpretation, or is it the other
way around? The former might be the case if the CJEU accepts that an evolutive
approach is warranted by reference to the object and purpose of the treaties. If this
were found to be the case, it would not yet provide an answer to the question which
methods are used to establish an evolutive interpretation. After all, the approach then
used by the Court would be one of meta-teleological reasoning, rather than a strictly
evolutive one. In that case, the principles of meta-teleological interpretation and
evolutive interpretation may seem to be placed on the same level, or evolutive inter-
pretation may even be regarded as part of the general and overarching principle of
meta-teleological interpretation. This is different if teleological interpretation actually
does help to establish the evolutive interpretation in a certain case, i.e. if micro-
teleological reasoning is used. The exact role of teleological interpretation and its
relation to evolutive interpretation is therefore of particular interest for the case study.
Similarly, it should be examined what role other interpretation methods might play
in establishing an evolutive interpretation to fundamental rights. Given the importance
of comparative interpretation in the context of fundamental rights before the CJEU,
it is legitimate in particular to ask whether comparative interpretation also plays a
role in establishing an evolutive interpretation.
7.6 CONCLUSION
The aim of this chapter has been to address several theoretical questions on evolutive
interpretation in order to get a better understanding of evolutive interpretation as an
interpretative aid. In general international law, evolutive interpretation is regarded
as a common interpretative concept. The Vienna Convention provides a limited
122 Reich (2005), p. 25 and p. 31.
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foundation for evolutive interpretation, but reference has also been made to the
Namibia advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice as a basis for evolutive
interpretation. More specifically, the preamble and the text of the European Convention
have been mentioned as factors that support an evolutive approach in the context of
the European Convention. In the context of the EU, the programmatic nature of the
treaties as a design for the future has been mentioned as the most important indication
that an evolutive approach is warranted. The question is whether both courts in their
case law address the basis for their evolutive approach.
Evolutive interpretation has been qualified in this thesis as an interpretative
principle. This qualification is often not explicitly made in the literature. Some authors
seem to implicitly recognize the different nature of evolutive interpretation in relation
to interpretation methods, but even then the difference is not really addressed. Often
evolutive interpretation is regarded as an interpretation method, just like any other.
The question is whether the ECtHR and the CJEU in their case law show any concern
for the nature of evolutive interpretation.
The advantages of evolutive interpretation are often taken for granted and dis-
cussions focus on the criticism voiced against evolutive interpretation. In general
theoretical literature there are two main points of criticism. First, the opponents are
concerned how far a judge can take evolutive interpretation. Several constraints for
judges have been mentioned in this regard, but these constraints only mitigate the
concern. The second criticism is that there is no guiding principle for evolutive
interpretation. As a result the use of this principle is unclear and that reduces the force
of this argument. These concerns need to be addressed. Both concerns show that it
is not clear how an evolutive interpretation is established. In the discussion on the
specific courts it became clear that for both courts the question how evolutive inter-
pretation is established could not be clearly answered either. The case law analysis
should provide some clarification in this respect. Comparative interpretation seems
to play an important role in the context of the ECtHR, while teleological interpretation
seems to be important in the context of the CJEU. Chapters 11 and 13 will test these
theoretical assumptions. A clear understanding of how evolutive interpretation is




PRINCIPLE OF AUTONOMOUS INTERPRETATION
The final theoretical analysis will be devoted to autonomous interpretation. Auto-
nomous interpretation has been explained in Chapter 4 as interpretation that is inde-
pendent from the meaning granted to terms and notions as contained in international
texts or in domestic law. Just like the principle of evolutive interpretation, autonomous
interpretation is one of the general interpretative principles that derives from a meta-
teleological approach to the treaty in question. This means that the object and purpose
of the treaty structure as a whole can be said to warrant an autonomous approach.1
As a result the reasons for adopting an autonomous approach could differ slightly
per treaty, depending on the specific object and purpose of each particular treaty.
Both the question what autonomous interpretation means exactly and on what basis
this principle of interpretation is invoked will be discussed in this chapter.
An important difference can be noted between autonomous interpretation and the
other interpretative aids discussed in this thesis. Autonomous interpretation is a concept
that is mainly developed in case law and which has not been the subject of much
theoretical debate. As a result, the general theoretical discussion on this interpretative
principle in this chapter is rather limited. In addition, while for the other interpretation
methods and principles national theoretical discussions proved relevant, this is different
in the context of autonomous interpretation. Autonomous interpretation inherently
appears to be a phenomenon that is not particularly relevant in national constitutional
interpretation. After all, it is clear from the definition provided that it concerns
interpretation that is independent of the interpretation accorded to a term in domestic
law. This already indicates that such a principle can hardly be relevant at the national
level. The focus of this chapter therefore will be on the role of autonomous interpreta-
tion before the supranational courts and, as far as any materials are available, on the
theoretical discussion on the principle in international law.
The objective of this chapter is to see whether it is possible to get a better under-
standing of how autonomous interpretation can be established in theory, and to
determine which questions and hypothesis can be formulated for further investigation
in the case law of the court. This chapter will focus on the question what methods
of interpretation may help the courts to establish an autonomous interpretation and
1 Lasser (2004), p. 208.
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in what situations autonomous interpretation can be used. These and other remaining
questions will subsequently be addressed in more depth in the case law analysis.
8.1 AUTONOMOUS INTERPRETATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Since autonomous interpretation mainly plays a role in the context of international
law, it is interesting to see if any (theoretical) foundations for the use of this inter-
pretative principle can be found at the level of international law. The logical starting
point to search for such foundations is the Vienna Convention. Indeed, two bases
for autonomous interpretation can be found in the Vienna Convention. Firstly, Section
4 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, which contains the general rules on treaty
interpretation, provides that, in exception to the general rule that the ordinary meaning
of a specific term must prevail, a ‘special meaning’ may be attributed to a term if
the parties so intended.2 The ‘special meaning’ could in the interpretation process
for the ECtHR and CJEU exist in the attribution of an autonomous meaning. The
indication that the parties intended such a special meaning can, for example, be found
in the object and purpose of a treaty. The second justification can be found in an
article unrelated to interpretation, namely Article 5 of the Vienna Convention. This
article provides that when interpreting the constituent instrument of an international
organization or any treaty adopted within an international organization, the special
rules of this organization may be taken into account.3 Within the context of the EU
and the European Convention this allows for an autonomous approach to interpretation.
Various authors have emphasized this second justification as an important basis for
autonomous interpretation within the Vienna Convention.4 However, regardless of
the relative importance of either of these bases, it is clear that they do not contradict
or exclude each other. Rather, they can be seen in combination, thus constituting a
proper justification for developing a general principle of autonomous interpretation.
In the context of a different type of international treaty than the human rights treaties
on which this thesis focuses, attention has been paid to autonomous interpretation
as well. Autonomous interpretation is also used in the context of the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). The situation
is somewhat different from the situation before the ECtHR and CJEU. Under the CISG
2 Article 31 § 4 reads: A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties
so intended.’ See for example, Aust (2000), p. 204.
3 Article 5 of the Vienna Convention reads: The present Convention applies to any treaty which
is the constituent instrument of an international organization and to any treaty adopted within an
international organization without prejudice to any relevant rules of the organization.’
4 See most importantly: Ganshof van der Meersch (1988), p. 205. See further: Vande Lanotte (2005),
p. 186; Matscher (1993), p. 71; Kastanas (1996), p. 344.
174
Principle of autonomous interpretation
there is no supranational court to address interpretative matters, so interpretations
have to be provided by national courts. This might create the risk of divergent inter-
pretations of the treaty provisions, since there is no single body responsible for giving
a clear and autonomous meaning to their text. For that reason, some authors have
argued that in the context of the CISG the solution to guarantee an autonomous
interpretation would be to establish a supranational court.5 To a certain extent, this
seems to be of little help for the present discussion, of which the focus is precisely
on autonomous interpretation at supranational courts. However, the desire to create
a supranational body may be considered to express the general need for autonomous
interpretation of treaty provisions in order to avoid divergent case law and divergent
interpretations on the domestic level. Autonomous interpretation in this context is
strongly motivated by a wish for uniformity. To that extent, the CISG example may
serve to stress the need and the justifiability of using a general principle of auto-
nomous interpretation by supranational courts that already exist.
The special character of autonomous interpretation has been stressed by GEBAUER.
While he sometimes refers to the notion as a method of interpretation, he does
acknowledge that it has a rather distinct character.6 He argues that autonomous
interpretation is ‘a principle of interpretation that gives preference to a particular kind
of teleological and systematic argument in interpreting a legal text’.7 Autonomous
interpretation accordingly is based on the treaty’s own system and objectives. GE-
BAUER’S statement thus not only stresses the character of autonomous interpretation
as a principle, rather than a method of interpretation, but also provides an indication
as to how an autonomous interpretation can be established. GEBAUER and others also
indicate that comparative interpretation may play a role in establishing an autonomous
interpretation as well.8 Thus, autonomous interpretation should not be taken so strictly
as to mean that drawing any inspiration from national legal orders to find a proper
interpretation is unacceptable. Although it seems to be accepted that the interpretational
result should not be dominated by the interpretation adopted in one of the Member
States, DIEDRICH has suggested that finding some sort of consensus is acceptable under
an autonomous interpretation.9 In the context of the CISG, for example, autonomous
interpretation could be based on an analysis of the legal systems of a number of the
states that are a party to the Convention. In the case law analysis, the question as
to whether in the context of the CJEU and ECtHR the same understanding of establish-
ing autonomous interpretation can be found will be further explored.
5 See Gebauer (2000), p. 684; Diedrich (1996), p. 336.
6 Gebauer (2000), p. 684 & p. 687
7 Gebauer (2000), p. 687.
8 Gebauer (2000), p. 690; Diedrich (1996), p. 324.
9 Diedrich (1996), p. 324.
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8.2 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The meaning of the principle of autonomous interpretation has already been discussed
in Chapter 4 together with the justification provided for the use of this interpretative
principle. The aim of the present chapter is not to duplicate that discussion, but rather
to elaborate on the different types of autonomous interpretation. Moreover, the aim
is to try to answer the question when the ECtHR will use the instrument of auto-
nomous interpretation, how it can establish autonomous interpretation and what kind
of criticism has been directed at this form of interpretation.
Before addressing these questions it is important to clarify one aspect of autonomous
interpretation, namely its relation to the margin of appreciation doctrine. Often these
two instruments are considered as each other’s opposites, since autonomous interpreta-
tion seems to be inspired by a desire for uniformity, whereas the margin of appre-
ciation is expressly intended to enable the Court to respect national differences, and
to allow for divergence and variety in the national protection of fundamental rights.10
The two instruments, however, have clearly different functions in the adjudication
process of the ECtHR. Autonomous interpretation, as implied by the terminology,
is a concept used in the interpretation process and concerns the applicability of
Convention rights to the facts of the case presented to the Court.11 The doctrine of
the margin of appreciation, on the other hand, plays a role in the process of establish-
ing whether a certain right has been violated and in assessing the justification that
has been advanced by the national authorities. They therefore in principle do not stand
in any meaningful relation to each other, which allows for omission of the doctrine
from the remainder of this chapter. Nevertheless, it remains a relevant question for
the case law analysis whether the ECtHR always adheres to this division or whether
in some cases it might grant a margin of appreciation in order to avoid an autonomous
interpretation.
Even though the concept of autonomous interpretation seems rather clear, there is
no common conception of the qualification ‘autonomous interpretation’ in scholarly
literature.12 Should all terms of the European Convention be qualified as autonomous
or does this qualification apply only to some Convention terms and not to others?
While some authors consider the former to be correct, other authors have proposed
a distinction between different types of autonomous concepts. These different types
10 See, for example, Ost (1992), p. 306, who argues that if states are granted a large margin of appre-
ciation, the ECtHR will be less inclined to adopt an autonomous interpretation.
11 Sudre, p. 108.
12 Sudre discusses the different understandings of autonomous concepts, Sudre (1998), p. 96-98.
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can be divided into two categories.13 On the one hand, some scholars adhere to a
‘weak’14 concept of autonomy or l’autonomie organique,15 which is based on the
idea that any interpretation coming from an international body that is specifically
charged with the interpretation of a treaty or convention can be considered auto-
nomous.16 Put differently, in this view the fact that an international autonomous body
interprets the Convention is enough to consider the interpretation of all Convention
terms autonomous. On the other hand, adherents of ‘strong’17 autonomy or l’autono-
mie substantielle18 do not take such a broad stance. In their view, one can only speak
of ‘autonomous’ interpretation if the Convention term is expressly and intentionally
interpreted in a real ‘European’ way, disconnected from the national qualification.
This does not mean that national qualifications cannot play a role in determining this
interpretation. The national qualification of the Member State in question is used as
a starting point and the national qualifications of all Contracting States can play a
role if the ECtHR uses a comparative interpretation to establish the autonomous
meaning.19 In the case of strong autonomy, the specific interpretation (even if based
on a national example) will be adapted to the European system and will be granted
a European flavour.
It is the latter conception of autonomous interpretation that is most often referred
to in the literature. Within this conception there is one more distinction to be made.
This distinction is a rather subtle one, but it is necessary in order to be exact about
the understanding of autonomous interpretation. There are those that consider Conven-
tion terms to be autonomous solely if the ECtHR has expressly qualified its interpreta-
tion or the Convention terms as such.20 Some, however, take a slightly broader
13 Vande Lanotte has made a different classification. On the one hand he distinguishes semi-auto-
nomous’ terms and on the other autonomous’ terms. He starts from the presumption that all terms
are autonomous, because an international body is charged with the interpretation of these terms. The
semi-autonomous terms are those terms in the Convention that refer back to national law (like
prescribed by law’ which has been laid down in art. 8-11). He seems to imply that autonomous
terms are all other terms in the European Convention, of which some have been explicitly classified
as such. Vande Lanotte (2005), p. 187-191.
14 Schokkenbroek (2000), p. 13.
15 Sudre (1998), p. 99; Vande Lanotte (2005), p. 187-188.
16 Kastanas (1996), p. 344.
17 Schokkenbroek (2000), p. 13.
18 Sudre (1998), p. 99.
19 This is visible in ECtHR, Engel and others v. the Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A
No. 22.
20 Sudre provides a list of terms that have been expressly qualified as autonomous: arrest; civil rights
and obligations; criminal charge; witness; charge; penalty; possessions. See Sudre (1998), p. 96-97.
Letsas on the other hand provides a different list of terms that have been expressly qualified as
autonomous by the ECHR. Some of the terms overlap, but others differ: civil rights and obligations;
criminal charge; possessions; association; victim; civil servant; lawful detention; home. See Letsas
177
Chapter 8
perspective by attributing the qualification autonomous also to terms that have been
given a specific Convention meaning, even though the ECtHR has not expressly
qualified this meaning in its case law as autonomous.21 Both perspectives seem
acceptable, but for the current research it is most useful to focus on what the ECtHR
itself qualifies as autonomous terms, since that reveals most about how this principle
is used by the ECtHR.22 Although the findings of the analysis may be relevant for
the broader category described in the literature as well, the analysis will therefore
focus on the label provided by the ECtHR.
Why does the ECtHR employ this principle of interpretation in its interpretation
process? A short indication of possible reasons and explanations was already given
in the introduction on autonomous interpretation in Chapter 4. Various authors have
provided different explanations, but the bottom line of most explanations seems to
be rather similar. By employing an autonomous interpretation the ECtHR establishes
a certain level of minimum uniformity or harmonization in a specific area,23 which
is, according to the preamble, one of the objectives of the European Convention.24
This uniformity ensures that fundamental rights will be granted effective protection,
since the (minimum) level of protection does not depend on the national qualification
of these rights in the various states. Put differently, the Court may favour an auto-
nomous interpretation in order to avoid the creation of different levels of protection
throughout the Contracting States of the European Convention.25 Contracting States
will not be able to exclude their citizens from the protection provided by certain
Convention rights by classifying or interpreting them more narrowly.26
Apart from the concerns relating to the effective protection of fundamental rights,
some authors have stressed the strategic relevance of the principle of autonomous
interpretation for the ECtHR itself. An autonomous interpretation provides the ECtHR
with a possibility to emphasize its jurisdictional power, by interpreting a specific term
in such a way that the national qualification cannot be used to escape from European
(2004), p. 283. Sudre notes that he is surprised that in the doctrine a broader notion of autonomous
interpretation exists, Sudre (1998), p. 97-98.
21 Distinction explained by Sudre (1998), p. 96. See also: Vanneste (2010), p. 233-234.
22 Sudre notes that it is not clear why the ECtHR qualifies some terms as autonomous, so the choices
of the ECtHR in explicitly qualifying a term as autonomous might not be the result of a specific
approach. Sudre (1998), p. 98.
23 Ost (1992), p. 305; Schokkenbroek (2000), p. 2.1-10; Matscher (1993), p. 73; Ovey &White (2006),
p. 43; Kastanas (1996), p. 346-347; Ganshof van der Meersch (1988), p. 204; Vande Lanotte (2005),
p. 186; Gerards (2008), p. 18; Kastanas (1996), p. 346.
24 Matscher (1993), p. 73.
25 Ryssdall (1996), p. 23.
26 Letsas (2004), p. 281-282; Gomez-Arostegui (2005), p. 159.
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protection.27 The ECtHR has the final say in determining whether a certain legal
term falls within the scope of the European Convention and if a complaint about an
interference with a Convention right is admissible ratione materiae. If a specific term
does come within the scope of the European Convention, this means that the ECtHR
will have jurisdiction to conclude whether a violation has occurred.28 It thus affects
the autonomous or sovereign position of the Contracting States, since even in the
process of classifying certain legal situations as being relevant under the Convention
they are subject to the control of Strasbourg. The ECtHR can therefore expand both
its jurisdiction and, accordingly, its control over national legal systems, by using the
instrument of autonomous interpretation to widen the scope of the fundamental rights
provisions.29 Such an approach may clearly have quite an impact on the Contracting
States.
Given the importance of the principle of autonomous interpretation for the ECHR
system, the questions become relevant as to when the ECtHR will choose an auto-
nomous approach and how it will establish such an autonomous interpretation. A very
general indication of when the ECtHR will resort to an autonomous interpretation
can be found in the text of the ECHR. The text of some provisions refers back to
national law, like Article 12, which stipulates that the right to marry is governed by
national laws.30 In the context of this type of provision it is to be expected that the
ECtHR will not employ an autonomous approach, given the explicit reference to
national law.31 The question is whether a more specific indication can be found as
to when the ECtHR applies an autonomous approach. SUDRE contends that the ECtHR
appears to resort to an autonomous approach as soon as there is a classification
dispute.32 This means that there is a dispute as to how a certain legal concept should
be classified. Two or more conceptions of one legal concept might exist and there
is disagreement about which is the correct one in the context of the ECHR.33 In the
case of Engel, for example, the applicant argued that a disciplinary sanction fell within
the concept of a criminal charge, while the respondent state argued that the concept
27 Vande Lanotte (2005), p. 186-187; Schokkenbroek (2000), p. 11; Kastanas (1996), p. 346.
28 Sudre (1998), p. 107.
29 Sudre (1998), p. 113.
30 Article 12 ECHR:
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to
the national laws governing the exercise of this right.
31 Gerards (2011), p. 33.
32 This has been noted by Letsas as well. Letsas (2004), p. 284.
33 Letsas (2004), p. 288.
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of a criminal charge did not include disciplinary sanctions.34 The ECtHR finally
adopted an autonomous interpretation to determine which conception of the term
criminal charge should be adhered to in the context of the European Convention. What
is peculiar about these disputes in comparison with other cases before the ECtHR
is that they concern a disagreement at an ‘earlier stage’ in the argument or at a differ-
ent level.35 In the majority of the cases the applicants argue that the respondent state
has not provided the necessary conditions to exercise their rights under the ECHR.
In this particular type of case the disagreement does not concern the conditions
necessary to respect the Convention rights, but the question whether certain categories
should be excluded from the protection afforded under the Convention.36
The question when the ECtHR invokes an autonomous interpretation, however,
is still not fully answered. In principle a classification dispute could arise for any
of the provisions, but the ECtHR has not adopted an autonomous approach for all
provisions. LETSAS argues that these disputes generally concern ‘distinctively legal
concepts’ like ‘criminal charge’, ‘civil rights and obligations’ and ‘lawful detention’.37
He argues that these are technical legal terms, generally included in legal sources,
that only obtain their full meaning if placed in a legal context (unlike a notion such
as ‘life’, which does not only or mainly gain meaning in a legal context).38 National
legislatures have often made deliberate choices in classifying these terms in a certain
way and this might conflict with the views of Strasbourg, which is why they adopt
an autonomous approach.
One could derive from this analysis by LETSAS that in cases where the interpreta-
tion concerns notions with an almost ‘moral’ content and meaning, like ‘religion’,
‘private life’ or ‘life’ more generally, the ECtHR would not adopt an autonomous
approach. Assuming that this is a deliberate choice by the ECtHR, one could question
whether this is a logical choice. No explanation has been provided in the literature
as to the reasons why the ECtHR would seem to reserve autonomous interpretation
for rather technical terms. Such an approach might be explained, however, by the
implications of autonomous interpretation. The underlying assumption could be that
there are more differences between Contracting States on moral issues and that
Contracting States feel more strongly about moral issues than about more ‘technical’
34 ECtHR, Engel and others v. the Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A No. 22. See also
Letsas (2004), p. 281 & p. 288 for a discussion of this case in the context of autonomous interpreta-
tion.
35 Letsas (2004), p. 283, speaks of a conceptual sub-level’. Vanneste (2010), p. 234, has, however,
classified this distinction as artificial’.
36 Sudre, p. 103.
37 Letsas (2004), p. 285.
38 Letsas (2004), p. 285. Matscher (1993), p. 70. Harris, O’Boyle &Warbrick (1995), p. 16: this passage
has not been included in the most recent version of Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick (2009).
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aspects of the Convention. As discussed above, autonomous interpretation may easily
intrude on the sovereignty of Contracting States in the sense that the ECtHR, by
relying on its own qualification, may declare itself competent to deal with all kinds
of sensitive national cases that fall within the scope of the provision as defined by
the ECtHR. Since this may be difficult to accept for the states, especially if they tend
to define certain rights or notions more narrowly, the ECtHR might be inclined to
adopt such an autonomous approach only in those areas where it thinks that there
will be no strong resistance in the states to a uniform understanding. The question
is whether any clues can be found, first of all for the assumption that autonomous
interpretation applies mainly to more technical terms and, secondly, as regards the
underlying reasons for adopting such an approach.
In his discussion on when the ECtHR relies on autonomous interpretation, SUDRE
further argues that in his view the ECtHR will rely on autonomous interpretation when
the rights in question are closely related to the rule of law principle.39 Without
defining his understanding of the rule of law, he argues that autonomous interpretation
helps to ensure the effectiveness of the rule of law.40 SUDRE considers that Article 5
(right to liberty and security), Article 6 (right to a fair trial) and Article 7 (no punish-
ment without law) are intimately connected to the rule of law; thus one may infer
from these provisions that the rule of law in his view, is closely connected to a fair
trial in a broad sense.41 The fact that most of the concepts that have been qualified
as autonomous concern Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention seems to provide some
support for this assertion. An autonomous approach has, however, also been adopted
in the context of Article 1 First Protocol (protection of property) and Article 11
(freedom of assembly and association). These provisions are, in SUDRE’S view, not
closely connected to the rule of law and they thus do not seem to support his argu-
ment. The argument by SUDRE raises the question whether the ECtHR indeed pre-
dominantly employs an autonomous approach when interpreting rights closely related
to the rule of law. The difficulty is that, in order to answer that question, one would
need to know what the concept ‘rule of law’ means, both in SUDRE’s view and in
the view of the ECtHR, which requires a further study that is beyond the scope of
this thesis. It is more feasible and suitable, therefore, to just explore whether the
ECtHR expressly refers to the rule of law to justify an autonomous approach and
if it does so, whether it provides an explanation for doing so. Indeed, this exploration
will be undertaken in the case law analysis discussed in Chapter 12.
39 Sudre claims that the ECtHR in its case law confirms that analysis (referring to ECtHR, Deweer
v. Belgium, judgment of 27 February 1980, Series A No. 35). Sudre (1998), p. 116-117.
40 Sudre (1998), p. 116.
41 Sudre (1998), p. 115.
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The second question that should be answered is how an autonomous interpretation
can be established by the ECtHR, in particular what methods of interpretation it can
use in this respect. When discussing the basis for relying on an autonomous interpreta-
tion, the relevance of teleological interpretation has already been mentioned. This
type of reasoning, which refers to the object and purpose of the Convention as a whole
to justify the use of certain interpretative principles, has been identified as a meta-
teleological approach in Chapter 4 and will not play a concrete role in the interpreta-
tion of a specific provision.42 (Micro-)teleological interpretation, on the other hand,
may certainly play a role in establishing an autonomous meaning. It will be relevant
to examine in the case law analysis whether teleological arguments actually play a
role in determining the autonomous meaning of a provision. Both LETSAS and SUDRE
discuss the role of comparative interpretation as a means of establishing an auto-
nomous interpretation.43 Both authors refer to comparative interpretation in the sense
of consensus interpretation, meaning that the ECtHR endeavours to establish some
kind of consensus that can be used as a basis for an autonomous interpretation.44
SUDRE points out that this seems to be rather paradoxical.45 The ECtHR wants to
take a uniform approach by adopting an autonomous interpretation precisely because
there is no uniform understanding of a certain notion. At the same time the ECtHR
bases this autonomous interpretation on the existence of a consensus among the
Contracting States. One could question whether the use of comparative interpretation
is really contrary to the idea behind autonomous interpretation. Perhaps one’s view
on this may depend on one’s precise understanding of autonomous interpretation.
Autonomous interpretation refers to interpretation that is independent of a notion’s
meaning in domestic law, but does that refer to one domestic system in particular,
or to the meaning in any domestic system? The latter understanding of autonomous
interpretation would be hard to defend, because it would mean that a supranational
court would have to force itself to establish an interpretation that does not exist in
any of the Contracting States. According to OST an entirely autonomous approach
is never possible, since in that situation the ECtHR would run the risk of ‘detaching
itself from reality’.46 The more logical explanation would seem to be that autonomous
interpretation concerns interpretation independent of the particular understanding of
a notion in the respondent State. In that perspective it could be valuable to find some
42 See page 4.1. and 4.4.2.1. for a more elaborate description on meta-teleological principles.
43 See also Gerards (2008), p. 18.
44 Sudre (1998), p. 118; Letsas (2004), p. 295-296. Vanneste (2010), p. 238-239 also claims that this
method plays an important role in establishing an autonomous interpretation.
45 Sudre (1998), p. 118.
46 Ost (1992), p. 305 & 308, argues that an autonomous interpretation completely detached from all
national qualifications would be illegitimate, because the preamble refers to the common heritage’
on which the Convention is built. See also: Gomez-Arostegui (2005), p. 159.
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basis for a certain interpretation in the Contracting States as long as that does not
diminish the character of autonomous interpretation, by relying on only a few Contract-
ing States. Then, a comparative interpretation could be acceptable as a method to
arrive at an autonomous understanding of the notion.
How a consensus can be established using comparative interpretation is discussed
in the context of comparative interpretation. The present chapter is concerned with
the question which methods have been identified as playing a role in establishing
an autonomous interpretation. The exact role of the consensus is, however, not clear.
LETSAS argues that the ECtHR when establishing an autonomous interpretation does
seriously look for a common ground, but establishes an autonomous meaning based
on moral truth.47 In his view the ECtHR does not really use comparative interpreta-
tion, but uses substantive arguments to support a certain interpretation. LETSAS
concludes that the ECtHR in some cases lacks real interest in the outcome of the
consensus, which leads him to assume that the ECtHR does not actually rely on this
consensus in establishing autonomous interpretation. After all, if the consensus
argument really played a role, the judges of the Court in LETSAS’ view would have
given a better explanation of the link between the consensus found and the interpreta-
tion chosen. This challenge by LETSAS provides an interesting background for the
case law analysis, in which it should be analyzed which role consensus plays in
establishing an autonomous interpretation. An additional question to be examined
for the case law of the ECtHR is whether there are other methods which help to
determine an autonomous interpretation, if it turns out that consensus indeed is not
really or not always decisive. Perhaps examples can be found of cases where the
ECtHR invoked arguments based on micro-teleological interpretation, textual inter-
pretation or systemic interpretation.
A final matter that should be dealt with in this chapter relates to the criticism that
has been voiced as regards the use of this interpretative approach. Some of the
dissenting judges within the ECHR have been critical of the application of the prin-
ciple of autonomous interpretation.48 This criticism has been directed in particular
at the role of the comparative method in establishing an autonomous meaning to
notions and terms contained in the Convention.49 The bottom line of this criticism
is that the Court may show itself to be too activist when extensively using the instru-
ment of autonomous interpretation.50 Especially since extensive autonomous inter-
pretation can have far-reaching implications for the national legal order and for the
47 Letsas (2004), p. 297.
48 See Letsas and Ost referring to judge Matscher. Letsas (2004), p. 285; Ost (1992), p. 307.
49 Ost (1992), p. 307.
50 This danger is also highlighted by Matscher in his extra-judicial writings. Matscher (1993), p. 73.
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Court’s jurisdiction, this is a concern that should be taken seriously.51 In the dis-
cussion on the teleological method, the issue of judicial activism has been briefly
discussed and the conclusions reached in this respect are equally relevant in the context
of autonomous interpretation. The accusations of activism depend on one’s perception
of the role of the judge and may therefore never be entirely avoided. A consistent
and transparent reasoning in which it is made very clear for which reasons and on
which grounds an autonomous interpretation is chosen, may reduce the force of these
accusations and may thereby strengthen the legitimacy of the argument made on the
basis of the autonomous approach.
8.3 COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
In the interpretation of fundamental rights by the CJEU, the concept of autonomous
interpretation plays a role as well. Various aspects of this interpretation have already
been briefly touched upon in Chapter 4. The aim of this chapter is to delve deeper
into the role of autonomous interpretation in the context of the development of
fundamental rights principles by the CJEU. To do so, however, it is first useful to
set out the different types of autonomous interpretation and the reason for the use
of this principle by the CJEU.
Reference has already been made to the understanding that autonomous interpreta-
tion indicates that the chosen interpretation is independent of that given to similar
notions and terms in the Member States. However, that is not the only version of
autonomous interpretation that is relevant in the context of the CJEU’s case law. In
the field of fundamental rights the relation with the ECtHR cannot be ignored. When
discussing autonomous interpretation of fundamental rights in the EU context, ‘auto-
nomy’ can also be related to a definition that is independent of the meaning provided
by the ECtHR, as well as from the meaning given in domestic law. Especially
DOUGLAS-SCOTT has viewed autonomous interpretation in light of this relation between
the two European Courts.52 The discussion below will address both forms of auto-
nomous interpretation.
The discussion on the principle of autonomous interpretation in the context of the
ECtHR has shown that one of the main aims of this principle is uniformity. In an
organization that is aimed at closer cooperation, integration and harmonization, such
as the EU, uniformity plays a crucial role.53 If only looking at the preamble of the
51 See Gerards, who highlights the impact of the autonomous approach. Gerards (2008), p. 19.
52 Douglas-Scott (2006), p. 648.
53 Lasser (2004), p. 215-219, who has identified uniformity as one of the meta-teleological purposes
of the EU.
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founding treaties, a strong argument can already be made for uniformity, considering
statements like: ‘an ever closer union’, ‘to strengthen the unity of their economies’,
‘ensure their harmonious development’, ‘process of European integration’ and the
recurrence of the word ‘common’.54 The subsequent developments of the EU appear
to enhance and strengthen this argument for uniformity. Given the overriding import-
ance of uniformity as regards core notions and principles of EU law, autonomous
interpretation seems to constitute a vital principle for the interpretation process of
the CJEU. After all, autonomous interpretation is an important vehicle to arrive at
uniform definitions which are independent of particular domestic legal systems. In
addition, the CJEU itself has stated that such interpretation may find a basis in the
fact that ‘… Community law uses terminology which is peculiar to it’.55 The inter-
pretation of the term ‘worker’ may exemplify the importance of a uniform and
autonomous interpretation by the CJEU. The CJEU held that this term should be given
a ‘Community meaning’, because otherwise Member States could ‘eliminate at will
the protection afforded by the Treaty to certain categories of person’.56 Indeed, a
similar justification is provided by the ECtHR when adopting an autonomous inter-
pretation, as has been expounded in section 8.2 above. Finally, and apart from this
need for uniformity and the efficacy of the EU’s four freedoms, autonomous interpreta-
tion provides the CJEU with an opportunity ‘to claim ultimate authority over the
meaning and scope’ of these terms.57 From the perspective of the CJEU’s position
as a supranational court, too, autonomous interpretation will therefore constitute an
essential principle underlying and guiding the definition of fundamental rights.
Considering the nature and aims of the European Union, these considerations seem
to constitute a legitimate justification for employing autonomous interpretation. There,
however, appears to be one catch, being that the European Union originally was not
expressly concerned with fundamental rights at all. On the contrary, in the early years
of the European Economic Community, fundamental rights were considered entirely
outside the scope of EEC law. Only gradually have they found their way into the
European project, resulting only recently in adopting a fundamental rights catalogue
as a binding part of EU law by means of the Lisbon Treaty. This development has
clear implications for the role of the principle of autonomous interpretation regarding
the interpretation of fundamental rights. While the desire for uniformity can be
considered to constitute a legitimate basis for an autonomous approach to economic
provisions in the Treaty, as has been shown above, the situation is different when
54 See preamble of the then EC and EU treaty.
55 C-283/81,CILFIT v. Ministero della Sanità [1982] ECR 3415, § 19. Arnull (2006), p. 608.
56 C-75/63 Unger v Bestuur [1964] ECR 1977. See furthermore Craig & De Burca (2003), p. 705 and
Barnard (2000), p. 133 both referring to CJEU cases that have dealt with the Community meaning
of the term worker’.
57 Craig & De Burca (2003), p. 706, referring to AG Mancini.
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fundamental rights are at play. In fact, the CJEU has long refrained from imposing
one uniform version of fundamental rights that must be accepted in all Member States.
Instead it respects diversity between the different national cultures, traditions and
identities, only striving to protect as common values those principles which are already
widely shared and accepted throughout the European Union.58 Thus, the common
values and traditions among the different Member States, combined with the definition
of rights provided by the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law
of the ECtHR, provide the basis for the fundamental rights that are protected within
the EU.59 This comparative element inherent to the interpretation of fundamental
rights within the EU, in addition to the CJEU’s reliance on the interpretation of rights
provided by the ECtHR, seems to exclude or at least severely limit the role of auto-
nomous interpretation of fundamental rights by the CJEU.60 Precisely these factors
have led VON BOGDANDY to state that fundamental rights are the least autonomous
part of EU law.61 It has already been argued in the context of the ECtHR that using
a comparative approach to establish an autonomous meaning, does not have to be
contrary to the idea behind an autonomous approach. It depends on the way the
comparative method is used.62
In this regard, it is therefore a relevant question whether the CJEU applies only
a comparative approach when defining the meaning of fundamental rights notions.
This is not to be expected, as it has already been mentioned in section 6.3 that the
CJEU does not blindly copy the results of the comparative method, but rather will
consider and sometimes re-define these results in the light of the object and purpose
of the EU.63 This could certainly have implications for the role of autonomous inter-
pretation. If a common ground approach is not unquestioningly and uncritically
applied, fundamental rights notions could be granted a specific EU flavour by the
CJEU. KÜHLING even speaks about an ‘autonomous specification’ of fundamental
rights based on the common traditions in the Member States. The approach might
thus be not as strictly autonomous as in other fields of EC law, but there still may
be a role for it.
An interesting question is, however, if the CJEU will choose a similar autonomous
stance as regards the meaning of notions that have already been interpreted and
explained by the ECtHR. DOUGLAS-SCOTT argues that only in a few cases the CJEU
has taken a different approach than the ECtHR and has adopted its own, ‘autonomous’
58 As can be seen in the preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000).
59 Art. 6 TEU.
60 Reich (2005), p. 29 claims that Community law in the case of fundamental rights encourages the
comparative argument; he seems to imply that this occurs to the detriment of the autonomous approach.
61 Von Bogdandy (2000), p. 1333; Douglas-Scott (2006), p. 652.
62 See section 8.2.
63 See among others: Kühling (2006), p. 506; Blanke (2006), p. 268.
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interpretation.64 Apparently, it feels less free to deviate from the authoritative inter-
pretation that has been given by a specialized human rights court, and which are
themselves based on interpretative principles and methods such as teleological,
evolutive and autonomous interpretation, than from interpretations given by domestic
authorities. However, the case law analysis will have to disclose if it is really true
that there is a difference between autonomous interpretation in relation to domestic
law and autonomous interpretation in relation to the ECtHR’s case law. An additional
question that may be raised in this respect is whether the entry into force of the Treaty
of Lisbon will change anything. Article 52(3) of the now binding Charter provides
that, as regards rights that are both contained in the ECHR and in the Charter, the
meaning of the rights as contained in the Charter shall be the same as that under the
European Convention. This would seem to imply that there is hardly any room for
an autonomous approach by the CJEU, but a contra-indication may be that the CJEU
is allowed to provide more protection than is already offered by the ECHR. As far
as the interpretation given by the CJEU is more protective, such an interpretation
may then be autonomous indeed. Although there is only limited case law in which
the Charter has been applied thus far, the case law analysis will pay some attention
to the question if the fundamental rights case law of the CJEU has been given more
‘body’ through the binding Charter, or if the approach remains a rather reluctant and
strongly comparative one.
The previous sections already provided some indication as to how an autonomous
interpretation is established by the CJEU. A main role is played by comparative
argumentation, but other arguments may be relevant as well. It was mentioned, for
example, that the CJEU can consider a consensus in the light of the object and purpose
of the EU and can decide to adapt the outcome of an exercise in comparative inter-
pretation to fit better with the aims and objectives of EU law. Thus, teleological
arguments may play an interesting role in this context.65 The examples of autonomous
interpretation in relation to the interpretation provided by the ECtHR that have been
given by DOUGLAS-SCOTT also reveal that the CJEU sometimes relies on teleological
arguments.66 In the chapter relating to the case law approach used by the CJEU,
it will be examined exactly how and to what extent such methods are used in order
to arrive at an autonomous meaning of fundamental rights notions.
64 Douglas-Scott (2006), p. 648.
65 In the broader EU context teleological arguments also play a role in establishing an autonomous
interpretation: Millett (1989), p. 177; Lenearts (2003), p. 894.
66 Douglas-Scott (2006), p. 648.
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Even though some authors claim that the fundamental rights context is the least
autonomous area of EU law, reasons have been listed to assume that autonomous
interpretation does play some role in this context. Therefore, assuming that there is
some form of autonomous interpretation, a subsequent question is in what types of
cases and in which circumstances does the CJEU employ such an autonomous
approach. It has been submitted in scholarly literature on other fields of EU law that
this will be the case in particular if the national systems diverge on a certain issue
and it will be interesting to test whether that reason is also valid for adopting an
autonomous approach in fundamental rights cases.
A final point that should be considered in this chapter is whether and in which respects
the principle has been the subject of criticism. Probably because of the limited im-
portance of the principle, the literature relating to fundamental rights interpretation
by the CJEU shows hardly any criticism that is specifically related to this principle
of interpretation. However, in analogy to the criticism discussed in relation to the
ECtHR, it may be supposed that the use of an autonomous approach by the CJEU
can evoke accusations of judicial activism. Before any such accusations can be
addressed or suggestions for improvement can be made, however, it is necessary to
gain more insight into the exact use of this interpretative principle by the CJEU. For
that reason, the question as to possible criticism as regard the use of autonomous
interpretation by the CJEU will only be answered after an in-depth analysis has been
provided of the relevant case law in Chapter 13.
8.4 CONCLUSION
For both the CJEU and the ECtHR, the autonomous approach appears to have added
value. Problematic is that the principle remains some sort of enigma. A general
justification for the use of this principle is provided in the Vienna Convention, which
allows for a ‘special meaning’ to be given to specific terms. The respective courts
have, however, mainly referred to arguments based on the need to ensure that Member
States do not avoid protection provided by fundamental rights. Scholars have for both
courts also identified a strategic reason for invoking an autonomous approach, namely
that it confirms their position as supranational judge vis-à-vis the Member States.
The main problem with autonomous interpretation is that, at least from the theoret-
ical literature and the analyses made thus far, it is not clear when the ECtHR and
the CJEU invoke an autonomous interpretation and how they establish an autonomous
meaning. Several suggestions have been made in order to find a pattern in the terms
that the ECtHR qualifies as autonomous. According to one author, autonomous terms
are mainly technical legal terms, but they are terms that have a close relation with
the rule of law according to another author. Reference has also been made to the fact
that the ECtHR often adopts an autonomous meaning when there is a dispute over
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the classification of a legal concept. None of these explanations, however, really
discloses a coherent approach by the ECtHR. The case law analysis should help in
getting more grip on the question when the ECtHR adopts an autonomous interpreta-
tion. The fundamental rights approach by the CJEU has been referred to as the least
autonomous area of EU law, but the question is whether that image will be confirmed
by the case law analysis.
According to theoretical analyses, the main method to establish an autonomous
meaning is comparative interpretation. This might seem strange in the context of
autonomous interpretation, but the aim of the comparison in these cases is not to adopt
an interpretation which is entirely detached from any legal system, but which is
detached from a specific legal system. In the case law analysis, further answers will
be presented to the question whether this is really the method employed in the case
law or whether different methods have also been employed to establish an autonomous
meaning.
This chapter furthermore aimed to provide a more fully-fledged theoretical under-
standing of autonomous interpretation. This has been only partly successful, since
many aspects remain unclear. If there is one aspect that has become clear throughout
this chapter it is the need for a thorough case law analysis. The case law analysis
is needed to get a proper understanding of this principle and its role in the interpretat-






EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS –
GENERAL INTRODUCTION1
The results of the analysis made of the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights on the interpretation of the Convention will be presented in four different
chapters, each one dedicated to one of the selected interpretative aids that have been
discussed in the theoretical analysis.
One general issue needs to be addressed before dealing with the analysis on each
specific method or principle, namely the selection of cases. Throughout the years,
the ECtHR has produced a vast amount of cases. The aim of this research has been
to undertake a qualitative analysis and not a quantitative analysis of the Court’s case
law. Several criteria have been used to make a selection of cases which would provide
relevant information as to the application of the interpretative aids under study by
the ECtHR. Firstly, all Grand Chamber judgments and decisions since 1998 have been
summarily reviewed, selecting those in which an interpretative issue played a substant-
ive role. Secondary sources have been used as a basis for the remainder of these
selection angles. A second criterion has been to select all landmark cases on any of
the Convention provisions, either substantive or procedural, on the basis of several
secondary sources.2 Not all of these cases appeared to concern matters of interpreta-
tion. The initial selection therefore was narrowed in order to include only those cases
in the analysis in which an interpretative issue could be found. Thirdly, the resulting
selection has been broadened by adding a number of more recent cases on the basis
of case notes that indicated that the case concerned an interpretative issue.3 Finally,
the selection has been supplemented with judgments dealing with Article 8 and Article
1 Protocol 1. This has been done because the theoretical analysis indicated that in
these cases the selected interpretation methods and principles often play a role, which
would ensure that at least some cases featured the selected interpretative aids. This
selection has also been made on the basis of secondary literature dealing with these
1 The case law analysis includes judgments until 31.12.2010.
2 Several chapters and articles on the interpretative approach of the ECtHR have been used to select
landmark judgments that featured in most of these chapters: Schokkenbroek (2000); Ost (1992); Harris,
O’Boyle & Warbrick (1995).
3 Case notes which appear in European Human Rights Cases. A journal publishing a selection of ECtHR
and CJEU cases, but its main focus is on ECtHR cases.
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specific provisions.4Again, only those cases dealing with an interpretative issue have
been selected.
This approach has resulted in a representative selection of cases that have been
used for the case law analysis. When analyzing the cases in detail to answer the
questions raised in the theoretical analysis, some cases in which interpretative issues
had been found when selecting the cases, proved not to add much in terms of an
analysis of interpretation methods and principles. This did not turn out to be problem-
atic, however, now that sufficient cases were left for a thorough case law analysis.
An additional complication for the case law selection was that it sometimes proved
to be challenging to determine whether one could really speak of an interpretative
issue. The distinction between interpretation and application discussed in the intro-
duction served as a framework for this selection, but this distinction is not always
strictly adopted in the actual judgments. Some cases in which the interpretation and
application phase were seriously mixed have not been added to the selection.5 Those
cases were not suitable for an analysis of the interpretation methods and principles
of the ECtHR.
The final selection has been analyzed on the basis of the four selected interpreta-
tion methods and principles. Both majority opinions and dissenting and concurring
opinions were included in this analysis. As indicated in the general introduction on
the ECtHR in Chapter 2, the dissenting and concurring opinions shed much light on
the discussions taking place among the judges and are therefore relevant for a dis-
cussion of judicial argumentation.
It has already been said at the beginning of this introduction that each chapter
will be dealing with one of the selected interpretative aids. Chapter 9 will therefore
address teleological interpretation, Chapter 10 comparative interpretation, Chapter
11 evolutive interpretation and Chapter 12 autonomous interpretation. Each chapter
will be structured along the most important questions that need to be answered for
that specific method or principle, which have been introduced in Chapters 5-8. Thus,
the analysis of the theoretical literature will form a starting point for these different
discussions.
4 Vande Lanotte (2005); EVRM Rechtspraak en Commentaar.
5 See, for example the case of ECtHR (GC) Hirst (No.2.) v. United Kingdom, judgment of 6 October
2005, Reports 2005-IX. This judgment contains a mix of aspects that belong to the interpretative
phase, like a short reference to the travaux préparatoires and the context of the Convention, but it
is heavily mixed with references to the margin of appreciation and proportionality. The two phases
are thus not clearly separated; thus even though one could argue that this case does contain an
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In the theoretical chapter on teleological interpretation it became clear that this is
an important method of interpretation. References to the object and purpose of the
Convention or its provisions have an important role to play in the interpretation
process. Two versions of this method were discovered. On the one hand, the object
and purpose can refer to the intention of the original drafting states, which is con-
sidered to be the subjective version of teleological interpretation. On the other hand,
the object and purpose can also be established by relying on what rationally can be
considered to be the purpose of a specific provision or the Convention. This is referred
to as the objective version of teleological interpretation. The theoretical analysis
revealed that many authors consider the objective version to be the most important
one in fundamental rights adjudication and some even consider that there is no room
at all for the subjective version when dealing with fundamental rights.6 The question
is whether in practice objective teleological interpretation plays a leading role and
whether there is any space for subjective teleological interpretation.
Before delving into the case law analysis, it is important to recall from section
4.3.2 an aspect that is relevant as a background to the analysis of teleological inter-
pretation at the ECtHR. It has already been pointed out that in addition to the
characterization of the Convention as a system for the protection of human rights,
the ECtHR has also characterized the Convention as a ‘law-making treaty’.7 That
entails, according to the ECtHR, seeking ‘the interpretation that is most appropriate
in order to realize the aim and achieve the object of the treaty, not that which would
restrict to the greatest possible degree the obligations undertaken by the Parties’.8
As a result of this characterization, exceptions to the Convention have to be interpreted
in a restricted manner.9 This characterization also increases the importance of teleo-
6 See section 5.1.1.
7 ECtHR, Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A No. 7, § 8; ECtHR, Golder v.
United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A No. 18, § 36. See for example section
4.3.2 as well.
8 ECtHR, Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A No. 7, § 8.
9 See for example: ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII,
§ 64; ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished,
§ 146. See among others: Vande Lanotte (2005), p. 183.
195
Chapter 9
logical interpretation in the context of the ECtHR, which is important as a background
for the following analysis.
In the theoretical chapter on teleological interpretation, several questions have
been identified that should be answered on the basis of the case law analysis. By doing
so, more in-depth information can be provided as to its legitimacy and its actual use
by the ECtHR. The following questions will be addressed hereinafter: How has
teleological interpretation been identified in the cases (section 9.1)? What is meant
when the ECtHR refers to the object and purpose (section 9.2)? How are they estab-
lished (section 9.3)? What role does this method play in the interpretation process
(section 9.4)? And what is its relation with other interpretative aids (section 9.5)?
9.1 HOW CAN THIS METHOD OF INTERPRETATION BE RECOGNIZED?
There are different ways to recognize teleological reasoning in the judgments of the
ECtHR or even in judgments in general. Referring to the ‘object and purpose’ of either
a provision or a Convention in general, is the dominant form used to refer to teleo-
logical interpretation.10 The ECtHR fits this general description perfectly; many cases
where some form of teleological interpretation can be detected do indeed contain
references to the ‘object and purpose’ of the Convention.11
10 See Chapter 5 on the theoretical analysis of teleological interpretation.
11 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, SeriesANo. 161, § 87; ECtHR, James
and others v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, SeriesANo. 98, § 42; ECtHR,Golder
v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A No. 18, § 34-36; ECtHR, Öztürk v.
Germany, judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A No. 73, § 49-50; ECtHR, Johnston and others
v. Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A No. 112, § 51-52; ECtHR, Engel and others
v. the Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A No. 22, § 81; ECtHR, König v. Germany,
judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A No. 27, § 88-89; ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary
objections), judgment of 23March 1995, SeriesANo. 310, § 62, 72, 73, 75, 88, 89; ECtHR,Wemhoff
v. Germany, judgment of 27 June 1968, SeriesANo. 7, § 8; ECtHR,Witold Litwa v. Poland, judgment
of 4 April 2000, Reports 2000-III, § 61; ECtHR, Case “Relating to certain aspects of the laws on
the use of languages in education in Belgium” v. Belgium, judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A No.
6, § 3-6; ECtHR (GC), Öneryildiz v. Turkey, judgment of 30 November 2004, Reports 2004-XII,
§ 69, 124; ECtHR (GC), Chassagnou and others v. France, judgment of 29 April 1999, Reports
1999-III, § 100; ECtHR (GC), Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005,
Reports 2005-I, § 101, 108, 123; ECtHR (GC), Bosphorus HavaYollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim
Śirketi v. Ireland, judgment of 30 June 2005,Reports 2005-VI, § 154; ECtHR (GC),Kudla v. Poland,
judgment of 26 October 2000, Reports 2000-XI, § 152; ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment
of 12 July 2001, Reports 2001-VII, § 24; ECtHR (GC), Martinie v. France, judgment of 12 April
2006, Reports 2006-VI, § 30; ECtHR (GC), Saadi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 January 2008,
unpublished, § 62-63-66; ECtHR (GC), Jussila v. Finland, judgment of 23 November 2006, unpub-
lished, § 36; ECtHR (GC), Stoll v. Switzerland, judgment of 10 December 2007, unpublished, § 60;
ECtHR (GC), Banković and others v. Belgium and others, decision of 12 December 2001, Reports
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One of the first cases where reference was made by the ECtHR to the ‘object and
purpose’ was Golder.12 In this judgment the ECtHR had to determine whether Article
6 of the Convention contained a right of access to courts or tribunals, since this is
not explicitly mentioned in the article itself. Before the Court elaborately answered
that question, it first clarified its interpretative approach by referring to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The Convention being a codification
of ‘generally accepted principles of international law’, the Court considered that its
interpretation should be guided by the rules of the VCLT as laid down in Articles
31 to 33.13 Without expressly referring to the particular article from the VCLT,14
the European Court did refer literally to the text of Article 31(1) of the VCLT when
justifying its interpretative approach to Article 6, which included a reference to
teleological interpretation.
This is not an extensive interpretation forcing new obligations on the Contracting States: it
is based on the very terms of the first sentence of Article 6 para. 1 read in its context and
having regard to the object and purpose of the Convention.15
The Court seems to have included the indirect reference to Article 31 of the VCLT
to provide a legitimate or at least a generally accepted framework for its interpretation
process, which could serve as a starting point for its own interpretative approach.
On later occasions the Court repeated its reference to the rules from the VCLT by
stating that it would interpret a certain provision or phrase “in their context and in
light of its object and purpose”.16
2001-XII, § 56; ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports
2005-X, § 53; ECtHR (GC), Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, decision of 4 July 2001,
unpublished; ECtHR (GC),Maaouia v. France, judgment of 5 October 2000, Reports 2000-X, § 38;
ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII, § 64; ECtHR,
Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A No. 31, § 31.
12 ECtHR, Golder v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A No. 18; in ECtHR,
Ringeisen v. Austria, judgment of 16 July 1971, Series A No. 13, reference was made to object and
purpose by dissent.
13 ECtHR, Golder v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A No. 18, § 29. For the
text of the provisions, see supra note 198 and 201.
14 As has been noted the Court at the beginning of its reasoning referred to the relevant articles from
the VCLT and declared that it would be guided by them.
15 ECtHR, Golder v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A No. 18, § 36.
16 ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished, § 65;
ECtHR, Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, judgment of 7 January 2010, unpublished, § 273-274; ECtHR,
Johnston and others v. Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A No. 112, § 51; ECtHR,
Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A No. 310, § 73;
ECtHR (GC), Banković and others v. Belgium and others, decision of 12 December 2001, Reports
2001-XII, § 55; ECtHR (GC), Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005,
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On many occasions after the Golder judgment the Court referred to the object
and purpose without explicitly basing itself on the VCLT.17 This difference appears
to have no influence on the application of the teleological method, which is under-
standable as the reference to the VCLT mainly seems to have been made in order
to introduce the interpretation methods mentioned in those provisions into the Conven-
tion framework. The reference to the VCLT thus only serves as a basis for relying
on teleological interpretation.
Another indication that teleological interpretation has been used is a reference
to the ‘aim’ of a provision or Convention. While less frequent, the Court applies this
term in its case law as well. Good examples can be found in sections such as the
following ones:
To determine the scope of the “right to education”, within the meaning of the first sentence
of Article 2 of the Protocol, the Court must bear in mind the aim of this provision.18
Reports 2005-I, § 123; ECtHR (GC), Saadi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 January 2008,
unpublished, § 62; ECtHR, Witold Litwa v. Poland, judgment of 4 April 2000, Reports 2000-III,
§ 59.
17 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, SeriesANo. 161, § 87; ECtHR, James
and others v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, SeriesANo. 98, § 42; ECtHR,Öztürk
v. Germany, judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A No. 73, § 49-50; ECtHR, Engel and others
v. the Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A No. 22, § 81; ECtHR, König v. Germany,
judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A No. 27, § 88-89; ECtHR, Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of
27 June 1968, Series A No. 7, § 8; ECtHR, Case “Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the
use of languages in education in Belgium” v. Belgium, judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A No. 6,
§ 3-6; ECtHR (GC), Öneryildiz v. Turkey, judgment of 30 November 2004, Reports 2004-XII, § 69-
124; ECtHR (GC), Chassagnou and others v. France, judgment of 29 April 1999, Reports 1999-III,
§ 100; ECtHR (GC), Bosphorus HavaYollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Śirketi v. Ireland, judgment
of 30 June 2005, Reports 2005-VI, § 154; ECtHR (GC), Kudla v. Poland, judgment of 26 October
2000, Reports 2000-XI,§ 152; ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports
2001-VII, § 24; ECtHR (GC), Martinie v. France, judgment of 12 April 2006, Reports 2006-VI,
§ 30; ECtHR (GC), Saadi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 January 2008, unpublished, § 62-63-66;
ECtHR (GC), Jussila v. Finland, judgment of 23 November 2006, unpublished, § 36; ECtHR (GC),
Stoll v. Switzerland, judgment of 10 December 2007, unpublished, § 60; ECtHR (GC), Stec and others
v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X, § 53; ECtHR (GC), Ilaşcu and others
v. Moldova and Russia, decision of 4 July 2001, unpublished, p. 17; ECtHR (GC),Maaouia v. France,
judgment of 5 October 2000, Reports 2000-X, § 38; ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment
of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII, § 64; ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June
1979, Series A No. 31, § 31.
18 ECtHR, Case “Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in
Belgium” v. Belgium, judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A No. 6, § B.3.
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The inequality between Contracting States which the permissibility of such qualified accept-
ances might create would, moreover, run counter to the aim, as expressed in the Preamble
to the Convention ... .19
The terminology the Court uses to refer to the aim of a provision is somewhat different
from cases where express reference is made to the object and purpose, but in principle
it appears to stand for the same thing. Aim or purpose, as well as the well-known
term of ‘object and purpose’ both refer to the goal that the Convention or a provision
is designed to achieve.
Teleological interpretation can finally be seen in cases where reference is made
to the “spirit”, “essence” or “underlying principles” of the Convention or one of its
provisions, as in the following examples:
Extradition in such circumstances, while not explicitly referred to in the brief and general
wording of Article 3, would plainly be contrary to the spirit and intendment of the Article
(..).20
The very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom.21
However it flows from the very essence of this procedural right that it must be open to
individuals to complain of alleged infringements of it in Convention proceedings.22
Although no previous case has established as such any right to self-determination as being
contained in Article 8 of the Convention, the Court considers that the notion of personal
autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of its guarantees.23
These quotations indicate that the Court took into account the underlying values or
principles that the Convention or a specific provision aims to protect. It will construct
the right in question in such a manner that it respects the underlying values of the
provision.
19 ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A No. 310,
§ 77.
20 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, SeriesA No. 161, § 88. See also § 87.
ECtHR (GC), Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, decision of 4 July 2001, unpublished, p. 16.
21 ECtHR, Pretty v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 April 2002, Reports 2002-III, § 65.
22 ECtHR, Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, judgment of 20 March 1991, Series A No. 201, § 99.
Reference to the essence of a right has also been made in ECtHR (GC), Christine Goodwin v. United
Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI, § 99 and 101 and ECtHR (GC), I v. United
Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI, § 79 and 81.
23 ECtHR, Pretty v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 April 2002, Reports 2002-III, § 61.
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In some cases teleological interpretation is used at a different level in the interpretative
framework. Earlier in this thesis reference was made to meta-teleological interpreta-
tion.24 This term refers to interpretative principles of which the use is justified by
reference to the object and purpose of the Convention as a whole. This is a more
abstract form of using teleological interpretation, because teleological interpretation
is used to justify another interpretative aid and not a particular interpretation of a
Convention provision. This form of teleological interpretation is visible in those cases
where reference is made to the need to interpret the Convention in a practical and
effective manner. The Court claims that this practical and effective approach to
interpretation follows from the object and purpose of the Convention:
The Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical and illusory but rights
that are practical and effective.25
Taking the parties’ arguments as a whole, the Court reiterates, firstly, that its approach to
the interpretation of Article 2 is guided by the idea that the object and purpose of the Conven-
tion as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings requires its provisions
to be interpreted and applied in such a way to make its safeguards practical and effective.26
Interpretation in these cases thus entails a reference to a teleological view on the Convention
as a whole and can be identified by a reference to the need to interpret the Convention in
a practical and effective manner.27
All these indicators have been taken into account when analyzing in which cases the
Court employs a teleological method of interpretation.28 On the basis of these indica-
24 See sections 4.1., 4.3.2. and 4.4.2.1.
25 ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A No. 32, § 24
26 ECtHR (GC), Öneryildiz v. Turkey, judgment of 30 November 2004, Reports 2004-XII, § 69.
27 See for a similar approach also: ECtHR (GC), Micallef v. Malta, judgment of 15 October 2009,
unpublished, § 81; ECtHR, Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, judgment of 7 January 2010, unpublished,
§ 275; ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished,
§ 66.
28 A category of cases that does not provide much insight into teleological interpretation and has therefore
not been included in the list of categories is where the Court states that a certain act or right can
be considered sufficient for the purpose of the Convention provision. The only indication for teleo-
logical interpretation is the fact that the word purpose is used, but for the rest there is no indication
that teleological interpretation played any role in these cases. See among others: ECtHR, Rotaru v.
Romania, judgment of 4 May 2000, Reports 2000-V, § 38 and 44; ECtHR, Gasus Dosier- und
Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands, judgment of 23 February 1995, Series A No. 306B, § 53;
ECtHR,Matos e Silva, Lda, and others v. Portugal, judgment of 16 September 1996,Reports 1996-IV,
§ 75; ECtHR (GC), Iatridis v. Greece, judgment of 25 March 1999, Reports 1999-II, § 54; ECtHR
(GC), Beyeler v. Italy, judgment of 5 January 2000, Reports 2000-I, § 100; ECtHR, Tre Traktörer
Aktiebolag v. Sweden, judgment of 7 July 1989, SeriesANo. 159, § 53; ECtHR,Gaygusuz v. Austria,
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tors the conclusion can be drawn that the Court indeed applied teleological interpreta-
tion in many cases. The difference in terminology seems to be based on linguistic
choices and does not point to a different form of teleological interpretation. In order
to keep matters clear when referring to teleological interpretation in this chapter, the
terms ‘object’ and ‘purpose’ will be used, but this also includes cases where the Court,
for example, refers to the ‘aim’ of the Convention or one of its provisions. The rest
of the chapter will be dedicated to the actual use of this method by the Court.
9.2 WHAT DOES THE COURT REFER TO WHEN SPEAKING ABOUT OBJECT AND
PURPOSE?
A logical next step in the analysis of the Court’s use of the teleological interpretation
method is to uncover what the terms that have been identified above actually refer
to. In other words, what does the Court refer to when it speaks about the ‘object’
or ‘purpose’ of the Convention or any of its provisions? The answer might be obvious
at first hand, but the question actually concerns whether the reference is substantiated
in any way by the Court. This only plays a role when the Court uses abstract indicators
like object and purpose, spirit, aim, etc. In cases where the Court literally refers to
underlying principles or values, the question whether the reference is substantiated
does not play a role. After all, the reference to principles and values is already a
substantive reference, as can be seen, for example, in the case of Pretty. In Pretty
the Court held that ‘the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle under-
lying the interpretation of the guarantees’ of Article 8.29 This type of case will thus
not be addressed in this section. The focus will be on those cases where the reference
of the Court to teleological interpretation through one of the indicators referred to
above, is not readily substantiated.
On the basis of the analysis, two types of cases can be distinguished in which teleo-
logical interpretation is used. On the one hand there is a range of cases in which the
teleological method of interpretation does not extend beyond a mere reference to the
indicators.30 On the other hand there is a whole set of cases where the reference
judgment of 16 September 1996,Reports 1996-IV, § 41; ECtHR,Gillow v. United Kingdom, judgment
of 24 November 1986, Series A 109, § 46; ECtHR, Buckley v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25
September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, § 54; ECtHR,Koua Poirrez v. France, judgment of 30 September
2003, Reports 2003-X, § 37.
29 ECtHR, Pretty v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 April 2002, Reports 2002-III, § 61.
30 ECtHR, König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978, SeriesANo. 27, § 88-89; ECtHR (GC), Ilaşcu
and others v. Moldova and Russia, decision of 4 July 2001, unpublished, p. 16-17; ECtHR, Engel
and others v. the Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A No. 22, § 81; ECtHR, Öztürk v.
Germany, judgment of 21 February 1984, SeriesANo. 73, § 49-50; ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy,
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to object or purpose has been more or less substantiated.31 In the former set of cases
the use of these terms remains devoid of any substance and the reference seems to
be merely there for rhetorical purposes. This can be illustrated by the following
quotations from the Court’s case law:
To regard the imposition of such a duty as constituting in itself an interference with
possessions for the purposes of Article 1 Protocol No. 1 would be giving the Article a far-
reaching interpretation going beyond its object and purpose.32
Moreover, regard being had to the object and purpose of the Convention, the responsibility
of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a consequence of military action - whether
lawful or unlawful - it exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory.33
In these cases the Court leaves the reader in doubt about the exact object and purpose
of the Convention, while on face value they play some role in the interpretation
process. This somewhat obscures the Court’s reasoning on the provision in question,
judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports 2001-VII, § 24; ECtHR (GC), Jussila v. Finland, judgment of
23 November 2006, unpublished, § 36; ECtHR (GC),Martinie v. France, judgment of 12 April 2006,
Reports 2006-VI, § 30; ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports
1999-VIII, § 64; ECtHR, Van der Mussele v. Belgium, judgment of 23 November 1983, Series A
No. 70, § 49; ECtHR, Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 March 1993, Series A
No. 247-C, § 36.
31 ECtHR (GC), Saadi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 January 2008, unpublished,§ 63, 66; ECtHR,
Case “Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium” v.
Belgium, judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A No. 6, § B5, 6, 8; ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom,
judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161, § 87, 88; ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary
objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A No. 310, § 72, 73, 75, 77; ECtHR, Witold Litwa
v. Poland, judgment of 4 April 2000, Reports 2000-III, § 59, 61; ECtHR (GC), Mamatkulov and
Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I, § 101; ECtHR (GC), Chassagnou
and others v. France, judgment of 29 April 1999, Reports 1999-III, § 100; ECtHR (GC), Stoll v.
Switzerland, judgment of 10 December 2007, unpublished, § 60-61; ECtHR (GC), Kudla v. Poland,
judgment of 26 October 2000, Reports 2000-XI, § 152; ECtHR, Johnston and others v. Ireland,
judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A No. 112, § 52; ECtHR, James and others v. United
Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, SeriesANo. 98, § 42; ECtHR,Golder v. United Kingdom,
judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A No. 18, § 34; ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13
June 1979, Series A No. 31, § 31; ECtHR (GC), Öneryildiz v. Turkey, judgment of 30 November
2004, Reports 2004-XII, § 69; ECtHR, Niemietz v. Germany, judgment of 16 December 1992, Series
A No. 251-B, § 31; ECtHR, Futro v. Poland, decision of 12 December 2000, unpublished, § 3.
32 ECtHR, Van der Mussele v. Belgium, judgment of 23 November 1983, Series A No. 70, § 49. In
this case the question arose whether the fact that a duty prescribed by law can involve a certain outlay
for the person bound to perform constituted an interference with the possessions of that person.
33 ECtHR (GC), Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, decision of 4 July 2001, unpublished, p.
17. In this case the Court had to answer the question whether Russia could be held responsible for
violations of the Convention in Transdniestria in Moldova.
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since a particular interpretation is then based on an object and purpose that have not
explicitly been identified. Moreover, the exact function of the teleological interpreta-
tion in this type of case is unclear. When analyzing these cases it is not possible to
assess whether teleological interpretation was actually considered to be relevant in
determining the meaning of a Convention notion. For the purpose of this chapter,
namely analyzing the use and role of the teleological method, this type of case is
therefore not particularly helpful. A more elaborate discussion of the consequences
and desirability of this way of using teleological interpretation will follow in the
conclusion of this chapter. For now the focus will be on the second category of cases,
i.e. the cases where the Court does provide some insight into the use of this method.
Fortunately, the Court has in the majority of cases put some flesh on the references
to the teleological method.34 This provides much more insight into the way the Court
incorporates this method into its reasoning. Again, this collection of cases can be
divided into two types. First, there are cases where the Court confines itself to the
provision in question. As can be seen from the examples below, the underpinnings
are still rather thin, but at least there is some elaboration on the meaning of the object
and purpose of the Convention provision.
The Court, like the Commission, considers that such an interpretation best reconciles the
language of the English and French texts, having regard to the object and purpose of Article 1
Protocol 1, which is primarily to guard against the arbitrary confiscation of property.35
[T]he Court emphasizes that such detention must be compatible with the overall purpose of
Article 5, which is to safeguard the right to liberty and ensure that no-one should be dis-
possessed of his or her liberty in an arbitrary fashion.36
According to the express terms of Article 8 of the Convention, “everyone has the right to
respect for his private life and family life, his home and correspondence”. This provision
by itself in no way guarantees either a right to education or a personal right of parents relating
to the education of their children: its object is essentially that of protecting the individual
against arbitrary interference by the public authorities in his private family life.37
Even though this does not seem like a very elaborate account of the object or purpose
of the provision at hand, these references are helpful for unravelling the meaning of
the teleological method in the Court’s case law. After all, with these short explanations
the Court provides the reader with indications as to the frame of reference from which
34 Supra note 31.
35 ECtHR, James and others v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, Series ANo. 98, § 42.
36 ECtHR (GC), Saadi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 January 2008, unpublished, § 66.
37 ECtHR, Case “Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in
Belgium” v. Belgium, judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A No. 6, § B7.
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it approached the interpretative problem. Already such a short elaboration sets some
boundaries for the interpretative process; by invoking this teleological insight the Court
indicates that it will stay within these limits when interpreting the provision. By doing
so it provides some guidance to the national authorities as well, since it indicates in
which direction the Court will look for an answer to the interpretative problem. This
makes it easier to see which role the teleological method played in the final interpreta-
tion – a point that will be addressed more elaborately below.
In many cases the Court furthermore deals with the object or purpose of the
Convention as a whole. This almost automatically results in much more general
explanations of the object or purpose of the Convention:
In addition, any interpretation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed has to be consistent with
the general spirit of the Convention, an instrument designed to maintain and promote the
ideals and values of a democratic society.38
The object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual
human beings require that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards
practical and effective, as part of the system of individual applications.39
If Contracting States were able, at their discretion, by classifying an association as “public”
or “para-administrative”, to remove it from the scope of Article 11, that would give them
such latitude that it might lead to results incompatible with the object and purpose of the
Convention, which is to protect rights that are not theoretical or illusory but practical and
effective.40
Given that it is a law-making treaty, it is also necessary to seek the interpretation that is most
appropriate in order to realize the aim and achieve the object of the treaty, not that which
would restrict to the greatest possible degree the obligations undertaken by the Parties.41
These examples show that, on a very general level, the meaning of the object or
purpose of the Convention provides a frame of reference for the interpretation of the
Convention provisions as well. In contrast with the type of case where the object and
purpose of a certain Convention provision are discussed, the framework in the cases
discussed here is extremely wide and hardly provides any substantive information
as to the interpretative process. The added value of this teleological element should
be sought at a ‘meta-level’, where it may serve as a justification for the application
38 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161, § 87.
39 ECtHR (GC), Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I,
§ 101.
40 ECtHR (GC),Chassagnou and others v. France, judgment of 29 April 1999, Reports 1999-III, § 100.
41 ECtHR, Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A No. 7, § 8.
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of other interpretative aids.42 In addition, by referring to the object and purpose of
the Convention as a whole, the Court is granted an opportunity to show the Contract-
ing States that it is not straying its own competence, but that this approach to the
Convention rights is inherent to the Convention. Reference to the object and purpose
of the Convention can as such be a way for the Court to indicate that its approach
was intended by the parties when accepting the Convention. To some extent this is
visible in the final three quotations that have been provided above. Referencing to
the object and purpose in this manner might make some interpretations more accept-
able to the Contracting States. The question is whether this argument still holds when
the Court relies on an evolutive interpretation of the object and purpose of the Conven-
tion, but that will be discussed in the following section.
9.3 HOW DOES THE COURT ESTABLISH THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE OR UNDER-
LYING VALUES?
In the process of analyzing the Court’s use of teleological interpretation, one of the
most important aspects is the manner in which the Court establishes the object or
purpose. How does the Court determine the object of a certain provision or its under-
lying values? To answer this question it is not necessary to retain the distinction made
above between the different types of case. The only set of cases that will not be
discussed here, is the set in which the Court has not substantiated the reference to
teleological arguments. In all other cases the question of how the Court determined
its teleological viewpoint is a highly interesting one.
Different elements deserve attention in this regard. In the theoretical chapter on
the teleological method of interpretation these aspects have been identified. Important
questions that have arisen as a result of the theoretical discussion are: whether the
Court invokes the subjective or objective purpose of the Convention or one of its
provisions and which documents the Court refers to when establishing the object or
underlying values of the Convention or the fundamental rights it protects. These two
aspects will be discussed in this section and should provide an overview of the Court’s
approach; in addition, the role of a number of different factors that have been found
in examining the court’s case law will be discussed.
9.3.1 Objective or subjective intention?
It should be recalled that the significance of the teleological method has been discussed
in the theoretical chapter. This discussion revealed that the underlying justification
for teleological reasoning is that it is assumed that legislating is a rational and pur-
42 See Lasser (2004), p. 206-208 and section 4.1.
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posive activity. Interpreting the legislative text, in this case the Convention, should
not lead to defeating the purpose of the legislative text.43 Instead it should try to
interpret the provision in such a way that it respects the purpose of the legislative
text at hand. This raises the question which purpose should be sought after: the
subjective purpose of the original legislator or drafter, or the objective purpose of
a rational legislator? As has been explained in section 5.1.3, there is no right or wrong
answer to this question; it appeared from the theoretical literature that it depends on
one’s perspective which approach is being favoured. However, in practice it makes
quite some difference which perspective is taken and therefore it is interesting to
discover which purpose the Strasbourg Court tries to respect.
In the majority of cases the Court seems to take into account the objective purpose
of the Convention or the provision at hand.44 The Court in these cases does not pay
any attention or at least does not grant any weight to the intention of the drafters of
the Convention. This lack of any reference to the purpose of the drafters of the
Convention supports the conclusion that the Court has taken an objective perspective
of the purpose of the Convention and its provisions. Examples of the use of an
objective purpose can be seen in quotations such as these:
Furthermore, private life, in the Court’s view, includes a person’s physical and psychological
integrity; the guarantee afforded by Article 8 of the Convention is primarily intended to ensure
the development, without outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his
relations with other human beings. There is therefore a zone of interaction of a person with
others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of ‘private life’.45
43 See section 5.1.1.
44 ECtHR (GC), Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I;
ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161; ECtHR (GC),
Öneryildiz v. Turkey, judgment of 30 November 2004, Reports 2004-XII; ECtHR (GC), Chassagnou
and others v. France, judgment of 29 April 1999, Reports 1999-III; ECtHR,Witold Litwa v. Poland,
judgment of 4 April 2000, Reports 2000-III; ECtHR, Case “Relating to certain aspects of the laws
on the use of languages in education in Belgium” v. Belgium, judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A
No. 6, § B7; ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A No. 31; ECtHR,
Niemietz v. Germany, judgment of 16 December 1992, SeriesANo. 251-B, § 31; ECtHR (GC), Saadi
v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 January 2008, unpublished; ECtHR, Golder v. United Kingdom,
judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A No. 18; ECtHR,Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27 June
1968, SeriesANo. 7; ECtHR (GC),Osman v. United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports
1998-VIII, § 116; ECtHR, P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 September 2001, Reports
2001-IX, § 56-60; ECtHR, Von Hannover v. Germany, judgment of 24 June 2004, Reports 2004-VII,
§ 50-53; ECtHR, Pretty v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 April 2002, Reports 2002-III, § 61;
ECtHR, Botta v. Italy, judgment of 24 February 1998, Reports 1998-I, § 32; ECtHR, Futro v. Poland,
decision of 12 December 2000, unpublished, § 3.
45 ECtHR, Von Hannover v. Germany, judgment of 24 June 2004, Reports 2004-VII, § 50.
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Although no previous case has established as such any right to self-determination as being
contained in Article 8 of the Convention, the Court considers that the notion of personal
autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of its guarantees.46
In these cases the Court clearly refrained from making any reference to the original
purpose of the drafters. On rare occasions the Court has even explicitly ignored the
subjective approach and preferred the objective approach, as in the case of Sigurdur
A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland.47 This case concerned the question whether a taxi driver
could be obliged to be a member of a professional association. The ECtHR had to
determine whether this constituted a violation of Article 11 (the right to freedom of
association and assembly). In order to answer this question the ECtHR had to deter-
mine whether Article 11 also included a right not to be associated. The respondent
government argued that Article 11 did indeed include a right not to be associated,
but this right was rather limited in their view. They supported their argument by
referring to an earlier judgment in the case of Young, James and Webster v. United
Kingdom.48 In that case it had cited the travaux préparatoires, which ‘showed that
a general rule, modelled on Article 20 para. 2 of the 1948 United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, that no one may be compelled to belong to an asso-
ciation, had deliberately been omitted from the Convention’.49 If this was deliberately
omitted by the drafters, so the argument by the respondent government went, then
Article 11 should not be interpreted in such a broad manner as to render this passage
nugatory. The ECtHR dismissed this argument by recalling that the precedent in which
the travaux préparatoires were cited, did not attach decisive weight to the travaux
préparatoires. It subsequently concluded that a negative right to association, i.e. the
right not to be a member of an association, indeed fell within the scope of Article
11. What is interesting about this case is that the Court in Young, James and Webster
established only a limited version of a negative right under Article 11. In Sigurdur
the Court went further and adopted the right which had been deliberately omitted.
The subjective intention of the drafters of the Convention was thus explicitly ignored
in this case.
The conclusion that the Court mainly adheres to an objective teleological approach
is also supported by the fact that the Court has regularly adopted an evolutive approach
in its interpretation process. This evolutive approach assumes that the Convention
should be interpreted according to present-day conditions and not the conditions at
the time of drafting of the Convention. This approach is clearly in contradiction with
46 ECtHR, Pretty v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 April 2002, Reports 2002-III, § 61.
47 ECtHR, Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A No. 264.
48 ECtHR, Young James andWebster v. United Kingdom, judgment of 13 August 1981, SeriesANo. 44.
49 ECtHR, Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A No. 264, § 33.
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the approach that aims to discover the subjective purpose of the Convention. Chapter
11 will deal with evolutive interpretation and its role in the Court’s case law. The
present purpose was to indicate that this might be one of the reasons why the Court
in its teleological reasoning not often considers the subjective purpose of the Conven-
tion.
As has already been hinted at above, there is a small number of cases in which the
Court does take the subjective intentions of the drafting states into account.50 Some-
times reference is made to the travaux préparatoires when establishing the object
and purpose. In other cases reference is made to the intentions of the drafting Contract-
ing States without explicitly discussing the travaux préparatoires. Examples of both
uses of the travaux can be found in the following quotations:
The object of Article 13, as emerges from the travaux préparatoires, is to provide a means
whereby individuals can obtain relief at national level for violations of their Convention rights
before having to set in motion the international machinery of complaint before the Court.51
One reason why the signatory Governments decided to ‘take the first steps for the collective
enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the Universal Declaration’ was their profound
belief in the rule of law.52
In these cases the Court clearly tries to invoke the purpose of the original legislator
and use that purpose as a frame of reference for interpretation in these individual cases.
It is interesting to know why in these cases the Court resorts to the subjective teleo-
logical approach. Unfortunately, in none of these cases does the Court provide any
clues to answer this question. In Johnston the Court had to address the question
whether Article 12 included not only the right to marry, but also the right to divorce.
The travaux préparatoireswere helpful for the Court’s final interpretation, since they
50 ECtHR, Golder v United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A No. 18; ECtHR (GC),
Kudla v. Poland, judgment of 26 October 2000, Reports 2000-XI; ECtHR, Johnston and others v.
Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986, SeriesANo. 112; ECtHR, Case “Relating to certain aspects
of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium” v. Belgium, judgment of 23 July 1968,
Series A No. 6, § B5,6; ECtHR (GC), Banković and others v. Belgium and others, decision of 12
December 2001, Reports 2001-VII, § 19-21, 58, 63 and 65; ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom,
judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161, § 103; ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary ob-
jections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A No. 310, § 71, where the ECtHR did hold that the
intention of the drafters should not be the sole argument taken into account.
51 ECtHR (GC), Kudla v. Poland, judgment of 26 October 2000, Reports 2000-XI, § 152. A similar
consideration can be found in ECtHR, Johnston and others v. Ireland, judgment of 18 December
1986, Series A No. 112, § 52: “Moreover, the foregoing interpretation of Article 12 is consistent
with the object and purpose as revealed by the travaux préparatoires.”
52 ECtHR, Golder v United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A No. 18, § 34.
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revealed that the drafters explicitly excluded a right to divorce. The travaux prépara-
toires in this case supported the textual interpretation. The same can be said for the
Belgian Linguistic case in which the reference to the travaux préparatoires supported
the textual considerations as well, as is evidenced by the following paragraphs:
The second sentence of Article 2 of the Protocol does not guarantee a right to education;
this is clearly shown by its wording. The second sentence of Article 2 of the Protocol does
not guarantee a right to education; this is clearly shown by its wording:
‘... In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching,
the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity
with their own religious and philosophical convictions.’
This provision does not require of States that they should, in the sphere of education or
teaching, respect parents’ linguistic preferences, but only their religious and philosophical
convictions. To interpret the terms ‘religious’ and ‘philosophical’ as covering linguistic
preferences would amount to a distortion of their ordinary and usual meaning and to read
into the Convention something which is not there. Moreover the ‘preparatory work’ confirms
that the object of the second sentence of Article 2 was in no way to secure respect by the
State of a right for parents to have education conducted in a language other than that of the
country in question.
It can, however, not be derived from this that the Court tends to resort to the subject-
ive intentions of the drafters if it wants to justify a strictly textual or narrow interpreta-
tion. In Kudla the reference to the travaux préparatoires simply seems to support
the whole argument of the Court, rather than only a specific reading of the text of
the provision.53 In that case the Court employed the subjective approach to find extra
support in general and the travaux préparatoires could afford this support. This
approach is difficult to explain since these cases are not exceptionally controversial,
nor are they in any other way different from the cases where the Court opted for an
objective teleological approach. For example, in Pretty the Court had to address a
similar type of interpretative question to the one in Johnston. Here the question was
whether Article 2 included the right to die, which is exactly the opposite of the right
to life. In this case the Court did not call upon the travaux préparatoires, but it stuck
to a mainly textual interpretation and concluded that this right could not be considered
to be included in the article. While the situations are not the same, the interpretative
problem presented by the cases was similar, making it difficult to understand why
the Court adopted a different approach in both types of case. An explanation could
be that the travaux préparatoires in the case of Johnston (on Article 12) provided
support for the Court, while the travaux préparatoires in the case of Pretty (on Article
53 ECtHR (GC), Kudla v. Poland, judgment of 26 October 2000, Reports 2000-XI, § 152:
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2) did not. More likely, however, is that the Court just does not really apply a consist-
ent approach towards the use of methods of interpretation and picks those methods
which seem to be most convincing in the case at hand.
It might therefore be warranted to conclude that there is not really a coherent
policy behind the reference to the objective or subjective purpose of the Convention.
With very few clues from the Court itself it is hard to draw definite conclusions.
Judging by the frequency of the cases in which the Court tries to find an objective
purpose, it seems legitimate to conclude that the Court has a preference for the
objective purpose, while at the same time it does not rule out the subjective approach.
9.3.2 Which documents play a role in establishing the subjective or objective
purpose?
In cases where the Court has substantiated the reference to the object or purpose of
the Convention or where the Court has referred to the underlying values of the
provision of the Convention, the Court has sometimes supported its findings by making
reference to specific documents. Already inGolder the Court stated that ‘the preamble
is generally very useful for the determination of the “object” and “purpose” of the
Convention.’54 In some others cases the preamble has been invoked in the same
manner:
The inequality between Contracting States which the permissibility of such qualified accept-
ances might create would, moreover, run counter to the aim, as expressed in the Preamble
to the Convention, to achieve greater unity in the maintenance and further realization of human
rights.55
It would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the Convention, that ‘common
heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law’ to which the Preamble
refers, were a Contracting State knowingly to surrender a fugitive to another State where
there were substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected
to torture, however heinous the crime allegedly committed.56
In the case of United Communist Party of Turkey, the Court used the preamble in
a more covert way to emphasize the importance of democracy throughout the whole
Convention.57 In the Court’s view the preamble reflects the fundamental value of
54 ECtHR, Golder v United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A No. 18, § 34.
55 ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A No. 310,
§ 77.
56 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161, § 88.
57 ECtHR (GC),United Communist Party of Turkey and others v. Turkey, judgment of 30 January 1998,
Reports 1998-I, § 25 refering to § 45.
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democracy in the Convention context. It is the importance of democracy in the
Convention that makes the protection of political parties fall within the scope of
Article 11:
Democracy is without doubt a fundamental feature of the European public order ... That is
apparent, firstly, from the Preamble to the Convention, which establishes a very clear con-
nection between the Convention and democracy by stating that the maintenance and further
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms are best ensured on the one hand by
an effective political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance
of human rights ... The Preamble goes on to affirm that European countries have a common
heritage of political tradition, ideals, freedom and the rule of law. The Court has observed
that in that common heritage are to be found the underlying values of the Convention ...;
it has pointed out several times that the Convention was designed to maintain and promote
the ideals and values of a democratic society ... .58
In the previous section, the travaux préparatoires have already been mentioned. These
documents are only used in a small number of cases, namely when the Court tries
to determine the subjective purpose of the Convention. What may be added to the
discussion of this use in the previous section is that it might seem to be rather easy
for the Court to refer to the travaux préparatoires, as if they constitute one clear
document that reveals the purpose of the drafting states. In reality this is not the case
and referring to the travaux préparatoires might be less transparent than it seems
at first sight. There was not one single purpose of the original framers of the Conven-
tion and if the Court refers to the object as revealed by the travaux préparatoires
this is still in many cases an interpretation of these materials by the Court.
The Court has made use of other documents in its reasoning as well. However, it
usually does not do so in the context of teleological reasoning, but mainly in the
context of comparative reasoning, which will be discussed in Chapter 10. In the
teleological context the Court has really limited itself to the preamble and the travaux
préparatoires.
The positive side of the references made to either the preamble or the travaux prépara-
toires is that the Court at least tried to legitimize how they determined the object
or purpose or underlying value. In many cases the Court does not refer to any docu-
ment at all, which makes it more difficult to understand where a particular object
or value comes from.




9.3.3 What other factors play a role in establishing the subjective or objective
purpose?
The limited number of cases in which the Court seeks support from a document, like
the preamble or travaux préparatoires, indicates that there have to be other factors
that play a role for the Court when establishing the object and purpose of the Conven-
tion. At least, that would have to be the case if the Strasbourg Court wants to provide
some insight into how it determines the object of the Convention or the underlying
values of a certain provision. There are some judgments in which this is not really
the case and where the reader is left in doubt about how the Court determined the
purpose.59 This lack of transparency makes it difficult for the reader to fully under-
stand the logic of the Court’s reasoning.
In many cases the Court, however, tries to increase the transparency of its reasoning
by relying heavily on precedent in establishing the object and purpose of the Conven-
tion as a whole or of specific provisions.60 Hereby the Court does provide some
justification for construing the object or purpose in a certain way or for relying on
a specific underlying value. The reference to precedents ensures continuity in the
Court’s approach. This is clearly visible in cases where the Court relies on the teleo-
logical justification for its practical and effective approach. In all these cases the Court
refers to precedents that state the same:
59 ECtHR, Pretty v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 April 2002, Reports 2002-III; ECtHR (GC), Saadi
v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 January 2008, unpublished; ECtHR, Wemhoff v. Germany,
judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A No. 7; ECtHR, James and others v. United Kingdom, judgment
of 21 February 1986, Series A No. 98.
60 ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A No. 310,
§ 72; ECtHR, Witold Litwa v. Poland, judgment of 4 April 2000, Reports 2000-III, § 60; ECtHR,
Niemietz v. Germany, judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A No. 251-B, § 31; ECtHR, Futro
v. Poland, decision of 12 December 2000, unpublished, § 3; ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom,
judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161, § 87; ECtHR (GC),Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey,
judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I, § 101; ECtHR (GC), Öneryildiz v. Turkey, judgment
of 30 November 2004, Reports 2004-XII, § 69; ECtHR (GC), Chassagnou and others v. France,
judgment of 29 April 1999, Reports 1999-III, § 100; ECtHR, P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom,
judgment of 25 September 2001, Reports 2001-IX, § 56; ECtHR, Stjerna v. Finland, judgment of
25 November 1994, Series A No. 299-B, § 37; ECtHR, Von Hannover v. Germany, judgment of
24 June 2004, Reports 2004-VII, § 50; ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979, Series
A No. 32, § 24; ECtHR (GC), Osman v. United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports
1998-VIII, § 116; ECtHR, Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, judgment of 20 March 1991, Series
ANo. 201, § 94; ECtHR, Botta v. Italy, judgment of 24 February 1998, Reports 1998-I, § 32; ECtHR,
Smirnova v. Russia, judgment of 24 July 2003, Reports 2003-IX, § 95.
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[T]he object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human
beings requires its provisions to be interpreted and applied in such a way as to make its safeguards
practical and effective.61
In cases concerning specific provisions, such continuity is less obvious. Especially
in cases concerning Article 8 the Court regularly relies on precedents. One needs to
look carefully at the precedents that the Court refers to in order to check whether
the precedent supports the Court’s own reasoning or whether it indirectly expands
the scope of the right in question. This ‘danger’ can be explained by the cases of
Pretty and Evans. In the case of Pretty the Court stated that the ‘notion of personal
autonomy’ was an important principle underlying Article 8 of the Convention.62
In Evans the Court stated by referring to Pretty that Article 8 included a ‘right to
personal autonomy’.63 The Court did not explain the seeming expansion in Evans
and pretended that it arose directly from the Pretty case. It does not need much
explanation why there is quite a difference between a notion and a right, and that
the Court silently seems to have expanded the scope of Article 8 in this example.
This can happen in more cases if the Court relies as heavily on precedents as it
currently does.
9.4 ROLE OF TELEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION IN THE INTERPRETATION PROCESS
The analysis discussed until now has already given some idea of the role of teleo-
logical interpretation, but this role still warrants some more in-depth analysis. The
role of teleological interpretation in the interpretative reasoning of the Court is not
easy to define. This could largely be the result of the fact that teleological interpreta-
tion plays different roles in the case law and it also does do so at different levels of
abstraction. The ensuing discussion will explain the different roles and thus will
complete the picture of teleological interpretation.
As has been explained in the theoretical part of this thesis, broadly three different
functions can be distinguished for teleological interpretation. In some cases teleological
interpretation functions as one of the arguments or as the sole argument in favour
of a certain interpretation.64 In other cases reference to teleological interpretation
61 ECtHR (GC), Öneryildiz v. Turkey, judgment of 30 November 2004, Reports 2004-XII, § 69.
62 ECtHR, Pretty v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 April 2002, Reports 2002-III Pretty § 61.
63 ECtHR (GC), Evans v. United Kingdom, judgment of 10 April 2007, unpublished, § 71.
64 See: ECtHR (GC), United Communist Party of Turkey and others v. Turkey, judgment of 30 January
1998, Reports 1998-I; ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No.
161; ECtHR, Johnston and others v. Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A No. 112;
ECtHR, Witold Litwa v. Poland, judgment of 4 April 2000, Reports 2000-III; ECtHR (GC), Ilaşcu
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seems to have only a symbolic or rhetorical function in the sense that it does not seem
to play an actual role in the decision of the Court; or at least not one that is visible
for the reader.65 The final category is where teleological interpretation influences
the approach by the Court on a rather abstract level. It may play such a role, for
example, when the Court wants to justify an autonomous approach or if it wants to
support the conclusion that the Convention should be interpreted in a practical and
effective manner. The example below will illustrate the three categories.
As said, the first category of cases is constituted by those where teleological interpreta-
tion functions like any other interpretation method, such as systematic interpretation
or textual interpretation. This means that the teleological argument is used in order
to establish the meaning of one of the Convention provisions or an aspect thereof.
As an example the case of Soering can be mentioned, where the Court had to deter-
mine whether extraditing a person to a territory where the person would be faced
with a real risk of exposure to torture could fall within the scope of Article 3 of the
and others v. Moldova and Russia, decision of 4 July 2001, unpublished; ECtHR, Niemietz v. Germany,
judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A No. 251-B; ECtHR, Golder v United Kingdom, judgment
of 21 February 1975, Series A No. 18; ECtHR (GC), Kudla v. Poland, judgment of 26 October 2000,
Reports 2000-XI; ECtHR, James and others v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, Series
A No. 98; ECtHR, Van der Mussele v. Belgium, judgment of 23 November 1983, Series A No. 70;
ECtHR, Futro v. Poland, decision of 12 December 2000, unpublished; ECtHR (GC), Saadi v. United
Kingdom, judgment of 29 January 2008, unpublished; ECtHR, Case “Relating to certain aspects
of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium” v. Belgium, judgment of 23 July 1968,
Series A No. 6, § B3 & B6; ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment of 23
March 1995, Series A No. 310, § 62, § 75 and 77 § 88-89; ECtHR, Pretty v. United Kingdom,
judgment of 29 April 2002,Reports 2002-III, § 61 and 65; ECtHR (GC), Jussila v. Finland, judgment
of 23 November 2006, unpublished, § 36.
65 ECtHR, Van der Mussele v. Belgium, judgment of 23 November 1983, SeriesANo. 70, § 37; ECtHR
(GC), Stoll v. Switzerland, judgment of 10 December 2007, unpublished, § 60; ECtHR (GC), Banković
and others v. Belgium and others, decision of 12 December 2001, Reports 2001-VII, § 65; ECtHR,
Pretty v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 April 2002, Reports 2002-III Pretty 54 (?). See also:
ECtHR, Rotaru v. Romania, judgment of 4 May 2000, Reports 2000-V, § 38 and 44; ECtHR, Gasus
Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands, judgment of 23 February 1995, Series A No.
306B, § 53; ECtHR, Matos e Silva, Lda, and others v. Portugal, judgment of 16 September 1996,
Reports 1996-IV, § 75; ECtHR (GC), Iatridis v. Greece, judgment of 25March 1999, Reports 1999-II,
§ 54; ECtHR (GC), Beyeler v. Italy, judgment of 5 January 2000, Reports 2000-I, § 100; ECtHR,
Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v. Sweden, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 159, § 53; ECtHR,
Gaygusuz v. Austria, judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, § 41; ECtHR, Gillow v.
United Kingdom, judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A 109, § 46; ECtHR, Buckley v. United
Kingdom, judgment of 25 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, § 54; ECtHR, Koua Poirrez v. France,
judgment of 30 September 2003, Reports 2003-X, § 37.
214
Teleological interpretation in the case law of the ECtHR
Convention.66 The Court concluded that it could and it thereby relied heavily on
a teleological interpretation of the provision. It held that:
Extradition in such circumstances, while not explicitly referred to in the brief and general
wording of Article 3, would be plainly contrary to the spirit and intendment of the Article,
... .67
In another example, the case of Johnston, the Court had to decide whether a right
to divorce could be derived from Article 12 of the Convention.68 In answering that
question, the Court relied on the ordinary meaning of the text and the context of the
provision. Additionally, the Court held that:
Moreover, the foregoing interpretation of Article 12 is consistent with its object and purpose
as revealed by the travaux préparatoires.69
There are few cases in which the Court expresses itself on the persuasive force of
teleological interpretation. In United Communist Party of Turkey the text of the
provision already supported the conclusion that political parties came within the scope
of Article 11, but the Court continued and held that:
However, even more persuasive than the wording of Article 11, in the Court’s view, is the
fact that political parties are a form of association essential to the proper functioning of
democracy. In view of the importance of democracy in the Convention system, there can
be no doubt that political parties come within the scope of Article 11.70
The emphasis on the strength of the teleological argument would seem to suggest
that that argument was decisive in determining the scope of Article 11.
In other cases the Court employs teleological arguments to argue against a very broad
interpretation of the Convention. Here generally only the teleological method plays
a role like in the case of Futro, for example:
66 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161.
67 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161, § 88.
68 ECtHR, Johnston and others v. Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A No. 112.
69 ECtHR, Johnston and others v. Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A No. 112, § 52.
70 ECtHR (GC),United Communist Party of Turkey and others v. Turkey, judgment of 30 January 1998,
Reports 1998-I, § 25.
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[T]he Court recalls that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 aims at securing the peaceful enjoyment
of existing possessions and that it does not guarantee a right to acquire property nor a right
to restitution of property.71
The examples show that teleological interpretation in the first category of cases has
a varying degree of influence, depending on the case in question. It ranges from highly
influential or even decisive in some cases to supporting an interpretation together
with other interpretation methods. No trend can be discerned on when teleological
interpretation is more influential. Apparently this depends on the arguments and
material available in a specific case. Another observation is that teleological interpreta-
tion is often employed at a very concrete level. It is used to establish the meaning
of a particular right laid down in the Convention; this use is contrary to the third
category of cases, which will be discussed below, where the teleological interpretation
plays a role at a much more abstract level.
The second category of cases is those where the Court at some point in its reasoning
refers to the object or purpose of the Convention or one of its provisions, but does
not substantiate this teleological reference in any visible manner. The reference to
teleological interpretation might indicate that the Court took a teleological approach,
but failed to express so in its reasoning. The Court in these cases typically considers
that:
[T]he Court will have regard to all the circumstances of the case in light of the underlying
objectives of Article 4 ... .72
Or
[T]he meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of
the treaty, is to be adopted.73
Another group of cases within this category only refers to the teleological method
of interpretation when concluding that a certain right is a right for the purpose of
one of the Convention provisions. An example can be found in the case of Gaygusuz
where the Court concluded that:
71 ECtHR, Futro v. Poland, decision of 12 December 2000, unpublished, § 3. Similar approach in
ECtHR, Van der Mussele v. Belgium, judgment of 23 November 1983, SeriesANo. 70, § 49; ECtHR
(GC), Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, decision of 4 July 2001, unpublished, p. 16.
72 ECtHR, Van der Mussele v. Belgium, judgment of 23 November 1983, Series A No. 70, § 37.
73 ECtHR (GC), Stoll v. Switzerland, judgment of 10 December 2007, unpublished, § 60.
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[T]he right to emergency assistance- in so far as provided for in the applicable legislation-
is a pecuniary right for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.74
In this type of judgment the ECtHR does not substantiate the object or purpose of
the Convention or a particular provision in these cases. As a result there is no possibil-
ity to check how the Court has come to its conclusion that the specific situation is
covered by the Convention.
All the cases in this second category have in common that the Court hints at
teleological interpretation, but does not explicate whether it has actually used this
method in the interpretative process in these cases. As a result the role of teleological
interpretation is unclear in these cases.
Arguably the most important role for teleological interpretation is not at the concrete
level of determining an interpretation of one of the Convention rights or a Convention
term, but at a more abstract level. In short it entails that the Court has created a
teleological framework which helps it to interpret the Convention and its provisions.
It requires some explanation in order to fully understand this point. The starting point
is that the Court has repeatedly emphasized the ‘special character [of the Convention]
as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental free-
doms’.75 Two consequences follow from this characterization, both of which have
been most explicitly articulated in the cases of Soering and Mamatkulov.76 The first
is that:
[O]bject and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual
human beings require that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards
practical and effective (emphasis added).77
74 ECtHR, Gaygusuz v. Austria, judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, § 41.
75 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161, § 87. See also
ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A No. 310;
ECtHR (GC), Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I;
ECtHR, Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, judgment of 20 March 1991, Series A No. 201. ECtHR
(GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished alludes to this
characterization, but only states that the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection
of human rights’, § 66.
76 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161, § 87; ECtHR (GC),
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I, § 100.
77 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161, § 87; ECtHR (GC),
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I, § 101. See also
ECtHR (GC), Bosphorus HavaYollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Śirketi v. Ireland, judgment of 30
June 2005, Reports 2005-VI, § 154; ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment
of 23 March 1995, Series A No. 310, § 72. The early Belgian Linguistic case already stated that
the object and purpose of the Convention was to provide effective protection, ECtHR,Case “Relating
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This requirement that rights should be practical and effective has become a very
important principle in the case law of the Court.78 It has guided the interpretation
of many Convention rights by providing a benchmark for the concrete interpretation
of these provisions. In determining the appropriate interpretation the Court is thus
guided by the general consideration that the interpretation has to fulfil the requirements
of being practical and effective. Moreover, it has proven to be a basis for justifying
other interpretative principles, namely autonomous and evolutive interpretation. The
chapters dealing with these interpretative principles will also deal with this issue, but
in order to understand the role of teleological interpretation the issue has to be
discussed here as well. The case ofChassagnou clearly justifies autonomous interpreta-
tion on the basis of the need to achieve a practical and effective interpretation:
If Contracting States were able, at their discretion, by classifying an association as “public”
or “para-administrative”, to remove it from the scope of Article 11, that would give them
such latitude that it might lead to results incompatible with the object and purpose of the
Convention, which is to protect rights that are not theoretical or illusory but practical and
effective.79
Thus, the Court finds that if it in some situations does not adopt an autonomous
approach, it risks surrendering the applicability of the ECHR to the ‘sovereign will’80
of the Contracting States and that might reduce the Convention to a paper tiger. A
similar justification has been provided for evolutive interpretation. The Court explicitly
linked evolutive interpretation with the need for practical and effective protection
in the case of Stec:
Since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human rights, the
Court must have regard to the changing conditions within the respondent State and within
to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium” v. Belgium, judgment
of 23 July 1968, Series A No. 6, § B5.
78 Supra note 935 where some examples of this principle in the case law of the ECtHR are mentioned.
79 ECtHR (GC),Chassagnou and others v. France, judgment of 29 April 1999,Reports 1999-III, § 100.
In the following cases the link with the object and purpose has been made as well, but the Court
has not literally referred to the terms pratical and effective. ECtHR, Öztürk v. Germany, judgment
of 21 February 1984, Series A No. 73, § 49; ECtHR, König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978,
Series A No. 27, § 88; ECtHR, Engel and others v. the Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series
A No. 22, § 81; ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports 2001-VII, § 24.
80 ECtHR, Öztürk v. Germany, judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A No. 73, § 49; ECtHR, Engel
and others v. the Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A No. 22, § 81.
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Contracting States generally, and must interpret and apply the Convention in a manner which
renders its rights practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory.81
The presumption by the Court in the case of evolutive interpretation is that human
rights standards evolve over time and that there is a need to keep them up to date
in order to avoid the Convention turning into a dead letter. A teleological approach
to the Convention thus generates some further interpretative principles, which play
an important role in the interpretation process.
The second consequence of the characterization of the Convention as a system for
the protection of human rights is that any interpretation:
[H]as to be consistent with the “general spirit of the Convention, an instrument designed to
maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society”.82
As a result the whole underlying approach to the interpretation of any aspect of the
rights protected in the Convention can be said to be teleological in nature. It is difficult
to tell whether teleological interpretation plays an important role in the interpretative
process under this second strand of the consequences, because if it were to be taken
into consideration it would be more implicit.
Teleological interpretation thus plays different roles at different levels of abstraction.
It is both a ‘regular’ interpretation method and a method that generates a whole
framework of interpretative principles. The level of influence of teleological interpreta-
tion in the first category is not always easy to discern and it varies per case. Teleo-
logical interpretation in the final category has a strong influence on the interpretative
process since it generates important and characteristic interpretative principles, such
as evolutive and autonomous interpretation.
9.5 RELATION WITH OTHER INTERPRETATIVE AIDS
The final category of cases discussed in the previous section serves as a good prelude
for the discussion on the relation of teleological interpretation with other interpretative
aids, mainly those discussed elsewhere in this thesis. Now that the different roles of
81 ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X, § 47.
A rather similar statement has been made in ECtHR (GC), Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey,
judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I, § 121. Link also made in ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland,
judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A No. 32, § 26.
82 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161, § 87; ECtHR (GC),
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I, § 101.
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teleological interpretation have been discussed it is clear that teleological interpretation
serves as a basis for autonomous and evolutive interpretation. The Court has not
explicitly invoked this method to establish the autonomous or evolutive meaning of
the Convention, so the main role for teleological interpretation is to justify the reliance
on these interpretative aids.
The teleological approach to the Convention has been translated by the Court in the
principle that rights should be interpreted in a practical and effective manner. This
principle has played an important role in advancing the protection afforded by the
Convention.83 Like the interpretative principles mentioned above, autonomous and
evolutive interpretation, the principle of effective interpretation interacts with teleo-
logical interpretation on an abstract level.
On a more concrete level there is not really a clear relation between teleological
interpretation and other interpretative methods. The Court invokes teleological inter-
pretation along with different other interpretative methods, such as textual interpreta-
tion, systematic interpretation or comparative interpretation.84 In some cases the
methods support the same conclusion, while in others they point in conflicting
directions. Interestingly, while the Court may in some cases overrule, for example,
a textual interpretation (or at least go beyond the clear wording), there are no cases
where a teleological interpretation is overruled by arguments from other interpretation
methods, at least none where teleological interpretation had been explicitly invoked.
This does not mean that an interpretation is always in line with the object and purpose
of the provision of the Convention. The dissenting opinion in Pellegrin, for example,
argues that the approach taken in Pellegrin, which claimed to be in line with the object
and purpose of the Convention, is not very consistent with the object and purpose
of the Convention.85 However, the fact that the Court never openly disregards teleo-
logical considerations does show that the method is important to the Court. Comparat-
ive arguments may be disregarded86 or the original intent of the drafters may have
been overturned,87 but teleological interpretations have not been dismissed in an
explicit manner. Thus, the Court really makes an effort to interpret the terms of the
83 Supra note 937 and see in addition: Leach (2005), p. 165; Christoffersen (2009), p. 55; Ovey &White
(2006), p. 47; Vanneste (2010), p. 312-317; Vande Lanotte (2005), p. 183; Gerards (2010), p. 16-19.
84 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of those methods.
85 ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII, dissenting
opinion by Tulkens, Fischbach, Casadevall and Thomassen.
86 Some examples: ECtHR (GC), Chapman v. United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 2001, Reports
2001-I; ECtHR, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, judgment of 24 June 2010, unpublished.
87 This was implicit in ECtHR, Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, Series
A No. 264; see discussion in section 10.2.1.1.
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Convention in line with the object and purpose of the various Convention provisions.
Whether the Court always succeeds in doing so in a satisfactory manner is matter
for debate. Finally, there does not appear to be a clear relation between teleological
interpretation and other interpretation methods, although the Court does seem to value
teleological interpretation as one of the more important interpretation methods.
9.6 CONCLUSION
While taking stock of the case law analysis, a few things have become clear. First
of all, teleological interpretation plays a role at different levels of abstraction. This has
already been found to be one of the results of the theoretical analysis, but this analysis
was based on the theory of LASSER which does not expressly concern the ECtHR.
The case law analysis has confirmed the theoretical assumption that the ECtHR also
invokes meta-teleological principles. The reference to the fact that the interpretation
of the Convention needs to be practical and effective serves as a justification for both
autonomous interpretation and evolutive interpretation. This is an important function
of teleological interpretation that takes place at a rather abstract level.
At a more concrete level teleological interpretation also plays a role in the inter-
pretation of the Convention provisions. One of the aspects that played a role in the
theoretical analysis is the question whether the ECtHR tries to establish the subjective
or objective purpose of the Convention or its provisions. The analysis showed that
in the majority of cases the ECtHR prefers the objective purpose. Only in a few cases
does the ECtHR refer to the travaux préparatoires to establish the subjective intention
of the original drafters. These instances all concerned the object and purpose of a
specific provision and not the Convention as a whole. The only problem that emerged
from the analysis is that it is not clear in what kind of situations the ECtHR relies
on the objective and the subjective purpose. Similar interpretative problems have led
to different approaches, which renders it difficult to understand the actual use of the
method.
Another aspect that does not help to get much insight into the use of this method
is that it is often not really clear how the ECtHR establishes the object and purpose.
The ECtHR generally only briefly indicates what it considers the object and purpose
to be, and that is it. Or in some cases there is no indication of what the object and
purpose are and only by mentioning these terms it is clear to the outsider that teleo-
logical interpretation must have played some role. The ECtHR would provide more
insight into its conclusions if it was more open about the use of teleological interpreta-
tion. In practice, moreover, there are hardly any discussions between dissenters and
the majority opinion on the object and purpose in a specific case. Providing more
insight into this method, or having a clear debate on it between dissenters and the






THE CASE LAW OF THE ECTHR
Comparative interpretation as a method of interpretation has led to quite some debate,
as can be seen in the theoretical analysis on this method in Chapter 6. In order to
streamline the discussion of the method, a distinction was proposed in that chapter
between internal comparative interpretation and external comparative interpretation.
If the ECtHR takes materials from Contracting States into account, this means that
it relies on internal comparative interpretation, but if materials from, for example,
the United Nations, the Council of Europe or the United States are taken into con-
sideration, this constitutes external comparative interpretation. It has been explained
that each of these two components requires a different justification. One of the main
questions defined for the case law analysis accordingly is whether the ECtHR in
practice acknowledges the need to distinguish between external and internal comparat-
ive interpretation and the need for a different justification for each component. More-
over, even if this distinction is not made, it is interesting to see what kind of justifica-
tion is provided for looking at comparative material. Especially the justification for
taking these materials into account is a controversial topic and the question is whether
the theoretical debate on the justification of comparative interpretation is reflected
in the case law.
Another aspect that warrants attention is the search for a consensus. The ECtHR
is known for relying on this particular form of comparative interpretation, but its use
remains somewhat of an enigma. One of the questions raised by the theoretical analysis
is whether there is any methodology to be discovered in the case law as to when and
how to use the consensus method or whether the reference to the existence of a
consensus is really as case-based as is assumed in the academic analysis.
These are, however, not the only topics to be discussed. The aim of this chapter
is to present a comprehensive overview of comparative interpretation in the case law
of the ECtHR. Therefore section 10.1 will discuss the meaning of comparative inter-
pretation, which it has according to the ECtHR in the cases under study. Subsequently,
section 10.2 will discuss when this method is used. The justifications for relying on
comparative interpretation will be discussed in section 10.3. An important aspect is
how comparative interpretation is used and what kinds of materials are referred to,
which will be addressed in section 10.4. Finally, section 10.5 will discuss the relation
between comparative interpretation and the other interpretative methods and principles
discussed in this thesis.
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10.1 WHAT IS COMPARATIVE INTERPRETATION ACCORDING TO THE ECTHR?
The notion ‘comparative method’ might seem rather straightforward, but it does
warrant some explanation in order to understand the scope of the discussion on this
method. In the theoretical chapter on comparative interpretation this issue has been
addressed as well,1 but it is important to revisit this question and look at it from the
perspective of the Court. The understanding of different concepts in the literature
might not always coincide with the understanding by the Court itself. For a full
understanding of the reasoning of the Court it is crucial to try to distil the Court’s
answer to the question what it considers comparative interpretation to be. A complete
answer to this question can only be given at the end of this chapter, but a short
discussion of some elements can serve as a useful introduction.
In the case law analyzed in this thesis, the Court hardly ever expressly employs the
terms ‘comparativemethod’, ‘comparative reasoning’ or ‘comparative interpretation’.2
The Court seems to prefer to refer to elements that indicate a comparative approach
over explicitly labelling the method it is using. The Court thus in its reasoning makes
mention of international treaties, national laws etc., without necessarily explicitly
qualifying this as comparative reasoning.
Only on rare occasions, such as in the Grand Chamber judgment in Demir and
Baykara, does the Court extensively discuss its use of the comparative method. For
other interpretation methods such a methodological account is very rare as well.3
Due to the significance of the Demir and Baykara case for this chapter, it may be
useful to present some background information on the case itself. The case arose out
of a complaint that the applicants as civil servants were denied sufficient protection
under Article 11 of the Convention.4 In its judgment the Chamber heavily relied on
some provisions of the European Social Charter, which had not been ratified by
1 See section 6.1.1.
2 Only the term comparative interpretation’ has been found once in a partly dissenting opinion by
judge Thór Vilhjálmsson in ECtHR,Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, SeriesANo. 31.
3 Most famous example is ECtHR,Golder v United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A
No. 18.
4 The Demir & Baykara-case concerned a union for civil servants that had concluded a collective
agreement with a local government. The local government, however, failed to meet its obligations
under the collective agreement. The union went to court to try to enforce the collective agreement.
The Court of Cassation finally determined that civil servants did not have a right to form a union
and as a result they did not have the power to conclude legally binding collective agreements. The
union complained in Strasbourg about a violation of their rights under Article 11 ECHR. ECtHR
(GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished.
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Turkey.5 Before the Grand Chamber Turkey objected to this practice of interpreting
the Convention on the basis of instruments that the respondent government had not
ratified, Turkey considered that the Court could not ‘by means of an interpretation
of the Convention, ... create for Contracting States new obligations that were not
provided for in the Convention’.6 The Grand Chamber elaborately responded to this
‘invitation’ of the Turkish government and, before deciding on the merits of the case,
it dealt with the methodological aspects of the case. The ECtHR did not in so many
words mention ‘comparative interpretation’, but it referred to the method as ‘interpreta-
tion in light of international texts and instruments’. The Court in this case unanimously
articulated its understanding of the comparative method as follows:
The Court, in defining the meaning of terms and notions in the text of the Convention, can
and must take into account elements of international law other than the Convention, the
interpretation of such elements by competent organs, and the practice of European States
reflecting their common values. The consensus emerging from specialized international
instruments and from the practice of contracting States may constitute a relevant consideration
for the Court when it interprets the provisions of the Convention in specific cases.7
This probably comes closest to a definition of the comparative method in the entire
case law of the Court. Most importantly for the question what the method entails,
one can discern in the quoted considerations that, according to the Court, the comparat-
ive method encompasses the use of all non-Convention material.8 An interpretation
based on Council of Europe material is therefore in the eyes of the Court an expression
of the comparative method as well. Furthermore, the unanimous decision shows that
the use and application of this method is far from contested within the Court. Indeed,
it is a well-accepted form of reasoning. While this observation may not be very helpful
towards a full understanding of the meaning of this method, it is an important aspect
to keep in mind.
In Demir and Baykara, the ECtHR ultimately concluded that in order to find the
consensus referred to in the citation above, it was not necessary that the respondent
State had ratified all the relevant instruments. ‘A continuous evolution in norms and
principles applied in international law’9 or a common ground in the Member States
of the Council of Europe appears to provide a sufficient basis for the Court to give
a novel interpretation to one of the terms contained in the Convention.
5 ECtHR, Demir & Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 21 November 2006, unpublished, § 35; ECtHR
(GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished, § 53-54.
6 ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished, § 54.
7 ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished, § 85.
8 ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X, the ECtHR
also made this clear in a more indirect manner.
9 ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished, § 86.
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Even though the case provides some clarity on certain aspects of the comparative
method, it also raises many questions as well as leaving certain matters open for
discussion. An analysis of the use of this method in the Court’s case law is therefore
still warranted.
10.2 WHEN IS IT USED IN THE COURT’S REASONING?
In contrast with, for example, teleological interpretation or textual interpretation, the
comparative method is not solely a method of interpretation. Its use is wider than
purely for determining the scope of a particular right, because the method is also
sometimes used for determining the margin of appreciation. This makes the method
more difficult to grasp, because it is more complicated to draw conclusions on the
basis of the diffuse application of this method. The focus of this chapter is on the
comparative method as a method of interpretation, but it is necessary to at least briefly
discuss some examples of the other roles of the comparative method in order to
demarcate the scope of comparative interpretation. This distinction between the various
functions of the comparative method is often underexposed, but it is relevant when
assessing whether there are any shortcomings in the current use of this method by
the Court as a method of interpretation. The following section will therefore first
analyze comparative interpretation in the interpretative phase and the different func-
tions that comparative interpretation has in that context. Subsequently, some examples
of the comparative method in the application phase will be discussed. The final aspect
that will be discussed in this section is the question whether the Court relies on
comparative interpretation in specific types of cases or whether it uses this method
randomly.
10.2.1 Comparative method in the interpretation phase
There are many ways in which the Court relies on the comparative method in the
interpretative phase, which complicates categorizing the different roles of the comparat-
ive method. The division discussed below is a reflection of the trends that can be
found in the case law. It is not a strict division into categories and there might be
cases that do not fit neatly into the categories. However, the fact that those cases might
be found does not defeat the usefulness of the categories drawn up here as they are
mainly meant to reflect general trends and cannot be tailored to fit every case. The
discussion in this section will be structured along the lines of the main functions of
comparative interpretation. Within these broad categories there might be differences
with regard to the role of comparative interpretation in a specific case.
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10.2.1.1 Comparative interpretation used for ‘regular’ interpretative problems
The first category of cases is those where comparative arguments are employed in
cases where the Court is simply presented with an interpretative question that has
not been conclusively answered in earlier cases. The Court in these cases invoked
comparative arguments either on their own or along with arguments based on other
interpretation methods.
In the case of Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson the Court used a comparative argument
to interpret the scope of Article 11 of the Convention.10 The case, which has already
been discussed in relation to teleological interpretation in section 9.1.3, concerned
the compulsory membership of a professional association, raising the question whether
Article 11 encompassed a negative right not to join an association. This question had
not yet been decisively answered by the Court and needed to be addressed in order
to understand the exact meaning of Article 11. The government relied on the travaux
préparatoires which showed that an explicit reference to a negative right not to join
an association had been deliberately left out of the text of Article 11 of the Conven-
tion.11 The Court recalled that the precedent12 invoked by the Icelandic government
took the travaux préparatoires into account, but the precedent did not attach decisive
importance to these travaux préparatoires. The ECtHR subsequently discussed the
situation in Member States of the Council of Europe and at the international level.
Compulsory membership of this nature, which, it may be recalled, concerned a private-law
association, does not exist under the laws of the great majority of the Contracting States.
On the contrary, a large number of domestic systems contain safeguards which, in one way
or another, guarantee the negative aspect of the freedom of association, that is the freedom
not to join or to withdraw from an association.
10 ECtHR, Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A No. 264, § 35.
In the case of ECtHR, Johnston and others v. Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A
No. 112 the Court made use of the comparative method in a similar fashion. One of the questions
the Court was presented with was whether Article 8 required states to ensure that illegitimate children
were placed in a similar social and legal position to legitimate children. The main argument for the
Court to conclude that the states were under such a positive obligation was the fact that the Preamble
to the European Convention on the Legal Status of Children born out of Wedlock provided that:
In a great number of member States of the Council of Europe efforts have been, or are being, made
to improve the legal status of children born out of wedlock by reducing the differences between their
legal status and that of children born in wedlock which are to the legal and social disadvantage of
the former.’ (§ 74) The Court emphasized the importance of these changes to the legal status of
illegitimate children in the Member States by adding that it could not but be influenced by these
developments’. (§ 74)
11 ECtHR, Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A No. 264, § 33.
12 ECtHR, Young James and Webster v. United Kingdom, judgment of 13 August 1981, SeriesANo. 44.
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A growing measure of common ground has emerged in this area also at the international
level.13
After this discussion on the situation in the Contracting States and at an international
level, the Court concluded that the Convention had to be interpreted in light of present-
day conditions. Thus it found that Article 11 also entailed a negative right of asso-
ciation.14 One of the judges, Judge Thór Vilhjálmsson, did not agree with this
outcome and claimed that Article 11 could not be construed to conclude a negative
right to association.15 He took a different approach by emphasizing the difference
in nature between the negative and positive freedom of association. Unfortunately,
he did not address or comment on the use of the comparative method in this case.
Another example of the Court’s reliance on comparative arguments in order to
underpin a new approach is the case of Zolotukhin v. Russia.16 In this case the Court
was forced to explain the meaning of the term ‘ne bis in idem’ contained in Article
4 Protocol 7 (the right not be tried twice for the same offence). In previous cases
three different approaches had been developed. Depending on which precedent was
followed, the notion of ‘idem’ could either refer to the same facts, to the same legal
qualification or to the fact that essential elements had to be the same.17 The Grand
Chamber found that these different approaches led to legal uncertainty, which ran
counter to the aim of Article 4 Protocol 7 and therefore a ‘harmonized interpretation’
had to be adopted.18 In order to find this harmonized interpretation the Court looked
at decisions of other international courts. After discussing the variety of ways the
right is formulated in different international instruments, the Court invoked a specific
reference to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in which they addressed the same question. Both
courts held that ‘idem’ referred to ‘the identity of the material acts’ and not the legal
classification of those acts.19 This approach is favourable to the perpetrator in the
sense that it provides more legal certainty. The ECtHR subsequently held that a more
restrictive approach was not necessary under the text of Article 4 Protocol 7 and
concluded that ‘idem’ must be understood to refer to the same or substantially the
13 ECtHR, Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A No. 264, § 35.
14 ECtHR, Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A No. 264, § 35.
15 ECtHR, Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, SeriesANo. 264, dissenting
opinion by Thór Vilhjálmsson.
16 ECtHR (GC), Zolotukhin v. Russia, judgment of 10 February 2009, unpublished. For other recent
examples see, among others, ECtHR, Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, judgment of 7 January 2010,
unpublished; ECtHR, M.C. v. Bulgaria, judgment of 4 December 2003, Reports 2003-XII.
17 ECtHR (GC), Zolotukhin v. Russia, judgment of 10 February 2009, unpublished, § 70-77.
18 ECtHR (GC), Zolotukhin v. Russia, judgment of 10 February 2009, unpublished, § 78.
19 ECtHR (GC), Zolotukhin v. Russia, judgment of 10 February 2009, unpublished, § 79 referring back
to § 37 and § 40.
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same facts. The interpretative choice of the ECtHR in this case was clearly based
on the approach of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Inter-American
Court of Justice.
In the case ofDemir & Baykara the Court did not only address the methodological
aspects of the comparative method, but it also made extensive use of it in its reasoning
on the merits of the case. One of the matters put before the Court was whether civil
servants could invoke the protection guaranteed by Article 11 of the Convention.20
The Grand Chamber argued that exceptions to the freedom of association had to be
narrowly construed and that civil servants could not be excluded per se from the
protection of Article 11. It supported this conclusion by reference to, among others,
European practice and it concluded that ‘the right of public servants to join trade
unions is now recognized by all Contracting States’.21 Even though the Court here
did not literally mention the existence of a consensus, the fact that all Contracting
States adopted the same approach strongly indicated that there was a consensus.22
In the case of James and Others23 the Court used the lack of a consensus or
common principle to argue against a too narrow understanding of the exceptions to
the right to property. The applicant argued that Article 1 of the First Protocol only
allowed for deprivation of property if the property was taken for a public purpose,
consequently compulsory transfer of property between private parties was not justified
by this provision.24 The Court did not agree and explained that the text of the Con-
vention did not warrant such a narrow interpretation of the exceptions right to property.
Moreover, the Court emphasized that ‘no common principle can be identified in the
constitutions, legislation and case-law of the Contracting States that would warrant
understanding the notion of public interest as outlawing compulsory transfer between
private parties’.25 Therefore it held that the fact that property was compulsorily
transferred between private parties was not per se against the public purpose exception
in Article 1 Protocol 1.
These examples show that the interpretative problem can concern a vital aspect
of the provision in question, like in the Zolotukhin case, or only a term that is less
20 ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished, § 96.
21 ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished, § 106.
22 In Loizidou the Court did not literally speak of a consensus either but concluded that there was uniform
and consistent state practice which supported the argument the Court was trying to make. ECtHR,
Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A No. 310, § 80
and 82.
23 ECtHR, James and others v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A No. 98.
24 Article 1 First Protocol provides: Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment
of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject
to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law... (emphasis
added)’.
25 ECtHR, James and others v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A No. 98, § 40.
229
Chapter 10
often invoked, like in the Demir & Baykara case. In all these situations comparative
arguments play a role in the final interpretative outcome.
10.2.1.2 Comparative interpretation used to adopt a new interpretation different from
the former interpretation
There is also a category of cases where the Court is faced with an interpretative
problem that has been addressed before, but where the current interpretation is chal-
lenged on the basis of comparative arguments. Comparative arguments in such cases
can perform two functions. Either comparative arguments provide a substantial basis
for a new interpretation or comparative arguments can be used to argue only that a
new approach is necessary. In the latter function comparative arguments do not
necessarily play a role in determining the new approach to be taken, but only serve
as proof that a new approach is warranted. Examples of both functions will be dis-
cussed in this section, starting first with the category of cases where comparative
arguments are used to justify overruling a (often well-established) precedent.
A clear example of comparative arguments that lead to the overruling of a
precedent is the case of Micallef.26 In this case the ECtHR was presented with the
question whether injunction proceedings were protected by Article 6 of the Conven-
tion. Until this case was placed before the Court, it had always concluded that in-
junction proceedings were not covered by Article 6. In Micallef, however, the Court
considered that:
there is widespread consensus amongst Council of Europe member States, which either
implicitly or explicitly provide for the applicability of Article 6 guarantees to interim measures,
including injunction proceedings ... Similarly, as can be seen from its case-law ... , the Court
of Justice of the European Communities (“CJEU”) considers that provisional measures must
be subject to the guarantees of a fair trial, particularly to the right to be heard.27
The widespread consensus and the approach taken by the CJEU clearly provided one
of the reasons for the ECtHR to adopt a new approach towards the applicability of
Article 6 in injunction proceedings. The criteria set out in the new approach were,
however, not justified by a direct reference to the comparative arguments. In this case
the comparative arguments thus clearly served to indicate that a new approach was
justified in the light of the developments in the Contracting States and in other
European organizations, like the EU. In other cases, like Demir & Baykara28 and
26 See for an unsuccessful attempt ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports
2001-VII.
27 ECtHR (GC), Micallef v. Malta, judgment of 15 October 2009, unpublished, § 78.
28 ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished.
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Mamatkulov,29 comparative arguments served both as a reason for the Court to adopt
a new approach, but comparative arguments also served as a substantial argument
to justify the content of the new approach.30
In many cases the Court did not explicitly overrule its previous approach, but it
adopted a new interpretation based (in part) on comparative arguments, which is the
second and most important function of comparative interpretation in this category.
The most famous example of adopting a new interpretation on the basis of comparative
arguments is presented by the so-called transsexuality cases.31 Given the exemplary
character of these cases, the whole line of case law will be discussed here. Over a
period of 16 years the Court received several applications on the same subject matter,
namely whether states could be obliged to ensure legal recognition of the gender
change of transsexuals. The question was whether such a positive obligation could
be inferred from Article 8 of the Convention. In Rees the Court was confronted with
the issue for the first time.32 The Court rejected the comparative argument of the
applicant and the Commission in favour of finding such a positive obligation and
simply claimed that it was not persuaded.33 After concluding that no violation of
Article 8 could be found, the Court ended by stating that the ‘need for appropriate
legal measures should be kept under review having regard particularly to scientific
and societal developments’.34 In the subsequent case dealing with this matter,
Cossey,35 the Court indeed addressed these developments in the following manner:
There have been certain developments since 1986 in the law of some member States of the
Council of Europe. However, the reports accompanying the resolution adopted by the European
Parliament on 12 September 1989 ... and Recommendation 1117 (1989) adopted by the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 29 September 1989 – both of which
seek to encourage harmonization of laws and practices in this field- reveal, as the Government
29 ECtHR (GC), Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I.
30 See also ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A No. 31; ECtHR (GC),
Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI; ECtHR (GC),
Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2), judgment of 17 September 2009, unpublished.
31 ECtHR, Rees v. United Kingdom, judgment of 17 October 1986, Series A No. 106; ECtHR, Cossey
v. United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1990, SeriesANo. 184; ECtHR, Sheffield &Horsham
v. United Kingdom, judgment of 30 July 1998, Reports 1998-V; ECtHR (GC), Christine Goodwin
v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI; ECtHR (GC), I v. United Kingdom,
judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI. ECtHR, B. v. France, judgment of 25 March 1993,
Series A No. 232-C, is one of the transsexual cases as well but this case was decided on different
grounds and the comparative method did not play an important role.
32 ECtHR, Rees v. United Kingdom, judgment of 17 October 1986, Series A No. 106.
33 ECtHR, Rees v. United Kingdom, judgment of 17 October 1986, Series A No. 106, § 41-42.
34 ECtHR, Rees v. United Kingdom, judgment of 17 October 1986, Series A No. 106, § 47.
35 ECtHR, Cossey v. United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A No. 184.
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pointed out, the same diversity of practice as obtained at the time of the Rees judgment.
Accordingly this is still, having regard to the existence of little common ground between
Contracting States, an area in which they enjoy a wide margin of appreciation.36
It thus concluded that not enough had changed to allow it to find a different conclusion
on the existence of a positive obligation, but again it stressed that the issue should
be kept under review.37 The dissenters all claimed that the developments had been
sufficient to justify a different conclusion than in Rees and that some consensus could
now be found.38
The story continued in Sheffield and Horsham where the Court again took note
of the developments that had taken place since the earlier judgments. The Court was
less definite in dismissing the comparative argument, but it did not yet consider the
time to be ripe to adopt a different approach:
As to legal developments in this area, the Court has examined the comparative study which
has been submitted by Liberty. However, the Court is not fully satisfied that the legislative
trends outlined by the amicus suffice to establish the existence of any common European
approach to the problems created by the recognition in law of post-operative gender status.39
Thus, according to the majority of the Court there was still no consensus, yet again
the dissenters argued the opposite and claimed that there was sufficient consensus
to establish a positive obligation.40
The Grand Chamber in the case of Christine Goodwin41 finally put an end to
the story and confirmed the existence of the long awaited positive obligation. The
Court still concluded that there was no common European approach, but that was
attributed to the number of Contracting States.42 Contrary to what the Court did in
the previous cases, it took into account the developments that took place outside
36 ECtHR, Cossey v. United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A No. 184. § 40
37 ECtHR, Cossey v. United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A No. 184, § 32.
38 See the dissenting opinion in ECtHR, Cossey v. United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1990,
Series A No. 184 by Martens and the joint dissenting opinion by Palm, Foighel and Pekkanen.
39 ECtHR, Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom, judgment of 30 July 1998, Reports 1998-V, § 57.
40 See the joint partly dissenting opinion in ECtHR, Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom, judgment
of 30 July 1998, Reports 1998-V by Bernhardt, Thór Vilhjálmsson, Spielmann, Palm, Wildhaber,
Makarczyk, Voicu and dissenting opinion by Casadevall.
41 ECtHR (GC), Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI;
ECtHR (GC), I v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI is similar, decided
on the same date, but Christine Goodwin has become the landmark judgment.
42 ECtHR (GC), Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI,
§ 85: While this would remain the case, the lack of such a common approach among forty-three
Contracting States with widely diverse legal systems and traditions is hardly surprising.’
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Europe and concluded that an international trend existed in favour of legal recognition
of gender change.43
This line of cases provides an interesting example of the reliance of the Court
on comparative material in order to adopt a new approach. Many more aspects of
the Court’s use of this method in these cases can be analyzed, but that will be done
in different parts of this chapter.
In other cases the ECtHR has also referred to comparative arguments, either to
support or to argue against taking a new approach. In the case of Schalk & Kopf,
for example, the applicants argued that Article 12 of the Convention had to be inter-
preted in an evolutive manner and should now be considered to include a right to
same-sex marriage as well.44 The ECtHR did not agree and held that there was no
consensus on same-sex marriage in Europe:
Although, as it noted in Christine Goodwin, the institution of marriage has undergone major
social changes since the adoption of the Convention, the Court notes that there is no European
consensus regarding same-sex marriage. At present no more than six out of forty-seven
Convention States allow same-sex marriages.45
The Court thus found that the comparative argument in this case did not provide
sufficient support for a new interpretation, neither did other interpretation methods
provide for a justification for a new interpretation of Article 12.
As can be seen from the examples provided above, it is mainly in this category
of cases that comparative arguments are strongly linked with an evolutive approach
to the Convention, either to explicitly accept or explicitly reject an evolutive approach.
10.2.1.3 Comparative interpretation used to argue that the Court should not adopt
a specific interpretation
An interesting set of cases are those where comparative arguments are used to indicate
that the issue is not ripe for interpretation by the Court. The most famous example
is Vo46 where the Court had to decide whether the term ‘everyone’ in Article 2 of
the Convention also covered an embryo or a foetus. The Court resorted to comparative
interpretation and concluded that there existed no European consensus as to the
question when life begins. The only common ground that could be found was that
a foetus belonged to the human race. Due to this lack of consensus the Court did
43 ECtHR (GC), Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI,
§ 85.
44 ECtHR, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, judgment of 24 June 2010, unpublished, § 57.
45 ECtHR, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, judgment of 24 June 2010, unpublished, § 58.
46 ECtHR (GC), Vo v. France, judgment of 8 July 2004, Reports 2004-VIII.
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not feel competent to decide the abstract question on the status of a foetus and granted
the Contracting States a margin of appreciation on the question when life begins.47
Here the Court, oddly enough, invoked the margin of appreciation in the interpretation
phase, whereas this doctrine normally only plays a role in respect to the justification
of an interference, i.e. in the phase of application.48 The exceptionally controversial
nature of the case seems to have led the Court to an equally exceptional approach,
whereby the comparative arguments are used as an indicator whether it is ‘safe’ to
pronounce itself on the issue.
The case of Vo is, however, not the only case in which this approach has been
taken. In Kimlya the Court adopted a similar approach.49 The Court was presented
with the question whether Scientology could be considered a religion in the sense
of Article 9 of the Convention. The Court held that ‘in the absence of any European
consensus on the religious nature of Scientology teachings, and being sensitive to
the subsidiary nature of its role, the Court considers that it must rely on the position
of the domestic authorities in the matter and determine the applicability of Article 9
of the Convention accordingly’.50 Again the Court used comparative arguments to
indicate that it did not feel competent to answer an abstract question related to the
scope of Convention provision and deferred to the Russian authorities. Their actions
indicated that the Russian authorities believed that Scientology was a religion.51
An interesting difference between these two cases is the extent of the proof of
the existence of a consensus. The question what kind of proof the Court uses to
substantiate its comparative arguments will be discussed in section 10.4. It can,
however, already be noted here that in the case of Vo the Court indeed made an effort
to show that there was no consensus. In the case of Kimlya on the other hand, the
Court did not go beyond the above quoted statement, namely that there was no
consensus. Initially the Court did provide some proof that matters were controversial
throughout Europe by making the following remark:
Many European countries, including Belgium, France, Germany and the United Kingdom,
have refused to grant Scientology religious recognition, whereas such recognition has been
obtained through the courts in other States, such as Spain and Portugal.
47 ECtHR (GC), Vo v. France, judgment of 8 July 2004, Reports 2004-VIII, § 82 and 85.
48 Gerards & Senden (2009).
49 ECtHR, Kimlya and others v. Russia, judgment of 1 October 2009, unpublished, § 79.
50 ECtHR, Kimlya and others v. Russia, judgment of 1 October 2009, unpublished, § 79.
51 ECtHR, Kimlya and others v. Russia, judgment of 1 October 2009, unpublished, § 80-81.
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Two months after the original judgment this sentence has been deleted (‘rectified’)
by the Registry in accordance with Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.52 Rule 81 allows
for errors to be corrected, but one might wonder whether that also applies to deleting
parts of a justification, which does not seem to be obviously wrong. On the contrary,
deleting the sentence has diminished the force of the argument made by the Court.
Therefore one may wonder what was behind the decision to delete the sentence, but
that is not really relevant for the purposes of this section, being to show that the
comparative arguments used by the Court need not be very convincing in order for
the Court not to feel competent to adopt a position.
10.2.1.4 Comparative interpretation to show textual difference
A different comparative argument is presented by cases where the Court relies on
foreign material to emphasize the textual difference with the European Convention.
In these cases the Court seems to want to corroborate a textual argument that a certain
aspect is not included in the text of a Convention provision by indicating that it is
explicitly included in the text of other, similar, treaties or conventions. In Burghartz,53
for example, the Court had to determine whether a complaint on a refusal to change
the family name was applicable under Article 8 of the Convention. In addressing that
question the Court emphasized that:
Unlike some other international instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Article 24 para. 2), the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 Novem-
ber 1989 (Articles 7 and 8) or the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 18), Article
8 of the Convention does not contain any explicit provision on names.54
The fact that these treaties did include an explicit provision on names strengthened
the ECtHR’s argument that it could not be held to be automatically included in the
text of the Convention. This does not, however, mean that a certain right or obligation
cannot be read into the Convention, it just entails that such an argument should rest
on a different basis. In Soering the Court made that point abundantly clear by stating
that:
52 Rule 81 (Rectification of errors in decisions and judgments): Without prejudice to the provisions
on revision of judgments and on restoration to the list of applications, the Court may, of its own
motion or at the request of a party made within one month of the delivery of a decision or a judgment,
rectify clerical errors, errors in calculation or obvious mistakes.
53 ECtHR, Burghartz v. Switzerland, judgment of 22 February 1992, Series A No. 280-B.
54 ECtHR, Burghartz v. Switzerland, judgment of 22 February 1992, Series A No. 280-B, § 24. Similar




[T]he fact that a specialized treaty should spell out in detail a specific obligation attaching
to the prohibition of torture does not mean that an essentially similar obligation is not already
inherent in the general terms of Article 3 of the European Convention.55
The Court subsequently relied on the ‘spirit and intendment’56 of the provision to
vindicate the inherent obligation.
A similar argument was adopted in the case of Cruz Varas in which the Court
had to decide whether a state could be held accountable for not respecting an interim
measure imposed by the then Commission. The text of the Convention did not contain
a reference to interim measures, but the measure was based on the Rules of Procedure
of the former Commission. The Court indicated the limits of the Convention by
pointing to other treaties that did contain a clause on interim measures:
While this approach argues in favor of a power of the Commission and Court to order interim
measures to preserve the rights of parties in pending proceedings, the Court cannot but note
that unlike other international treaties or instruments the Convention does not contain a specific
provision with regard to such measures (see, inter alia, Article 41 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice; Article 63 of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights;
Articles 185 and 186 of the 1957 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community).57
The Court seems to have referred to comparative arguments to provide extra force
to the argument that the Convention does not contain a provision on interim measures
by pointing to the fact that other treaties have addressed the matter. Subsequently
the ECtHR addressed the question whether an obligation to respect interim measures
could be inferred from the obligation for Contracting States under then Article 25
of the Convention not to hinder the effectiveness of an individual’s rights to petition
(presently Article 34).58 The Court finally concluded that this was not the case.
The comparative arguments in this category of cases thus do not support a specific
interpretation, but they do strengthen the ECtHR’s argument that certain rights were
not originally included in the Convention. The Court does not make clear in these
cases, however, why it calls upon additional support from similar treaties when the
text of the Convention alone already offers a strong indication that a certain obligation
or right is not included. The obvious explanation is that the Court apparently does
not consider the text to be evident and therefore seeks additional support. Whether
that is the whole answer is, however, difficult to tell from the cases.
55 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161, § 88.
56 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161, § 88.
57 ECtHR, Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, judgment of 20 March 1991, Series A No. 201, § 94.
58 ECtHR, Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, judgment of 20 March 1991, Series A No. 201, § 97.
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10.2.2 Comparative method in the application phase
It has already been explained at the beginning of this section that comparative argu-
ments do not only play a role in the interpretation phase of a judgment.59 The focus
of this thesis is the interpretation phase, but in order to get a better understanding
of the role of comparative arguments, this section will briefly address some examples
of its use in the application phase.
In the case of Evans the Court had to deal with a conflict between the rights of
two individuals. In connection with her treatment for cancer, Ms. Evans had to have
her ovaries removed, but the growth of the cancer did allow for time to remove some
eggs from Ms. Evans so that she could still have her own biological child once her
ovaries were removed. Due to the cancer she would have to wait two years before
having the embryos planted back into her uterus, so the eggs would have to be stored.
She was advised against freezing her unfertilized eggs, because this had a lower chance
of success and was not performed at the clinic she attended. She therefore agreed
to have her eggs fertilized with the sperm of her then partner J, whom also consented
to have the created embryos stored for a period of a maximum of 10 years. Half a
year later the relationship broke down and J wanted to have the embryos destroyed.
In accordance with the law both partners had to consent to storing the embryos and
this consent could be withdrawn at any time by one of the partners. Ms. Evans (the
applicant) argued that destroying the embryos would violate her right to become a
biological parent under Article 8 of the Convention, while there is also the right of
J not to become a biological parent against his will. The ECtHR argued that the right
to respect for the decision to become or not become a parent is covered by Article 8
of the Convention. In order to determine whether the English legislation that ordered
the destruction of the embryos if one of the partners withdrew his or her consent,
violated the Convention the Court first addressed the extent of the margin of ap-
preciation for the Contracting States. This is where the Court invoked comparative
arguments. The Court held that:
Where, however, there is no consensus within the Member States of the Council of Europe,
either as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to the best means of protecting
it, particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues, the margin will be wider
...
59 This has been explicitly acknowledged by Judge Finlay Geoghegan in her concurring opinion in
ECtHR (GC), A, B and C v. Ireland, judgment of 16 December 2011, unpublished. This judgment,




In addition, while the Court is mindful of the applicant’s submission to treat the comparative
law data with caution, it is at least clear, and the applicant does not contend otherwise, that
there is no uniform European approach in this field. Certain States have enacted primary or
secondary legislation to control the use of IVF treatment, whereas in others this is a matter
left to medical practice and guidelines. While the United Kingdom is not alone in permitting
storage of embryos and in providing both gamete providers with the power freely and effect-
ively to withdraw consent up until the moment of implantation, different rules and practices
are applied elsewhere in Europe. It cannot be said that there is any consensus as to the stage
in IVF treatment when the gamete providers’ consent becomes irrevocable ...
While the applicant contends that her greater physical and emotional expenditure during the
IVF process, and her subsequent infertility, entail that her Article 8 rights should take preced-
ence over J’s, it does not appear to the Court that there is any clear consensus on this point
either. The Court of Appeal commented on the difficulty of comparing the effect on J of
being forced to become the father of the applicant’s child and that on the applicant of being
denied the chance to have genetically-related offspring ..., and this difficulty is also reflected
in the range of views expressed by the two panels of the Israeli Supreme Court in Nachmani
and in the United States case-law ...
In conclusion, therefore, since the use of IVF treatment gives rise to sensitive moral and ethical
issues against a background of fast-moving medical and scientific developments, and since
the questions raised by the case touch on areas where there is no clear common ground
amongst the Member States, the Court considers that the margin of appreciation to be afforded
to the respondent State must be a wide one ... .60
The lengthy quotation from this judgment indicates that the comparative arguments
disclosed a clear lack of consensus on the specific issue, as a result of which the
Contracting States were granted a wide margin of appreciation. The case of Dickson
showed a similar approach, whereby the existence of a consensus determined the extent
of the margin of appreciation.61
A different role for comparative arguments in relation to the examination of a
justification for an interference can be seen in the case of Yumak and Sadak.62 The
electoral threshold for parliamentary elections in Turkey was 10%. The applicants
in the case complained that this threshold interfered with the free expression of the
opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature and relied on Article 3 of
60 ECtHR (GC), Evans v. United Kingdom, judgment of 10 April 2007, unpublished, § 77-81.
61 ECtHR (GC), Dickson v. United Kingdom, judgment of 4 December 2007, unpublished. See also
ECtHR (GC), A, B and C v. Ireland, judgment of 16 December 2011, unpublished. In this judgment
on abortion issues, the Grand Chamber invoked a reference to the existence of a consensus in a
discussion on the extent of the margin of appreciation. In this case the existence of a strong consensus
did not limit the margin of appreciation according to the majority of the Grand Chamber. A number
of dissenting judges commented on this conclusion by the Grand Chamber.
62 ECtHR (GC), Yumak & Sadak v. Turkey, judgment of 8 July 2008, unpublished.
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Protocol 1. The Court indicated that Contracting States have a large margin of appreci-
ation in designing their own electoral system, but the question was whether this
threshold was proportionate. In order to answer that question the Court invoked
references to other European systems.
The Court observes that electoral thresholds are not unknown among European electoral
systems and that there are different kinds which vary according to the type of election and
the context within which they are used. Analysis of the electoral thresholds adopted in the
member States shows that, apart from Turkey, only three States have opted for high thresholds.
Liechtenstein has fixed the level at 8%, and the Russian Federation and Georgia at 7%. A
third of the States impose a 5% threshold and 13 of them have chosen a lower figure. The
other States which have a proportional representation system do not use thresholds. Thresholds
also vary according to whether they apply to a party or a coalition, and some countries have
adopted thresholds for independent candidates... .63
The large variety of situations provided for in the electoral legislation of the member States
of the Council of Europe shows the diversity of the possible options. It also shows that the
Court cannot assess any particular threshold without taking into account the electoral system
of which it forms a part, although the Court can agree with the applicants’ contention that
an electoral threshold of about 5% corresponds more closely to the member States’ common
practice. However, it has already been pointed out that any electoral legislation must be
assessed in the light of the political evolution of the country concerned, so that features that
would be unacceptable in the context of one system may be justified in the context of another,
at least so long as the chosen system provides for conditions which will ensure the “free
expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature” ... That is why the
Court must now assess the effects of the correctives and other safeguards with which the
impugned system is attended.64
The Court thus used comparative arguments to assess whether the threshold was
exceptional, which it was. For that reason, it found it necessary to take a close look
at the correctives and safeguards provided by the Turkish system. The Court finally
concluded that the threshold was indeed excessively high, but given the political
context and the safeguards provided there was no violation of Article 3 Protocol 1.
These examples show that comparative arguments can play an important role in
the application phase. They also make clear that the aim of the use of these arguments
in this phase is quite a different one than in the phase of interpretation. In relation
to the examination of a justification, comparative arguments are either used as a basis
for determining the intensity of review, or in connection with the test of pro-
portionality.
63 ECtHR (GC), Yumak & Sadak v. Turkey, judgment of 8 July 2008, unpublished, § 129.
64 ECtHR (GC), Yumak & Sadak v. Turkey, judgment of 8 July 2008, unpublished, § 132.
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10.2.3 Specific type of cases?
The question as to when the Court uses comparative interpretation can also be looked
at from a different angle, namely whether the Court has used this method mainly in
specific types of cases. The examples discussed above already indicate that the Court
uses the method in a wide variety of cases. The method has been invoked to interpret
various Convention rights: the right to life,65 the prohibition of torture,66 prohibition
of forced labour,67 right to liberty,68 right to a fair trial,69 right to respect for pri-
vate and family life,70 freedom of expression,71 freedom of assembly and associ-
ation,72 right to marry73 and some procedural provisions of the Convention.74 No
clear line can be found in the case law as to when the Court considers it warranted
to invoke comparative arguments. That is, however, not a specific character of com-
parative interpretation; teleological interpretation is also invoked in many different
cases. Both are flexible methods and are therefore suitable to be applied in a broad
variety of cases without there necessarily being a coherent strategy behind the use
of such methods in specific cases. Furthermore, it also depends on the specific facts
and circumstances of each case whether the Court considers it appropriate or necessary
to resort to comparative interpretation.
Despite the fact that there is no clear trend in the use of the comparative method,
there is one provision that is often interpreted on the basis of comparative arguments,
namely Article 8, which protects the right to respect for private and family life. This
provision is overrepresented in the case law on comparative interpretation that has
been analyzed for the purposes of this thesis.75 The very broad character of this
65 ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 2 March 2010, unpublished.
66 ECtHR (GC), T v. United Kingdom, judgment of 16 December 1999, unpublished; ECtHR (GC),
Selmouni v. France, judgment of 28 July 1999, Reports 1999-V; ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom,
judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161
67 ECtHR, Van der Mussele v. Belgium, judgment of 23 November 1983, Series A No. 70.
68 ECtHR (GC), Saadi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 January 2008, unpublished.
69 ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII; ECtHR (GC),
Vilho Eskelinen and others v. Finland, judgment of 19 April 2007, unpublished.
70 Transsexual cases, but also ECtHR,M.C. v. Bulgaria, judgment of 4 December 2003, Reports 2003-
XII.
71 ECtHR (GC), Stoll v. Switzerland, judgment of 10 December 2007, unpublished.
72 ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished; ECtHR,
Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A No. 264
73 ECtHR, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, judgment of 24 June 2010, unpublished; ECtHR, Johnston and
others v. Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A No. 112.
74 ECtHR (GC), Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I.
75 See the transsexuals cases discussed in section 10.2.1.1. See also: ECtHR, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria,
judgment of 24 June 2010, unpublished; ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979,
Series A No. 31; ECtHR, M.C. v. Bulgaria, judgment of 4 December 2003, Reports 2003-XII.
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provision could be part of the explanation. The Court itself has not provided any
indication as to why it appreciates comparative arguments so much in the context
of Article 8.76 As a result only the tendency as such can be inferred from the cases.
10.2.4 Conclusion
This section aimed to show the different functions comparative arguments can have
in the case law of the ECtHR. Within the different categories discussed, the first two
are the most common. This means that comparative arguments are most often when
the Court wants to support a ‘regular’ interpretative solution or when the Court is
challenged to adopt a new approach that deviates from its former approach. In this
latter category the relation with evolutive interpretation plays an important role, which
will be addressed in Chapter 11 as well.
10.3 ANY JUSTIFICATION?
Many justifications can be adduced in favour of the use of comparative arguments
in judicial reasoning; they have been discussed in a general fashion in the theoretical
analysis (see section 6.1.4). Here, the question is pertinent whether the Court itself
has provided any justifications. Indeed, it has appeared from the case law analysis
that the Court in some cases has provided a general explanation why it considers
comparative arguments justifiable in interpreting the Convention.
Firstly, the Court has invoked the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to
account for either looking at the Contracting States or taking international material
into consideration.77 In Cruz Varas the Court explained that subsequent state practice
was an important factor that could be taken into account:
Subsequent practice could be taken as establishing the agreement of Contracting States
regarding the interpretation of a Convention provision [Court refers to Soering and the VCLT
76 The Court in Johnston did say that in comparison to Article 12, Article 8 did lend itself more to
an evolutive interpretation. Perhaps the wide use of the comparative method for interpreting Article
8 should be seen in this context. ECtHR, Johnston and others v. Ireland, judgment of 18 December
1986, Series A No. 112, § 57.
77 ECtHR, Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, judgment of 20 March 1991, Series A No. 201; ECtHR
(GC), Saadi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 January 2008, unpublished; ECtHR (GC), Banković
and others v. Belgium and others, decision of 12 December 2001, Reports 2001-VII; ECtHR (GC),
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I; ECtHR (GC),
Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished.
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art. 31(b)] but not to create new rights and obligations which were not included in the
Convention at the outset.78
The approach ultimately failed in this case, but that did not defeat the general state-
ment that subsequent state practice was a relevant consideration in the interpretation
process. While Cruz Varas provided an argument for relying on comparative material
from the Contracting States, however, it did not explain reliance on international
material. The Court provided a more express justification for reliance on international
material based on the Vienna Convention in Banković.79 When setting out the general
interpretative approach to the case, the Court observed that:
Moreover, Article 31 § 3 (c) indicates that account is to be taken of “any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties”. More generally, the Court
recalls that the principles underlying the Convention cannot be interpreted and applied in
a vacuum. The Court must also take into account any relevant rules of international law when
examining questions concerning its jurisdiction and, consequently, determine State responsibil-
ity in conformity with governing principles of international law, although it must remain
mindful of the Convention’s special character as a human rights treaty. The Convention should
be interpreted as far as possible in harmony with other principles of international law of which
it forms part.80
The Court thus did not only rely on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
to justify the use of comparative international material, but it also claimed that is has
to be mindful of the context in which the Court is operating.81 Or to put in the words
of the Court: it has to take into account ‘the international law background’.82 It is
important to note in the context of the distinction made between external and internal
comparative interpretation in the theoretical chapter that an additional justification
is provided for relying on external or international materials. This does not mean to
78 ECtHR, Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, judgment of 20 March 1991, Series A No. 201, § 100.
The general statement that subsequent state practice can be relevant has been reconfirmed by the
Court in general terms in ECtHR (GC), Banković and others v. Belgium and others, decision of 12
December 2001, Reports 2001-VII, § 56.
79 ECtHR (GC), Banković and others v. Belgium and others, decision of 12 December 2001, Reports
2001-VII, § 57.
80 ECtHR (GC), Banković and others v. Belgium and others, decision of 12 December 2001, Reports
2001-VII, § 57. A similar statement has been made in ECtHR (GC), Mamatkulov and Askarov v.
Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I, § 111.
81 Dissent in Saadi also confirms that Convention is not interpreted in a vacuum and that it applies
in conjunction with the other international fundamental rights protection instruments’. ECtHR (GC),
Saadi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 January 2008, unpublished, joint partly dissenting opinion
by Rozakis, Tulkens, Kovler, Hajiyev, Spielmann and Hirvelä.
82 ECtHR (GC), Saadi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 January 2008, unpublished, § 63; ECtHR
(GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished, § 76.
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say that the ECtHR expressly embraces this distinction, an issue that will be discussed
further in section 10.4.4, but it does indicate that it at least at some level realizes that
an additional justification might be necessary to justify relying on materials that are
further removed from the European Convention and the Council of Europe.
It can be doubtful, though, whether this combined explanation provides a justifica-
tion for reliance on all types of international materials. Article 31(c) of the VCLT
refers to international law in force between the parties. The question is whether this
provision can be interpreted in such a broad manner as to justify reference to any
type of international legal instrument. The provision rather seems to imply that in
interpreting the Convention the ECtHR needs to take account of obligations of
international law that rest upon the Contracting States.83 The ECtHR itself also seems
to adhere to this interpretation of the VCLT in other cases, like Bosphorus.84 In this
case Ireland had to obey its obligations under EU law, which the ECtHR considered
a legitimate goal to restrict property rights under the European Convention. The
ECtHR added that on the basis of Article 31(c) VCLT it had to respect relevant
international legal rules, which included the principle of pacta sunt servanda.85 This
interpretation makes it doubtful whether this provision or the reference to the inter-
national legal context is a sufficient justification for invoking references to, for
example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights or other international instruments
which are not applicable between the parties.
A different set of cases provides a more explicit justification for the function of the
comparative argument for the Court. In Polacek86 the applicants had relied on a
United Nations Human Rights Committee conclusion in their complaint. The Court
stressed that it was only competent to apply the European Convention, but added that
in interpreting the Convention ‘it may find it helpful to be guided by provisions of
other international legal instruments’.87 Similarly in Pellegrin the Court turned to
the CJEU for helpful guidance.88
83 Drooghenbroeck (2009), p. 811.
84 ECtHR (GC), Bosphorus HavaYollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim ªirketi v. Ireland, judgment of 30
June 2005, Reports 2005-VI.
85 ECtHR (GC), Bosphorus HavaYollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim ªirketi v. Ireland, judgment of 30
June 2005, Reports 2005-VI, § 150; similarly ECtHR (GC), Behrami & Behrami v. France, decision
of 2 May 2007, unpublished.
86 ECtHR (GC), Polacek & Polackova v. Czech Republic, decision of 10 July 2002, unpublished, § 45.
87 ECtHR (GC), Polacek & Polackova v. Czech Republic, decision of 10 July 2002, unpublished, § 45.
88 ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII, § 66. A similar
reference can be found in ECtHR (GC), Vilho Eskelinen and others v. Finland, judgment of 19 April
2007, unpublished, § 60.
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A final justification provided for looking at comparative material in the Contracting
States and at international level is based on the link between evolutive interpretation
and comparative interpretation. This link has already been mentioned above, when
discussing the different roles of comparative interpretation. Comparative interpretation
may be used by the Court to substantiate arguments based on evolutive interpretation.
InDangeville the Court explicitly pointed out that the Convention had to be interpreted
in light of comparative material:
The Convention is a living instrument that must be interpreted in the light of present-day
conditions and the notions currently prevailing in democratic States.89
Likewise in Demir and Baykara the Court observed that ‘it has always referred to
the “living” nature of the Convention, which must be interpreted in the light of
present-day conditions, and that it has taken account of evolving norms of national
and international law in its interpretation of Convention provisions’.90 The principle
of evolutive interpretation is thus invoked to justify the use of comparative arguments.
The idea that evolutive interpretation helps the ECtHR to keep pace with developments
in Contracting States and the Council of Europe can be supported as an explanation
and justification for the use of international and foreign material. This explanation
is, however, far less convincing when developments at the international level or
developments in Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America are men-
tioned. A separate justification that explains the relevance of looking at these materials
would be desirable.
The Court has thus relied on comparative arguments for a variety of reasons. It has
done so to receive guidance, to be able to ground an evolutive interpretation in
developments occurring within Europe or internationally, or to take the international
law background into account. However, these justifications are usually somewhat
succinctly mentioned and it can be questioned whether they suffice to legitimize the
use of the method by the Court.
89 ECtHR, S.A. Dangeville v. France, judgment of 16 April 2002, Reports 2002-III, § 47. Somewhat
similar statements have been made in ECtHR (GC), I v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002,
Reports 2002-VI, § 54; ECtHR (GC), Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July
2002, Reports 2002-VI; ECtHR, Cossey v. United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1990, Series
A No. 184, § 35; ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports
2005-X, § 47.
90 ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished, § 68.
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10.4 COMPARATIVE INTERPRETATION – HOW?
An important question that still needs to be answered relates to the way in which
the Court invokes comparative arguments or, put differently, the ‘how’ of comparative
interpretation. Reference has already been made to the fact that the Court is sometimes
looking for a consensus, but this does not yet provide any information as to what
the Court considers to constitute such a consensus. It is also interesting to know what
kinds of materials are invoked by the Court when referring to comparative arguments.
The examples in previous sections have already provided some insight, but this section
will address this issue in more detail. Moreover, it is relevant to know whether the
Court only relies on comparative arguments to support other arguments or whether
the comparative argument is really the main or decisive argument and actually deter-
mines the meaning of the Convention notion at issue. Finally, the question by whom
the materials are collected and selected will be addressed.
In section 10.4.1 the search for a consensus or trend will be discussed. This search
will be shown to be often limited to finding a consensus or trend among the Contract-
ing States. Section 10.4.2 deals with all other references and how the Court has
invoked them. In section 10.4.3 the question will be addressed whether the comparat-
ive argument is the main argument or whether it is used to support other arguments.
The question whether the Court acknowledged the distinction between external and
internal comparative interpretation will be discussed in section 10.4.4. Finally, section
10.4.5 will discuss where the materials come from. In the discussion in the first two
sections attention will be paid to the way in which the Court invokes the materials;
thus whether it is looking for a consensus or trend or whether it is simply a reference
to some comparative materials. Moreover, attention will also be paid to the depth
of the comparative reference and the kind of materials that are referred to, in the sense
that it will be discussed whether reference has been made to treaties, legislation, case
law or other materials.
10.4.1 Finding a consensus or trend
A much criticized aspect of comparative interpretation is the search for a consensus
or trend. In most of these cases the ECtHR refers solely to the Member States of the
Council of Europe, but in some cases it looks beyond the borders of Europe. The
ECtHR sometimes tries to find a trend outside Europe when no trend or consensus
was found within Europe. In other cases, however, the ECtHR refers to some inter-
national materials to support a trend among the Contracting States. It is not always
explicitly stated that the ECtHR is looking for a trend or consensus, but in all the
judgments discussed below, the ECtHR is looking for some sort of common standard.
In order to get more insight into the way the ECtHR uses this consensus, two main
questions need to be answered. Firstly, when does the ECtHR speak of a consensus
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or trend? Secondly, what kind of evidence is used to support this conclusion? Both
questions are intertwined and therefore both aspects are dealt with when discussing
some specific cases even though attempts will be made to discuss the two questions
separately as much as possible in order to make the discussion more clear.
The first aspect that should be discussed is whether any guideline or standard can
be found with regard to when there is enough support to speak of a consensus, trend
or common standard. In many cases the Court relies on the situation in the Member
States of the Council of Europe.91 Some of these judgments contain rather general
references without much explanation. They generally do not illuminate which countries
have been examined or how many countries support a particular approach. Even
though the Court should perhaps not be compelled to provide statistically exact
numbers, solely stating that ‘judicial practice in several of the States shows that’92
a particular practice has been adopted is rather indefinite.93 The statement of the
91 ECtHR, Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A No. 264, § 35;
ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished; ECtHR,
M.C. v. Bulgaria, judgment of 4 December 2003, Reports 2003-XII; ECtHR, Rees v. United Kingdom,
judgment of 17 October 1986, Series A No. 106; ECtHR, Cossey v. United Kingdom, judgment of
27 September 1990, Series A No. 184; ECtHR, Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom, judgment
of 30 July 1998, Reports 1998-V; ECtHR (GC), Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, judgment
of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI; ECtHR (GC), I v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002,
Reports 2002-VI; ECtHR, B. v. France, judgment of 25 March 1993, Series A No. 232-C; ECtHR,
Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A No. 7; ECtHR, Cruz Varas and others
v. Sweden, judgment of 20 March 1991, Series A No. 201; ECtHR, Niemietz v. Germany, judgment
of 16 December 1992, Series A No. 251-B; ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment of 12 July
2001, Reports 2001-VII; ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005,
Reports 2005-X; ECtHR (GC), Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal, judgment of 6 April 2000, Reports
2000-IV; ECtHR, James and others v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A
No. 98; ECtHR (GC), Üner v. the Netherlands, judgment of 18 October 2006, Reports 2006-XII;
ECtHR (GC), Vilho Eskelinen and others v. Finland, judgment of 19 April 2007, unpublished; ECtHR
(GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII; ECtHR, Van der
Mussele v. Belgium, judgment of 23 November 1983, Series A No. 70; ECtHR, Soering v. United
Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161; ECtHR (GC), Vo v. France, judgment of 8
July 2004, Reports 2004-VIII; ECtHR, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series
A No. 26; ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series
A No. 310; ECtHR, Öztürk v. Germany, judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A No. 73; ECtHR,
Engel and others v. the Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A No. 22; ECtHR, König v.
Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978, Series ANo. 27; ECtHR (GC), T v. United Kingdom, judgment
of 16 December 1999, unpublished.
92 ECtHR (GC), Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal, judgment of 6 April 2000, Reports 2000-IV, § 34.
93 See for more references that hardly provide an insight into the material that is relied upon: ECtHR,
Niemietz v. Germany, judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A No. 251-B, § 30; ECtHR, Cossey
v. United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A No. 184, § 40; ECtHR, Wemhoff v.
Germany, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A No. 7, § 9; ECtHR, Öztürk v. Germany, judgment
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ECtHR in Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson only referred to ‘a large number of domestic
systems’.94 In addition in Tyrer the Court did not even define what the situation
in the Contracting States is, even though it claims that it has influenced its decision:
‘the Court cannot but be influenced by the developments and commonly accepted
standards in the penal policy of the member States of the Council of Europe in this
field.’95 These examples render it rather difficult to understand at what point one
can speak of a consensus or trend. A more elaborate example of this type of case
can be found in the decision in Stec. Previous judgments by the Court had created
two distinct lines of case law on the same subject matter. In Stec, the Court considered
that it was time to remove the confusion and to decide on the new line for future
cases.96 The Court held that:
The Court’s approach to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 should reflect the reality of the way
in which welfare provision is currently organized within the Member States of the Council
of Europe. It is clear that within those States, and within most individual States, there exist
a wide range of social security benefits designed to confer entitlements which arise as of
right. Benefits are funded in a large variety of ways ... Given the variety of funding methods,
and the interlocking nature of benefits under most welfare systems, it appears increasingly
artificial to hold that only benefits financed by contributions to a specific fund fall within
the scope of Article 1 Protocol No. 1.97
Without attempting to find a real consensus, the Court limited itself to making a vague
reference to ‘those States’ that showed a variety of approaches to the problem at hand,
using this to support its choice for the broadest interpretation of the provision.98
of 21 February 1984, Series A No. 73, § 53; ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment of 12 July
2001, Reports 2001-VII, § 29; ECtHR (GC), I v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports
2002-VI, § 65; ECtHR (GC), Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002,
Reports 2002-VI, § 85; ECtHR, Van der Mussele v. Belgium, judgment of 23 November 1983, Series
ANo. 70, § 40; ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII,
§ 62; ECtHR (GC), Vilho Eskelinen and others v. Finland, judgment of 19 April 2007, unpublished,
§ 57; ECtHR, Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, judgment of 20 March 1991, Series A No. 201,
§ 100.
94 ECtHR, Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A No. 264, § 35.
95 ECtHR, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A No. 26, § 31.
96 In the case of Stec the Court had to determine whether both contributory and non-contributory benefits
were considered possession’ for the purpose of Article 1 Protocol No. 1. The case law had been
contradictory on this point and there were many differences between the way the social system was
organized in the different Member States. ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision
of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X.
97 ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X ,§ 50
98 The decision did include a paragraph that provided some comparative data on the pensionable age
of men and women in Europe, but that data dealt with an entirely different question and as a result
did not provide any help for the question discussed here.
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In other cases the ECtHR does mention specific Contracting States, but it hardly
ever refers to all Contracting States.99 InMicallef, for example, references to a ‘wide-
spread practice’ were used to argue for overruling the ECtHR’s previous approach,
which was to exclude injunction proceedings from the scope of Article 6 (right to
fair trial). In a paragraph devoted to the comparative analysis, reference was made
to 23 Contracting States (a relevant number according to the Court) in which injunc-
tion proceedings were protected by the guarantees provided by Article 6. In the eyes
of the ECtHR this presented a ‘widespread practice’. It is questionable whether this
is indeed a widespread practice, considering that the European Convention has 47
Contracting States. If these Contracting States, which are not mentioned in Micallef,
all exclude injunction proceedings from protection under the right to fair trial, the
conclusion of the ECtHR comes to stand in an entirely different light (23 against 24
Contracting States). The aim of this remark is not to show that the conclusion of the
ECtHR was wrong, but to show that it is difficult to understand the conclusion if
only the Contracting States that support the conclusion are discussed. It would be
more insightful to discuss the Contracting States that do not support the conclusion
as well. This is especially relevant, because the theoretical chapter noted that a
Contracting State which has taken an explicit position against the majority position
might be less convinced by an argument based on the will of the majority.100 In
that context a discussion of the Contracting States which do not support the consensus,
common standard or trend can either be used to support the conclusion of the Court
or to show the need for an additional explanation for its conclusion. Moreover, there
is the psychological aspect to not mentioning Contracting States. They might consider
that they are not taken into account, especially if the ECtHR speaks of a ‘relevant
number of Contracting States’. After all, who determines which Member State is
‘relevant’?
In the case of M.C. v. Bulgaria, where the ECtHR had to determine whether ‘the
Member States’ positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention must
be seen as requiring the penalization and effective prosecution of any non-consensual
sexual act, including in the absence of physical resistance by the victim’.101 The
ECtHR referred to specific Contracting States in order to support the conclusion that
the physical resistance of the victim was no longer required in rape cases. The ECtHR
stated that most continental European Contracting States held this position, but actual
reference was only made to eight Contracting States. The United Kingdom and Ireland
99 See ECtHR (GC), Micallef v. Malta, judgment of 15 October 2009, unpublished; ECtHR, Schalk
and Kopf v. Austria, judgment of 24 June 2010, unpublished; ECtHR (GC), T v. United Kingdom,
judgment of 16 December 1999, unpublished, for examples of cases where the ECtHR refers to an
incomplete number of Contracting States.
100 See section 6.1.6.2.
101 ECtHR, M.C. v. Bulgaria, judgment of 4 December 2003, Reports 2003-XII, § 166.
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were discussed separately under the common law countries. The conclusion that states
were under a positive obligation to prosecute rape crimes even if there was no physical
resistance by the victim was also supported by evidence from external comparative
material. Moreover, the ECtHR relied on a Recommendation adopted by the Council
of Ministers in which all Member States are represented.102 Reference was also made
to the findings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to
show developments in international criminal law. The ECtHR thus relied on different
sources to support its conclusion. The purpose of discussing this case is, however,
to show that vague references of the ECtHR to ‘most European countries influenced
by the continental legal tradition’ can be quite misleading, if the judgment shows
that only eight Contracting States have been analyzed.
In Schalk & Kopf, where the ECtHR held that there was not enough consensus
to determine that the right to marriage included a right for same-sex couples to marry,
the ECtHR also referred to around 22 Contracting States. Here only six Contracting
States had adopted legislation to allow for same-sex couples to marry, which was
not enough to support a radical turn in Article 12 case law. The ECtHR did discuss
other Contracting States where legislative proposals were pending or that had already
adopted legislation allowing same-sex couples to legally register their union, but not
to marry. Even though the comparative analysis did not provide enough support to
find a consensus on Article 12, the ECtHR did witness a growing trend towards legal
recognition of same-sex couples and thus determined that these types of relationships
were henceforth covered under the notion of ‘family life’ (Article 8). The question
whether some sort of consensus is actually required or whether a mere tendency is
enough, thus appears to depend on the specific issue the Court is presented with.
The question whether there is enough support for a consensus or common standard
is also complicated by another factor. Should all Contracting States have adopted
similar measures or is it sufficient to constitute a consensus that developments can
be seen, even though they might not all go in the same direction? This question is
related to an issue that has been discussed in the theoretical chapter, namely that this
also may depend on the level of abstractness of the question to be answered.103 If
a question is posed at a relatively abstract level it might be easier to find a consensus
than in cases where a relatively concrete question is asked. The answer can also be
approached from two angles, on the one hand in an abstract manner, namely to
conclude that there is a clear tendency towards one specific direction and on the other
hand the answer can also be approached in a rather concrete manner by requiring
that all Contracting States adopt a similar standard. This can be illustrated by the case
102 ECtHR, M.C. v. Bulgaria, judgment of 4 December 2003, Reports 2003-XII, § 162.
103 See section 6.1.6.2.
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of T v United Kingdom.104 This case concerned an 11-year old boy who had to stand
trial for murdering a two-year old boy. He claimed that this constituted inhuman and
degrading treatment due to his youth. The Court invoked the general notion of
evolutive interpretation to justify its taking the minimum age for criminal responsibility
throughout Europe into account.105 Subsequently, it concluded that no common
standard could be found, thereby referring to a number of Contracting States. The
overview included about half the Contracting States and showed that a few states
had a similarly low age of criminal responsibility as the United Kingdom (7 or 8 years
old), while many others had a higher minimum age, varying from 13 years old to
18 years old.106 The majority in T concluded that no common standard could be
found on the basis of the Contracting States listed; the United Kingdom had one of
the lowest in age (together with only a few other countries), but this did not dispropor-
tionately differ from the age limit in the other Contracting States.107 The dissenting
judges did not agree and concluded there was indeed a clear minimum standard.108
They considered that only a few out of the then 41 Contracting States (not even half
of those that were explicitly mentioned in the overview provided by the Court) had
such a low age; all the others used a higher minimum age. The dissenters thus adopted
a more abstract analysis and pointed to the fact that most states opted for a higher
age, even though they did not necessarily all adopt the same minimum age. This
example shows that the same comparative materials can lead to opposing con-
clusions.109
A similar problem can be noted in the case of Sheffield and Horsham on the right
of transsexuals to have their gender change legally recognized.110 The Court in this
case had to decide again on the rights of transsexuals under Article 8 of the Conven-
tion. An NGO provided a comparative study outlining different legislative trends
throughout Europe.111 The Court held on the basis of this study that it was: ‘not
fully satisfied that the legislative trends outlined by amicus suffice to establish the
existence of any common European approach to the problems created by the recog-
104 See also ECtHR (GC), V v. United Kingdom, judgment of 16 December 1999, Reports 1999-IX. This
is the parallel case to ECtHR (GC), T v. United Kingdom, judgment of 16 December 1999, unpub-
lished.
105 ECtHR (GC), T v. United Kingdom, judgment of 16 December 1999, unpublished , § 70.
106 ECtHR (GC), T v. United Kingdom, judgment of 16 December 1999, unpublished , § 48.
107 ECtHR (GC), T v. United Kingdom, judgment of 16 December 1999, unpublished , § 72.
108 ECtHR (GC), T v. United Kingdom, judgment of 16 December 1999, unpublished, dissenting opinion
by Judges Pastor Ridruejo, Ress, Makarczyk, Tulkens and Butkevych, § 1.
109 A similar problem can be seen in the discussion on the transsexuals cases; see section 10.2.1.1. for
the discussion on the transsexuals cases.
110 ECtHR, Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom, judgment of 30 July 1998, Reports 1998-V.
111 The judgment itself only contains a very succinct overview of that comparative study.
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nition in law of post-operative gender status.’112 It subsequently outlined in which
areas the Court considered that there was no common approach. The dissenters did
not agree with this approach and considered that it was impossible to request uniform-
ity in such a highly complex and controversial area. The dissenters continued to
consider that:
... the essential point is that in these countries, unlike in the United Kingdom, change has
taken place – whatever its precise form is – in an attempt to alleviate the distress and suffering
of the post-operative transsexual and that there exists in Europe a general trend which seeks
in differing ways to confer recognition on the altered sexual identity.113
In other words, the fact that different solutions were sought, according to the dis-
senters, did not matter, but what did matter was that most Contracting States were
seeking a solution.
Two other cases from this line of cases on the rights of transsexuals warrant
discussion. First of all, in one of the early cases on the rights of transsexuals, namely
Cossey, the Court had to examine whether sufficient changes had taken place to
warrant overruling the case of Rees.114 When discussing the legal developments
the Court considered the following:
There have been certain developments since 1986 in the law of some of the member States
of the Council of Europe. However, the reports accompanying [a Resolution by the European
Parliament and a Recommendation by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe]
reveal, ..., the same diversity of practice as obtained at the time of the Rees judgment.115
Without mentioning one single development or reference to the law in a State the
Court dismissed the developments as not sufficient. At least two of the dissenting
judges, however, drew the opposite conclusion from the same materials according
to their dissenting opinions.116 Judge Martens actually supported his conclusion
with references to specific developments.117 By failing to provide support for its
112 ECtHR, Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom, judgment of 30 July 1998, Reports 1998-V, § 57.
113 ECtHR, Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom, judgment of 30 July 1998, Reports 1998-V, joint
partly dissenting opinion by Judges Bernhardt, Thór Vilhjámsson, Spielmann, Palm, Wildhaber,
Makarczyk and Voicu.
114 ECtHR, Cossey v. United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A No. 184; ECtHR,
Rees v. United Kingdom, judgment of 17 October 1986, Series A No. 106. See section 10.2.1.1. for
a more detailed account on the transsexuals cases.
115 ECtHR, Cossey v. United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A No. 184, § 40.
116 ECtHR, Cossey v. United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A No. 184, joint partly
dissenting opinion by Judges MacDonald and Spielmann and dissenting opinion by Martens.
117 ECtHR, Cossey v. United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A No. 184, dissenting
opinion by Martens § 5.5.
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conclusion on the comparative material the majority thus left more room for discussion
than perhaps would have been the case if they had paid more attention to show that
in their view no consensus existed.
A consensus or trend is mostly based on references to the Contracting States, but
not always; in some cases a combination can be found.118 The case of Christine
Goodwin presents a famous example of relying solely on an external trend.119 This
case was the last one in the line of transsexual cases and the ECtHR considered that
there was still no European consensus on the issue. In the eyes of the ECtHR ‘the
lack of such a common approach among forty-three Contracting States with widely
diverse legal systems and traditions is hardly surprising’.120 The ECtHR continued
and referred to the fact that in their view a clear and uncontested international trend
could be found.121 Reference was made to Singapore, Canada, South Africa, Israel,
Australia, New Zealand and almost all states of the United States of America.122
The examples discussed have so far indicated that it is not clear when the ECtHR
will conclude that a consensus or trend can be found. In M.C. ten Contracting States
were sufficient, in Schalk & Kopf six Contracting States were not enough, while in
Christine Goodwin no consensus could be found, but evidence from seven foreign
countries proved to be sufficient. It thus depends heavily on the specific context and
the specific question. The problem is that the lack of standards also leads to different
interpretations and outcomes, as indicated by some of the dissents. As a result this
might jeopardize the persuasiveness and credibility of this method.
118 In some cases in addition to the consensus or trend found in Member States the ECtHR does refer
to external materials as well. For example in the case of ECtHR, M.C. v. Bulgaria, judgment of 4
December 2003, Reports 2003-XII, where the results of Member States were supported with a
reference to the ICTY. InDemir & Baykara references were made to several international and Council
of Europe materials and also to the practice in Member States. ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara
v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished.
119 ECtHR (GC), Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI.
See also: ECtHR (GC), Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2), judgment of 17 September 2009, unpublished, where
the majority relied on a consensus that emerged in Europe and internationally, but reference was
made only to external documents. In Mamatkulov the ECtHR also only looked at external materials
to find an international trend. This was, however, inevitable given that they were seeking an answer
that was related to a procedural matter in the context of international or supranational adjudication.
Looking at Member States would not have provided any relevant results. ECtHR (GC),Mamatkulov
and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I.
120 ECtHR (GC), Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI,
§ 85.
121 ECtHR (GC), Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI,
§ 85.
122 ECtHR (GC), Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI,
§ 55.
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The second aspect that should be discussed in this context is the question what these
references entail. It has already been said, in the majority of the cases that the con-
sensus or trend is established on the basis of references to Contracting States, some-
times with support from external materials. Only in rare cases is reference made to
only external materials. Even then, however, it is not clear on which kind of materials
these references are based, such as legislation, case law or other materials. Interesting-
ly, a difference can be noted in this regard between cases in which the Court refers
to external or Council of Europe documents and cases in which it refers to the law
of the States.
The cases ofMamatkulov, Demir, James and others, Stec and Sigurdur can serve
as good examples of such differences. InMamatkulov the ECtHR referred to external
materials to support its conclusion that interim measures are binding on the respondent
Contracting States. In the paragraph devoted to the presentation of ‘relevant inter-
national law and practice’, reference was made to the Statute of the International Court
of Justice and to excerpts of some of its judgments.123 Reference was also made
to the rule of procedures of the United Nations Committee against Torture, United
Nations Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.124
Not only the relevant parts of their rules of procedure were cited in the judgment,
but even excerpts of relevant decisions or judgments were reproduced. When dealing
with the question of interim measures, the ECtHR referred back to these observa-
tions.125
Similarly extensive references to international and Council of Europe materials
can be found in the case of Demir & Baykara.126 Several provisions of different
Conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) were discussed, including
references to explanations of these provisions by relevant committees, such as the
ILO Committee of Experts.127 A similar type of reference was made to provisions
of the European Social Charter and the explanation provided by the European Commit-
tee of Social Rights.128 In addition relevant provisions of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
123 ECtHR (GC), Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I,
§ 46-48.
124 ECtHR (GC), Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I,
§ 40-45 & 51-53.
125 ECtHR (GC), Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I,
§ 113-117.
126 ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished.
127 ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished, § 37-39
and 42-44.




Cultural Rights and the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights were cited.129 The refer-
ence to the Contracting States was both extensive and limited at the same time. The
reference did provide an analysis of the situation in the Contracting States by generally
discussing the current situation in Europe without mentioning specific Contracting
States, but no references were made to the materials from which this information had
been drawn.130 Of course, it would make judgments extremely long if the ECtHR
were to discuss per Member State the analyzed materials,131 but it would be more
insightful if the ECtHR in general indicates the type of materials considered: legis-
lation, case law, policy or other materials.
The case of James and others provides an example which does provide information
on the type of data analyzed.132 The question was how the notion of ‘in the public
interest’ contained in Article 1 Protocol 1 (the right to property) should be explained.
The ECtHR claimed that ‘no common principle can be identified in the constitutions,
legislation, and case-law of the Contracting States that would warrant understanding
the notion of public interest as outlawing compulsory transfer between private par-
ties’.133 Even though this reference could have been more elaborate on other aspects,
it is useful to know the type of materials analyzed for this conclusion.
In a case like Sigurdur the ECtHR did not provide any insight at all into the
material used. The ECtHR simply stated on the question whether Article 11 includes
a right not join an association:
129 ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished, § 40-41,
47, 51.
130 ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished, § 52.
As to the practice of European States, it can be observed that, in the vast majority of them, the right
for public servants to bargain collectively with the authorities has been recognized, subject to various
exceptions so as to exclude certain areas (disciplinary procedures, pensions, medical insurance, wages
of senior civil servants) or certain categories of civil servants who hold exclusive powers of the State
(members of the armed forces and of the police, judges, diplomats, career civil servants at federal
level). The right of public servants working for local authorities and not holding State powers to
engage in collective bargaining in order to determine their wages and working conditions has been
recognized in the vast majority of Contracting States. The remaining exceptions can be justified by
particular circumstances. Similar in ECtHR (GC), T v. United Kingdom, judgment of 16 December
1999, unpublished.
131 The case of ECtHR, M.C. v. Bulgaria, judgment of 4 December 2003, Reports 2003-XII, is an
exception in this context. The discussion on the Member States in that case referred to specific
provision of national legislation and thus provided insight into the material on which the subsequent
conclusion would be based. This case, however, did not address all Member States, but only discussed
ten Member States.
132 ECtHR, James and others v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A No. 98.
133 ECtHR, James and others v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A No. 98, § 40.
254
Comparative interpretation in the case law of the ECtHR
Compulsory membership of this nature, which, it may be recalled, concerned a private-law
association, does not exist under the laws of the great majority of the Contracting States.
On the contrary, a large number of domestic systems contain safeguards which, in one way
or another, guarantee the negative aspect of the freedom of association, that is the freedom
not to join or to withdraw from an association.134
No paragraph providing data on which this conclusion is based can be found in the
judgment, which renders it difficult to verify the conclusion.
These are some examples of varying degrees of referring to both international
data and data on the Contracting States. While more elaborate discussions on the data
drawn from the Contracting States are exceptional, they are much more common when
reference is made to international materials or Council of Europe treaties. This makes
it especially more difficult to understand the conclusions drawn on the basis of
references to Contracting States.
10.4.2 Separate references to international, regional and foreign materials
In many different cases the Court relies on international or regional material or
material based on foreign jurisdictions as a basis for comparative interpretation.135
The ECtHR hardly ever relies on references to specific Contracting States without
looking for a trend or consensus; therefore the discussion in this section is limited
to those instances when the ECtHR, for one of the purposes listed in section 6.1.4
looks at external materials or Council of Europe documents.
134 ECtHR, Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A No. 264, § 35.
135 ECtHR, Pretty v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 April 2002,Reports 2002-III Pretty; ECtHR (GC),
Saadi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 January 2008, unpublished; ECtHR, Costello-Roberts v.
United Kingdom, judgment of 25 March 1993, SeriesANo. 247-C; ECtHR (GC), Selmouni v. France,
judgment of 28 July 1999, Reports 1999-V; ECtHR (GC), Amann v. Switzerland, judgment of 16
February 2000, Reports 2000-II; ECtHR (GC), Banković and others v. Belgium and others, decision
of 12 December 2001, Reports 2001-VII; ECtHR (GC), Stoll v. Switzerland, judgment of 10 December
2007, unpublished; ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008,
unpublished; ECtHR (GC),Öneryildiz v. Turkey, judgment of 30 November 2004, Reports 2004-XII;
ECtHR, P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 September 2001, Reports 2001-IX; ECtHR,
Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, judgment of 20 March 1991, Series A No. 201; ECtHR, Soering
v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161; ECtHR, James and others v. United
Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A No. 98; ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, judgment
of 13 June 1979, Series A No. 31; ECtHR (GC), Vilho Eskelinen and others v. Finland, judgment
of 19 April 2007, unpublished.
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These references have included, but not been limited to: UN documents (mainly
treaties and conventions);136 other (regional) human rights instruments;137 Council
of Europe documents, mainly treaties and materials from the Parliamentary Assem-
bly;138 material from the European Union, like directives, the EU Charter on Funda-
mental Rights, judgments from the Court of Justice of the European Union;139 judg-
ments from other international courts;140 specialized international treaties;141 and
judgments from foreign jurisdictions.142
In Costello Roberts, for example, the Court had to determine whether Articles 3
and 8 of the Convention had been violated. The headmaster of a private school had
136 For example: ECtHR (GC), Zolotukhin v. Russia, judgment of 10 February 2009, unpublished, for
a reference to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in § 79; ECtHR (GC),Mamat-
kulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I, for a reference to the
United Nations Committee against Torture in § 115; ECtHR (GC), Saadi v. United Kingdom, judgment
of 29 January 2008, unpublished, for a reference to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugee’s Programme and the UNHRC Guidelines in § 65; ECtHR (GC), Selmouni v. France,
judgment of 28 July 1999, Reports 1999-V, for a reference to the United Nations Convention against
Torture and other Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment in § 97.
137 Mainly references to the American Convention on Human Rights: ECtHR (GC), Zolotukhin v. Russia,
judgment of 10 February 2009, unpublished, § 79; ECtHR (GC),Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey,
judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I, § 116; ECtHR, Soering v United Kingdom, judgment
of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161, § 108.
138 See for example: ECtHR (GC), Amann v. Switzerland, judgment of 16 February 2000, Reports 2000-II,
referring to the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data in § 65; ECtHR (GC),Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment
of 12November 2008, unpublished, referring to, among others, the European Social Charter in § 149;
ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A No. 31, referring to the European
Convention on the Legal Status of Children born out of Wedlock in § 41; ECtHR, Koua Poirrez
v. France, judgment of 30 September 2003, Reports 2003-X, referring to a Recommendation from
the Committee of Ministers in § 39.
139 See for example: ECtHR (GC), Vilho Eskelinen and others v. Finland, judgment of 19 April 2007,
unpublished, referring to the EU Charter and case law of the CJEU in § 60; ECtHR (GC), Micallef
v. Malta, judgment of 15 October 2009, unpublished, referring to case law of the CJEU in § 78;
ECtHR, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, judgment of 24 June 2010, unpublished, referring to the EU
Charter in § 60; ECtHR, Posti and Rahko v. Finland, judgment of 24 September 2002, Reports 2002-
VII, referring to case law of the CJEU in § 54.
140 See for example: ECtHR, Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, judgment of 7 January 2010, unpublished,
referring to judgments of the ICTY in § 280; ECtHR, M.C. v. Bulgaria, judgment of 4 December
2003, Reports 2003-XII, referring to judgments from the ICTY as well in § 163; ECtHR (GC),
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I, referring to the
case law of the International Court of Justice in § 117.
141 This does not happen often. See for example: ECtHR, Pretty v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29
April 2002, Reports 2002-III, referring to a judgment from the Canadian Supreme Court in § 66.
142 See for example: ECtHR, James and others v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, Series
A No. 98; ECtHR, Pretty v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 April 2002, Reports 2002-III.
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inflicted corporal punishment on a schoolboy in accordance with the disciplinary rules.
The applicability of the Convention depended on the question whether this treatment
invoked the responsibility of the United Kingdom under Article 1 of the Convention.
The Court recalled that the Convention should be read as a whole and that it included
an obligation for states to secure the right to education. School discipline was, in the
view of the Court, not secondary to the educational process and as a result this fell
within the responsibility of the respondent state. In order to support its own view
the Court stated that:
That a school’s disciplinary system falls within the ambit of the right to education has also
been recognized, more recently, in Article 28 of the United Nations Convention of the Rights
of Child of 20 November 1989 which entered into force on 2 September 1990 and was ratified
by the United Kingdom on 16 December 1991.143
The Court substantiated this support based on the United Nations Convention of the
Rights of the Child by a reference to the text of the relevant provision, which literally
referred to school discipline.144
A similar reference was made in Selmouni145 where the Court was struggling
to determine whether certain acts amounted to torture under Article 3 of the Conven-
tion. The Court held that the distinction between torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment was intended to attach a ‘special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment
causing very serious and cruel suffering’.146 Support for this approach was provided
by the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which embodied the same distinction in its
Articles 1 and 16 as was shown by the inclusion of their text in the judgment of the
Court.147
In Amann148 the Court, instead, relied on a regional Convention in order to
underpin its argument. The Court held that Article 8 of the Convention should not
be interpreted narrowly and as a result the storing of data relating to an individual’s
private life fell within the scope of the provision.
143 ECtHR,Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25March 1993, SeriesANo. 247-C, § 27.
ECtHR (GC), Saadi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 January 2008, unpublished and ECtHR (GC),
Stoll v. Switzerland, judgment of 10 December 2007, unpublished, equally rely on UN material to
support the interpretation in those cases.
144 ECtHR, Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 March 1993, SeriesANo. 247-C, § 27.
145 ECtHR (GC), Selmouni v. France, judgment of 28 July 1999, Reports 1999-V.
146 ECtHR (GC), Selmouni v. France, judgment of 28 July 1999, Reports 1999-V, § 96.
147 ECtHR (GC), Selmouni v. France, judgment of 28 July 1999, Reports 1999-V, § 97.
148 ECtHR (GC), Amann v. Switzerland, judgment of 16 February 2000, Reports 2000-II.
257
Chapter 10
That broad interpretation corresponds with that of the Council of Europe’s Convention of
28 January 1981 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data ... whose purpose it is “to secure in the territory of each Party for every
individual ... respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to
privacy, with regard to automatic processing of personal data relating to him” (Article 1),
such personal data being defined as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable
individual” (Article 2).149
Just like in other cases, the Court relied on a specialized treaty, in this case a Council
of Europe Convention, to support the interpretation of the general Article 8 of the
European Convention.
Whenever the Court invokes references to international materials or materials from
foreign jurisdictions, it generally is rather specific in presenting the material. The
Court, for example, explicitly invoked a Canadian judgment that dealt with a similar
matter as the ECtHR in the case of Pretty.150 Or the Court invokes ‘the practice
of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the International
Labor Office (ILO)’, whereby it refers to the exact page where the decision supporting
this argument can be found.151 In a similar way the Court has referred to ‘observa-
tions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee’, while citing some of the
observations themselves.152 It is possible to continue this list, but that might not
add anything extra. The important observation to make is that contrasted with refer-
ences to material from the Contracting States, the references to international material
are generally on a much more specific level and allow for much less disagreement
on the conclusion to be drawn from them. This difference was also mentioned in the
previous section. The case law does not provide any explanation for this difference,
but perhaps the Court considers that this somehow increases the legitimacy of referring
to these materials in the first place.
149 ECtHR (GC), Amann v. Switzerland, judgment of 16 February 2000, Reports 2000-II, § 65. The
same reference can be found in ECtHR, P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 September
2001, Reports 2001-IX, § 57 which dealt with the same subject matter. InÖneryildiz the Court refers
to European developments reflected in Council of Europe documents, ECtHR (GC), Öneryildiz v.
Turkey, judgment of 30 November 2004, Reports 2004-XII. ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, judgment
of 13 June 1979, Series A No. 31 also refers to CoE material (CoM Resolution). In ECtHR, Pretty
v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 April 2002, Reports 2002-III, § 40 reference is made to a
Recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
150 ECtHR, Pretty v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 April 2002, Reports 2002-III Pretty § 66.
151 ECtHR, Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A No. 264, § 35.
152 ECtHR (GC), Stoll v. Switzerland, judgment of 10 December 2007, unpublished, § 54 and 42.
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10.4.3 Used to support argument or decisive argument?
By now, it has become clear that comparative interpretation in the ECtHR’s case law
can serve various purposes and it can be used in different ways, which have generally
be analyzed as looking for a consensus or by referring to one or a few specific
comparative sources. There is one final aspect that needs to be discussed in this
context and that is whether the comparative argument is the sole or main argument
pleading for a specific interpretation or whether comparative interpretation is used
to support other interpretation methods.
In cases like,M.C.,Mamatkulov and Vo the comparative arguments play a crucial
role.153 The comparative argument might not be the only argument provided, but
from these judgments it emerges that the comparative argument played a decisive
role in these cases. The conclusion is thus almost exclusively built upon the comparat-
ive argument. In the majority of cases comparative arguments are used in addition
to arguments based on other interpretation methods, like textual interpretation or
systemic interpretation.154 Cases like Rantsev and Van der Mussele, illustrate this
use of comparative arguments, whereby comparative arguments are one of a set of
arguments used to argue for a specific conclusion.
It is perhaps not always possible to make this distinction clearly, because it does
not always become entirely clear from the presentation whether all arguments played
an equal role or not. The main point is to realize that comparative arguments are both
used to support an argument or as a decisive argument. This renders it even more
important that this method is used in a convincing manner.
153 See also ECtHR, Kimlya and others v. Russia, judgment of 1 October 2009, unpublished; ECtHR
(GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished. ECtHR (GC),
Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI.
154 See for example: ECtHR, James and others v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986,
Series A No. 98; ECtHR (GC), Selmouni v. France, judgment of 28 July 1999, Reports 1999-V;
ECtHR (GC), Amann v. Switzerland, judgment of 16 February 2000, Reports 2000-II; ECtHR (GC),
Saadi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 January 2008, unpublished; ECtHR, Niemietz v. Germany,
judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A No. 251-B; ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment
of 12 July 2001, Reports 2001-VII; ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision of
6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X; ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A No.
31; ECtHR, Van der Mussele v. Belgium, judgment of 23 November 1983, Series A No. 70; ECtHR,
Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161; ECtHR, Costello-Roberts
v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 March 1993, Series A No. 247-C; ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v.
France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII; ECtHR (GC), Vilho Eskelinen and others
v. Finland, judgment of 19 April 2007, unpublished; ECtHR (GC), Stoll v. Switzerland, judgment
of 10 December 2007, unpublished.
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10.4.4 Does the ECtHR acknowledge the distinction between internal and external
materials?
The theoretical chapter on comparative interpretation distinguished between the use
of internal and external materials. Internal materials are based on the situation in the
Member States of the European Convention, while external materials come from
countries outside the European Convention or are international or regional in character,
such as UN Conventions or EUmaterials or Council of Europe documents. The reason
to make this distinction is that a different justification has to be provided for each
of the different sources of materials, as explained in section 6.1.3. The question to
be answered in this section is whether the Court considers it necessary to make this
distinction as well.
The answer can be rather short: the Court does not seem to think that this dis-
tinction is relevant. While indications for such a non-differential approach can already
be found in earlier judgments,155 the Court in the recent case of Demir and Baykara
clearly implied that the distinction does not matter. In its methodological account
of comparative interpretation the Court was presented with a slightly different question,
namely whether the fact that a respondent state had not ratified a certain instrument
mattered for comparative arguments. The Court answered that question in the negative,
considering as follows in doing so:
The consensus emerging from specialized international instruments and from the practice
of contracting States may constitute a relevant consideration for the Court when it interprets
the provisions of the Convention in specific cases.156
The Court thus treats internal and external material in exactly the same way. Though
it does try to provide an extra justification for referring to international materials,
as indicated in section 10.3, this justification can only cover references to a limited
selection of international materials. Does the fact that the ECtHR does not acknow-
ledge this distinction mean that it is not valid or not relevant in practice? One can
argue that that is not the case. The Demir and Baykara case might even prove the
point that a distinction should be made between different types of material and that
these require different justifications. There are good arguments for distinguishing
between European materials and non-European materials, which have been discussed
155 For example in ECtHR (GC), I v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI and
ECtHR (GC), Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI.
156 ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished, § 85.
This excerpt has already been quoted above, but it is easier for the discussion not to refer back, but
to repeat the statement here as well.
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in the theoretical chapter. This distinction could have benefited the ECtHR in pro-
viding a convincing answer to the question posed in Demir and Baykara.
10.4.5 Who collects the materials?
The material that is used for comparative interpretation has to be carefully collected
and selected, since not every piece might be relevant for the case. This process might
not seem that interesting, but it can have a strong influence on the comparative
argument. The choice for certain materials can be crucial for the argument in question,
since the reasoning is naturally only based on the selected materials. If this process
is underestimated the Court risks being criticized for cherry-picking or worse of
manipulating the comparative argument.157 It might be impossible to undertake an
extensive comparative research for each case before the Court or even for each Grand
Chamber judgment, but it is important that the selection process is undertaken care-
fully. This element of the comparative method might not be very visible in the case
law, but perhaps some information can be gained from the case law analysis.
Does the case law provide any insight into who collects the comparative materials?
This is hardly ever clarified in the Court’s case law. In some cases where one of the
parties supplies comparative information or where it is supplied by an intervening
third party this has been explicitly mentioned.158 In most other cases the source
of the reference is not clarified. The more recent cases, especially recent Grand
Chamber judgments, often include a section on comparative and international
material.159 The extent of the overview in those cases depends on the specific issue,
157 See section 6.1.6.2.
158 See among others: ECtHR (GC),Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005,
Reports 2005-I; ECtHR (GC), Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002,
Reports 2002-VI; ECtHR (GC), I v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI;
ECtHR (GC), Banković and others v. Belgium and others, decision of 12 December 2001, Reports
2001-VII; ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161; ECtHR,
James and others v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A No. 98.
159 ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII; ECtHR (GC),
T v. United Kingdom, judgment of 16 December 1999, unpublished; ECtHR (GC),Chapman v. United
Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 2001, Reports 2001-I; ECtHR (GC), Banković and others v. Belgium
and others, decision of 12 December 2001, Reports 2001-VII; ECtHR (GC), Christine Goodwin v.
United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI; ECtHR (GC), I v. United Kingdom,
judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI; ECtHR, Pretty v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 April
2002, Reports 2002-III; ECtHR,M.C. v. Bulgaria, judgment of 4 December 2003, Reports 2003-XII;
ECtHR (GC), Vo v. France, judgment of 8 July 2004, Reports 2004-VIII; ECtHR (GC), Öneryildiz
v. Turkey, judgment of 30 November 2004, Reports 2004-XII; ECtHR (GC),Mamatkulov and Askarov
v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I; ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United
Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X; ECtHR (GC), Vilho Eskelinen and others v.
Finland, judgment of 19 April 2007, unpublished; ECtHR (GC), Stoll v. Switzerland, judgment of
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but also, as shown in section 10.4.2 on the type of material to be discussed. In most
cases this material is actually used in the reasoning of the Court, but this is not the
case for all of these judgments. This change in the case law can be explained by the
fact that a research unit has been set up in the Court. There is not much public
information on this unit, but it seems safe to assume that the sections on comparative
and international material are based on findings made by this research unit. The setting
up of the unit clearly is an improvement, since it enhances the capacity of the Court
to do comparative research. Still, an important question that cannot be answered on
the basis of the case law is who determines the framework for the research. Or to
put it differently: who decides what will be investigated. That may be the unit itself,
but it may also be the judge-rapporteur in a particular case. The same lack of clarity
exists as to who selects which results are relevant for the case at hand. Thus, even
though the existence of the research unit shows that the Court does take comparative
interpretation seriously, it is not possible to answer a number of important questions
as to its exact functioning on the basis of publicly available information.
10.5 ROLE OF COMPARATIVE REASONING IN RELATION TO OTHER METHODS AND
PRINCIPLES
The lengthy analysis of comparative interpretation in this chapter has already dealt
with the relationship between comparative interpretation and other interpretative
methods on some specific occasions. The aim of the discussion in the current section
is to identify the relations that have not yet been mentioned and to briefly recall those
that have been touched upon. Specific attention will be paid to the relation between
comparative interpretation and those other interpretative aids that are central to this
thesis.
In general there is no clear relation between comparative interpretation and other
interpretative aids, with one notable exception that will be discussed below. Beyond
the fact that in some cases teleological interpretation and comparative interpretation
support the same interpretation,160 there is no relevant relation between these two
methods. The only relation that can be discerned from the case law is that both are
interpretation methods used by the Court.
A few cases refer to the existence of a connection between autonomous interpreta-
tion and comparative interpretation. In Pellegrin the Court was struggling with the
10 December 2007, unpublished; ECtHR (GC), Saadi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 January
2008, unpublished; ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008,
unpublished.
160 ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A No. 310;
ECtHR, Niemietz v. Germany, judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A No. 251-B.
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question in what situations a civil servant would be covered by the scope of Article
6 and in what situation a civil servant would be excluded.161 The Court noticed
that several Contracting States made a distinction between ‘two categories of staff
at the service of the State, namely officials under contract and established civil
servants’.162 Furthermore, the Court observed that ‘in the current practice of the
Contracting States established civil servants and officials under contract frequently
perform the same duties’.163 Despite the fact that both categories frequently per-
formed the same duties the civil servant could not in all States claim protection under
Article 6 of the Convention. In order to avoid this inequality the Court decided to
adopt an autonomous interpretation. The comparative arguments thus justified or at
least spurred the autonomous approach in this case. An entirely different relation to
autonomous interpretation was presented in the case of Stec.164 In this case the Court
had to adopt an autonomous interpretation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The Court
invoked evolutive interpretation and comparative interpretation substantiated the
evolutive arguments.165 The case thus actually represents the interaction between
three interpretative aids.
The relation between evolutive interpretation and comparative interpretation has
already been touched upon frequently in the course of this chapter and will be dis-
cussed in the chapter on evolutive interpretation as well. Indeed, it has been mentioned
in the theoretical chapter that some authors do not even distinguish between the two
interpretative aids and consider them as one.166 However, even if they are closely
intertwined, it is important to note that comparative interpretation does not only play
a role as substantiating evolutive interpretation. It is used for other purposes as well,
as has been shown in this chapter. By considering both concepts as one, one would
be ignoring those other roles of comparative interpretation. That would be an over-
simplification of the interpretative framework established by the Court. So evolutive
interpretation and comparative interpretation are strongly related, but they have
different functions in the interpretative process.
Finally, the limitations on the comparative method of interpretation are instructive
for the relation between this method and two of the key methods of interpretation
employed by the Court.167 These limitations are not related to the persuasiveness
161 ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII.
162 ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII, § 62.
163 ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII, § 62.
164 ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X. Aweaker
version is visible in: ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports 2001-VII.
165 ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X, § 50.
166 Helfer (1993); Rigaux (1998).
167 Systemic and textual interpretation.
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of the comparative argument, but reflect the value which the Court attaches to argu-
ments based on the clear text of the Convention or the system or structure of the
Convention. If these point in a direction different from the comparative argument,
these considerations often take priority over comparative interpretation.168 For
example, in the case of Üner the Court had to decide whether the expulsion of a long-
term immigrant was allowed under the Convention.169 The case was finally deter-
mined on the question whether the interference with Article 8 was necessary in a
democratic society, but the Court did address the scope of Article 8 as well. The Court
addressed the question whether an absolute right for long-term immigrants not to be
expelled could be derived fromArticle 8. Even though a number of Contracting States
indeed had legislation or policies to that effect and the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe had issued Recommendations on the issue, the Court held that
the structure and text of Article 8 did not allow for such a conclusion.170
10.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter has tried to provide a complete overview of comparative interpretation
in the case law of the Court. Some observations are worth recalling here. Comparative
arguments are used for different purposes in the interpretation stage. Comparative
arguments can be used to support a regular interpretative problem or a change of
approach, they can be used to argue that the ECtHR should not interpret a specific
aspect of a Convention provision, and they even can be used to show that a certain
interpretation is not automatically included in the text of the Convention. The com-
parative arguments within these different purposes can either be based on a reference
to one or a few comparative materials or the argument can be based on the existence
of a consensus or trend or lack thereof. In some cases the comparative argument is
the main argument and plays a crucial role in the conclusion, while in most cases
comparative interpretation is used in addition to other interpretative arguments.
It is interesting to note that in the theoretical analysis comparative interpretation
proved to be rather controversial, while the case law does not show signs that this
method is considered controversial. Some dissents point in the direction that the actual
use of this method can be controversial in specific cases, but the method in itself
seems to be universally accepted by the judges of the ECtHR, as can be seen from
the unanimous decision in the case of Demir & Baykara.
168 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161; ECtHR (GC), Üner
v. the Netherlands, judgment of 18 October 2006, Reports 2006-XII.
169 ECtHR (GC), Üner v. the Netherlands, judgment of 18 October 2006, Reports 2006-XII.
170 ECtHR (GC), Üner v. the Netherlands, judgment of 18 October 2006, Reports 2006-XII, § 55.
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The main disagreement between judges concerns the question whether one can
speak of a consensus or trend in a certain case. An important problem in this context
is the fact that it is not clear when there is enough proof for a consensus, as indicated
in section 10.4.1. A related problem is that it is not always clear what is sought, in
that the Court does not provide an unequivocal answer to the question if all Contract-
ing States have adopted the same solution to a certain development, or if it is sufficient
that a trend can be seen fromwhich a minimum standard can be distilled. Both aspects
have led to discussions among judges. Disagreement can lead to useful discussions,
but some disagreements have underlying causes that can be prevented. It might not
be possible to draw up a general standard to determine when one can speak of a
consensus. This is not a mathematical exercise and the context of a specific case
cannot be ignored. Much could be gained, however, if more insight is provided into
the material taken into account for the conclusion and the specific question the ECtHR
seeks to answer. The cases of Sheffield & Horsham v United Kingdom and T v United
Kingdom were instructive in this regard, where judges disagreed on what was neces-
sary to constitute a consensus in this case. If the ECtHR is clear on the specific
question it seeks to answer, this type of disagreement might be prevented, which
ultimately will benefit the credibility of the method.
An aspect that played an important role in the theoretical analysis, but which has
not appeared to play a role in the case law, is the distinction between internal and
external comparative interpretation and the related need for a different justification.
The ECtHR does seem to provide an additional justification for relying on external
materials, namely Article 31(c) VCLT, which refers to rules of international law
applicable in the relation between the parties and the fact that the ECtHR does not
operate in a vacuum. This justification can, however, not explain why in some cases
the ECtHR looks at foreign jurisdictions, like the United States of America, or to
international treaties that have not been ratified by all parties concerned or international
soft law. Indeed, in Demir and Baykara the Court even stressed that no difference
needs to be made between the different sources. Nevertheless, a different justification
is necessary if the ECtHR really wants to convince outsiders of the relevance of these
materials for the interpretation of the European Convention. Amore specific justifica-
tion would also help to explain the choice of certain materials. In the international
arena different materials can be found that support different positions. A justification
is therefore necessary that helps to explain the choice of the chosen materials.
In a few cases the ECtHR justified comparative arguments by calling them helpful.
The theoretical analysis indicated that the fact that comparative data can be helpful
is not a sufficient justification, because it does not indicate ‘why’ or ‘how’ these
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materials are helpful.171 From this perspective an additional justification would be
warranted as well.
Both the problem of unclear use of comparative interpretation, mainly when the
ECtHR seeks to find a consensus, and the question of finding a justification can have
an impact on the credibility and objectivity of this method. This is especially problem-
atic in the context of comparative arguments. Given the wealth of materials available
not indicating why certain materials have been taken into consideration leaves this
method vulnerable to criticism. Cherry-picking is an often heard term and refers to
the fact that support can be found for any argument if you cite the correct material
(the ‘cherries’). More insight into the use of this method might not entirely prevent
this criticism, but it might at least lead to significant reduction.
The method is highly valued as indicated before; the question is therefore how
this method can be enhanced. The areas of concern have been identified, but the
question is whether any suggestions can be provided for actual improvement. Because
comparative interpretation is onemethod in an interpretative framework, this question
will be dealt with after the other methods and principles have been analyzed as well.
This question will thus be reserved for the final synthesis.




THE CASE LAW OF THE ECTHR
Evolutive interpretation is a well-known interpretative aid in the case law of the
ECtHR. The theoretical discussion in Chapter 7 already indicated its importance for
the interpretation of the European Convention. The theoretical analysis indicated that
evolutive interpretation could be seen as a meta-teleological interpretative principle.
The question to be answered in this chapter is whether the Court provides any indica-
tion to support this conclusion or whether the Court remains silent on the nature of
evolutive interpretation as an interpretative aid.
The theoretical analysis further indicated that references to evolutive interpretation
will often be justified by invoking the Preamble and the text of the Convention. The
Preamble points to further realization of human rights and the text of the Convention
is written in the present tense. The question phrased for further analysis in that chapter
is whether any express justification is provided by the Court for the use of evolutive
interpretation and whether this justification corresponds to the academic explanation.
In order to get a proper understanding of evolutive interpretation it is necessary
to analyze the type of situations in which evolutive interpretation is used. Is this
interpretative aid used for the interpretation of all Convention provisions, or only for
some? Is evolutive interpretation used in different types of situations or only in specific
types of situations?
The most controversial aspect of evolutive interpretation is that it is not clear how
far a judge may take this interpretative aid. Can a judge rewrite the Convention
according to present-day conditions or are there any restraints? Some theoretical limits
have been discussed in Chapter 7 and it is highly interesting to see whether the Court
is aware of this controversy and how it addresses that aspect of evolutive interpreta-
tion. A related concern for evolutive interpretation is that there is no guiding principle.
It is not always clear how evolutive interpretation is established. Comparative inter-
pretation seems to play an important role, but this chapter will also investigate whether
that is the only way to establish an evolutive interpretation or whether other methods
play a role as well.
These questions will be addressed in the course of this chapter in order to get
a better understanding of the perspective of the ECtHR on evolutive interpretation.
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11.1 IDENTIFICATION OF EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION IN THE CASE LAW
In order to provide an overview of the approach of the ECtHR to evolutive interpreta-
tion it is necessary to first establish what the Court means by evolutive interpretation.
A closely related question is how evolutive interpretation can be identified in the
Court’s cases. The terms by which the Court refers to evolutive interpretation reveal
to a certain extent the meaning of evolutive interpretation. Discussing the two ques-
tions separately would lead to unnecessary repetition. Therefore this section will
endeavour to answer what evolutive interpretation means to the Court, while revealing
simultaneously the indicators for evolutive interpretation.
The Court never extensively explained what it considers to be evolutive interpreta-
tion. Yet the case law does provide some indications on how the Court perceives this
interpretative aid. A case like Kress shows that in the eyes of the Court evolutive
interpretation means:
that the Convention is a living instrument to be interpreted in light of current conditions and
of the ideas prevailing in democratic States today.1
In other cases the more commonly used term ‘present-day conditions’ has been linked
to the Convention as a living instrument and thus evolutive interpretation:2
1 ECtHR (GC), Kress v. France, judgment of 7 June 2001, Reports 2001-VI, § 70. A similar statement
has been made in ECtHR, Johnston and others v. Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986, Series
A No. 112, § 53: ... the Convention and its Protocols must be interpreted in the light of present-day
conditions’. It continued to state the limits of this approach, which will be discussed in section 11.3.
below. In ECtHR (GC), T v. United Kingdom, judgment of 16 December 1999, unpublished, § 70
the Court expressed itself in similar terms as well: In doing so, it has regard to the principle, well
established in its case-law that, since the Convention is a living instrument, it is legitimate when
deciding whether a certain measure is acceptable under one of its provisions to take account of the
standards prevailing amongst the Member States of the Council of Europe’. See also: ECtHR, Van
der Mussele v. Belgium, judgment of 23 November 1983, Series A No. 70, § 32.
2 See for example ECtHR, Société Colas Est and others v. France, judgment of 16 April 2002, Reports
2002-III, § 41; ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161,
§ 102; dissenting opinion in ECtHR (GC), Hatton and others v. United Kingdom, judgment of 8 July
2003, Reports 2003-VII, § 2; ECtHR, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series
A No. 26, § 31; ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports 2001-VII, § 26;
ECtHR, Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A No. 264, § 35;
ECtHR, S.A. Dangeville v. France, judgment of 16 April 2002, Reports 2002-III, § 47; ECtHR (GC),
Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished, § 68 and § 146; ECtHR
(GC), Banković and others v. Belgium and others, decision of 12 December 2001, Reports 2001-XII,
§ 64; ECtHR (GC), Selmouni v. France, judgment of 28 July 1999, Reports 1999-V, § 101; ECtHR
(GC), Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I, § 121;
ECtHR (GC), Vo v. France, judgment of 8 July 2004, Reports 2004-VIII, § 82.
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The Court reiterates that the Convention is a living instrument, which must be interpreted
in the light of present-day conditions.3
A recurring aspect in all cases is that the Convention provisions have to be interpreted
according to present-day circumstances and not ‘solely in accordance with the in-
tentions of their authors as expressed more than forty years ago’.4 The Convention
is thus not a static or frozen document, but on the contrary evolves with the passage
of time.
Evolutive interpretation thus means that the interpretation of the Convention will
evolve. An almost inevitable follow-up question is what this element of ‘evolution’
means. Does evolutive interpretation mean that the interpretation of Convention
provisions develops for better or for worse throughout the years? Or does evolutive
interpretation mean that increasingly more protection will be afforded in line with
changes in society? In other words, will a decrease in human rights standards also
be adopted as an evolutive interpretation or will only developments that lead to a
higher form of protection be taken into account when relying on evolutive interpreta-
tion? The term itself does not provide a conclusive answer to these questions. For-
tunately, the matter has been addressed by the Court in a number of cases. The prime
example mentioned in most scholarly writings is the case of Selmouni, which dealt
with the question whether specific ill-treatment had to be qualified as torture or
inhuman treatment. In this case the Court, after stating that the Convention is a living
instrument, considered that:
It takes the view that the increasingly high standards being required in the area of the
protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires
greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies.5
More recently, the Court confirmed this approach and more explicitly linked evolutive
interpretation to these “higher standards”:
… it is appropriate to remember that the Convention is a living instrument which must be
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions, and in accordance with developments in
international law, so as to reflect the increasingly high standard being required in the area
of protection of human rights, thus necessitating greater firmness in assessing breaches of
fundamental values of democratic societies.6
3 ECtHR, Société Colas Est and others v. France, judgment of 16 April 2002, Reports 2002-III, § 41.
4 ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, SeriesANo. 310,
§ 71. The approach is subject to limitations which will be discussed below.
5 ECtHR (GC), Selmouni v. France, judgment of 28 July 1999, Reports 1999-V, § 101, emphasis added.




The Court thus considers that evolutive interpretation is a means to reflect the increas-
ingly high standards in the area of human rights.7 The examples confirm that the
ECtHR does not consider evolutive interpretation to be a neutral interpretative aid,
but should reflect the progress in human rights protection. This conclusion has been
confirmed in the dissenting opinion inHatton v United Kingdom, where the dissenters
considered that:
this evolutive interpretation by the Commission and the Court of various Convention require-
ments has generally been “progressive”, in the sense that they have gradually extended and
raised the level of protection afforded to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention
to develop the “European public order”.8
These statements indicate that in the view of the Court evolutive interpretation is not
neutral, but should be progressive. The question is whether this aim is tenable in every
situation as pointed out in the theoretical chapter. Often more protection in one area
will mean less protection in another area, because fundamental rights can conflict.
Granting more protection for the freedom of expression, for example, might conflict
with the right to protect one’s privacy, one’s reputation or the right not to be dis-
criminated against. The examples from the case law indicate that the fact that this
does is not an aspect that the Court acknowledges, at least not explicitly.
So far several indicators of an evolutive approach have been mentioned. Apart from
the cases where the Court literally refers to notions such as ‘living instrument’,
‘evolutive interpretation’ or any term derived from the word ‘evolutive’,9 there are
other ways in which the Court signals that it will take an evolutive approach. As
indicated above, the Court frequently refers to present-day conditions, but also without
7 This is also confirmed in the recent cases of ECtHR (GC), A v. Croatia, judgment of 14 October
2010, unpublished; ECtHR, Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, judgment of 12
October 2006, Reports 2006-XI; ECtHR, Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, judgment of 7 January 2010,
unpublished.
8 ECtHR (GC), Hatton and others v. United Kingdom, judgment of 8 July 2003, Reports 2003-VII,
dissenting opinion by Judges Costa, Ress, Türmen, Zupancic and Steiner.
9 Like evolution’ ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A No. 31, § 41;
evolving’ ECtHR, M.C. v. Bulgaria, judgment of 4 December 2003, Reports 2003-XII, § 155-164,
ECtHR (GC), I v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI, § 54, ECtHR (GC),
Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI, § 74; for evo-
lutive interpretation’ see ECtHR, Johnston and others v. Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986,
Series A No. 112, § 53-57.
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the additional qualification of the Convention as a living instrument.10 Beside these
regularly used references to the Convention as a living instrument or present-day
conditions, there are other less frequently used terms that indicate an evolutive
approach. When the Court refers to a ‘dynamic approach’11 or to ‘changing con-
ditions’12 it also applies evolutive interpretation. The Court in its case law does not
provide any reason to assume that the difference in signalling terms is more than a
mere change of words. The terminology is different, but all terms are used alternatively
to refer to the same concept, namely an evolutive approach. The common denominator
in all the different ways of indicating evolutive interpretation is that the Court refers
to an element of change, an element of development, which is the characteristic feature
of evolutive interpretation.
One final element still needs to be discussed, because it will also shed light on the
real meaning of the concept of evolutive interpretation in the Court’s case law, which
is whether the Court classifies this interpretative aid as a principle or as a method
of interpretation. The Court has never pronounced itself on the character of this
interpretative aid. Therefore the issue has to be addressed on the basis of indirect
information, i.e. on various indications as to its use in the case law under study.
Although a definitive conclusion as to the classification of evolutive interpretation
can best be given at the end of this chapter, the discussion on the meaning of evolutive
interpretation in this section warrants at least a preliminary answer. The fact that the
Court keeps referring to the Convention as a living instrument and in Demir &
Baykara referred to the ‘living nature’13 of the Convention can be taken as a clear
indication that the Court does not see evolutive interpretation as a technique to
establish the meaning of the Convention. It seems to imply that the Court considers
10 ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A No. 31, § 41; ECtHR (GC), I v.
United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI, § 55; ECtHR (GC), Christine Goodwin
v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI, § 75; ECtHR, Johnston and others
v. Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A No. 112, § 30; ECtHR, Cossey v. United
Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A No. 184, § 35; ECtHR, F v. Switzerland,
judgment of 18 December 1987, Series A No. 128, § 33; ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 9
October 1979, Series A No. 32, § 26; ECtHR, James and others v. United Kingdom, judgment of
21 February 1986, Series A No. 98, concurring opinion by Thór Vilhjálmsson.
11 ECtHR (GC), I v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI, § 54; ECtHR (GC),
Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI, § 74; ECtHR,
Société Colas Est and others v. France, judgment of 16 April 2002, Reports 2002-III, § 41; ECtHR,
Pretty v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 April 2002, Reports 2002-III, § 54.
12 ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X, § 47;
ECtHR (GC), I v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI, § 54, ECtHR (GC),
Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI,§ 74.
13 ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished, § 146.
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evolutive interpretation to be an aim that it seeks to achieve, but not a method that
provides a substantive argument that helps to interpret the Convention.14 The refer-
ence to ‘present-day conditions’, however, might imply that the Court does view
evolutive interpretation as a method whereby these present-day conditions are used
as a reference point to establish an evolutive interpretation. At this point in the
discussion, an argument can thus be made going either way. The discussion in the
following sections will perhaps make it possible to draw more decisive conclusions.
11.2 WHY INVOKED BY THE COURT?
The concept of evolutive interpretation has by now been well-established in the case
law of the Court,15 but what justification has been provided for invoking this inter-
pretative aid? The best starting point for that discussion is the case in which the very
concept was introduced into the case law of the Court.
The first case in which the Court referred to evolutive interpretation or at least to
what later has become known as evolutive interpretation is the case of Tyrer.16 This
case concerned a schoolboy who was sentenced to three strokes of the birch, which
were administered to him on the bare posterior and in the presence of his father. He
complained that this sentence constituted a breach of Article 3 ECHR (prohibition
of inhuman and degrading treatment). In answering the question whether this consti-
tuted degrading treatment, the Court, for the first time, classified the Convention as
a living instrument that had to be interpreted in light of present-day conditions.
Interestingly enough the Court did not provide any reasons for invoking this new
approach. It merely stated:
The Court must also recall that the Convention is a living instrument which, as the Commis-
sion rightly stressed, must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.17
Attention should be paid to the word ‘recall’ as that implies that this concept has been
invoked before, which seems to indicate a justification for the use of evolutive
interpretation in this case. The fact that the Court itself or the Commission applied
evolutive interpretation before could justify the Court’s use of this approach. However,
14 See Chapter 4.1. on a more detailed discussion of the distinction between interpretation methods
and principles that will be adhered to in this thesis.
15 ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, SeriesANo. 310;
ECtHR (GC), Banković and others v. Belgium and others, decision of 12 December 2001, Reports
2001-XII.
16 ECtHR, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A No. 26.
17 ECtHR, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A No. 26, § 31. Italics added.
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such prior justification cannot be found in the case law of the Court; Tyrer is generally
acknowledged to be the first case where these evolutive concepts have been
invoked.18 In the quoted passage the Court refers explicitly to the Commission, which
suggests that the Commission in this case or in an earlier case relied on the Conven-
tion as a living instrument that should be read in light of present-day conditions. The
report of the Commission in the Tyrer case itself did not mention this approach
explicitly; the applicant and government, however, both indirectly evoked an evolutive
interpretation by referring to modern development in juvenile punishments and by
referring to the fact that not all countries have abolished corporal punishment. The
Commission did not address these arguments and was silent on evolutive interpretation,
so that cannot explain the Court’s reference to evolutive interpretation. Earlier Com-
mission reports reveal that only once, in the context of the interpretation of Article
11, reference has been made by the Commission to the need to keep the interpretation
of the Convention in pace with the dynamic international context.19 This reference
shows that the Commission was already welcoming towards an evolutive approach,
but it did not provide a thorough justification for the use of evolutive interpretation.
While the Court in Tyrer could at that time not predict that evolutive interpretation
would become a characteristic element of the Strasbourg reasoning, it should at least
have properly referred to the precedent that justified the reliance on this new approach
to interpretation. Now subsequent case law relied on a precedent that is unclear about
the justification for introducing a specific element in the Court’s reasoning.
Shortly after the Tyrer case the Court applied an evolutive approach in the case
of Airey as well.20 In this case the ECtHR did provide some kind of justification
for invoking reliance on an evolutive interpretation. The case concerned the question
whether in the specific circumstances of that case Article 6 included an obligation
for the Contracting States to grant legal aid in order to safeguard an effective right
of access to a court. The Court concluded that such an obligation existed in this case
and in its reasoning referred to the fact that:
[T]he Convention must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions ... and it is
designed to safeguard the individual in a real and practical way as regards those areas with
which it deals ... .21
With the latter remark the Court referred back to an earlier passage in the judgment
where the Court held that ‘the Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that
18 Vanneste (2010), p. 244; Ost (1992), p. 302; Matscher (1993), p. 68; Christoffersem (2009), 47;
Bernhardt (1999), p. 18; Mowbray (2005), p. 60; Prebensen (2000), p. 1123; Mahoney (1990), p. 61.
19 ECHR, Svenska Lokmannaförbundet v. Sweden, report of 27 May 1974, Series B. No. 18, p. 39.
20 ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A No. 32.
21 ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A No. 32, § 26.
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are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective’.22 Evolutive
interpretation is thus a way to keep the Convention alive and capable of offering
effective protection. The Court often refers to these two aspects, evolutive interpreta-
tion and practical and effective protection in one paragraph, but not always expressly
connects the two. In the case of Stec the ECtHR expressly provided this connection
and added another justification:
Since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human rights, the
Court must have regard to the changing conditions within the respondent State and within
Contracting States generally, and must interpret and apply the Convention in a manner which
renders its rights practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory.23
The Court thus links the need for an evolutive approach to the nature of the system,
namely a system to protect human rights. The underlying presumption for the Court
must be that human rights reflect fundamental moral standards and, since these
standards are subject to progressive change, so too should the standards laid down
in the Convention.24 The fear of provisions becoming a dead letter justifies, where
necessary, an evolutive approach. This is not a very elaborate justification, but at least
the Court provides more insight into its own reasoning and the underlying reasons
for its interpretative approach.
A justification that is less often invoked for relying on evolutive interpretation
has been given, among others, in the case of Vilho Eskelinen.25 The Court in this
case was contemplating whether to overrule a previous line of cases (Pellegrin v
France).26 After extensively discussing the difficulty and practical problems and
results of the criterion that had been established in Pellegrin, the Court concluded
that the previous approach had created uncertainty.27 The Court considered that:
While it is in the interest of legal certainty, foreseeability, and equality before the law that
the Court should not depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous
22 ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A No. 32, § 24.
23 ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X, § 47.
A rather similar statement was made in ECtHR (GC),Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment
of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I, § 121. Link also made in ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland, judgment
of 9 October 1979, Series A No. 32, § 26.
24 See section 7.2.
25 ECtHR (GC), Vilho Eskelinen and others v. Finland, judgment of 19 April 2007, unpublished.
26 ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII. This case
concerned the question whether Article 6 ECHRwas applicable to disputes concerning civil servants.
27 ECtHR (GC), Vilho Eskelinen and others v. Finland, judgment of 19 April 2007, unpublished, § 55.
274
Evolutive interpretation in the case law of the ECtHR
cases, a failure by the Court to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would risk
rendering it a bar to reform or improvement.28
The need to reform or improve the Convention is thus considered an important
justification for overruling precedents. This justification nicely ties in with the justifica-
tion discussed above in the sense that both are related to the concern to keep the
Convention protection as effective as possible. The difference between the two lines
of cases is therefore not so much the justification, but the function of evolutive
interpretation, which is why they are discussed separately. In the first line of cases
evolutive interpretation is used to interpret a specific provision and is one of the
interpretative aids used to come to an interpretation. In the second line of cases
evolutive interpretation is only used to justify a new approach, but it does not
necessarily form a part of the interpretative aids that are used to justify the content
of the new approach. The different situations in which evolutive interpretation is used,
will be discussed in the next section. The point of this section is to show that the
nature of the system and the need to ensure practical and effective human rights
protection are the prime justifications for an evolutive approach.
11.3 WHEN DOES EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION PLAY A ROLE?
Is there a specific area of the Convention in which evolutive interpretation plays a
bigger role than in other areas, or is evolutive interpretation used randomly for all
the Convention rights? No clear trend can be distilled from analyzing the case law
in which the indicators discussed in section 11.1 have been found. References to
evolutive interpretation have been made in all kinds of cases, ranging from the
interpretation of Article 1, to Article 12 and even the interpretation of procedural
provisions. Evolutive interpretation has, however, often been invoked in the context
of the interpretation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. Especially in cases con-
cerning Article 8, the Court seems to be more inclined to rely on evolutive interpreta-
tion. The question is whether an explanation can be found for the more frequent
reliance on evolutive interpretation in the context of Articles 3 and 8. The Court has
itself given some kind of explanation for this tendency, but only with respect to Article
8. In the Johnston case, where the Court had to decide whether the right to marry
28 ECtHR (GC), Vilho Eskelinen and others v. Finland, judgment of 19 April 2007, unpublished, § 56.
ECtHR (GC), I v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI, § 54; ECtHR (GC),
Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002,Reports 2002-VI, § 74. Afterwards
in ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished, § 153




included a right to divorce as well, the Court considered that, contrary to Article 12
(right to marriage):
Article 8, with its reference to the somewhat vague notion of “respect” for family life, might
appear to lend itself more readily to an evolutive interpretation than does Article 12.29
It is doubtful whether this one statement can serve as a basis for the conclusion that
the Court is more willing to apply an evolutive approach to vaguely worded pro-
visions, but it at least explains why an evolutive approach is often adopted when
interpreting Article 8. No explanation can, however, be found with regard to the
popularity of an evolutive approach in the context of Article 3. The fact that con-
ceptions of what constitutes torture or inhuman or degrading treatment change over-
time, might explain that the Court relies regularly on evolutive interpretation in this
context. Nevertheless, it does not really explain why this is more often the case in
the context of Article 3, because this justification could easily apply to other Conven-
tion provisions as well.
A second interpretation of the central question in this section concerns the type of
situation in which the Court employs evolutive interpretation. As a result of the
meaning of evolutive interpretation, namely that the Convention will be interpreted
in light of present-day conditions, this interpretative aid will mainly be invoked when
the Court is confronted with a new situation. This new situation arises generally
because an applicant invokes the Convention in a situation in which the Convention
has not been applied before. Either this is because the situation has not yet been placed
before the Court, or it is because an applicant challenges the Court to revisit a situation
in which it has previously always denied that the Convention was applicable. In other
situations the Court has already dealt with a certain aspect in the context of another
Convention article and the application forces the Court to consider whether that
approach can be also be adopted in the context of the provision at stake. The case
of Rantsev, for example, was one of the few occasions where the Court was confronted
with the question whether trafficking in human beings was covered by the scope of
Article 4 (prohibition of slavery and forced labour).30 The Court took this opportunity
29 ECtHR, Johnston and others v. Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A No. 112, § 57.
30 ECtHR, Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, judgment of 7 January 2010, unpublished. Similar cases where
the Court was confronted with a new situation are, among others: ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium,
judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A No. 31; ECtHR, M.C. v. Bulgaria, judgment of 4 December
2003, Reports 2003-XII; ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment of 23March
1995, Series A No. 310; ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A No. 32;
ECtHR, Van der Mussele v. Belgium, judgment of 23 November 1983, Series A No. 70; ECtHR,
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to discuss this question in light of the fact that trafficking in human beings had not
been a big problem at the time of the conclusion of the Convention, it has grown
to be a major problem in present-day society. Even though the text of Article 4 does
not make express mention of trafficking, the present-day circumstances led the Court
to adopt a new interpretation of Article 4 in which trafficking should be seen as a
separate category in addition to ‘slavery’, ‘servitude’ or ‘forced and compulsory
labour’, which are expressly laid down in the text of Article 4.
The case of Ferrazzini provides a good example of a case where the Court is
challenged to revaluate its approach. The applicant in that case complained about
the length of the proceedings in a tax dispute. In earlier cases the ECtHR had held
that tax proceedings were not covered by Article 6 as they were not covered by the
notion of ‘civil rights and obligations’. The government therefore argued that Article 6
was not applicable, but the Court recalled that the Convention is a living instrument
and that:
... it is incumbent on the Court to review whether, in the light of changed attitudes in society
as to the legal protection that falls to be accorded to individuals in their relations with the
State, the scope of Article 6 § 1 should not be extended to cover disputes between citizens
and public authorities as to the lawfulness under domestic law of the tax authorities’ de-
cisions.31
The Court finally concluded that there was not enough ground to take an evolutive
approach and thus tax proceedings were still excluded from the scope of Article 6.
Finally, an example of the last situation discussed above, can be found in the case
of Colas Est. In this case the Court applied an evolutive approach which was already
taken in the context of Article 41 (just satisfaction) to Article 8. The question was
whether Article 8 also included a right of respect for a ‘company’s registered office,
branches, or other business premises’.32 The Court held that it had already concluded
in the context of Article 41 that a company could have a right to compensation for
Tyrer v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A No. 26; ECtHR (GC), T v. United
Kingdom, judgment of 16 December 1999, unpublished.
31 ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports 2001-VII, § 26. Similar cases
where the Court was requested to review its own approach are, among others: ECtHR (GC), Stec
and others v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X; ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and
Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 2 March 2010, unpublished; ECtHR (GC), Selmouni v.
France, judgment of 28 July 1999, Reports 1999-V; and famously the transsexual cases: ECtHR,
Cossey v. United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1990, SeriesANo. 184; ECtHR, Rees v. United
Kingdom, judgment of 17 October 1986, Series A No. 106; ECtHR, B v. France, judgment of 25
March 1992, Series A No. 232-C; ECtHR (GC), Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, judgment
of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI.
32 ECtHR, Société Colas Est and others v. France, judgment of 16 April 2002, Reports 2002-III, § 41.
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non-pecuniary damage. In light of its evolutive approach, the Court considered that
Article 8 should also be extended to include, under certain circumstances, a right for
a company to respect its business premises.
Different uses of evolutive interpretation are visible in the Court’s case law too.
For example, in certain cases the Court has referred to an evolutive interpretation
in order to justify explicitly overruling well-established previous cases.33 The Conven-
tion system does not have a rule of binding precedent, but in practice the Court will
respect its own precedents and will only overrule them when there are good reasons
to do so.34 In these situations there is a constant tension between on the one hand
legal certainty and on the other hand the need for reform. When the Court considers
that there is a need for reform, it refers to the need for a ‘dynamic and evolutive
approach’35 as a justification for disregarding the principle of legal certainty. In this
type of case, evolutive interpretation is usually not invoked to justify a new interpreta-
tion, like in the cases discussed above, but it rather serves to justify the overruling
of a precedent. This means that a new meaning is often given as a result of the
overruling, but the newly chosen interpretation in those cases is not always justified
by evolutive arguments as such. The case of Micallef provides a good example of
the Court’s approach in such cases.36 This case dealt with the question whether there
were enough reasons to reconsider the case law that interim proceedings were excluded
from the scope of Article 6. The Court argued that present-day conditions did warrant
a new approach and thus the need for a new approach was justified by referring to
the evolutive nature of the Convention. The criteria that were developed for the new
approach were, however, not justified by referring to an evolutive approach.
There is also a small category of cases where the Court makes mention of the
evolutive approach, but where in reality it does not appear to employ any evolutive
arguments to underpin its conclusions. Interestingly enough this seems to be the case
in Tyrer, which is elaborately discussed above as the first case where the Court
33 ECtHR (GC),Micallef v. Malta, judgment of 15 October 2009, unpublished; ECtHR (GC),Mamatkulov
and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I; ECtHR (GC), Demir and
Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished; ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v.
United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X; ECtHR (GC),Christine Goodwin v. United
Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI; ECtHR (GC), Vilho Eskelinen and others
v. Finland, judgment of 19 April 2007, unpublished.
34 Supra note 23 (Chapter 1).
35 ECtHR (GC), Vilho Eskelinen and others v. Finland, judgment of 19 April 2007, unpublished, for
the full excerpt, see note 1146. See also ECtHR (GC),Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment
of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I and ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of
12 November 2008, unpublished .
36 ECtHR (GC), Micallef v. Malta, judgment of 15 October 2009, unpublished. The case of ECtHR
(GC), Vilho Eskelinen and others v. Finland, judgment of 19 April 2007, unpublished, is also a good
example.
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referred to an evolutive approach. In another case, Demades, the Court had to decide
whether a home where the applicant did not live could be considered ‘home’ in the
context of Article 8. In both cases the Court recalled that the Convention is a living
instrument, but does not refer to any evolutive arguments in its subsequent reasoning.
Therefore it is difficult to see whether evolutive interpretation played any actual role
in the reasoning of the Court.
The use of evolutive interpretation is not without its limits. It has already been
mentioned that resorting to the principles of evolutive interpretation will not always
lead to an evolutive approach. There are three different situations in which the ECtHR
will generally not take an evolutive approach. Firstly, this is the case when other
interpretation methods, like systematic and textual interpretation, clearly point in a
different direction.37 In Pretty the terminally ill applicant claimed that the refusal
to grant her husband the guarantee that he would not be prosecuted for aiding her
in committing suicide would lead to inhuman and degrading treatment, since she would
have to suffer the final stages of her disease.38 The Court recalled that it had to take
a dynamic approach towards this issue, since the Convention is a living instrument,
but it also pointed to the coherence of the Convention. Subsequently, it argued that
Article 3 had to be interpreted in accordance with Article 2 and the latter did not
confer a right to ‘require a State to permit or facilitate his or her death’.39 An
evolutive approach was thus prevented by reliance on the system of the Convention.40
Textual interpretation is, however, not always sacred. In the case of Al-Saadoon the
Court had to determine whether in the light of recent circumstances Articles 2 and 3
should be interpreted to prohibit the death penalty at all times, even though the text
of Article 2 explicitly allows the death penalty in some circumstances.41 After careful
consideration the Court took an evolutive approach and ignored the text of the Conven-
37 See Prebensen (2000), p. 1131, where he argues that the ECtHR will generally not take an evolutive
approach when this is outweighed by primary means of interpretation.
38 ECtHR, Pretty v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 April 2002, Reports 2002-III, § 54.
39 ECtHR, Pretty v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 April 2002, Reports 2002-III, § 54.
40 A similar argument was made in ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series
A No. 161, § 103. In ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports 2001-VII,
the text of the provision which included the word civil seemed to be an insurmountable obstacle;
in ECtHR, Quark Fishing Limited v. United Kingdom, decision of 19 September 2006, unpublished,
the Court indicated that it cannot unwrite a provision.
41 ECtHR, Al-Saadoon andMufdhi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 2March 2010, unpublished, § 120.
Earlier in the case of ECtHR (GC), Öcalan v. Turkey, judgment of 12 May 2005, Reports 2005-IV
a similar approach was taken with regard to the prohibition of the death penalty in peace time. The
ECtHR held that the Contracting States had opted for the traditional method of amendment with regard
to the prohibition of the death penalty at all times and did not consider it appropriate to adopt an
evolutive approach in this latter context.
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tion. This example should, however, be seen as an exception, since the Court in this
case could find strong support in the existence of Protocol 13 which completely
abolished the death penalty and which was ratified by a large majority of Contracting
States. It is more common for the Court to regard a clear understanding of a certain
Convention provision that is warranted on the basis of systemic and textual interpreta-
tion as an obstacle for an evolutive approach.
Secondly, in some cases there is not enough support to substantiate an evolutive
interpretation, like in the case of Vo.42 The question in Vo was whether a foetus
fell within the scope of the right to life. The Court in this case held that there was
no consensus in Europe and thus the Court did not take an evolutive approach. This
can be a highly controversial limit on evolutive interpretation, since there are different
views on the level of support needed for an evolutive approach.43 This problematic
aspect of finding a consensus has been discussed in section 6.1.6.2 on comparative
interpretation. A somewhat contradictory situation seems to have presented itself in F.
The question was whether Switzerland was allowed to impose a marriage ban after
someone got a divorce. The Court acknowledged that no other country still had a
marriage ban and thus in the light of an evolutive interpretation the practice should
no longer be allowed. The Court, however, argued that states do not necessarily offend
the Convention only due to the fact that they are the final state in a ‘gradual evolu-
tion’. The Court thus did not interpret Article 12 in such a way that it prohibited
remarriage bans, but it ultimately did conclude that the ban was disproportionate.
Finally, in some cases the intention of the drafters is very clear, which may lead
the Court to consider that it cannot ignore this intention.44 This was the reason for
not taking an evolutive approach to the problem at hand in Johnston and Banković.
In Johnston the travaux préparatoires indicated that Article 12 only protected the
right to marry and not the right to divorce. The Court considered that:
It is true that the Convention and its Protocols must be interpreted in light of present-day
conditions. However, the Court cannot, by means of an evolutive interpretation, derive from
these instruments a right that was not included therein at the outset. This is particularly so
here, where the omission was deliberate.45
42 ECtHR (GC), Vo v. France, judgment of 8 July 2004, Reports 2004-VIII. See also: ECtHR, Schalk
and Kopf v. Austria, judgment of 24 June 2010, unpublished, where the Court indicated that there
was no consensus on opening the institution of marriage for homosexual couples.
43 See dissent in ECtHR (GC), Vo v. France, judgment of 8 July 2004, Reports 2004-VIII.
44 See ECtHR (GC), Banković and others v. Belgium and others, decision of 12 December 2001, Reports
2001-XII, § 65: ... the extracts of the travaux préparatoires detailed above constitute a clear
indication of the intended meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, which cannot be ignored’.
45 ECtHR, Johnston and others v. Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A No. 112, § 53.
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Thus in some cases where travaux préparatoires are explicit about excluding a certain
right or where they express a clear opinion the ECtHR will not adopt an evolutive
interpretation, because it does not want to go against the deliberate intention of the
drafters. Problematic in this regard is that it is not clear when the Court will regard
the travaux préparatoires as being sufficiently clear to be able to override an evolutive
approach. In Sigurdur Sigurjónsson the respondent government argued that it followed
from the travaux préparatoires that a right not to be a member of an association was
deliberately not included in the Convention.46 The Court only stated that in a previous
judgment no decisive importance was attached to the travaux and continued to discuss
the present-day circumstances. By referring to the fact that in a previous judgment
the travaux did not play a decisive role, the Court does not deny that the travaux
indeed prove that a negative right of association was deliberately left out of the
Convention. The practice of the Court with regard to respecting the travaux therefore
risks becoming arbitrary, because there does not seem to be a clear pattern.
This section has demonstrated the various types of situations in which evolutive
interpretation does play a role or when its limits are reached. There are no strict
categories, but some patterns have been found, which help to get a clearer under-
standing of evolutive interpretation.
11.4 HOW DOES THE COURT FIND AN ‘EVOLUTION’?
The discussion so far has focused on the meaning of evolutive interpretation and the
situations in which evolutive interpretation is used. An important question that has
not yet been addressed is how an ‘evolution’ is established by the Court. Only re-
ferring to evolutive interpretation may not suffice to convincingly justify a certain
interpretative outcome. Evolutive interpretation in that sense only points in a certain
direction, but it cannot justify any substantive meaning of evolutive interpretation.
This substantive evolutive meaning can only be established by using interpretation
methods, such as teleological or comparative interpretation. Evolutive interpretation
in this sense really has all the characteristics of an interpretative principle as discussed
in section 4.1. This section will address the question whether the Court has realized
that it needs to substantiate its reference to evolutive interpretation by using concrete
methods of interpretation and, if so, how it has used the various methods of interpreta-
tion to do so.
46 ECtHR, Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A No. 264. See also
ECtHR (GC), Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2), judgment of 17 September 2009, unpublished, where the
dissenters argued that the intention of the drafters was clear and that the decision of the majority
to take an evolutive approach went beyond judicial interpretation.
281
Chapter 11
In some cases the Court only summarily invokes evolutive interpretation without
demonstrating the concrete existence of an evolution by the use of substantive argu-
ments.47 As a result it is not always clear whether the existence of an evolution has
really been established and to what extent it has been taken into account in the
reasoning in these cases. Moreover, without the use of any substantive arguments
or methods of interpretation, the reference to evolutive interpretation is just a hollow
phrase. A clear example of such lack of care in applying evolutive interpretation is,
oddly enough, the case of Tyrer, which has been elaborately discussed in section
11.2.48 The Court expressly stated for the first time in that case that it could not
but be influenced by the ‘developments and commonly accepted standards’ in the
Contracting States, but it never explained what these development and commonly
accepted standards were.49 This case therefore serves well as a judgment in which
evolutive interpretation was introduced as an interpretative concept, but it is a poor
example of how evolutive interpretation is used.
In many cases, however, the Court does substantiate the reference to evolutive
interpretation.50 The exercise to substantiate evolutive interpretation varies in the
degree of elaboration from very succinct to rather thorough. In the overwhelming
majority of the studied cases the Court resorts to comparative interpretation to sub-
47 ECtHR, Pretty v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 April 2002, Reports 2002-III, § 54; ECtHR (GC),
Kress v. France, judgment of 7 June 2001, Reports 2001-VI, § 70; ECtHR (GC), Selmouni v. France,
judgment of 28 July 1999, Reports 1999-V, § 101; ECtHR, S.A. Dangeville v. France, judgment
of 16 April 2002, Reports 2002-III, § 47; ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979,
Series A No. 32, § 26; ECtHR, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A No.
26, § 31.
48 ECtHR, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A No. 26.
49 ECtHR, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A No. 26, § 31.
50 ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished; ECtHR,
Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A No. 264; ECtHR, Soering
v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161; ECtHR,M.C. v. Bulgaria, judgment
of 4 December 2003, Reports 2003-XII; ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision
of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X; ECtHR (GC), T v. United Kingdom, judgment of 16 December 1999,
unpublished; ECtHR (GC), Chapman v. United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 2001, Reports
2001-I; ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series
ANo. 310; ECtHR (GC),Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports
2005-I; ECtHR (GC), Vilho Eskelinen and others v. Finland, judgment of 19 April 2007, unpublished;
ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports 2001-VII; ECtHR, Van der
Mussele v. Belgium, judgment of 23 November 1983, Series A No. 70; ECtHR, Société Colas Est
and others v. France, judgment of 16 April 2002, Reports 2002-III; the transsexual cases: ECtHR,
Cossey v. United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1990, SeriesANo. 184; ECtHR, Rees v. United
Kingdom, judgment of 17 October 1986, Series A No. 106; ECtHR, B v. France, judgment of 25
March 1992, Series A No. 232-C; ECtHR (GC), Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, judgment
of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI.
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stantiate an evolutive argument, which is not surprising given the reference to present-
day conditions.51 Both comparative arguments resulting from material on the Con-
tracting States and international materials are invoked in such cases. In the case of
M.C. v Bulgaria, for example, the Court based itself on both the changing conditions
in theMember States of the Council of Europe, on changes in countries outside Europe
and on developments in international criminal law in order to show that the under-
standing of how rape is experienced by the victim has evolved.52 As a result the
Court held that the positive obligation for the State had to be interpreted in light of
these developments.53 Likewise, in Sigurdur Sigurjónsson the Court looked into
developments in the Member States of the Council of Europe as well as into develop-
ments at the international level, as demonstrated by references to, among others, a
(European) Community Charter on social rights for workers and the practice of one
of the ILO Committees.54 The Court thus makes full use of the comparative material
available in order to support an evolutive interpretation.55
In only very few cases the Court does not refer to comparative interpretation in
order to substantiate an evolutive interpretation.56 In Société Colas Est the Court
had to determine whether ‘the rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention may
be construed as including the right to respect for a company’s registered office,
branches or other business premises’.57 The Court held that the Convention is a living
instrument and that the Court had to build on its dynamic interpretation of it when
giving meaning to the right to respect for one’s private life. In doing so it did not
51 ECtHR (GC), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished; ECtHR,
Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A No. 264; ECtHR, Soering
v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161; ECtHR,M.C. v. Bulgaria, judgment
of 4 December 2003, Reports 2003-XII; ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision
of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X; ECtHR (GC), T v. United Kingdom, judgment of 16 December 1999,
unpublished; ECtHR (GC), Chapman v. United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 2001, Reports
2001-I; ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series
ANo. 310; ECtHR (GC),Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports
2005-I; ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports 2001-VII; ECtHR, Van
der Mussele v. Belgium, judgment of 23 November 1983, Series A No. 70; the transsexual cases:
ECtHR, Cossey v. United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A No. 184; ECtHR,
Rees v. United Kingdom, judgment of 17 October 1986, Series A No. 106; ECtHR, B v. France,
judgment of 25 March 1992, Series A No. 232-C; ECtHR (GC), Christine Goodwin v. United
Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 2002-VI.
52 ECtHR, M.C. v. Bulgaria, judgment of 4 December 2003, Reports 2003-XII, § 155-166.
53 ECtHR, M.C. v. Bulgaria, judgment of 4 December 2003, Reports 2003-XII, § 166.
54 ECtHR, Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A No. 264, § 35.
55 For an extensive discussion of comparative interpretation, see Chapter 6 for a theoretical analysis
and Chapter 10 for a case law analysis.
56 ECtHR, Société Colas Est and others v. France, judgment of 16 April 2002, Reports 2002-III.
57 ECtHR, Société Colas Est and others v. France, judgment of 16 April 2002, Reports 2002-III, § 41.
283
Chapter 11
refer to comparative material, but it considered that for other Convention provisions
the Court had already extended the scope to offer some guarantees for companies.
The Court concluded that ‘the time had come’ to do the same for Article 8.58 The
present-day conditions were thus reflected in the approach of the Court to other
Convention guarantees, which can be seen as a form of systemic interpretation. In
the case of Al-Saadoon the Court adopted a combined approach.59 The question was
whether under present-day conditions the death penalty could be considered to be
contrary to Article 3. Until the case of Al-Saadoon, Article 3 had always been inter-
preted not to prohibit the death penalty, since the text of Article 2 does allow for
the death penalty in certain circumstances. In the meantime Protocol 13 abolishing
the death penalty in all circumstances had been adopted and ratified by a large
majority of Contracting States. The existence of this protocol and the practice in the
Contracting States played a role in the conclusion of the Court in Al-Saadoon that
the death penalty can in present-day conditions be regarded as a form of inhuman
or degrading treatment.60 The Court in this case thus combined a systemic and
comparative interpretation to give shape to its desire to give an evolutive meaning
to the Convention.
Despite these examples of a different approach to substantiate evolutive interpretation,
the Court’s predominant approach thus appears to be reliance on only comparative
arguments. The situations in which a substantiated evolutive argument will not be
sufficient for the Court to opt for an evolutive approach have been discussed when
dealing with the limits of evolutive interpretation.61 One of the situations in which
the role of evolutive interpretation is limited, is when there is a lack of comparative
support. The question whether in a certain case there is enough comparative material
to support an evolutive interpretation is not a very objective one. The case that was
used as an example, namely Vo, already illustrates this point. In that case the judges
disagreed on whether the comparative findings supported an evolutive interpretation.62
The fact that there is no guideline or minimum threshold for comparative arguments
contributes to the disagreement on the question whether there is enough evidence
to support an evolutive approach. The case law does not provide any help in this
regard, rather confirming the theoretical observation that this is a complicated aspect
of its case law by showing disagreement on the conclusions from the comparative
58 ECtHR, Société Colas Est and others v. France, judgment of 16 April 2002, Reports 2002-III, § 41.
59 ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 2 March 2010, unpublished.
60 ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 2March 2010, unpublished, § 120.
61 See section 11.3.
62 ECtHR (GC), Vo v. France, judgment of 8 July 2004, Reports 2004-VIII.
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results.63 The problematic aspects of relying on consensus or comparative arguments
have been discussed elaborately in the chapter on comparative interpretation. Having
regard to the frequent use of comparative arguments in connection with evolutive
interpretation, these problems are to some extent incorporated in evolutive interpreta-
tion too. At this point it is therefore important to realize that the persuasiveness and
legitimacy of an evolutive approach depends on the quality of the use of comparative
arguments by the Court.
11.5 RELATION TO OTHER INTERPRETATIVE AIDS
In order to fully grasp the role evolutive interpretation plays in the case law of the
Court, it is important to analyze the relation of this interpretative aid with the other
aids, mainly those selected for the purpose of this thesis. Some of the sections in this
chapter have already touched upon this relation of evolutive interpretation with other
interpretative aids, whereby these other aids may either function as a limit to evolutive
interpretation or as a way to substantiate evolutive interpretation. In Soering, for
example, the Court concluded that it could not take an evolutive approach, since
considerations based on systematic and textual interpretation strongly pointed in
different directions and proved to be a clear reflection of the intentions of the
drafters.64 This case again shows the tense relation between the intention of the
drafters and the living nature of the Convention. Only in relatively few cases will
evolutive interpretation have to yield to the intention of the drafters.
The most important relation that has been discussed is that between comparative
interpretation and evolutive interpretation. This relation has been elaborated upon
in the previous section, which showed that comparative interpretation is often used
to determine the present-day conditions in the light of which the Convention has to
be interpreted. This tight relation is not very surprising, as it had already been
observed in the theoretical chapter on the basis of academic literature.65 Some
authors, however, have equated evolutive interpretation to comparative interpretation
and have failed to make a clear distinction between the two concepts.66 While this
63 See for example: the dissenting opinions in ECtHR, Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom, judgment
of 30 July 1998, Reports 1998-V; ECtHR (GC), T v. United Kingdom, judgment of 16 December
1999, unpublished; ECtHR (GC), V v. United Kingdom, judgment of 16 December 1999, Reports
1999-IX.
64 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161, § 102-103. Similar
examples can be found in ECtHR, Johnston and others v. Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986,
Series A No. 112, § 53 and ECtHR (GC), Banković and others v. Belgium and others, decision of
12 December 2001, Reports 2001-XII, § 65.
65 See Chapter 6 on comparative interpretation, but mainly Chapter 7 on evolutive interpretation.
66 Most notably Helfer (1993); Rigaux (1998).
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chapter (and the chapter on comparative interpretation) has illustrated that comparative
interpretation and evolutive interpretation are closely connected, it has also tried to
demonstrate that they are two separate concepts. Each concept plays a different role
in the interpretation process and they can and have been applied independently as
well. Evolutive interpretation indicates the direction in which an interpretation might
go and comparative interpretation provides the substantive justification for a specific
evolutive interpretation.
One of the other interpretative aids central to this thesis is autonomous inter-
pretation. Only very few cases show both references to autonomous and evolutive
interpretation to establish the meaning of a Convention provision, notable exceptions
being the cases of Stec and Ferrazzini.67 Indeed, in Stec the Court explained the
relation between autonomous and evolutive interpretation in express terms:
It is in the interests of the coherence of the Convention as a whole that the autonomous
concept of “possessions” in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 should be interpreted in a way which
is consistent with the concept of pecuniary rights under article 6 § 1. It is moreover important
to adopt an interpretation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which avoids inequalities of treatment
based on distinctions which, at the present day, appear illogical or unsustainable (emphasis
added).68
Thus, also when the Court has adopted an autonomous meaning of one of the Conven-
tion provisions, it considers it necessary to keep it under review whether this auto-
nomous meaning still meets the present-day standards. The Court indicated in Ferraz-
zini, this is not without its limitations:
The principle according to which the autonomous concepts contained in the Convention must
be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions in democratic societies does not give
the Court power to interpret Article 6 § 1 as though the adjective “civil” (with the restriction
that that adjective necessarily places on the category of “rights and obligations” to which
that Article applies) were not present in the text.69
Evolutive interpretation can as a result be used to reform the autonomous under-
standing of some of the Convention concepts, however, within the limits of the
wording of the provision. It should be underlined that this has happened in very few
cases.
67 ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X; ECtHR
(GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports 2001-VII.
68 ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X, § 49.
In Stec the Court actually adopted an evolutive approach. In ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment
of 12 July 2001, Reports 2001-VII, the Court in the end did not.
69 ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports 2001-VII, § 30.
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Finally, the relation with teleological interpretation should be discussed. Contrary
to the relation with other interpretative methods and principles, the link between
evolutive and teleological interpretation exists at a more abstract level. It has already
been pointed out that an evolutive approach is often justified by the Court on the
basis of the need to interpret its provisions in a practical and effective manner and
not leave them theoretical and illusory.70 This need for a practical and effective
approach is, according to the Court, required by the object and purpose of the Conven-
tion.71 In justifying an evolutive approach the Court has linked evolutive interpreta-
tion with the need for practical and effective protection.72 Evolutive interpretation
seems to be one of the ways to keep the Convention guarantees practical and effective
and as such it helps fulfil one of the objectives of the Convention. In that sense
evolutive interpretation can be seen as one of the meta-teleological principles of the
Convention and the justification provided by the Court seems to confirm this view.
Even if the Court does not express itself on the nature of evolutive interpretation,
it does consider it one of the purposes of the Convention.
11.6 CONCLUSION
Various questions that still remained after the theoretical analysis of the notion of
evolutive interpretation have been addressed in the case law analysis, resulting in
greater clarity as to its meaning and its use by the Court. The Court evidently is
cautious not to let the European Convention become a dead letter and often refers
to the need to interpret according to present-day circumstances. The question that
was posed in this context in the theoretical analysis was whether this desire to interpret
according to present-day circumstances in practice meant that the Court aimed for
a higher standard of protection. This has been confirmed in many cases by the Court,
where it indicated that the Convention should be interpreted according to increasingly
higher standards. The question whether this is always possible with conflicting
fundamental rights is something that has not been addressed by the Court, but should
be kept in mind when thinking about this tendency of the ECtHR to aim for higher
standards.
The Court has not expressly addressed the nature of evolutive interpretation, which
means that it is difficult to conclude on the basis of the case law analysis whether
70 See footnote 1186 for the quote from ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision
of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X.
71 See ECtHR (GC),Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports 2005-I,
§ 101; ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161, § 87.
72 See among others: ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports




the ECtHR considers evolutive interpretation to be an interpretative method or prin-
ciple. Nevertheless, the justification it often provides for the choice for evolutive
interpretation, namely that is necessary to keep the Convention practical and effective,
supports the conclusion that it is based on a meta-teleological approach to the Conven-
tion. In light of the theoretical analysis, evolutive interpretation as it is used by the
Court can therefore be considered a meta-teleological principle, even though the Court
is unclear about its nature.
There is no clear trend in the type of case of situation types of the ECtHR in which
the Court chooses to apply an evolutive approach. Some trends can, however, be found
in the situations in which the ECtHR does consider an evolutive approach to be
inappropriate. If a textual or systemic interpretation clearly points in a different
direction, this will often trump an evolutive approach. Also when the ECtHR considers
that it does not have enough evidence for an evolutive approach, it will not adopt
an evolutive solution. Finally, in some cases a clear intention of the drafters can be
discerned in the travaux préparatoires, which has sometimes (though not always)
been respected by the Court. The ECtHR thus does seem to be aware of the limits
of this approach, although it has to be stressed that it does not always consistently
apply these limits.
A final point that has been analyzed is how an evolutive interpretation is estab-
lished. This is often with the help of comparative interpretation. Reference is made
to both internal and external comparative material.73 The problems discussed in
section 6.1.6.2 which relate to proving that a consensus can be found, also resonate
when used to establish an evolution. The question whether an evolution exists is
therefore not always clearly proven.




THE CASE LAW OF THE ECTHR
This chapter will address the use of autonomous interpretation in the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights. Autonomous interpretation has been identified in
the theoretical chapter as one of the meta-teleological principles that are used in the
case law of the Court. The theoretical chapter identified meta-teleological principles
as principles that are based on the object and purpose of the Convention, thereby
justifying the use of an interpretation that is in line with the main aims of the Conven-
tion. The question is whether this justification for the use of autonomous interpretation
is actually visible in the case law of the Court, and so whether the Court really refers
to the object and purpose of the Convention as a basis for autonomous interpretation.
Related to this, it will be interesting to see whether the Court clarifies the nature of
this interpretative aid, i.e. whether it can be gleaned from its case law if it considers
autonomous interpretation to be either an interpretation method or an interpretative
principle.1
The theoretical chapter revealed that much is still unclear about the use of auto-
nomous interpretation by the Court. It is not known in what type of situations the
Court relies on an autonomous approach. The theoretical analysis suggested, for
example, that more technical terms, or terms related to the rule of law, are more likely
to be interpreted in an autonomous manner than other terms. One of the questions
to be answered therefore is whether this presupposition is supported by the case law
analysis or whether another pattern can be found.
Furthermore, one of the characteristics of an interpretative principle is that it cannot
on its own justify a specific interpretation.2 The principles only indicate a specific
interpretative approach and do not provide a specific substantive argument on which
an interpretation can be based. Presupposing that the Court actually uses autonomous
interpretation as a principle, rather than as a method of interpretation (see above),
it is to be expected that it will refer to different interpretation methods in order to
find an autonomous meaning of the Convention – an examination of this element
will therefore also be made in this chapter. In addition, and regardless of the way
the Court characterizes autonomous interpretation, the role of autonomous in relation
1 For a discussion on the difference, see section 4.1.
2 For an elaborate discussion, see section 4.1.
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to other interpretative aids will be discussed in order to obtain a better understanding
of the interpretative framework that is used by the ECtHR.
As indicated in the theoretical chapter on autonomous interpretation, this thesis
will only address those cases where the Court has explicitly adopted or rejected an
autonomous approach. The reason for this is that those cases will be most instructive
for the question how autonomous interpretation is used in the case law of the ECtHR.
The discussion of the analysis of these cases in this chapter will be structured along
the lines of the questions and issues for examination that have been presented above.
Thus, this chapter will address what autonomous interpretation means (section 12.1),
how it is characterized (section 12.2), why it is used (section 12.3), when it is applied
(section 12.4) and how the Court applied autonomous interpretation (section 12.5).
The role of autonomous interpretation in relation to other interpretation principles
and methods will be addressed throughout all these discussions.
12.1 WHAT IS AUTONOMOUS INTERPRETATION?
Before going into an in-depth analysis of the role and use of autonomous interpretation
in the case law of the ECtHR, it is useful to discuss what the Court means by auto-
nomous interpretation. The Court in many cases refers to the ‘autonomous meaning’
of Convention provisions,3 but only in few cases does it explicitly explain what this
entails.4 In Stran Greek Refineries the Court held that ‘the concept of “civil rights
and obligations” is not to be interpreted solely by reference to the respondent State’s
3 See for example: ECtHR (GC), Beyeler v. Italy, judgment of 5 January 2000, Reports 2000-I, § 100;
ECtHR (GC), Iatridis v. Greece, judgment of 25 March 1999, Reports 1999-II, § 54; ECtHR, Zwier-
zynski v. Poland, judgment of 19 June 2001, Reports 2001-VI, § 63; ECtHR, Matos e Silva, Lda,
and others v. Portugal, judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, § 75; ECtHR, Gasus
Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands, judgment of 23 February 1995, Series A No.
306B, § 53; ECtHR,Witold Litwa v. Poland, judgment of 4 April 2000, Reports 2000-III, § 76; ECtHR
(GC), Jussila v. Finland, judgment of 23 November 2006, unpublished, § 29; ECtHR (GC),Chassag-
nou and others v. France, judgment of 29 April 1999, Reports 1999-III, § 100; ECtHR, James and
others v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A No. 98, § 42; ECtHR (GC),
Öneryildiz v. Turkey, judgment of 30 November 2004, Reports 2004-XII, § 124; ECtHR (GC),
Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2), judgment of 17 September 2009, unpublished; ECtHR (GC), Depalle v.
France, judgment of 29 March 2010, unpublished, § 62; ECtHR, Storbråten v. Norway, decision
of 1 February 2007, unpublished, § 7. In ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision
of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X, § 49, the Court refers to autonomous concepts.
4 See ECtHR (GC), Chassagnou and others v. France, judgment of 29 April 1999, Reports 1999-III,
§ 100; ECtHR, Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, judgment of 9 December
1994, SeriesANo. 301-B, § 39; separate opinion by Matscher in ECtHR, König v. Germany, judgment
of 28 June 1978, Series A No. 27.
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domestic law’.5 Some of the terms in the Convention are thus expressly interpreted
independently from the classification of these terms in the domestic law of the de-
fending State. The meaning of autonomous interpretation has been most elaborately
explained by Judge Matscher in his separate opinion in König:
In my view, autonomous interpretation means, above all, that the provisions of international
conventions must not be interpreted solely by reference to the meaning and scope which they
possess in the domestic law of the contracting State concerned, but that reference must be
made “first, to the objectives and scheme of the Convention, and, secondly, to the general
principles which stem from the corpus of the national legal systems.”6
This quote confirms the fact that autonomous interpretation means autonomy from
national classifications. However, the opinion by Judge Matscher was a separate
opinion and therefore not necessarily reflects the opinion of the Court. This might
explain why the second point made by Matscher is not visible in the case law of the
Court, as will be shown in this chapter.
From the two examples given above it is safe to conclude that autonomy refers
only to the national classifications of particular terms and not to autonomy from, for
example, the meaning of specific terms within the European Union.7 The following
examples can provide further support to this conclusion:
In this connection the Court points out that the concept of ‘possessions’ in the first part of
Article 1 has an autonomous meaning which is not limited to ownership of physical goods
and is independent from the formal classification in domestic law.8
The term ‘association’ therefore possesses an autonomous meaning; the classification in
national law has only relative value and constitutes no more than a starting point.9
Thus, the general meaning of ‘autonomous interpretation’ seems to be relatively clear
and uncontested in the Court’s case law.
5 ECtHR, Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, judgment of 9 December 1994,
Series A No. 301-B, § 39.
6 Separate opinion by Matscher in ECtHR, König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A
No. 27. Judge Matscher subsequently referred to an CJEU judgment from which this quote was taken
and explains that the latter part of his explanation means that the Court should look for the common
denominator.
7 This aspect of autonomous interpretation, namely autonomy from the ECHR, does play a role in
the context of the CJEU, as will be seen in Chapter 13. Vanneste (2010), p. 232, also emphasizes
that the ECtHR only employs an autonomous approach in relation to the domestic classification.
8 ECtHR (GC), Beyeler v. Italy, judgment of 5 January 2000, Reports 2000-I, § 100.
9 ECtHR (GC),Chassagnou and others v. France, judgment of 29 April 1999,Reports 1999-III, § 100.
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12.2 AUTONOMOUS INTERPRETATION: INTERPRETATIVE PRINCIPLE OR METHOD?
One of the objectives of this chapter is to analyze the role of autonomous interpretation
in the interpretation process of the Court. In order to get a complete picture of the
role of autonomous interpretation, it is necessary to discuss the nature of this inter-
pretative aid as it is used by the ECtHR. The theoretical analysis showed that some
authors recognize the special nature of autonomous interpretation as an interpretative
aid, but the explicit distinction between interpretative principles and interpretation
methods has hardly been made in this context. The question is how the ECtHR itself
classifies this interpretative aid – can any indication be found in the case law as to
whether the Court qualifies autonomous interpretation as an interpretative principle
or rather as a method of interpretation.10
The Court is generally not very explicit on methodological issues, although indirect
indications can sometimes be found.11 As has already been indicated above, the Court
in many cases stresses that particular terms in the Convention have an autonomous
meaning: ‘[i]t recalls that the notion “possessions” (in French: “biens”) in Article 1
of Protocol 1 has an autonomous meaning.’12 The Court has also employed different
formulations by referring to the autonomy of certain notions in Convention provisions:
Having thus reaffirmed the ‘autonomy’ of the notion ‘criminal’ as conceived of under Article,
what the Court must determine is whether or not the ‘regulatory offence’ committed by the
applicant was a ‘criminal’ one within the meaning of that Article 6.13
These examples do not actually reveal how the Court qualifies autonomous interpreta-
tion, but they do to a certain extent reveal the nature of autonomous interpretation.
The Court seems to consider autonomous interpretation as an objective that should
be obtained, not so much as an interpretative technique. By invoking an autonomous
meaning the Court adopts a particular approach towards some of the Convention
terms, namely to take the national classification only as a starting point. The reference
to autonomous interpretation or autonomous meaning does not indicate a certain
technique to establish that autonomous or ‘European’ meaning. Indeed, referring to
the autonomy of a notion seems to imply something about the character of the notion,
10 See section 4.1. for a discussion of the differences between an interpretative method and principle.
11 ECtHR, Golder v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A No. 18 and ECtHR
(GC),Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008, unpublished are rare examples
of the ECtHR addressing methodological issues.
12 ECtHR,Matos e Silva, Lda, and others v. Portugal, judgment of 16 September 1996,Reports 1996-IV,
§ 75.
13 ECtHR,Öztürk v. Germany, judgment of 21 February 1984, SeriesANo. 73, § 50. See also: ECtHR,
König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A No. 27, § 88.
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rather than indicating a concrete interpretative technique that may be used to determine
its meaning.
In a few cases the Court has even expressly referred to autonomous interpretation
as a principle that should be applied:
The Court has on several occasions affirmed the principle that this concept is ‘autonomous’,
within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.14
The Court confirms this case-law on the present occasion. Hence, it considers that the same
principle of autonomy applies to the concept in question; any other solution might lead to
results incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.15
It might be tempting to conclude that the Court considers autonomous interpretation
as an interpretative principle, but that would perhaps be making too much out of these
two references. However, even if the Court usually remains silent on the nature of
autonomous interpretation, these references may certainly be regarded as an indication
that the Court does not consider autonomous interpretation to be a regular inter-
pretation method.
12.3 WHY AUTONOMOUS INTERPRETATION?
The Convention does not make reference to autonomous interpretation, nor does it
contain any provision that indirectly allows for an autonomous approach. While this
does not mean that such an interpretative approach does not fit the Convention scheme,
it does beg for a justification for the introduction and use of this approach. As has
been explained in the theoretical chapter on autonomous interpretation (Chapter 8),
many authors invoke the Vienna Convention to justify the use of an autonomous
approach by international judges. Perhaps rather surprisingly, however, the ECtHR
itself has never invoked the VCLT to justify an autonomous approach (even though
it has referred to the VCLT to justify its interpretative approach in general).
In a limited number of cases the ECtHR provided an explanation for relying on
an autonomous approach.16 In the case of Öztürk, one of the earlier cases in which
the concept was invoked, Judge Matscher in his dissenting opinion explained why
14 ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports 2001-VII, § 24.
15 ECtHR, König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A No. 27, § 88.
16 Most notably: ECtHR,König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978, SeriesANo. 27; ECtHR,Öztürk
v. Germany, judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A No. 73; ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy,
judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports 2001-VII; ECtHR (GC), Chassagnou and others v. France,
judgment of 29 April 1999, Reports 1999-III; ECtHR, Storbråten v. Norway, decision of 1 February




perhaps the Court has not always articulated the justifications for autonomous inter-
pretation very clearly. He considered that:
It goes without saying that autonomous interpretation is the method best suited to multilateral
conventions, and particularly rule-making instruments, such as the European Convention on
Human Rights.17
Matscher apparently considered the use of this interpretative aid self-evident. The
ECtHR, however, in this and many other cases relied on teleological arguments to
justify its autonomous approach as will be discussed below.
There are two related strands of problems that would result were the Court to
defer to national classifications for the applicability of Convention provisions. The
Court has referred to both to provide a more detailed elaboration of the general
justification for relying on autonomous interpretation, namely that another approach
would jeopardize the object and purpose of the Convention. In the first place, the
Court does not want to grant the Contracting States the freedom to shift labels and
thereby avoid having to comply with the Convention requirements. It would severely
damage the effective protection of fundamental rights in Europe. The second problem
would be that, in addition to this, the level of protection would differ per Contracting
State. In States where the domestic and European classification would coincide,
citizens would be afforded protection, while others citizens in similar situations would
be denied this protection. Such an unequal result is undesirable according to the Court,
which is why in cases like Pellegrin18 the Court has adopted an autonomous inter-
pretation. In Pellegrin the Court had to determine in what situations a legal dispute
concerning a civil servant would be covered by the protection afforded by Article
6. The Court emphasized that it would be undesirable if the applicability of the
Convention would depend on the specific national legal situation. The fact that
different Contracting States had different approaches led the Court to adopt an auto-
nomous approach. The following excerpts from both cases reflect this aim to afford
equal protection:
The Court accordingly considers that it is important, with a view to applying Article 6 § 1,
to establish an autonomous interpretation of the term ‘civil service’ which would make it
possible to afford equal treatment to public servants performing equivalent or similar duties
in the States Parties to the Convention, irrespective of the domestic system of employment
17 ECtHR, Öztürk v. Germany, judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A No. 73, dissenting opinion
by Matscher, § 2.
18 ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII. This is one
of the few cases where the ECtHR explicitly mentioned the aspect of equal protection; in others cases
this aspect is often implied in the reasoning.
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and, in particular, whatever the nature of the legal relation between the official and the
administrative authority (emphasis added).19
The emphasis on equivalent protection is also visible in the case of Stec where the
Court had to determine whether both contributory and non-contributory benefits were
considered ‘possessions’ for the purpose of Article 1 Protocol No. 1. The case law
had been contradictory on this point and there were many differences between the
ways the social systemwas organized in the different Contracting States. Both aspects
led the Court to adopt an autonomous approach.
It is in the interest of the coherence of the Convention as a whole that the autonomous concept
of “possessions” in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1should be interpreted in a way which is
consistent with the concept of pecuniary rights under Article 6 § 1. It is moreover important
to adopt an interpretation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which avoids inequalities of treatment
based on distinctions which, at the present day, appear illogical or unsustainable (emphasis
added).
... Given the variety of funding methods, and the interlocking nature of benefits under most
welfare systems, it appears increasingly artificial to hold that only benefits financed by
contributions to a specific fund fall within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.20
In conclusion one can say that the Court wants to control the applicability of the
Convention in order to grant an equal minimum level of protection throughout
Europe.21
In this context it is interesting to note that the ECtHR may sometimes also decide
to revert to a more dependent and subsidiary approach. This is what happened in the
case of Vilho Eskelinen in which the Court in its own words ‘further developed’ the
criterion from Pellegrin, which determined in what situations a legal dispute con-
cerning civil servants would be covered by Article 6. The Court in Vilho Eskelinen
had to decide whether the autonomous criterion developed in Pellegrin was still
workable. The majority concluded that it was not and it established new criteria to
determine whether disputes concerning civil servants would fall under Article 6.
According to the new approach a Member State is allowed to exclude a civil servant
protection under Article 6 if two conditions are met, i.e. that the protection is expressly
excluded under national law and the exclusion is justified on objective grounds. What
is striking about this new approach is that the ECtHR has abandoned the autonomous
approach taken in Pellegrin and opted for a more dependent and subsidiary approach
whereby it still holds some control under the second condition. This new approach
19 ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII, § 63.
20 ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X, § 49-50.




has been heavily criticized by the dissenters, who argue that this variable approach
is an ‘inappropriate step back’.22 Why the ECtHR did not develop a different auto-
nomous criterion, but instead afforded an important position to the domestic qualifica-
tion is not clear. It would have been enlightening for the discussion on autonomous
interpretation if the reasons behind this move had been made clearer.
This raises the question whether the ECtHR really wants to establish a harmonized,
minimum level of protection in all situations. The new approach in Vilho Eskelinen
already provides an answer to that question, but there are other cases that shed light
on this question. There are two cases in which the ECtHR clearly refused to adopt
an autonomous approach, because it would have been too sensitive to harmonize the
different views on this issue. In Kimlya the question was whether Scientology could
be considered a religion in the sense of Article 9 of the Convention.23 In other cases,
which have been discussed above, like Pellegrin and Stec, the fact that Contracting
States differed in their qualification led the ECtHR to adopt an autonomous approach,
so that individuals would be offered the same level of minimum protection. In Kimlya
the ECtHR used the fact that Contracting States differ on the qualification of
Scientology as a religion to argue against an autonomous approach. The ECtHR held
that: ‘In the absence of any European consensus on the religious nature of Scientology
teachings, and being sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role, the Court considers
that it must rely on the position of the domestic authorities in the matter and determine
the applicability of Article 9 of the Convention accordingly.’24 The protection
afforded in this case thus depends on the national classification.
A similar situation arose in the case of Vo, where the Court had to determine
whether a foetus could be considered a person in the context of the right to life. The
Court indicated that there was no consensus among Contracting States nor in scientific
circles on the beginning of life.25 The ECtHR subsequently held that it was ‘con-
vinced that it is neither desirable, nor even possible as matters stand, to answer in
the abstract the question whether the unborn child is a person for the purposes of
Article 2 of the Convention’.26 Like in the case of Kimlya the ECtHR did not want
to apply an autonomous approach due to the differences between Contracting States.
22 Dissenters in ECtHR (GC), Vilho Eskelinen and others v. Finland, judgment of 19 April 2007,
unpublished.
23 ECtHR, Kimlya and others v. Russia, judgment of 1 October 2009, unpublished.
24 ECtHR, Kimlya and others v. Russia, judgment of 1 October 2009, unpublished, § 79. The ECtHR
held that in Russia Scientology was recognized as a religion.
25 ECtHR (GC), Vo v. France, judgment of 8 July 2004, Reports 2004-VIII, § 82. The ECtHR exception-
ally refers to the margin of appreciation of Contracting States in this case, but generally Contracting
States are not granted a margin of appreciation when it comes to the interpretation of the Convention.
26 ECtHR (GC), Vo v. France, judgment of 8 July 2004, Reports 2004-VIII, § 85.
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The reason the Court provides seems understandable, but it is more difficult to
understand when compared with the approach in other cases that have been discussed
above. The differences in the Contracting States triggered an autonomous approach
in those cases.
In general, it is safe to conclude that teleological considerations are mainly at
the basis of the choice for an autonomous approach. An autonomous approach is
necessary to respect the object and purpose of the Convention either because it would
prevent the States from shifting labels or because it would prevent inequality. This
confirms the argument in the theoretical chapter that autonomous interpretation is
one of the meta-teleological principles that has been introduced to protect the object
and purpose of the Convention.27
12.4 WHEN AUTONOMOUS INTERPRETATION?
In the theoretical analysis it has been submitted that autonomous interpretationmainly
plays a role in the context of Article 6 and Article 1 Protocol No. 1. The question
is whether such preference is actually visible in the analyzed case law and, if so,
whether any indications can be found in the case law to explain why an autonomous
approach is adopted in specifically these situations.
There are two different situations in which the Court has applied autonomous
interpretation. The differences between the situations are subtle, but to regard them
as belonging to one and the same category would amount to overly generalizing.
Firstly, many cases where the Court has adopted an autonomous meaning involved
a dispute between the applicant and the government on the applicability of the right
invoked by the applicant.28 The issue in these cases is whether the applicant’s com-
plaint concerns a sufficient interest to fall within the scope of the Convention. The
majority of these cases concern the question whether an applicant holds a ‘possession’
which brings the case under the protection of Article 1 First Protocol.29 In these
cases the Court recalls that the notion of ‘possession’ has an autonomous meaning
under the Convention and tries to establish whether the facts of the case come within
that meaning. This is not, however, a typical situation that does not occur in relation
27 See section 4.4.1.3. and the introduction to Chapter 8.
28 ECtHR (GC),Öneryildiz v. Turkey, judgment of 30 November 2004, Reports 2004-XII, § 124; ECtHR
(GC), Beyeler v. Italy, judgment of 5 January 2000, Reports 2000-I; ECtHR, Matos e Silva, Lda,
and others v. Portugal, judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV; ECtHR, Gasus Dosier-
und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands, judgment of 23 February 1995, Series A No. 306B;
ECtHR (GC), Iatridis v. Greece, judgment of 25 March 1999, Reports 1999-II; ECtHR, Posti and
Rahko v. Finland, judgment of 24 September 2002, Reports 2002-VII; ECtHR, Zwierzynski v. Poland,
judgment of 19 June 2001, Reports 2001-VI.
29 Supra note 28 for references.
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to any other Convention right, since it is basically a matter of applying the facts of
the case. It is therefore not a characteristic situation that necessarily requires auto-
nomous interpretation and may therefore explain a preference for autonomous inter-
pretation in relation to Article 1 Protocol No. 1.
Secondly, the Court has often applied autonomous interpretation in cases where
the domestic classification would prevent a certain case from being protected by the
Convention.30 If the Court would accept such a national classification, this would
determine the applicability of the Convention and, accordingly, the Court’s jurisdiction
to decide on the complaint. While in the first category the dispute concerns the
evaluation of the facts in light of the Convention, thus, in these cases the Court would
not even get to that stage, since the classification under national law implies that the
Convention is not applicable. In some of these cases the Court has explicitly said
that if the Court were to defer to the national classifications ‘the operation of the
fundamental clauses of Articles 6 and 7 would be subordinated to their sovereign
will’.31 Such a control by the Contracting States would be incompatible with the
object and purpose of the Convention according to the Court, as discussed above,
and which can be seen by the following examples:
If Contracting States were able, at their discretion, by classifying an association as “public”
or “para-administrative”, to remove it from the scope of Article 11, that would give them
such latitude that it might lead to results incompatible with the object and purpose of the
Convention, which is to protect rights that are not theoretical or illusory but practical and
effective.32
The Court has on several occasions affirmed the principle that this concept is “autonomous”,
within the meaning of article 6 § 1 of the Convention ... The Court confirms this case-law
in the instant case. It considers that any other solution is liable to lead to results that are
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.33
The protection afforded by the Convention would be hampered if the application of
the Convention depended on the discretion of the Contracting States. The Court does
not want to play games with labels and therefore looks beyond the national classifica-
tion. This general justification for the use of the principle could be relevant to all
30 See most importantly: ECtHR, Engel and others v. the Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series
A No. 22; ECtHR, König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A No. 27; ECtHR, Öztürk
v. Germany, judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A No. 73; ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France,
judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII.
31 ECtHR, Engel and others v. the Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, SeriesANo. 22, § 81. Similar
statement made in ECtHR, Öztürk v. Germany, judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A No. 73,
§ 49.
32 ECtHR (GC),Chassagnou and others v. France, judgment of 29 April 1999, Reports 1999-III, § 100.
33 ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports 2001-VII, § 24.
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rights protected by the Convention. It is difficult to see how this could be a problem
that occurs mainly when interpreting the right to fair trial and the right to property,
as has been implied in academic literature. In many other situations the Court needs
to look beyond appearances and determine an interpretation that might be independent
of the national interpretation. Nevertheless, the question remains as to why the ECtHR
in these situations opts for an explicit acknowledgement of the autonomous approach
in these cases. It appears from the case law analysis that the answer to this question
might be that not only the situation in which an autonomous approach has been
adopted is relevant, but that also the specific terms that have been labelled autonomous
play a role in this regard.
The question is then whether an autonomous interpretation is specifically reserved
for certain terms and not for others. The theoretical chapter indicated that not all terms
have been explicitly recognized as having an autonomous meaning. There are only
a relatively limited number of cases in which the Court has explicitly adopted an
autonomous meaning.34 What immediately attracts the attention when considering
these cases is that they mainly concern the interpretation of two Convention rights,
namely the right to a fair trial and the right to property.35 It seems that in only few
34 ECtHR (GC), Chassagnou and others v. France, judgment of 29 April 1999, Reports 1999-III; ECtHR,
Witold Litwa v. Poland, judgment of 4 April 2000, Reports 2000-III; ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France,
judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII; ECtHR (GC), Jussila v. Finland, judgment of
23 November 2006, unpublished; ECtHR, Öztürk v. Germany, judgment of 21 February 1984, Series
A No. 73; ECtHR, Engel and others v. the Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A No. 22;
ECtHR, König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A No. 27; ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini
v. Italy, judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports 2001-VII; ECtHR, Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis
Andreadis v. Greece, judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A No. 301-B; ECtHR (GC), Beyeler
v. Italy, judgment of 5 January 2000, Reports 2000-I; ECtHR, Matos e Silva, Lda, and others v.
Portugal, judgment of 16 September 1996,Reports 1996-IV; ECtHR,Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik
GmbH v. the Netherlands, judgment of 23 February 1995, Series A No. 306B;ECtHR (GC), Iatridis
v. Greece, judgment of 25 March 1999, Reports 1999-II;ECtHR, Posti and Rahko v. Finland, judgment
of 24 September 2002, Reports 2002-VII; ECtHR, Zwierzynski v. Poland, judgment of 19 June 2001,
Reports 2001-VI; ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports
2005-X.
35 ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII; ECtHR (GC),
Jussila v. Finland, judgment of 23 November 2006, unpublished; ECtHR, Öztürk v. Germany,
judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A No. 73; ECtHR, Engel and others v. the Netherlands,
judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A No. 22; ECtHR, König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978,
Series A No. 27; ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports 2001-VII;
ECtHR, Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, judgment of 9 December 1994,
Series A No. 301-B; ECtHR (GC), Beyeler v. Italy, judgment of 5 January 2000, Reports 2000-I;
ECtHR,Matos e Silva, Lda, and others v. Portugal, judgment of 16 September 1996,Reports 1996-IV;
ECtHR, Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands, judgment of 23 February 1995,
Series A No. 306B; ECtHR (GC), Iatridis v. Greece, judgment of 25 March 1999, Reports 1999-
II;ECtHR, Posti and Rahko v. Finland, judgment of 24 September 2002, Reports 2002-VII; ECtHR,
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other cases autonomous interpretation has expressly been applied to entirely different
rights, namely the right to freedom of association, the right to respect for one’s home
and a specific aspect of the right to freedom of liberty.36 In the case of Chassagnou
the ECtHR had to establish whether French hunting associations were associations
within the meaning of Article 11 of the Convention.37 The Court held that the term
‘association’ has an autonomous meaning and concluded that the hunting association
was indeed an association within the meaning of Article 11. In the case of Witold
Litwa the Court determined that the term ‘alcoholic’ expressed in Article 5 of the
Convention had an autonomous meaning.38 In the cases of Prokopovich and Hartung
the Court determined that the notion ‘home’ is an autonomous concept which does
not depend on classification under domestic law.39 The ECtHR has also relied on
an autonomous interpretation in the context of the right not to be punished or tried.40
In that case, however, the ECtHR had to establish the autonomous meaning of the
term ‘criminal’ in the context of Article 4 Protocol 7, but in doing so referred to the
autonomous meaning of the term ‘criminal’ in the context of fair trial. The latter
example is thus not entirely disassociated from the autonomous interpretation of the
right to fair trial. All other cases that have been studied either concern the interpreta-
tion of Article 6 of the Convention, more specifically the interpretation of the notions
‘civil right’ and ‘criminal charge’,41 or the interpretation of the term ‘possession’
Zwierzynski v. Poland, judgment of 19 June 2001, Reports 2001-VI; ECtHR (GC), Stec and others
v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X.
36 ECtHR (GC), Chassagnou and others v. France, judgment of 29 April 1999, Reports 1999-III; ECtHR,
Prokopovich v. Russia, judgment of 18 November 2004, Reports 2004-XI, confirmed in ECtHR,
Hartung v. France, decision of 3 November 2009, unpublished; ECtHR, Witold Litwa v. Poland,
judgment of 4 April 2000, Reports 2000-III.
37 ECtHR (GC), Chassagnou and others v. France, judgment of 29 April 1999, Reports 1999-III, the
applicant objected to the fact that by law he automatically became a member of a hunting association,
without the possibility to undo this membership.
38 ECtHR, Witold Litwa v. Poland, judgment of 4 April 2000, Reports 2000-III, § 76 referring back
to § 57-63.
39 In ECtHR, Prokopovich v. Russia, judgment of 18 November 2004, Reports 2004-XI, the respondent
government argued that the applicant could not claim that the flat of her deceased partner was her
home’ for the purpose of Article 8, even though they had lived their together for 10 years. In
ECtHR, Hartung v. France, decision of 3 November 2009, unpublished, the question was whether
a dressing room of an artist could be considered home’ in the context of Article 8. The Court did
not rule out that possibility, but doubted whether Article 8 was applicable in the circumstances of
this case. The case was finally dismissed on other grounds.
40 See ECtHR, Storbråten v. Norway, decision of 1 February 2007, unpublished and ECtHR (GC), Sergey
Zolotukhin v. Russia, judgment of 10 February 2009, unpublished.
41 ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII; ECtHR (GC),
Jussila v. Finland, judgment of 23 November 2006, unpublished; ECtHR, Öztürk v. Germany,
judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A No. 73; ECtHR, Engel and others v. the Netherlands,
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under Article 1 First Protocol.42 Hence, the case law analysis confirms this trend
that has been suggested in the theoretical analysis. It has been found that the ECtHR
itself does not provide any such explanation. What is visible, though, is that an
autonomous approach automatically leads to a minimum level of harmonization, which
also may be an important explanation. In the theoretical analysis, it has also been
assumed that the reason for an autonomous approach is that the terms in question
are technical legal terms or that the explanation may be found in the nature of the
rights concerned.43 Contracting States might more easily accept a certain level of
harmonization, and thus intrusion on its national sovereignty, when it concerns terms
that do not have strong moral connotations, which is the case for the terms connected
to the right to fair trial and the right to property.44 Once again, even though this
explanation is not expressly embraced by the Court, the cases of Kimlya and Vo seem
to support this explanation.
Of course, however, this does not yet explain the occurrence of autonomous
interpretation in cases that do not relate to technical terms as contained in Articles 6
or 1 First Protocol. In this respect it is interesting to note that most of these cases
have been from relatively recent dates. Chassagnou dates from 1999, Witold Litwa
from 2000, Prokopovich from 2004 and Hartung from 2009. This might justify the
conclusion that the Court is now more willing to apply autonomous interpretation
to other notions than it was before, but it is difficult to warrant such a conclusion
in the light of contrary examples such as Kimlya and Vo.
judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A No. 22; ECtHR, König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978,
Series A No. 27; ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports 2001-VII;
ECtHR, Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, judgment of 9 December 1994,
Series A No. 301-B. See also ECtHR (GC), Micallef v. Malta, judgment of 15 October 2009,
unpublished, where the Court had to determine whether injunction proceedings fell within the scope
of Article 6. The Court established two criteria, one of which is that the injunction proceedings have
to concern civil rights and obligations in their autonomous meaning. The Court thus incorporated
an autonomous concept in the criteria for determining whether injunction proceedings are covered
by Article 6. The second criterion is not autonomous and indicates that the object and purpose of
the injunction proceedings must be taken into account.
42 ECtHR (GC), Beyeler v. Italy, judgment of 5 January 2000, Reports 2000-I; ECtHR, Matos e Silva,
Lda, and others v. Portugal, judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV; ECtHR,Gasus Dosier-
und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands, judgment of 23 February 1995, Series A No. 306B;
ECtHR (GC), Iatridis v. Greece, judgment of 25 March 1999, Reports 1999-II; ECtHR, Posti and
Rahko v. Finland, judgment of 24 September 2002, Reports 2002-VII; ECtHR, Zwierzynski v. Poland,
judgment of 19 June 2001, Reports 2001-VI; ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom,
decision of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X.
43 See Letsas (2004), p. 285; Matscher (1993), p. 70; Harris, O’Boyle (1995), p. 16. This observations
has, however, not been included in their most recent edition. See also section 8.2.
44 See section 8.2.
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12.5 HOW IS AUTONOMOUS MEANING ESTABLISHED?
An important aspect that can prove to be very relevant to the discussion on auto-
nomous interpretation relates to the way in which the Court establishes this meaning.
The reference to the autonomous meaning of a certain notion or provision implies
that there is a ‘European’ meaning of the term in question. How does the Court arrive
at this ‘European’ or autonomous meaning? Can any clues be found in the case law?
Does the Court invoke specific interpretation methods or is there another way to
determine the autonomous meaning?
There is not one standard method to establish an autonomous meaning. In the
case law two main trends can be discerned. In the first category of cases the Court
develops a criterion or a set of criteria which will help the Court to look beyond the
domestic classification and assess the true nature of a certain right.45 This is mostly
visible in the context of establishing the autonomous meaning of a ‘criminal charge’
or the meaning of ‘civil service’ to determine whether Article 6 is applicable. The
case of Engel46 was the first in which the Court employed this approach in order
to establish the autonomous meaning of a ‘criminal charge’ and it has been a leading
precedent ever since.47 In that case the Court had to determine whether disciplinary
sanctions for a conscript in the military constituted a criminal charge within the
meaning of Article 6. After concluding that it had to adopt an autonomous approach
in this case, the Court set itself to the task of specifying how it could determine
whether a charge with a disciplinary character constituted a criminal charge within
the meaning of Article 6. It first took the national classification into account, but it
considered this as merely a starting point. Interestingly, the national classification
of the respondent state had to be considered ‘in light of the common denominator
of the respective legislation of the various Contracting States’.48 Subsequently, it
considered that a crucial factor was the nature of the offence. Finally, the degree of
severity of the penalty had to be taken into consideration. These three criteria de-
termine the autonomous meaning of ‘criminal charge’ under Article 6. The autonomous
45 See for example: ECtHR, König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A No. 27; ECtHR,
Engel and others v. the Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A No. 22; ECtHR, Öztürk
v. Germany, judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A No. 73; ECtHR (GC), Jussila v. Finland,
judgment of 23 November 2006, unpublished; ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment of 12 July
2001, Reports 2001-VII. The same approach adopted in the context of establishing the autonomous
interpretation of Article 4 Protocol 7. See also: ECtHR (GC), Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2), judgment
of 17 September 2009, unpublished.
46 ECtHR, Engel and others v. the Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A No. 22.
47 See ECtHR, König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A No. 27; ECtHR (GC), Jussila
v. Finland, judgment of 23 November 2006, unpublished; ECtHR, Öztürk v. Germany, judgment
of 21 February 1984, Series A No. 73.
48 ECtHR, Engel and others v. the Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A No. 22, § 82.
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meaning is thus not a specific meaning or definition, but rather a way to test whether
the right at national level falls within the category of rights that the provision in
question aims to protect.
It is interesting to note that the Court does not really explain how it established
these criteria. It seems to derive the criteria from the nature of the right, but this
analysis cannot really be supported by any indications from the case itself. The
question how the Court has established the autonomous interpretation can thus hardly
be answered since it is unclear how these criteria have been established.
The Court adopted a somewhat similar approach with regard to the autonomous
meaning of ‘civil service’ in the context of Article 6.49 The ECtHR established in
its case law that ‘disputes relating to the recruitment, careers and termination of service
of civil servants’ are not within the scope of applicability of Article 6, because they
do not concern civil proceedings.50 The question before the Court in Pellegrin was
whether it was fair to exclude from the protection of Article 6 civil servants whose
position was comparable to that of employees under a private law contract.51 The
Court held that a criterion was necessary in order to establish on the basis of the nature
of the employee’s duties and responsibilities whether Article 6 should be applicable,
instead of the domestic label being decisive. The ECtHR adopts a functional criterion
under which civil servants ‘whose duties typify the specific activities of the public
service in so far as the latter is acting as the depositary of public authority responsible
for protecting the general interest of the State and other public authorities’ are
excluded from the protection of Article 6.52 The Court did spend some time on
explaining this criterion it established in this case, but it did not explicitly relate this
criterion to, for example, the text or purpose of the article in question or the Conven-
tion scheme in general. Perhaps one could argue for this case that this is implicit in
the Courts reasoning, but when establishing a criterion that should form the basis
of an autonomous approach, it would be better if the Court is explicit about the origins
of the criterion. This need for a better explanation on the origins or justification of
this criterion is already visible in the judgment itself. Indeed, the dissenting judges
explained that they failed to see the necessity of the criterion established by the
majority and they provided a different solution, which, in their view, would be more
49 As pointed out by the dissenting judges in ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December
1999, Reports 1999-VIII, this term does not exist in the Convention, but the ECtHR uses this term
to determine which cases concerning civil servants fall within Article 6 and which cases are excluded
from the protection afforded by this provision.
50 ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII, § 59.
51 ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII.
52 ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII, § 66.
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in line with the spirit and letter of Article 6.53 While it might always be possible
to disagree on the reasoning in a particular case, at least the starting point for each
of the positions should be clear and that is not the case in Pellegrin.
In the cases concerning the autonomous interpretation of the concept ‘home’, the
Court also formulated some criteria. The Court indicated that the question whether
the notion ‘home’ is applicable depends on ‘the factual circumstances, namely, the
existence of sufficient and continuous links with a specific place’.54 The choice of
these criteria is justified with references to previous case law. Indeed, these criteria
indicate which element in the factual situation of the case counts most for the question
of applicability and thus provides some guidance for subsequent cases. Nevertheless,
the criteria themselves are not often repeated in later case law and they do not seem
to be of great importance to the practical use of autonomous interpretation.
In the second category of cases the Court does not formulate any clear criteria which
reflect the autonomous meaning of the Convention provision or any particular term
contained therein. Examples of this approach can be found when establishing the
autonomous interpretation of ‘civil rights and obligations’,55 ‘possession’56 and
‘association’.57 In the case of König the ECtHR held that the concept of ‘civil rights
and obligations’ should also be treated autonomously, like the concept of a ‘criminal
charge’.58 The ECtHR did provide some sort of criterion to establish when one can
speak of a civil right or obligation, namely by looking at ‘the substantive content
and effects of the right under the domestic law of the State concerned’.59 In that
53 ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-VIII, dissenting
opinion by Tulkens, Fischbach, Casadevall and Thomassen.
54 ECtHR, Prokopovich v. Russia, judgment of 18 November 2004, Reports 2004-XI, § 36 andECtHR,
Hartung v. France, decision of 3 November 2009, unpublished, § 1.
55 In the context of Article 6, see: ECtHR, König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A
No. 27; ECtHR, Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, judgment of 9 December
1994, Series A No. 301-B; ECtHR, Posti and Rahko v. Finland, judgment of 24 September 2002,
Reports 2002-VII;ECtHR (GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports 2001-VII;
ECtHR (GC), Perez v. France, judgment of 12 February 2004, Reports 2004-I.
56 In the context of Article 1 First Protocol, see: ECtHR (GC), Iatridis v. Greece, judgment of 25 March
1999, Reports 1999-II; ECtHR,Matos e Silva, Lda, and others v. Portugal, judgment of 16 September
1996, Reports 1996-IV; ECtHR,Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands, judgment
of 23 February 1995, Series A No. 306B; ECtHR (GC), Öneryildiz v. Turkey, judgment of 30
November 2004, Reports 2004-XII; ECtHR, Zwierzynski v. Poland, judgment of 19 June 2001, Reports
2001-VI; ECtHR (GC), Beyeler v. Italy, judgment of 5 January 2000, Reports 2000-I; ECtHR (GC),
Depalle v. France, judgment of 29 March 2010, unpublished.
57 In the context of Article 11, see ECtHR (GC), Chassagnou and others v. France, judgment of 29
April 1999, Reports 1999-III.
58 ECtHR, König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A No. 27, § 88.
59 ECtHR, König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A No. 27, § 89.
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process, the ECtHR held, it must also take account of the object and purpose of the
Convention and the law of the other Contracting States. Later cases show, however,
that the ECtHR only looks at the effect of the right in question and does not address
the object and purpose, or the situation in other Contracting States.60 The difference
with the criteria for establishing a criminal charge is that these criteria actually indicate
what aspects play a role in assessing whether something is a criminal charge, while
the ‘criterion’ established in König only indicates that the ECtHR must look beyond
appearances. That is basically a different way of stating what it means to take an
autonomous approach and therefore it does not provide much guidance.
In the cases concerning the interpretation of the term possession, the ECtHR took
a similar approach. Often the ECtHR stated that the term ‘possession’ has an auto-
nomous meaning and looked into the facts of the case to assess whether the interest
claimed in the specific case could be regarded as possession.61 The case of Beyeler
can serve to illustrate this approach.62 In this case the parties disagreed whether the
applicant had a property interest that was protected under Article 1 First Protocol.
The Court considered that:
In that connection the Court points out that the concept of “possessions” in the first part of
Article 1 has an autonomous meaning which is not limited to ownership of physical goods
and is independent from the formal classification in domestic law: certain other rights and
interests constituting assets can also be regarded as “property rights”, and thus as “possessions”
for the purposes of this provision. The issue that needs to be examined is whether the circum-
stances of the case, considered as a whole, conferred on the applicant title to a substantive
interest protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The Court considers that that approach
requires it to take account of the following points of law and of fact. [The Court went on
to consider the facts of the case, which proved that the applicant had a proprietary interest
over a painting, even though this right was revocable during a certain period.]63
60 See ECtHR, Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, judgment of 9 December 1994,
Series A No. 301-B;ECtHR, Posti and Rahko v. Finland, judgment of 24 September 2002, Reports
2002-VII; ECtHR (GC), Perez v. France, judgment of 12 February 2004, Reports 2004-I. In ECtHR
(GC), Ferrazzini v. Italy, judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports 2001-VII, the ECtHR took a more abstract
approach and did refer to the situation in democratic societies, which can be seen as an abstract way
of referring to the situation in the Member States, but the Court did not take into account the object
and purpose.
61 See for example: ECtHR (GC), Iatridis v. Greece, judgment of 25 March 1999, Reports 1999-II;
ECtHR,Matos e Silva, Lda, and others v. Portugal, judgment of 16 September 1996,Reports 1996-IV;
ECtHR,Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands, judgment of 23 February 1995,
Series A No. 306B; ECtHR (GC), Öneryildiz v. Turkey, judgment of 30 November 2004, Reports
2004-XII;ECtHR, Zwierzynski v. Poland, judgment of 19 June 2001, Reports 2001-VI; ECtHR (GC),
Beyeler v. Italy, judgment of 5 January 2000, Reports 2000-I.
62 ECtHR (GC), Beyeler v. Italy, judgment of 5 January 2000, Reports 2000-I.
63 ECtHR (GC), Beyeler v. Italy, judgment of 5 January 2000, Reports 2000-I, § 100. See recently:ECtHR
(GC), Depalle v. France, judgment of 29 March 2010, unpublished, confirming this approach.
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The most important observation that can be made on the basis of this excerpt is that
it does not provide a clear idea of what the autonomous meaning of ‘possession’
exactly is. There has to be a substantive interest protected by Article 1 First Protocol,
but that in itself does not provide much guidance. In contrast, the criteria provided
for establishing whether something can be considered a ‘criminal charge’ or whether
a position can be considered to fall under ‘civil service’ provide more guidance by
indicating which aspects are taken into account in the assessment. In order to establish
whether something could be considered a substantive interest protected by the right
to property the ECtHR has relied heavily on precedent, which does help in under-
standing what is and what is not covered by the autonomous meaning of ‘possession’.
Even then, it is still rather unclear what the autonomous meaning of ‘possession’ really
entails, which makes the application of this concept difficult or at least very vague.
Similarly unclear is the approach by the ECtHR in the case of Chassagnou, where
the Court had to establish whether a hunting association was an association in the
autonomous understanding of Article 11 of the Convention.64 The government in
question argued that the hunting associations were public law associations and accord-
ingly fell outside the scope of Article 11. The Court held that the domestic classifica-
tion was only a starting point and subsequently looked at the facts of the case to assess
the hunting association. The ECtHR concluded that it indeed could be considered
as an association for the purpose of Article 11. The conclusion is clear, but the case
does not help in getting a clear understanding of what an ‘association’ for the purpose
of Article 11 means. No criteria were provided and therefore it seems to be a matter
that is decided on the facts of each individual case.
The risk of the approach in the second category of cases is that it is rather strongly
case-based. This is especially problematic, since the terms that are being explained
by the Court, i.e. ‘possession’ in the right to property cases and ‘association’ in the
Chassagnou-case, determine the scope of Convention provisions. Whether or not the
case is covered by the Convention guarantees depends on the meaning given to these
terms. For that reason the Court should be much clearer about the autonomous
meaning of these terms, either by providing adequate criteria for their application,
or by actually providing an autonomous meaning.
After having discussed these two categories of cases, it may be concluded that the
answer to the question how the Court established the autonomous meaning, appears
to be that the Court actually does not define any autonomous meaning at all. It really
takes an autonomous approach, while the term ‘meaning’ has the connotation that
there is one definition that constitutes the autonomous meaning – that is not what
the Court does. The Court looks beyond the national classification and it has regard
64 ECtHR (GC), Chassagnou and others v. France, judgment of 29 April 1999, Reports 1999-III.
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to the nature of the right in dispute. It thus interprets rights in an autonomous way,
rather than giving its own particular definition. The Court’s own reference to auto-
nomous meaning therefore seems to be misleading.
The only two cases in which the Court actually adopted an autonomous meaning
or definition are the case of Stec and Witold Litwa. As these are the only two cases,
it would be perhaps too much to call this a category on its own. In Stec the Court
was confronted with two distinct authoritative lines in its case law, which contradicted
each other.65 The question was whether welfare benefits in a non-contributory scheme
could constitute ‘possessions’ for the purpose of Article 1 First Protocol. The answers
given by the ECtHR in previous cases had been contradictory and unclear, because
there was no criterion to provide guidance on what possession meant in this context.
The Court therefore found that it needed to address this question anew and establish
an unambiguous precedent. By invoking arguments from systematic, evolutive and
comparative interpretation the Court finally determined the autonomous meaning of
‘possession’ in this context, namely that welfare benefits constituted a possession
regardless of whether they were financed by a non-contributory or a contributory
scheme.66
In the case of Witold Litwa the ECtHR had to determine the meaning of the term
‘alcoholics’ as expressed in Article 5. Reference is even made to the Vienna Conven-
tion in order to justify the use of textual and teleological interpretation in order to
come to an understanding of the term ‘alcoholics’. The Court also invokes the travaux
préparatoires to support its autonomous interpretation of the term in question. The
ECtHR finally holds that the term does not mean that for a person to be held under
Article 5 this person needs to be addicted to alcohol, but the term ‘alcoholics’ also
refers to persons abusing alcohol and thereby posing a danger to themselves or the
public. The Court in this case thus clearly, by relying on several interpretation
methods, establishes an autonomous meaning of a Convention term.
The discussion in the case of Stec is not only important to show that the Court
has adopted an autonomous meaning in some of its cases, but also that there is a risk
of diverging lines in the case law of the Court. Especially when hardly any guidance
is provided on how this autonomous meaning should be established, as in the second
category of cases discussed above, the risk of diverging interpretations becomes real.
Judging only on the basis of the facts of each individual case without any criteria
or indication on what is the crucial factor that determines whether a certain concept
falls within the autonomous interpretation of a specific term risks being arbitrary and
contradictory. It might not be possible in all cases to provide an answer as clear as
65 ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X, § 46.
66 ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X, § 53.
The distinction between contributory and non-contributory schemes was no longer justified.
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in the case of Witold Litwa, but some criteria as in the case of Engel might already
provide more guidance.
12.6 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, some of the questions relating to autonomous interpretation could
be answered on the basis of the case law analysis, while in respect to some other
issues the case law did not provide enough information for clear conclusions. One
such issue is whether the ECtHR regards autonomous interpretation as an interpretative
principle or interpretation method, which the Court has not pronounced itself explicitly
on. Nonetheless, the analysis presented in this chapter made clear which role the notion
of autonomous interpretation plays in the interpretative framework of the Court. The
cases indicate that the Court uses autonomous interpretation as an approach to indicate
a specific aim for the interpretation of some Convention terms rather than a method
that provides a substantive element that helps justify a particular interpretation.
Viewing autonomous interpretation as an approach is in line with the concept of
interpretative principles as discussed in this thesis. The fact that autonomous interpreta-
tion is justified with reference to the object and purpose of the Convention supports
the assumption in the theoretical chapter that autonomous interpretation can be viewed
as one of the meta-teleological principles of the Convention.
If autonomous interpretation is only an approach, the question how an autonomous
interpretation is established becomes acute. The discussion in section 12.5 indicated
that in some cases the ECtHR establishes criteria that help to determine whether a
certain factual situation is covered by the scope of the autonomous concept. In other
cases the Court takes account of the factual situation, but has not established criteria
on which to assess the facts in a consistent manner. Only in a few cases has the Court
established a real autonomous meaning of a Convention term. In these cases of Stec
and Witold Litwa the Court explicitly resorted to other interpretative aids (most
importantly systematic, comparative and evolutive interpretation).67 In all other cases
the Court did not explicitly link up with any interpretative aid at all, not even in those
cases where the Court provided criteria.68 The fact that the ECtHR not often invokes
references to other interpretative aids, when using autonomous interpretation, is
problematic in the sense that it risks an arbitrary interpretation, because no reference
is made to a recognized interpretative aid that can justify the choices made.
67 ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005, Reports 2005-X; ECtHR,
Witold Litwa v. Poland, judgment of 4 April 2000, Reports 2000-III.
68 Only in ECtHR, König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A No. 27 and ECtHR, Engel
and others v. the Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A No. 22, the Court mentioned that
the criteria have to be applied in the light of the object and purpose and comparative material.
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The theoretical analysis indicated that comparative interpretation plays an important
role for autonomous interpretation. The case law does not seem to really support this
assumption.
An important part of this chapter dealt with the question when autonomous
interpretation was used. The case law did not provide an entirely clear picture here.
To some extent it supports the theoretical assumption that autonomous interpretation
is mainly used when interpreting legally technical terms, rather than terms that have
strong moral connotations. Terms from Article 6 and Article 1 First Protocol have
been identified in theoretical literature as most likely to be interpreted autonomously.
However, the case law analysis also showed that in the past decade other terms have
also been interpreted in an autonomous manner. The ECtHR might thus be inclined






THE CASE LAW OF THE CJEU1
After the case law analysis of the ECtHR it is now time to analyze the case law of
the CJEU in detail, more in particular the use of interpretation methods and the
reasoning by the CJEU. The aim of this chapter is to analyze in detail the use of
comparative interpretation, teleological interpretation, evolutive interpretation and
autonomous interpretation in the case law of the CJEU. These interpretation methods
and interpretative principles have been discussed extensively in the theoretical part
of this thesis. The present case law analysis will rely on this theoretical discussion
and use that as a starting point. A thorough analysis of the different issues that have
been identified in the theoretical discussion will provide more insight into the reason-
ing of the CJEU. Moreover, it will enable a discussion of the specific aspects that
might be open for improvement.
It is important to keep in mind that this is not an exhaustive analysis of interpreta-
tion methods and principles employed by the CJEU. Other methods, like textual
interpretation, play a role as well in the reasoning of the CJEU. The methods and
principles in this thesis have, however, been selected for the reasons set out in Chapter
4, one of these reasons being the special role that these methods and principles play
in reasoning in a multilevel legal system like the EU system. The other, non-selected,
methods will only be discussed insofar as that would serve the discussion of the four
interpretation methods and principles that are central to this thesis.
The case law analysis will, as has been indicated before, limit itself to a selection
of cases in which the CJEU deals with fundamental rights. In the introductory Chapter
3 on the CJEU, the way in which fundamental rights were introduced into the Euro-
pean Community system was discussed. That discussion will serve as a basis for this
chapter. This means that the emphasis in this chapter will not be on the different stages
that the protection of fundamental rights went through in order to gain a permanent
spot in the EU, but rather on the way in which the CJEU determines the existence
and scope of individual fundamental rights.
The range of cases in which the CJEU deals with fundamental rights is rather
wide. For that reason, it was necessary to introduce certain limiting criteria. Firstly,
1 The case law analysis includes judgments until 31.12.2010.
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only cases have been selected in which fundamental rights played a role that have
a counterpart in the European Convention on Human Rights. This approach enhances
the possibility to compare the Strasbourg and Luxemburg case law approaches. Apart
from the possible comparison, it seemed almost self-evident to limit the scope of
analysis for both courts to the same type of case. As a consequence of this choice,
rights that have been recognized only in the EU context will not be discussed. No
attention will accordingly be paid to the rights attached to the status of citizen of the
European Union,2 such as the right to move and reside freely in the EU.3
Secondly, only cases in which the CJEU dealt with the interpretation or definition
of fundamental rights have been selected. This means that the focus has been placed
on cases in which the CJEU determined the scope of fundamental rights and not on
cases in which the CJEU applied fundamental rights to particular situations. However,
it proved to be challenging to find cases in which the CJEU expressly deals with the
scope of a certain fundamental right. Section 13.1 will discuss this characteristic
feature more elaborately and will explain its background. For here, it is more relevant
to note that a narrow understanding of the notion of ‘interpretation’ would have
resulted in a very small number of cases that could be analyzed in depth. After all,
the particular context of the CJEU, which was discussed in Chapter 3 has as its most
specific feature that only relatively recently has a catalogue of fundamental rights
been formulated.4 The CJEU for quite a period had to proceed without such a
catalogue and it had to employ specific argumentative instruments to construe funda-
mental rights. In order to take this background sufficiently into account, the selection
has been made on the basis of a somewhat broader understanding of interpretation,
namely by looking more generally at cases in which the CJEU actually construes
fundamental rights and which might provide information about the way in which it
determines their scope. Incorporating these cases into the analysis is useful as it sheds
light on this broader use of interpretation methods and argumentative instruments
as well.
The selected cases have been drawn from a variety of sources in order to ensure
that a representative selection could be made. The initial selection, most importantly,
included cases which were mentioned in the Explanatory Report to the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. The cases that have been incorporated in this Explanatory Report
represent in the view of the drafters the most relevant cases from the CJEU concerning
fundamental rights. The initial selection also included cases selected on the basis of
two secondary sources. Firstly, references to fundamental rights cases have been taken
2 For an elaborate discussion, see Craig and De Burca (2008), Chapter 23.
3 See for example: C-200/02, Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department [2004] ECR I-09925; C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v.
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] I-06241.
4 On 1 December 2009 this catalogue became legally binding; see Chapter 3 for more details.
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from secondary literature on EU law.5 Secondly, the selection has been supplemented
with references to CJEU cases drawn from another secondary source, namely a legal
periodical on European human rights case law, in which a relevant selection of CJEU
cases on fundamental rights is regularly published.6
The resulting, broad initial selection has then been narrowed down on the basis
of the criteria mentioned above, namely the fact that the right at stake should have
a counterpart in the European Convention and the case had to deal with the interpreta-
tion of that right (rather than only its application). These cases constitute the final
selection and have been analyzed as to the meaning and use that is made therein of
the four interpretative aids that are central to this thesis.
The discussion of the various cases that is presented in the following chapters will
focus on both the judgments of the Court and the opinions of the Advocate General.7
A general overview of the role of the Advocate General was provided in Chapter 3,
where it was also explained that these opinions are of particular relevance in deter-
mining the use of certain methods or principles of interpretation. For the purposes
of the present chapter, the opinions therefore have been studied in detail, focusing
on the role of the Advocate General in the use of interpretation methods and principles.
The discussion of both the judgments and the opinions will provide a complete picture
of the use of interpretation methods before the CJEU.
The analysis to be presented here has been organized in a slightly different manner
than the discussion of the ECtHR case law, which was provided in Chapters 9-12.
One of the reasons for this is that the CJEU’s work is not limited to fundamental
rights and that fundamental rights have found their way into EU law in a rather
different way than is the case in the context of the ECtHR. For that reason, the
discussion of the CJEU will start by addressing some striking features that have
emerged from analyzing the CJEU case law (section 13.1). The subsequent sections
will deal with an analysis of how the CJEU and its Advocates General make use of
the four selected interpretative aids: comparative interpretation (section 13.2), teleo-
logical interpretation (section 13.3), evolutive interpretation (section 13.4.1) and
autonomous interpretation (section 13.4.2). Finally, some conclusions will be drawn
on the basis of the overview presented in this chapter (section 13.5).
5 The well-known handbook on EU law by Craig & De Burca served as a source for selecting the
relevant cases. Craig & De Burca (2008). This is a widely respected secondary source for EU law
and as a result a reliable source for case law references.
6 European Human Rights Cases. As this journal focuses on presenting a representative selection of
fundamental rights cases, it is a useful source to supplement the other two.
7 The focus will only be the cases of the Court of Justice and not the General Court.
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13.1 THE CJEU AND THE INTERPRETATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
The main task of the CJEU is to interpret European Union law, which includes
fundamental rights as general principles of EU law.8 A few general comments need
to be made about the interpretative approach of the CJEU to set the background for
the discussion on the specific interpretation methods and principles. The case law
analysis clearly revealed the difference in judicial style between the CJEU and the
ECtHR. Even though the ECtHR is not always elaborate in its judgments, there is
certainly a difference with the judgments of the CJEU. The ECtHR, when interpreting
a Convention provision, usually provides a framework (ranging from rather cursory
to rather extensive) in which some general considerations concerning the right in
question are discussed. The CJEU is much more to the point and does not elaborate
much on the meaning of a specific fundamental right. Indeed, the approach of the
CJEU seems to be even more case-based than the approach by the ECtHR; the CJEU
seems conscious not to go beyond what is necessary for answering the specific
question.9 This ‘void’ is to some extent filled by the opinions of the Advocate
General, who often provides a more elaborate reasoning on the meaning of a specific
right.10
To illustrate this, the case of Kent Kirk can be mentioned.11 In this case, the Court
was asked to decide whether a certain provision could have retroactive effect. In reply,
the Court limited itself to stating that:
The principle that penal provisions may not have retroactive effect is one which is common
to all the legal orders of the Member States and is enshrined in Article 7 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as a fundamental
right.12
8 See former Article 220 EC Treaty on the competence of the CJEU and former Article 6 EU Treaty.
Article 220 EC has been repealed and replaced in substance by Article 19 TEU. Article 6 EU remains
Article 6 TEU.
9 For example in the case of Booker Aquacultur, where the Court not even mentioned that this case
fell within the ambit of the rights to property, but only asked whether a violation had occurred, C-20/
00, Booker Aquacultur Ltd v. The Scottish Ministers [2003] ECR I-07411. In the case of Bosman
the Court referred to the freedom of association, but failed to elaborate on the meaning of this right
in relation to the case at hand. Only mentioning a right followed by a extremely terse reaction does
not help in clarifying the scope of fundamental rights for the Member States, C-415/93,Union royale
belge des sociétés de football association ASBL and others v. Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-04921.
10 See for an example of an extensive discussion of the meaning of a specific fundamental right, namely
ne bis in idem, the opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomber in C-436/04, Criminal
proceedings against Leopold Henri Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I-02333.
11 C-63/83, Regina v. Kent Kirk [1986] ECR 02689.
12 C-63/83, Regina v. Kent Kirk [1986] ECR 02689, § 22.
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Non-retroactivity of penal provision was thus recognized as one of the fundamental
rights to be protected by the EU. The CJEU did not explain, however, what this
fundamental right meant in the EU context, for example by addressing the question
whether it is the national or the EU-qualification of the notion of ‘penal’ that counts.
By using such a short and case-based approach, the CJEU does not provide much
guidance to the Member States on the level of protection afforded under EU law.
In the case of Promusicae the CJEU left many questions open in a similar way.13
Promusicae is an organization protecting the intellectual rights of music producers,
who wanted to take action against illegal downloading. The question was whether
EU law allowed Member States to limit the duty for internet providers to provide
data on specific users of their services to criminal investigations or to protect public
security and thus exclude civil proceedings. The CJEU concluded in its judgment
that EU law did not oblige the Member States to extend the duty to provide data.
The CJEU added that, when transposing the relevant directives, the Member State
should strike a fair balance between all the fundamental rights at stake. Reference
was made to the right to intellectual property and the right to an effective judicial
remedy. The Court furthermore mentioned that the right to private life, namely
protection of personal data, should play a role in the balance of interests to be struck.
What the Court did not address, however, was the extent to which the circumstances
of this case actually came within the scope of the fundamental rights mentioned. The
right to private life does encompass the right to protection of personal data, but to
what extent? What kind of data falls within the scope of this right? By not providing
any kind of clarification as to the scope of the rights at stake the CJEU made it
difficult for the national authorities to understand how these rights are balanced.
Especially in such a relatively new context it would have provided much guidance
to the Member States if the Court at least paid some attention to these aspects.
There are other cases, however, in which the Court provides more insight into
the scope of a certain right, for example in the case of Connolly.14 This case con-
cerned the freedom of expression of an EU civil servant, who had published a critical
book on the EU during his leave even though permission to publish the book had
been denied on earlier occasions. The Court indicated, by citing a case of the ECtHR,
that also expressions that offend, shock and disturb are protected by the freedom of
expression.15 Moreover, the Court expressly confirmed that ‘officials and other
employees of the European Communities enjoy the right of freedom of expression
even in areas falling within the scope of the activities of the Community institu-
13 C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de España SAU [2008]
ECR I-00271.
14 C-274/99, Bernard Connolly v. Commission of the European Communities [2001] ECR I-01611.
15 C-274/99, Bernard Connolly v. Commission of the European Communities [2001] ECR I-01611, § 39.
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tions’.16 The Court thus explicitly mentioned two elements of the scope of the right,
namely the content of the right to freedom of expression and the persons protected
by that right.
In the case of Mary Carpenter, the CJEU discussed the meaning of the right to
family.17 Even though it did so in a rather cursory manner, the CJEU did provide
enough of a framework to understand why it considered this case to fall within the
scope of family life. Mary Carpenter, a Philippines national, married an Englishman.
Despite being married to a UK national she was not allowed to stay in the United
Kingdom and was threatened with deportation. The question before the CJEU was
whether her deportation was contrary to respect for the family life of Mr. Carpenter.
The CJEU stated that this constituted an interference with the right to respect for
family life. Subsequently, the CJEU paraphrased the doctrine of the ECtHR, holding
that the right to family life does not entail a right to enter or reside, but also stated
that removing someone from a country where that person has close family ties, may
breach the right to respect for one’s family life. This case thus provided some explana-
tion on the scope of the right to family life.
It is clear, thus, that the focus of the CJEU when dealing with fundamental rights
is generally not on determining the scope of these rights. Rather, the CJEU focuses
on the question whether fundamental rights can be legitimately restricted. That
observation warrants a more elaborate discussion. The CJEU often emphasizes that
fundamental rights within the EU context are always relative and never absolute. In
the case of Wachauf the Court made this clear in a general statement that: ‘The
fundamental rights recognized by the Court are not absolute (…) but must be con-
sidered in relation to their social function.’18 The CJEU continued to emphasize that,
accordingly, restrictions are allowed provided that they meet certain criteria and that
the core of the right is not affected.19 The same emphasis can be seen in the case
of Hauer, where the applicant claimed that her right to property had been violated.20
In this case the CJEU mentioned that the right to property is protected by EC law
16 C-274/99, Bernard Connolly v. Commission of the European Communities [2001] ECR I-01611,
Connolly, § 43.
17 C-60/00, Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-06279.
18 C-5/88, Hubert Wachauf v. Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] ECR 02609, § 18.
19 The rest of the specific paragraph reads: Consequently, restrictions may be imposed on the exercise
of those rights, in particular in the context of a common organization of a market, provided that those
restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and do
not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing
the very substance of those rights’. C-5/88, Hubert Wachauf v. Bundesamt für Ernährung und
Forstwirtschaft [1989] ECR 02609, § 18.
20 C-44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 03727.
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and it recalled the text of the right to property under the European Convention on
Human Rights.21 The CJEU subsequently stated that: ‘Having declared that persons
are entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of their property, that provision envisages two
ways in which the rights of a property owner may be impaired’.22 The Court thus
did not discuss whether the right to property was actually applicable to the case at
hand, nor did it provide information as to its meaning and scope. It limited itself to
stating that the right to property as such is protected in the Community. It spent
considerably more words in this case on the question whether the limitation of the
right was justified. This structure can be seen in many more judgments by the CJEU
as well,23 which clearly reveals a different attitude towards fundamental rights than
the European Court of Human Rights. Indeed, the ECtHR regularly emphasizes that
justification clauses should be narrowly constructed.24
Nevertheless, there are some examples of cases in which the CJEU has actually
differentiated between two phases, such as the case of Österreichischer Rundfunk.25
This case raised the question whether Austrian local and regional authorities and public
undertakings could be obliged to communicate data on the income of their employees
to the National Audit Office. The CJEU first addressed the issue whether the collection
of data on a person’s income with a view to send it to third parties constituted an
interference with the right to private life of that person. After quoting the ECtHR
in saying that the notion of private life should not be interpreted restrictedly, the CJEU
continued to address whether the case showed an interference with Article 8 ECHR.
The CJEU held that the recording of data does not form an interference, but com-
municating it with third parties does:
21 C-44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 03727, § 17-18.
22 C-44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 03727, § 19.
23 See for example: C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others
[2007] ECR I-11767; C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s
Union v. Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779; C-275/06, Productores
de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de España SAU [2008] ECR I-00271, where the
Court does not speak expressly about limiting these rights, but about balancing these rights. Balancing
involves a certain amount of limiting, therefore this case can be regarded as an example of this
approach as well. See also: C-136/79, National Panasonic (UK) Limited v Commission of the European
Communities [1980] ECR 02033; C-94/00, Roquette Frères SA v. Directeur général de la concurrence,
de la consommation et de la répression des fraudes, and Commission of the European Communities
[2002] ECR I-09011.
24 The case of C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de España SAU
[2008] ECR I-00271, also revealed a similar approach.
25 C-465/00, Rechnungshof v Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others [2003] ECR I-04989.
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It necessarily follows that, while the mere recording by an employer of data by name relating
to the remuneration paid to his employees cannot as such constitute an interference with
private life, the communication of that data to third parties, in the present case a public
authority, infringes the right of the persons concerned to respect for private life, whatever
the subsequent use of the information thus communicated, and constitutes an interference
within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention.
To establish the existence of such an interference, it does not matter whether the information
communicated if of a sensitive character or whether the persons concerned have been in-
convenienced in any way [reference to ECtHR judgment]. It suffices to find that data relating
to the remuneration received by an employee or pensioner have been communicated by the
employer to a third party.26
The Court, thus, first interpreted the right to private life as protecting data that were
to be communicated to a third party. Subsequently, the CJEU discussed the justifica-
tion for the interference. However, this bifurcated approach is only rarely visible in
the CJEU’s case law as it has been analyzed in this thesis.
Thus, it can be concluded that the CJEU generally marginalizes an important phase
in the adjudicative process, namely the interpretative phase.27 This does not render
an analysis of the use of interpretation methods by the CJEU useless. Indeed, the terse
judgments are inherent to the French inspired style of reasoning by the CJEU. The
fact that the CJEU adheres to a different style of reasoning does not mean that there
is no point in analyzing the interpretation process. It is, however, a factor that explains
the perhaps more limited results of the case law analysis of the CJEU compared to
those of the ECtHR. It also indicates the importance of taking the opinions of the
Advocate General into consideration, since they may sometimes provide additional
insight as to the scope and meaning of the rights at issue.
13.2 COMPARATIVE INTERPRETATION
13.2.1 Introduction
As one of the main interpretation methods analyzed in this thesis, it is important to
pay attention to the role of comparative interpretation in the case law of the CJEU.
The use of the method should be particularly interesting in the case of the CJEU,
as this court has been classified in the literature as the ‘working laboratory for com-
parative law’.28 Before delving into the analysis of the Court’s use of this method,
26 C-465/00, Rechnungshof v Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others [2003] ECR I-04989, § 74-75.
27 Gerards & Senden (2009).
28 See Hilf (1986), p. 550, where he provides many more literature references.
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it is useful to recall the main theoretical issues that play a role when applying com-
parative interpretation. Chapter 6 has defined comparative interpretation as interpreta-
tion whereby references are made to (or arguments are based on) the law as it stands
in foreign legal systems. The term ‘foreign’ has been explained in the context of the
two supranational courts discussed in this thesis (CJEU and ECtHR) as referring to
any other legal system than the one in which the respective court has jurisdiction.
This means for the CJEU that the term ‘foreign’ refers to any other system than the
EU legal system. In the theoretical chapter, a distinction was furthermore made
between external and internal comparative interpretation. In the context of the EU,
this means that internal comparative interpretation takes place when the CJEU takes
the national legal systems of the EUMember States into account in defining the scope
and substance of fundamental rights, while external comparative interpretation means
that reference is made to any legal system outside the EU (including international
treaties to which the CJEU itself is not a party).
The present case law analysis will take this distinction as a starting point. First,
the use of comparative material from within the Member States will be discussed.
Subsequently, the role of material foreign in relation to the EU will be discussed.
The latter category is itself divided into two different subcategories. On the one hand,
the role of the European Convention on Human Rights will be discussed. Despite
the fact that there is some overlap in Member States between the European Union
and the Council of Europe, the legal system provided by the European Convention
is regarded as external, since this legal system is set in a different organization, which,
unlike the EU, covers almost the whole of Europe.29 According to the CJEU ‘special
significance’30 should be attached to the ECHRwhen dealing with fundamental rights,
which is why the role of the European Convention should be dealt with separately.
29 The European Union presently has 27 Member States. The Council of Europe has 47 Member States
that have all ratified the European Convention of Human Rights.
30 See for example: C-44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 03727; C-46/87
Hoechst AG v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 02859; C-260/89, Elliniki
Radiophonia Tiléorassi (ERT) AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v. Dimotiki
Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others [1991] ECR I-02925;
C-219/91, Criminal proceedings against Johannes Stephanus Wilhelmus Ter Voort [1992] ECR I-
05485; C-299/95, Friedrich Kremzow v Republik Österreich [1997] I-02629; C-309/96, Daniele
Annibaldi v. Sindaco del Comune di Guidonia and Presidente Regione Lazio [1997] ECR I-07493;
C-17/98, Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v. Aruba [2000] ECR I-00665; C-274/99, Bernard Connolly
v. Commission of the European Communities [2001] ECR I-01611; C-94/00, Roquette Frères SA
v. Directeur général de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la répression des fraudes, and
Commission of the European Communities [2002] ECR I-09011; C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und
Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-09609;
C-540/03, European Parliament v Council of the European Union [2006] ECR I-05769.
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The second subcategory consists of other international materials, which are either
derived from other international organizations or the legal systems of third countries.
The discussion of the various categories of comparative sources will address the
respective bases for the references to these different materials. This question has
received much attention in theoretical discussions due to its importance for the
acceptability of the method. Another critical issue is the question on the exact role
of this method, namely whether the conclusions drawn from the comparative material
play a decisive or a supportive role in the reasoning of the court. Answering these
questions, however, would still leave some aspects unaddressed. A discussion of the
relevant practical aspects relating to this method of interpretation may help to analyze
to what extent the problematic issues identified in the theoretical chapter materialize
in the reality of the case law of the CJEU. Therefore a closer look will be taken within
each category of comparative interpretation at the kind of material that is used by
the CJEU and at its sources.
Thus far, reference has been made in this chapter to the CJEU in general, referring
to the institution as a whole. A distinction should, however, be made between the
reasoning of the CJEU (the judgments) and the reasoning of the Advocate General
(the opinions). As has been stressed before, for the purposes of the analysis presented
in this chapter, the reasoning of the Advocate General will be looked at in detail,
as well. By doing so, it will become clear that the approaches of the Advocate General
and the CJEU differ with regard to comparative interpretation.
Ultimately, the presented analysis should facilitate a discussion of the purpose
of the method before the CJEU, in particular on the questions whether the theoretical
criticism of this method applies to the CJEU, whether something useful can be learned
from the application of the method by the CJEU and whether some aspects should
be adapted.
13.2.2 Role of national constitutional traditions
Ever since the case of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the CJEU refers to the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States as a source of inspiration for
defining fundamental rights.31 In the case of Nold the CJEU confirmed these national
traditions to be one of the main sources of inspiration32 when it held that:
31 C-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und
Futtermittel [1970] ECR 01125.
32 The other main source is the European Convention on Human Rights, which will be discussed later
on in section 13.2.3.
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The Court is bound to draw inspiration from constitutional traditions common to the Member
States, and it cannot therefore uphold measures which are incompatible with fundamental
rights recognized and protected by the Constitutions of those States.33
This reference to the constitutional traditions of Member States as a source of in-
spiration still features in recent cases and has become part and parcel of the funda-
mental rights case law of the CJEU.34 A 2008 judgment in the Sopropré case is one
recent example of a case in which the CJEU re-emphasized that it ‘draws inspiration
from the constitutional traditions of the Member States’.35 This reference to common
constitutional traditions has become so ingrained in the case law of the CJEU that
one can question whether it still means anything or whether it is has become a hollow
phrase or mere ornamentation. Several questions can be asked in order to try and
provide an answer to this central question. What is the basis for these references
(section 13.2.2.1)? How has the CJEU incorporated these references in its case law
(section 13.2.2.2)? What has been the approach of the Advocates General in dealing
with references to national constitutional traditions (section 13.2.2.3)? What are the
main differences between the approach of the CJEU and the Advocates General
(section 13.2.2.4)? What has been the purpose of these references (section 13.2.3.5)
And, perhaps most importantly, is a common tradition necessary and what does this
mean (section 13.2.2.6)? Where does the information come from (section 13.2.2.7)?
What information is taken into consideration? Finally, the theoretical chapter paid
much attention to the question whether references to comparative materials (either
internal or external) are sufficiently justified. That question will be addressed at the
end of this section in the conclusion. The fact that there might be a basis for the
references to national constitutional traditions is not necessarily enough for a justified
use of this method of interpretation.36 The specific use of these references plays a
role in answering that question as well.
These questions should be answered in order to be able to have some under-
standing of the role of this aspect of comparative interpretation in the case law of
the CJEU. A short preview of the role of national constitutional traditions has already
been given in the introductory Chapter 3 and in the theoretical analysis provided in
33 C-4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v. Ruhrkohle Aktiengesellschaft [1974] ECR
00491, § 13.
34 See C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi (ERT) AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon
Prossopikou v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others
[1991] ECR I-02925, § 41; C-74/95, Criminal Proceedings against X [1996] ECR I-06609, § 25;
C-411/04, Salzgitter Mannesmann GmbH v. Commission of the European Communities, [2007] ECR
I-00959, § 41 as some examples throughout the years in which the CJEU has mentioned the constitu-
tional traditions as a source of inspiration.
35 C-349/07, Sopropé – Organizações de Calçado Lda v. Fazenda Pública [2008] ECR I-10369, § 33.
36 See section 6.1.6.2. on practical criticism that also influences a justified use of this method.
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Chapter 6. This slight overlap can hardly be avoided, given the particular way in which
fundamental rights have found their way into the EU.
13.2.2.1 The basis for invoking national constitutional traditions
An aspect that has led to much debate in the legal-theoretical literature on comparative
interpretation is whether the court in question has any legal basis for relying on
comparative references.37 This is a controversial issue in particular when discussing
the external component of comparative interpretation, but it is also relevant in the
context of the internal component.
The introductory chapter already referred to former Article 6 (3) TEU (former
Article 6 (2) EU), which provides that:
The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November
1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as
general principles of Community law.
This provision, which found its way into the EU legal order through the Maastricht
Treaty in 1992,38 explicitly lists the two main sources of inspiration, namely constitu-
tional traditions and the European Convention on Human Rights. In fact, this provides
a solid basis for the CJEU to rely on references to national constitutional traditions.
Such an explicit basis for comparative interpretation is rather uncommon, but in the
EU context its existence is quite understandable. Article 6 (3) TEU represents a
codification of the practice of the CJEU at that point in time.39 In most older funda-
mental rights cases the CJEU treated constitutional traditions and the European
Convention as the main sources of inspiration.40 For cases after the insertion of this
37 See section 6.1. dealing with various aspects related to the question whether there is a sufficient basis
for comparative interpretation.
38 Initially this was Article F(2) in the Maastricht Treaty; the Treaty of Amsterdam changed this into
the well-known Article 6(2) EU. The content of this particular aspect of the provision did not change
as a result of Amsterdam.
39 In C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad [2007] ECR I-03633
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomber mentions this point in his Opinion, § 75. See also: Rainer
(2008), p. 31.
40 See for example: C-44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 03727; C-136/79,
National Panasonic (UK) Limited v Commission of the European Communities [1980] ECR 02033;
C-63/83, Regina v. Kent Kirk [1986] ECR 02689; C-222/84,Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable
of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 01651; C-222/86, Union nationale des entraîneurs
et cadres techniques professionnels du football (Unectef) v. Georges Heylens and others [1987] ECR
04097; C-46/87Hoechst AG v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 02859; C-374/
87, Orkem v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 03283; C-260/89, Elliniki
322
Interpretation in the case law of the CJEU
provision, it is no longer an issue on what basis these references are made. The
approach by the CJEU had already been accepted by the EU institutions in a joint
declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission in 1977.41
Finally, by ratifying then Article 6(2) EU the Member States accepted this approach
as well.
However, the question remains on what basis the CJEU used these comparative
references before the existence of former Article 6 (2) EU. The judgments by the
CJEU do not really answer this question. In Nold, the Court stated that it ‘is bound
to draw inspiration from constitutional traditions’,42 but that hardly qualifies as a
justification for relying on these references. Advocate General Dutheillet De Lamothe
in International Handelsgesellschaft provided a rather more elaborate explanation
for considering national constitutional traditions as a source of inspiration. He argued
that national constitutional traditions provide a foundation from which fundamental
rights emerge that should be protected in the EU:
They [national constitutional traditions] contribute to forming that philosophical, political
and legal substratum common to the Member States from which through the case-law an
unwritten Community law emerges, one of the essential aims of which is precisely to ensure
respect for the fundamental rights of the individual.
In that sense, the fundamental principles of the national legal systems contribute to enabling
Community law to find in itself the resources necessary for ensuring, where needed, respect
for the fundamental rights which form the common heritage of the Member States.43
Thus, references to national constitutional traditions appear to be justified in the view
of Advocate General Dutheillet De Lamothe since they help to shape the EU legal
order in a field where no written EU law exists. No more explicit explanation has
been given in the Court’s case law or in opinions of the Advocates General.
While the CJEU remains silent on this matter, some attention has been given by
legal commentators to the justification for resorting to comparative interpretation.
Although some authors only refer to Article 6(3) TEU as the basis for incorporating
references to national constitutional traditions,44 others have paid attention to the
Radiophonia Tiléorassi (ERT) AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v. Dimotiki
Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others [1991] ECR I-02925.
41 OJ 1977/C 103/1. See also: Dörte Hempfing (2004), p. 14; Lenaerts & De Smijter (2001), p. 275.
42 C-4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v. Ruhrkohle Aktiengesellschaft [1974] ECR
00491, § 13.
43 Opinion by Advocate General Dutheillet de Lamothe in C-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft
mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 01125, p. 1146. Rainer
also refers to common constitutional traditions as an ideological basis for fundamental rights, (2008),
p. 28.
44 Singer & Engel (2007), p. 499.
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fact that this provision only came into existence after a few decades of fundamental
rights case law before the CJEU. Some have argued that Article 19 TEU (which is
similar in substance to former Article 220 EC) provides a basis for using comparative
interpretation.45 This provision requires the CJEU (and later also the General Court)
‘to guarantee that in the interpretation and application of the Treaty the law is ob-
served’. According to LENAERTS, comparative interpretation helps the CJEU to find
‘the ius commune – i.e. ‘the law’- whose observance they are to ensure in the inter-
pretation and application of the Treaty’.46 This justification is thus based on a wide
interpretation of the notion of ‘law’ as contained in Article 19 TEU.47
Furthermore, reference is made in the literature to the fact that the CJEU has
consistently held that the EU legal order is based on legal principles.48 The national
constitutional traditions are an accepted source of these common principles of law.
Especially in the field of fundamental rights, where no written provisions existed,
comparative interpretation may legitimately serve as a gap-filling method.49
Interestingly, these justifications for the use of comparative materials are inter-
related in the sense that they all assume that principles common to the Member States
can be considered as part of the ‘law’ that should be observed by the CJEU. In that
sense they also fit the justification provided by the Advocate General in Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft.50
13.2.2.2 CJEU and national constitutional traditions
In the previous section, it has been made clear that the CJEU often refers to the
constitutional traditions of the Member States as a basis for its fundamental rights
case law. An important question in regard to the central theme of this thesis is whether
the CJEU only does do so in a general fashion, or whether it actually and in a concrete
way discusses some or all of these traditions. This question is important for under-
standing how the references to common constitutional traditions are used in practice.
The CJEU’s case law discloses roughly three different scenarios. First, in a
substantial number of cases the CJEU does not provide any express reference to
national constitutional traditions at all, neither in an abstract manner nor by very
45 See for example: Lenaerts (2003), p. 876; Wasensteiner (2004), p. 29; Kakouris (1994), p. 272-273.
46 Lenaerts (2003), p. 877.
47 See also Wasensteiner (2004), p. 30.
48 See for example: Kakouris (1991), p. 496-497; Wasensteiner (2004), p. 30.
49 Lenaerts (2003), p. 879 hints at this justification; Kakouris (1991), p. 496. Fairclothes-People (2008),
p. 223.
50 C-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und
Futtermittel [1970] ECR 01125, Opinion by Advocate General Dutheillet De Lamothe.
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concrete references to the situation in the Member States.51 In these cases the refer-
ence to the constitutional traditions remains devoid of any real explanation, the CJEU
solely mentioning that common constitutional traditions are a source of inspiration.
In the case of Kent Kirk, for example, the question was whether the principle of non-
retroactivity of criminal provisions could be considered one of the fundamental rights
protected by the EU. In answer to this, the CJEU simply held that:
51 In C-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und
Futtermittel [1970] ECR 01125, both the CJEU and Advocate General Dutheillet de Lamothe only
mention that constitutional traditions can play a role, but do not discuss any national constitutional
traditions. In C-4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v. Ruhrkohle Aktiengesellschaft
[1974] ECR 00491, the CJEU only refers to constitutional traditions as a source of inspiration.
Advocate General Trabucchi reaffirms the importance of constitutional traditions as a source of
inspiration as well, but fails to provide any substance, apart from the reference to all countries of
the free world, which is so general that it can hardly be considered to be an example of substantiating
these references. In C-63/83, Regina v. Kent Kirk [1986] ECR 02689, the CJEU states that the principle
of non-retroactivity is common to all legal orders of the Member States. In C-222/84, Marguerite
Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 01651, the CJEU solely
states that the requirement of judicial control reflects a general principle of law which underlies the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States. See also C-222/86, Union nationale des
entraîneurs et cadres techniques professionnels du football (Unectef) v. Georges Heylens and others
[1987] ECR 04097; C-260/89,Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi (ERT) AE and Panellinia Omospondia
Syllogon Prossopikou v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas
and others [1991] ECR I-02925, only the reference to the ECHR is more elaborately dealt with. See
in similar fashion: C-94/00, Roquette Frères SA v. Directeur général de la concurrence, de la
consommation et de la répression des fraudes, and Commission of the European Communities [2002]
ECR I-09011 (only the ECHR is extensively dealt with); C-465/00, Rechnungshof v Österreichischer
Rundfunk and Others [2003] ECR I-04989, is also more detailed on the ECHR. Or C-74/95,Criminal
Proceedings against X [1996] ECR I-06609; C-185/97, Belinda Jane Coote v. Granada Hospitality
Ltd. [1998] ECR I-05199; C-7/98,Dieter Krombach v. André Bamberski [2000] ECR I-01935; C-17/
98, Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v. Aruba [2000] ECR I-00665; C-274/99, Bernard Connolly v.
Commission of the European Communities [2001] ECR I-01611, only mentioning it as source of
inspiration. See also: C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v.
Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-05659; C-263/02, Commission of the European Communities v.
Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA [2004] ECR I-03425; C-540/03, European Parliament v Council of the European
Union [2006] ECR I-05769; C-411/04, Salzgitter Mannesmann GmbH v. Commission of the European
Communities, [2007] ECR I-00959; C-370/05, Criminal proceedings against Uwe Kay Festersen
[2007] ECR I-01129; C-432/05, Unibet (London) Ltd and Unibet (International) Ltd v. Justitiekanslern
[2007] ECR I-02271; C-450/06, Varec SA v. Belgian State [2008] ECR I-00581; C-465/07, Meki
Elgafaji and Noor Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2009] ECR I-00921;C-349/07, Sopropé
– Organizações de Calçado Lda v. Fazenda Pública [2008] ECR I-10369. In C-308/07, Koldo
Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso v. European Parliament [2009] ECR I-01059, the judgment does not
mention any reference to constitutional traditions; the AG in this case does, but only lists them as
a source of inspiration.
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The principle that penal provisions may not have retroactive effect is one which is common
to all the legal orders of the Member States ...; it takes its place among the general principles
of law whose observance is ensured by the Court of Justice.52
Another example is the equal treatment case of Marguerite Johnston, where one of
the questions related to the right to a judicial remedy. The CJEU in this case did not
do more than just stating that:
The requirement of judicial control stipulated by that article reflects a general principle of
law which underlies the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.53
In both examples neither the CJEU nor the Advocate General provided more insight
into the basis for reaching the conclusion that these rights really formed part of the
constitutional traditions in the various Member States.
The second scenario is when the CJEU itself does not address the fundamental
rights issue or fails to substantiate the reference to national traditions, but the Advocate
General does.54 These cases will be discussed in depth in the subsequent section,
which specifically deals with the approach of the Advocates General to comparative
interpretation. The purpose of mentioning these types of cases here is to show that,
when the CJEU does not address the common constitutional traditions at all, this does
not automatically mean that no attention is paid to the substance of these constitutional
traditions at all.
In the third and last scenario, the CJEU does provide some form of explanation
on what the constitutional traditions entail. The extent and depth of this explanation
52 C-63/83, Regina v. Kent Kirk [1986] ECR 02689, § 22.
53 C-222/84, Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR
01651, § 18.
54 See for example: C-130/75, Vivien Prais v. Council of the European Communities [1976] ECR 01589;
C-20/00, Booker Aquacultur Ltd v. The ScottishMinisters [2003] ECR I-07411; C-17/74, Transocean
Marine Paint Association v. Commission of the European Communities [1974] 01063; C-118/75,
Lynne Watson and Alessandro Belmann [1976] ECR 01185; C-168/91, Christos Konstantinidis v.
Stadt Altensteig – Standesamt and Landratsamt Calw – Ordnungsamt [1993] ECR I-01191; C-13/94,
P v. S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECRI-02143; C-50/00, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores
(UPA) v. Council of the European Union [2002] ECR I-06677; C-117/01, K.B. v National Health
Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health [2004] ECR I-00541. See also C-341/05,
Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others [2007] ECR I-11767, the
judgment in this case only refers to the international instruments as a source of inspiration, while
the AG refers to Member States as well. See also: C-341/06, Chronopost SA and La Poste v. Union
française de l’express (UFEX) and Others [2008] ECR I-04777, where the AG responds to one of
the arguments of the parties by discussing their references to constitutional traditions. To a very limited
extent: C-136/79, National Panasonic (UK) Limited v Commission of the European Communities
[1980] ECR 02033 (Advocate General Warner speaks in rather abstract terms).
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differs per case. The CJEU seldom names individual Member States when discussing
whether a common constitutional tradition exists.55 In most cases the CJEU discusses
the existence of a certain tradition at an abstract level, not mentioning any Member
State in particular.56 In the case of Orkem the CJEU discussed whether the Member
States acknowledged a right not to incriminate oneself to legal persons in competition
cases:
In general, the laws of the Member States grant the right not to give evidence against oneself
only to a natural person charged with an offence in criminal proceedings. A comparative
analysis of national law does not therefore indicate the existence of such a principle, common
to the laws of the Member States, which may be relied upon by legal persons in relation to
infringements in the economic sphere, in particular infringements of competition law.57
The CJEU thus implied that it had undertaken a comparative analysis of which it only
included the very brief conclusion in the judgment itself. The cited considerations
do not deal with Member States individually, but, as can be seen, contain a rather
concise and abstract reference to the situation in the Member States. Interestingly,
Advocate General Darmon in his opinion to the case discussed the law of a number
of individual Member States and concluded from this that no common principle could
be found therein for legal persons not to incriminate themselves. This opinion will
be discussed in more detail in the next section. At this point it is important to realize
that the discussion of the Advocate General in this case provided a useful and elabor-
ate foundation for the brief reasoning of the CJEU.
In the case of Grant the CJEU also discussed the situation in the Member States
at a very abstract level.58 The question was whether stable homosexual relationships
55 This is also the impression that is generally expressed in the literature. See for example: Lenaerts
(2003), p. 874; Singer (2007), p. 498; Colneric (2007), p. 316; Hilf (1986), p. 561; Kakouris (1994),
p. 276; Wasensteiner (2004), p. 41. Exceptionally in the case of C-44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land
Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 03727, the CJEU did name individual Member States, § 20.
56 See for example: C-155/79, AM & S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities
[1982] ECR 01575, § 18-22; C-46/87Hoechst AG v. Commission of the European Communities [1989]
ECR 02859, § 17; C-374/87,Orkem v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 03283,
§ 29; C-249/96, Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-00621, § 32; C-122/99,
D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council of the European Union [2001] ECR I-04319, § 35; C-341/05,
Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others [2007] ECR I-11767, § 92.
The case of Omega Spielhallen (C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH
v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-09609) differs from the other examples.
In this judgment the judges explicitly refer back to the discussion by Advocate General Stix-Hackl
and in that sense put some flesh on the bones of the reference to national constitutional traditions.
57 C-374/87, Orkem v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 03283, § 29.
58 C-249/96, Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-00621.
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outside marriage should be considered equal to stable heterosexual relationships outside
marriage. The CJEU noted the following about the situation in the Member States:
As for the laws of the Member States, while in some of them cohabitation by two persons
of the same sex is treated as equivalent to marriage, although not completely, in most of them
it is treated as equivalent to a stable heterosexual relationship outside marriage only with
respect to a limited number of rights, or else it is not recognized in any particular way.59
There was thus no clear common tradition, but the Court clearly discerned some
developments in the direction of a legal consensus. The CJEU, however, finally
concluded that homosexual and heterosexual relations outside marriage did not have
to be regarded as equivalent.
Finally, in the case of AM & S the CJEU had to decide on the confidentiality of
written communications between a lawyer and his/her client in competition pro-
ceedings.60 Here the CJEU spent a few more words on discussing what the national
traditions entailed. The discussion dealt with these traditions at an abstract level, not
mentioning any individual Member State. However, the CJEU did indicate that the
scope and criteria for protecting this type of communication varied between the legal
systems.61 The CJEU mentioned some examples of these differences and concluded
that common criteria were also to be found.62 The following paragraphs may illustrate
this point:
As far as the protection of written communications between lawyer and client is concerned,
it is apparent from the legal systems of the Member States that, although the principle of
such protection is generally recognized, its scope and the criteria for applying it vary, as has,
indeed, been conceded both by the applicant and by the parties who have intervened in support
of its conclusions.
Whilst in some of the Member States the protection against disclosure afforded to written
communications between lawyer and client is based principally on a recognition of the very
nature of the legal profession, inasmuch as it contributes towards the maintenance of the rule
of law, in other Member States the same protection is justified by the more specific require-
ment (which, moreover, is also recognized in the first-mentioned States) that the rights of
the defense must be respected.
59 C-249/96, Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-00621, § 32.
60 C-155/79, AM& S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 01575.
61 C-155/79, AM& S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 01575,
§ 19-20
62 C-155/79, AM& S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 01575,
§ 20-21
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Apart from these differences, however, there are to be found in the national laws of the
Member States common criteria ... .63
In the end, the CJEU held that the common elements to the laws of the Member States
were to be incorporated into EC law.64
The examples provided of the third scenario show that the Court is not very fond
of referring to individual Member States, but prefers to discuss national traditions
in a more general and abstract manner. HILF has provided an explanation for this
approach by the CJEU, namely that the Court is aware of the practical difficulties
inherent to this method. By refusing to discuss the Member States individually, the
Court may want to avoid ‘the reproach of “dilettantism” if it omitted or misunderstood
one of the numerous national legal systems’.65 The Court itself has not provided
any clues as to why it prefers abstract references, but it is certainly likely that the
explanation by HILF is correct.
The division into three scenarios made in this section may be useful for analytical
purposes as it helps to shed light on the role of internal comparative interpretation
by the Court. No substantive conclusions should, however, be attached to whether
a judgment can be listed under the first, second or third scenario. The main reason
for making this distinction is to gain some insight into the different forms in which
common constitutional traditions are used in the different judgments.
The case law studied for the purposes of this thesis also clearly shows that not
all scenarios occur equally frequently. In the majority of cases neither the Court nor
the Advocate General refer to more than the fact that the common constitutional
traditions are a source of inspiration.66 Less common is the scenario in which the
Court remains silent and the Advocate General to some extent tries to substantiate
the reference to national constitutional traditions.67 Finally, the Court will only rarely
provide a more detailed account of what it perceives to be the national constitutional
traditions.68 Even when this occurs, the Court does do so in a rather abstract and
concise manner.
63 C-155/79, AM& S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 01575,
§ 19-20-21.
64 C-155/79, AM& S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 01575,
§ 22
65 Hilf (1986), p. 561.
66 Supra note 51.
67 Supra note 54.
68 Supra note 55 and 56.
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How can this difference between the use of the three scenarios be explained? The
case law itself, unfortunately, does not provide any clues. One first explanation,
however, may be that the reference to both constitutional traditions and the European
Convention on Human Rights has become a standard part of most judgments on
fundamental rights. In some cases it might therefore be mentioned as part of the
standard reasoning, merely framing the legal context, without any intention to develop
this in any way at some point in the reasoning. After the codification of this practice
in Article 6(3) TEU (formerly Article 6(2) EU) it has become even more understand-
able that the Court refers to constitutional traditions as an acknowledged source of
inspiration. A second explanation might be found in the fact that there are two main
sources of inspiration, the European Convention being the second source. In cases
where no attention is paid to national constitutional traditions, references may still
be made to the European Convention or to other international material. In K.B., for
example, the Court only referred to the case law of the European Convention, without
mentioning the national constitutional traditions at all.69 A third possible explanation
relates to the role of the European Convention and also the Charter of Fundamental
Rights. It might appear, albeit rather implicitly, from the case law that these documents
are regarded as an expression of the common constitutional traditions. Indeed, Ad-
vocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomber expressly stated in his opinion in the case of
Advocaten voor de Wereld70 that the Charter of Fundamental Rights ‘codifies and
reaffirms certain rights which are derived from the heritage common to the Member
States’.71 In a similar way the European Convention can be viewed as ‘proof’ of
common constitutional traditions, since it has been ratified by all Member States of
the EU.72 This may well render an investigation into the national constitutional
traditions superfluous in some (more recent) cases, especially if a certain right is
clearly mentioned in the Convention or in the Charter. Only where it concerns rights
not protected by the Charter or the European Convention might there be a more
prominent role for national traditions. Another potential explanation is that in some
cases the Court recalls the sources of inspiration for establishing fundamental rights
in the EU context, but refers to a precedent in which it has already been decided that
69 C-117/01, K.B. v National Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health [2004]
ECR I-00541, Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer did refer to national constitutional traditions.
70 C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad [2007] ECR I-03633 .
71 C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad [2007] ECR I-03633, § 77.
See also Reich (2005), p. 217.
72 A similar argument is made in Craig & De Burca (2008), p. 386. See also: Rainer (2008), p. 29 where
he claims that the ECHR is an expression of a common European legal conviction binding theMember
States. See also Reich (2005), p. 210 who argues that the CJEU considers the Convention to be a
codification of the principles common to the Member States.
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a certain right should be protected. This was the case in UNECTEF v Heylens,73
where the Court referred back to the case of Johnston,74 in which it had recognized
the right to an effective judicial remedy:
As the Court held in its judgment of 15 May 1986 in Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable
of the Royal Ulster Constabulary ..., that requirement reflects a general principle of Commun-
ity law which underlies the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and has
been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.75
A fresh examination of national constitutional traditions would evidently have been
redundant in this case.
In summary, thus, it may be recalled that three different scenarios can be identified
in the case law of the CJEU referring to national constitutional traditions. Most often
the reference to national constitutional traditions is not substantiated. This seems to
be a result of the fact that reference to common constitutional traditions and the
European Convention of Human Rights as a source of inspiration has become a
standard phrase in the judgments of the CJEU. Such references may seem to be of
a rhetoric nature, rather than providing a substantive basis for a new interpretation
or the recognition of a new right. The second scenario, whereby the Advocate General
substantiates a reference and the CJEU remains silent, occurs less frequently. Least
frequent is the third scenario in which the CJEU itself substantiates a reference to
national constitutional traditions. These latter references are, moreover, mostly rather
general in character, not at all mentioning specific national legislation or case law.
The discussion in this section has focused primarily on the reasoning of the Court.
The following section will concentrate on the approach by the Advocate General.
A subsequent discussion in section 13.2.2.4 will deal with the differences between
the two approaches in more detail.
13.2.2.3 Advocate General and national constitutional traditions
The Advocate General plays an important role in the context of referring to national
constitutional traditions. This has already been hinted at in the previous section, but
73 C-222/86,Union nationale des entraîneurs et cadres techniques professionnels du football (Unectef)
v. Georges Heylens and others [1987] ECR 04097.
74 C-222/84, Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR
01651.
75 C-222/86,Union nationale des entraîneurs et cadres techniques professionnels du football (Unectef)
v. Georges Heylens and others [1987] ECR 04097, § 14.
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it is also frequently noted in theoretical literature.76 This assumption warrants a more
detailed look at the opinions of the Advocates General in order to analyze their
approach to national constitutional traditions. The discussion of the Advocate General’s
opinions in this section will focus on all opinions where references to the national
constitutional traditions play a certain role. Mention will be made, whenever relevant,
within which of the three scenarios an opinion appears to fall, since that can be
relevant for the context in which a judgment by the CJEU has been given and it might
explain the reasoning by the CJEU in some situations.
Some of the aspects identified in the theoretical chapter on comparative interpreta-
tion and briefly cited in the introduction to this section have been or will be addressed
for both the Court and the Advocate General together. The discussion of the justifica-
tion for references to national traditions in section 13.2.2.1 above, for example, did
not distinguish between the Court and the Advocate General. By contrast, the way
in which national constitutional traditions are being invoked and the way in which
references to these traditions are substantiated, can be made more insightful by
discussing the Court and the Advocates General separately. Moreover, discussing these
approaches separately enables a comparison to be made between the approach taken
by the Court and by the Advocates General.
An important conclusion from the analysis of references to national constitutional
traditions reached in section 13.2.2.2. was that the CJEU either not really substantiates
the reference, or only does so at a rather abstract level. The question is whether this
conclusion is also valid with respect to the opinions of the Advocate General or
whether a different approach can be detected there.
Indeed, in a certain number of cases the Advocates General does not refer at all
to national constitutional traditions as a source of inspiration for fundamental rights.77
76 See Craig & De Burca (2008), p. 386; Faircloth Peoples (2008), p. 224; Ritter (2005), p. 758; Hilf
(1986).
77 C-7/98,Dieter Krombach v. André Bamberski [2000] ECR I-01935; C-370/05,Criminal proceedings
against Uwe Kay Festersen [2007] ECR I-01129; C-94/00, Roquette Frères SA v. Directeur général
de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la répression des fraudes, and Commission of the
European Communities [2002] ECR I-09011; C-465/00, Rechnungshof v Österreichischer Rundfunk
and Others [2003] ECR I-04989; C-263/02, Commission of the European Communities v. Jégo-Quéré
& Cie SA [2004] ECR I-03425;C-300/04,M. G. Eman and O. B. Sevinger v. College van burgemees-
ter en wethouders van Den Haag [2006] ECR I-08055; C-436/04, Criminal proceedings against
Leopold Henri Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I-02333; C-438/05, International Transport Workers’
Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR
I-10779; C-450/06, Varec SA v. Belgian State [2008] ECR I-00581; C-14/07, Ingenieurbüro Michael
Weiss und Partner GbR v. Industrie- und Handelskammer Berlin [2008] ECR I-03367; C-6/75,Ulrich
Horst v. Bundesknappschaft [1975] ECR 00823; C-63/83, Regina v. Kent Kirk [1986] ECR 02689;
C-222/84, Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR
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For example, the Advocate General may not spend much time on analyzing the
fundamental rights aspect of the case,78 or he may only focus on the European Con-
vention.79
In another range of cases the Advocates General refers to the standard phrase
mentioned earlier, just stating that national constitutional traditions are a source of
inspiration, without developing or substantiating this general reference to these
traditions.80 Once again, this may have a variety of explanations. In some cases the
Advocate General simply recalls the content of Article 6 (3) TEU or refers to the
well-established case law in order to indicate that fundamental rights are protected
within the EU, like Advocate General Trsentjak did in the case of Atxalandabaso.
In this case the Advocate General referred to the standard formula and subsequently
devoted all his attention to the European Convention.81
The range of cases that is most interesting for the present purposes, however, are
those cases in which the Advocate General provides a substantive discussion on the
national constitutional traditions used as a basis for establishing or construing a
fundamental right.82 The discussions in these cases may be rather brief or very ela-
01651; C-49/88, Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company (Samad) and Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company (Safco)
v. Council of the European Communities [1991] ECR I-03187; C-222/86, Union nationale des
entraîneurs et cadres techniques professionnels du football (Unectef) v. Georges Heylens and others
[1987] ECR 04097; C-260/89,Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi (ERT) AE and Panellinia Omospondia
Syllogon Prossopikou v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas
and others [1991] ECR I-02925; C-74/95, Criminal Proceedings against X [1996] ECR I-06609.
78 See for example: C-465/00, Rechnungshof v Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others [2003] ECR I-
04989; C-263/02, Commission of the European Communities v. Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA [2004] ECR
I-03425; C-63/83, Regina v. Kent Kirk [1986] ECR 02689.
79 See for example: C-94/00, Roquette Frères SA v. Directeur général de la concurrence, de la con-
sommation et de la répression des fraudes, and Commission of the European Communities [2002]
ECR I-09011; C-74/95, Criminal Proceedings against X [1996] ECR I-06609.
80 C-60/00,Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-06279; C-122/
00, Schmidberger; C-540/03, European Parliament v Council of the European Union [2006] ECR
I-05769; C-411/04, Salzgitter Mannesmann GmbH v. Commission of the European Communities,
[2007] ECR I-00959; C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad [2007]
ECR I-03633; C-432/05, Unibet (London) Ltd and Unibet (International) Ltd v. Justitiekanslern [2007]
ECR I-02271; C-308/07, Koldo Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso v. European Parliament [2009] ECR I-
01059; C-465/07,Meki Elgafaji and Noor Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2009] ECR I-00921;
C-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und
Futtermittel [1970] ECR 01125; C-149/77,Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation
aérienne Sabena [1978] ECR 01365.
81 C-308/07, Koldo Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso v. European Parliament [2009] ECR I-01059, § 54 et
seq, Opinion by Advocate General Trstenjak.
82 C-122/99,D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council of the European Union [2001] ECR I-04319; C-274/
99, Bernard Connolly v. Commission of the European Communities [2001] ECR I-01611; C-20/00,
Booker Aquacultur Ltd v. The Scottish Ministers [2003] ECR I-07411; C-117/01, K.B. v National
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borately, as will be shown later on. First, the above will be further illustrated by a
number of examples.
In one of the first cases to introduce the references to national constitutional traditions,
Nold, Advocate General Trabucchi referred in a very abstract manner to the fact that
the right to property was recognized by all Member States:
It will be necessary to examine in particular whether there has been any violation of the
general principle of protection of property which is recognized by all the Constitutions of
the Member States and which, without doubt, is also an integral part of the Community
order.83
The Advocate General did not support this statement with a reference to the law and
legal practice of individual Member States, nor to any study that might have
underpinned this conclusion. Other cases in which the Advocates General only
marginally refers to the national constitutional traditions can easily be found. A
similarly abstract reference was made in the case of National Panasonic, where
Advocate General Warner had to interpret the powers of the Commission when
carrying out investigations of infringements of competition law.84 The Advocate
General referred in abstracto to the laws of the Member States in order to show that
‘[i]n general, though not always, the laws of Member States require officers of a public
Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health [2004] ECR I-00541; C-36/02,
Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn
[2004] ECR I-09609; C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and
others [2007] ECR I-11767; C-341/06, Chronopost SA and La Poste v. Union française de l’express
(UFEX) and Others [2008] ECR I-04777; C-4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v.
Ruhrkohle Aktiengesellschaft [1974] ECR 00491; C-17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Association
v. Commission of the European Communities [1974] 01063; C-118/75, LynneWatson and Alessandro
Belmann [1976] ECR 01185; C-130/75, Vivien Prais v. Council of the European Communities [1976]
ECR 01589; C-44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 03727; C-136/79, National
Panasonic (UK) Limited v Commission of the European Communities [1980] ECR 02033; C-155/79,
AM & S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 01575; C-46/87
Hoechst AG v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 02859; C-374/87, Orkem v.
Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 03283; C-168/91, Christos Konstantinidis
v. Stadt Altensteig – Standesamt and Landratsamt Calw – Ordnungsamt [1993] ECR I-01191; C-13/94,
P v. S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECRI-02143.
83 C-4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v. Ruhrkohle Aktiengesellschaft [1974] ECR
00491, Opinion by Advocate General Trabucchi.
84 C-136/79, National Panasonic (UK) Limited v Commission of the European Communities [1980]
ECR 02033, Opinion by Advocate General Warner.
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authority to have such a [search] warrant before they may enter private premises’.85
This type of brief and abstract reference does not really shed much light on the
question whether a common principle exists and as such does not provide much
guidance on the actual use of the method of comparative interpretation.
In quite a large number of cases, the Advocates General provide a more substantial
reference to national constitutional traditions.86 This reference can still be rather
short, like in the case of D v Council, where Advocate General Mischo was faced
with the question whether the term spouse had to be interpreted broadly in order to
include registered partners as well.87 The Advocate General took into account the
situation in the whole Community and concluded that there was no general consensus
on the basis of which registered partnerships could be equated with marriage:
At the time of the events in question, there existed in only three of the fifteen Member States
the legal category of registered partnership assimilating, to a greater or lesser degree, the
communal life of two persons of the same sex to that of two married persons in the traditional
meaning of the term.88
85 C-136/79, National Panasonic (UK) Limited v Commission of the European Communities [1980]
ECR 02033, p. 2068. See also the case of C-274/99, Bernard Connolly v. Commission of the European
Communities [2001] ECR I-01611.
86 See, for example (note the difference in depth of the reference): C-17/74, Transocean Marine Paint
Association v. Commission of the European Communities [1974] 01063, p. 1088-1089; C-118/75,
Lynne Watson and Alessandro Belmann [1976] ECR 01185; C-130/75, Vivien Prais v. Council of
the European Communities [1976] ECR 01589; C-44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz
[1979] ECR 03727, p. 3759-3761; C-155/79, AM& S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European
Communities [1982] ECR 01575; C-46/87Hoechst AG v. Commission of the European Communities
[1989] ECR 02859, § 49-111; C-374/87,Orkem v. Commission of the European Communities [1989]
ECR 03283, § 96-129; C-168/91, Christos Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig – Standesamt and
Landratsamt Calw – Ordnungsamt [1993] ECR I-01191, § 36-38; C-13/94, P v. S and Cornwall
County Council [1996] ECRI-02143, § 9-11; C-122/99, D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council of
the European Union [2001] ECR I-04319, § 48; C-20/00, Booker Aquacultur Ltd v. The Scottish
Ministers [2003] ECR I-07411, § 116-124; C-117/01,K.B. v National Health Service Pensions Agency
and Secretary of State for Health [2004] ECR I-00541, § 28; C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und
Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-09609,
§ 83; C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others [2007]
ECR I-11767; C-341/06, Chronopost SA and La Poste v. Union française de l’express (UFEX) and
Others [2008] ECR I-04777; C-506/06, Sabine Mayr v. Bäckerei und Konditorei Gerhard Flöckner
OHG [2008] ECR I-01017, § 44.
87 C-122/99,D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council of the European Union [2001] ECR I-04319, Opinion
by Advocate General Mischo.
88 C-122/99, D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council of the European Union [2001] ECR I-04319, § 48,
Opinion by Advocate General Mischo.
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This is still an abstract reference to the law of the Member States, no states being
mentioned specifically, but the statistics mentioned by the Advocate General provide
some insight into the situation in the Community. What is problematic about the
reference in this case, however, is that no source is provided on the basis of which
this conclusion has been based, which makes it difficult to check the validity of the
Advocate General’s conclusions. This is different in the case of Omega Spielhallen,
in which Germany endeavoured to justify an infringement of the freedom to provide
services by expressing its desire and need to protect the right to human dignity.89
In order to provide an answer to the preliminary questions asked in this case, Advocate
General Stix-Hackl had to discuss the status of human dignity in the Community and
the status of human dignity in the Member States formed part of that discussion. As
a result the Advocate General stated that some form of protection of human dignity
could be found in all Member States:
As far as the constitutional systems of the Member States are concerned, therefore, the concept
of human dignity enjoys full recognition in one form or another, especially when one considers
... that this concept can be expressed in different ways.90
Once again this reference seems to be of a rather abstract nature, but this time the
Advocate General at least provided a source, namely two academic studies,91 on
which she could base her conclusions.
In the third category of cases, the Advocates General have referred to individual
Member States in order to provide an overview of the situation in the Community.92
89 C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundes-
stadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-09609.
90 C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundes-
stadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-09609, Opinion by Advocate General Stix-Hackl, § 83.
91 C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundes-
stadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-09609, Opinion by Advocate General Stix-Hackl, footnote 55.
92 See for varying degrees of references: C-168/91, Christos Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig –
Standesamt and Landratsamt Calw – Ordnungsamt [1993] ECR I-01191; C-117/01, K.B. v National
Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health [2004] ECR I-00541; C-13/94,
P v. S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECRI-02143; C-374/87, Orkem v. Commission of the
European Communities [1989] ECR 03283; C-46/87 Hoechst AG v. Commission of the European
Communities [1989] ECR 02859; C-155/79, AM& S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European
Communities [1982] ECR 01575; C-44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR
03727; C-118/75, Lynne Watson and Alessandro Belmann [1976] ECR 01185; C-130/75, Vivien Prais
v. Council of the European Communities [1976] ECR 01589; C-17/74, Transocean Marine Paint
Association v. Commission of the European Communities [1974] 01063; C-341/06, Chronopost SA
and La Poste v. Union française de l’express (UFEX) and Others [2008] ECR I-04777; C-341/05,
Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others [2007] ECR I-11767; C-20/
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In the case of K.B., for example, Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer had to
answer questions regarding the entitlement of transsexuals to a widow’s or widower’s
pension.93 The status of transsexuals’ right to marry in the different Member States
was relevant to answering these questions. In a brief overviewAdvocate General Ruiz-
Jarabo Colomer referred to all (then) 15 Member States and provided a clear (though
rather succinct) overview of the ways in which and the extent to which most of them
accepted or allowed for marriage of transsexuals according to their acquired gender:
A comparative study of the prevailing legal situation shows that the marriage of transsexuals
in their acquired gender is generally accepted. Whether it is as a result of express action by
the legislature (Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden), administrative practice
(Austria, Denmark) or judicial interpretation (Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Luxembourg,
Portugal), registers can be amended following gender reassignment operations, so that
transsexuals are able to marry. Only the Irish and United Kingdom legal systems appear to
go against this general trend, which is not a bar to identifying a sufficiently uniform legal
tradition capable of being a source of a general principle of Community law.94
Even though the references provided in this opinion are short and even though they
are rather roughly divided into broad categories, they still offer a relatively complete
00, Booker Aquacultur Ltd v. The Scottish Ministers [2003] ECR I-07411; C-279/09, DEB Deutsche
Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2010], § 77.
93 C-117/01, K.B. v National Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health [2004]
ECR I-00541, Opinion by Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer.
94 C-117/01, K.B. v National Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health [2004]
ECR I-00541, § 28 Opinion by Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer. The origin of the sources
will be discussed in section 13.2.2.7. A more extensive version of this type of reference is provided
by the case of C-13/94, P v. S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECRI-02143. In this case
Advocate General Tesauro discussed, among others things, the situation in Member States concerning
the changing legal status of transsexuals. The Advocate General observed that in almost all Member
States surgery to alter one’s sex is permitted. Subsequently, the Advocate General discussed in general
terms the different ways in which recognition of these operations had been guaranteed. Only a few
Member States were mentioned individually, the rest being discussed as an abstract category, but
the footnotes referred to individual Member States: Some States have given a legal response to
transsexuality by adopting special legislation. As far as Member States of the Community are
concerned this is so in the case of Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Nether-
lands. The laws concerned authorize transsexuals to correct their birth certificates so as to include
a reference to their new sexual identity, with the result that they have the right to marry, adopt children
and enjoy pension rights according to their new sexual identity. The fact that the other Member States
do not have special laws on the subject does not mean that the position of transsexuals is ignored.
As a matter of fact, in some States, the legality of surgery performed on transsexuals and of the
resulting change of civil status is based on laws which themselves have nothing to do with the
questions of transsexuality [footnote refers to Denmark]. In most of the other States the problem
is, by contrast, resolved case by case by the courts, or even, much more simply, at the administrative
level [Footnote refers to France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg and Greece].’
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overview which permits conclusions to be drawn about the situation in the Member
States of the then Community.95
In other cases a more elaborate discussion of the situation in the different Member
States is provided. A good example is the case of Hoechst in which the question was
raised whether the inviolability of the home could be extended to the business premises
of undertakings.96 Advocate General Mischo discussed the situation in all (at the
time 12) Member States at rather great length. To cite a part of this discussion would
not be relevant, since that would require delving too deeply into the subject matter
of the case and it would result in lengthy quotations. Indeed, the fact that the com-
parative discussion took up to nine pages of the opinion may already indicate that
the situation in all of the Member States was discussed rather extensively.97 The
Advocate General concluded that the right to inviolability of the home was common
to the traditions of the Member States, but that the situation was less clear when
extending this protection to the business premises of legal persons.98 The Advocate
General, however, did discern a trend and he concluded that a fundamental right to
inviolability of business premises existed at the time, but that it did not apply to the
same extent as to private dwellings.99
In more recent cases, such an elaborate discussion of the state of law in the
different Member States has never been given. This can probably be explained by
the increase in Member States of the EU, since it would be perhaps too time-con-
suming to discuss all 27 Member States separately at such great length in an opinion
on a concrete case.
95 A related type of references is made in the case of Sabine Mayr, where reference was made to the
wide variety of provisions in the different Member States on the storing of fertilized ova. Some broad
categories were mentioned and in this case only the two ends of the spectrum were mentioned, along
with the Member State that was involved in the case. See C-506/06, Sabine Mayr v. Bäckerei und
Konditorei Gerhard Flöckner OHG [2008] ECR I-01017, § 44.
96 C-46/87 Hoechst AG v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 02859, Opinion by
Advocate General Mischo.
97 Similar approaches can be seen in the following cases: C-17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Association
v. Commission of the European Communities [1974] 01063; C-44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land
Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 03727; C-155/79, AM & S Europe Limited v. Commission of the
European Communities [1982] ECR 01575 Opinion by Advocate General Slynn; C-374/87, Orkem
v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 03283. To a somewhat lesser extent this
is also visible in: C-130/75, Vivien Prais v. Council of the European Communities [1976] ECR 01589;
C-168/91,Christos Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig – Standesamt and Landratsamt Calw – Ordnungs-
amt [1993] ECR I-01191.
98 C-46/87 Hoechst AG v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 02859, § 97-101.
99 C-46/87 Hoechst AG v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 02859, § 103-106.
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The preceding examples clearly show that when the Advocates General choose to
substantiate the reference to national constitutional traditions, they generally prefer
to do so at a rather concrete level. In most cases some reference is made to individual
Member States,100 while in only a few cases an abstract reference is made to general
notions such as the existence of a common tradition.101 It has already been noted
above that the extensive references to national traditions can be found mainly in the
older cases, but even in recent cases references to individual Member States can be
found.102
The examples mentioned above correspond to both the second and third scenario
identified in section 13.2.2.2. It does not need much explanation why cases belonging
to the second group are discussed, since that scenario concerned the cases where only
the Advocate General elaborated on the national constitutional traditions and where
the CJEU remained silent on this aspect. In these cases the extent of the reference
to national constitutional traditions by the Advocate General differs, as has been shown
above. In the cases that fall within the third scenario, i.e. the cases where the Court
itself also substantiates the reference to national constitutional traditions, the degree
of reference by the Advocate General differs as well. It can be noted in this regard
that the most elaborate references by the Advocates General have been given in those
cases where subsequently the Court also invoked a more substantial reference to
100 C-17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Commission of the European Communities [1974]
01063; C-130/75, Vivien Prais v. Council of the European Communities [1976] ECR 01589; C-188/75,
Watson & Belmann; C-44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 03727; C-155/79,
AM& S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 01575; C-374/87,
Orkem v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 03283; C-46/87 Hoechst AG v.
Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 02859; C-168/91, Christos Konstantinidis
v. Stadt Altensteig – Standesamt and Landratsamt Calw – Ordnungsamt [1993] ECR I-01191; C-13/94,
P v. S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECRI-02143; C-20/00, Booker Aquacultur Ltd v. The
Scottish Ministers [2003] ECR I-07411; C-117/01, K.B. v National Health Service Pensions Agency
and Secretary of State for Health [2004] ECR I-00541; C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others [2007] ECR I-11767; C-341/06,Chronopost SA and La Poste
v. Union française de l’express (UFEX) and Others [2008] ECR I-04777. C-122/99, D and Kingdom
of Sweden v. Council of the European Union [2001] ECR I-04319 is a borderline case. In this case
the Advocate General does not mention Member States individually, but does refer to numbers of
Members States thereby indicating the division in the EU. The reference is thus neither concrete nor
abstract.
101 C-4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v. Ruhrkohle Aktiengesellschaft [1974] ECR
00491; C-136/79, National Panasonic (UK) Limited v Commission of the European Communities
[1980] ECR 02033; C-36/02,Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürger-
meisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-09609.




constitutional traditions.103 This is not always the case, however, so no conclusions
can be drawn from this observation. Nonetheless, it is striking that in only one case
the Court invokes substantial references to national constitutional traditions, while
the Advocate General does not.104 This might imply that the discussions by the
Advocate General play an important role for the substantial references in the reasoning
of the Court, either as a basis for the analysis by the Court or as an indicator that
references to constitutional traditions could be a relevant factor in a specific case.
13.2.2.4 Comparing approaches
The preceding two sections have addressed the approaches of the CJEU and the
Advocates General in referring to national constitutional traditions. Two clearly
different approaches have been identified. The Court itself prefers to be silent on
national constitutional traditions. If a more substantial reference is made, this is most
often a rather abstract reference which does not mention any individual Member States.
At the most, reference is made to certain categories of Member States.105 The Ad-
vocates General on the other hand, prefer to substantiate their references to national
constitutional traditions, in most cases by making concrete references to the law of
the Member States. Not seldom are individual Member States mentioned by the
Advocates General. The difference is thus that the Advocates General more often
rely on this form of comparative interpretation and, if so, they use concrete rather
than abstract references.
The section on the CJEU’s approach already provided some explanations for the
attitude taken by this Court. The question here is whether an explanation can be found
for the difference in attitude between the two. This difference can be explained from
the difference in style between the Advocate General and the CJEU, which has been
addressed in Chapter 3. The distinction made by LOTH between the Advocates General,
who contribute to the substantial debate, and the CJEU, who makes authoritive
decisions, also appears to hold true in the context of comparative interpretation.106
13.2.2.5 The purpose of invoking national constitutional traditions
The previous sections have shown that in many cases the reference to national consti-
tutional traditions does not stretch beyond the remark that they are an important source
103 See for example: C-155/79, AM & S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities
[1982] ECR 01575; C-374/87,Orkem v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 03283.
104 C-249/96, Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-00621.
105 C-155/79, AM& S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 01575.
106 Loth (2009), p. 274.
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of inspiration. Thus in many cases the reference does not go further than a rhetorical
reference to indicate the link with the Member States.
In those cases where the reference to national constitutional traditions is substan-
tiated there seem to be three goals for the references to constitutional traditions. One
purpose of relying on national constitutional traditions is to construe fundamental
rights that deserve protection in the EU. As indicated before – see mainly Chapter 3 –
the EU until 2000 did not have its own fundamental rights document, but EU law
had to be interpreted in accordance with fundamental rights. The question was:Which
fundamental rights? Those fundamental rights that could be found in the national
constitutional traditions and the ECHR. Thus the purpose of the references was to
fill the gap by providing a basis on which to decide which fundamental rights had
to be protected within the EU or by providing a reason not to construe a fundamental
right, when there was no sufficient support. This purpose is thus mainly visible in
the earlier cases and not really in the more recent cases after the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights came into existence.107 A rare, relatively recent example of this pur-
pose would be the opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Laval, where he referred
to national constitutional traditions to indicate that the right to collective action to
defend trade union members is a fundamental right to be protected in the EU.108
The example simultaneously explains why this purpose of referring to national consti-
tutional traditions has become relatively seldom:
As regards the constitutional traditions of the Member States, whilst I am not of the view
that they must be examined exhaustively, in view of the fact that, as emphasized in point
68 of this Opinion, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, although not binding, is principally
intended to reaffirm the rights resulting in particular from those traditions, I would nevertheless
point out that the constitutional instruments of numerous Member States explicitly protect
the right to establish trade unions and the defense of their interests by collective action, the
107 See for example: C-17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Commission of the European
Communities [1974] 01063; C-130/75, Vivien Prais v. Council of the European Communities [1976]
ECR 01589; C-44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 03727; C-155/79, AM
& S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 01575; C-46/87Hoechst
AG v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 02859; C-374/87,Orkem v. Commission
of the European Communities [1989] ECR 03283; C-168/91,Christos Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig
– Standesamt and Landratsamt Calw – Ordnungsamt [1993] ECR I-01191; C-13/94, P v. S and
Cornwall County Council [1996] ECRI-02143; C-74/95, Criminal Proceedings against X [1996] ECR
I-06609; C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others [2007]
ECR I-11767; C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union
v. Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779.
108 C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others [2007] ECR I-
11767, opinion by Advocate General Mengozzi, § 77.
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right to strike being, in that connection, the method most regularly referred to. [In several
footnotes the Advocate General referred to legislation in specific countries].109
This corresponds to the observation made before when addressing the question why
substantiated references to national constitutional traditions have diminished. This
does not, however, mean that the references have become irrelevant or vanished
entirely, because that is not the only purpose for relying on references to the Member
States.
References to the Member States are also used to solve interpretative problems
that arise concerning rights that have already been recognized or that have been laid
down in the Charter.110 In Booker Aquaculture, for example, the question was
whether a right to compensation existed for the destruction of fish.111 The right to
property had already been recognized on earlier occasions and the question as the
right to compensation for the destruction of fish fell within its scope. Advocate General
Mischo referred to some Member States and concluded that there was ‘no constitu-
tional principle common to the laws of the Member States’.112 In DEB, the CJEU
and Advocate General Mengozzi were trying to find an answer to the question whether
Article 47 of the Charter included a right to legal aid for legal persons as well.113
In answering that question they included a reference to a few Member States in order
to show that no such common principle could be found. The final conclusion was
that such a right was not necessarily excluded from the scope of Article 47 of the
Charter. These two examples show that the references to Member States can still have
a relevant function and the fact that it is also used for interpretative problems con-
cerning the Charter indicates that in the future they might continue to play a role.
A final purpose of relying on references to Member States is to check the state
of affairs in the Member States and thus to support an evolutive interpretation. As
will be discussed in the section on evolutive interpretation this happens on a rather
109 C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others [2007] ECR I-
11767, opinion by Advocate General Mengozzi, § 77.
110 See for example: C-20/00, Booker Aquacultur Ltd v. The Scottish Ministers [2003] ECR I-07411;
C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad [2007] ECR I-03633; C-279/
09, DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland
[2010].
111 C-20/00, Booker Aquacultur Ltd v. The ScottishMinisters [2003] ECR I-07411, Opinion by Advocate
General Mischo, § 119-124.
112 C-20/00, Booker Aquacultur Ltd v. The Scottish Ministers [2003] ECR I-07411, opinion by Advocate
General Mischo, § 123-124.
113 C-279/09,DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land [2010].
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small scale, but there are some examples of this purpose of comparative interpreta-
tion.114 This will be discussed in more detail when dealing with evolutive interpreta-
tion, in section 13.4.1, but it is important to realize that this is one of the purposes
of comparative references to the Member States as well.
A final question in this context that helps to shed light on the role of the references
to Member States is whether the references have been used as the sole argument
pleading for a specific interpretative conclusion or whether they have been used in
conjunction with other arguments. In the majority of the cases in which either the
CJEU or the Advocate General (or both) refer to Member States the outcome of that
reference is supported by other arguments.115 In most cases this other argument
consists of a reference to the ECHR and its case law.116 Only in some cases, mainly
older cases, did the reference to the Member States seem to be the decisive argu-
ment.117 The fact that these references are mainly used to support a specific argument
is understandable, because both are placed on an equal footing with the ECHR in
Article 6 TEU.
114 C-122/99,D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council of the European Union [2001] ECR I-04319; C-117/
01, K.B. v National Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health [2004] ECR
I-00541; C-249/96, Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-00621.
115 See for example: C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others
[2007] ECR I-11767, Opinion by Advocate General Mengozzi, § 77; C-20/00, Booker Aquacultur
Ltd v. The Scottish Ministers [2003] ECR I-07411, Opinion by Advocate General Mischo, § 104-132;
C-122/99, D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council of the European Union [2001] ECR I-04319, where
the references are supported by textual interpretation, § 31 and Opinion by Advocate General Mischo
who supports the references to teleological interpretation, § 51; C-249/96, Lisa Jacqueline Grant
v. South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-00621, § 36; C-117/01, K.B. v National Health Service
Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health [2004] ECR I-00541, Opinion by Ruiz-Jarabo
Colomer § 27-29.
116 C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others [2007] ECR I-
11767, Opinion by Advocate General Mengozzi, § 77; C-20/00, Booker Aquacultur Ltd v. The Scottish
Ministers [2003] ECR I-07411, Opinion by Advocate General Mischo, § 104-132; C- 249/96, Lisa
Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-00621, § 36; C-117/01, K.B. v National
Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health [2004] ECR I-00541, Opinion
by Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer § 27-29.
117 C-17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Commission of the European Communities [1974]
01063, Opinion by Advocate General Warner; 155/79, AM & S Europe Limited v. Commission of
the European Communities [1982] ECR 01575; C-168/91,Christos Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig
– Standesamt and Landratsamt Calw – Ordnungsamt [1993] ECR I-01191, Opinion by Advocate
General Jacobs; C-46/87Hoechst AG v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 02859;




Several questions concerning the references to national constitutional traditions have
already been answered in the above, namely both as regards the basis of and justifica-
tion for using these references, and as regards the way in which the Court and the
Advocates General express these references. An important question that has been
identified in the theoretical chapter that still needs to be answered, is how these
references are used. It has become clear from the analysis so far that when reference
is made to theMember States, this is always done to establish a common constitutional
tradition; no references to individual Member States have been found without these
references being part of the search for common constitutional traditions. Against that
background, it is particularly interesting to know if the CJEU is really looking for
a ‘common’ tradition, i.e. to some kind of consensus within the European Union.
Indeed, the term ‘common’ would seem to imply that the sought principle must be
recognized in each Member State. The question is whether that is possible in the
current European Union with its 27 members.118 In a Union of this size, if a real
common tradition can be found at all, such commonality will probably only exist
on a very general level – as soon as more concrete elements of a certain right are
concerned, opinions and laws will probably differ. Thus, even if a real common
approach would be sought for, finding it would not provide much guidance as to the
actual meaning and scope of the right at issue. It is thus unlikely that absolute un-
animity among the Member States is intended when reference is made to ‘common
traditions’.
Leaving unanimity aside, however, the question still is when the CJEU considers
a certain tradition sufficiently ‘common’ as to warrant a specific right to be recognized
as part of the general principles of EU law. That is rather hard to distil from the
reasoning in the CJEU’s cases, since the Court only refers to Member States law in
a rather abstract fashion. As has been explained before, however, the opinions of the
Advocates General might be helpful in this respect. In the case of Orkem it became
clear, for example, that the Court could not find a common principle or right not to
incriminate oneself in competition proceedings, but it did not explain the basis for
this conclusion.119 The opinion of Advocate General Darmon does shed some light
on this finding by the Court. In his opinion he discussed all Member States, painting
a rather diverse picture. The Advocate General mentioned that in only two (of the
then 12) Member States the right not to incriminate oneself was available in com-
118 The Advocate General in AM & S also refers to this practical problem: C-155/79, AM & S Europe
Limited v. Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 01575, p. 1651 Opinion by
Advocate General Slynn, p. 1650.
119 C-374/87, Orkem v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 03283, § 29.
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petition cases. The conclusion from this legal mosaic, as he called it, was according
to him that a right not to incriminate oneself could be regarded as a ‘general’ principle
(of Community law). The analysis in the view of Advocate General Darmon, however,
showed that the general principle found among the Member States was ‘not of such
“force” that it cannot be excluded in an area such as competition law’.120 Thus,
the framing of the conclusions reached by the Court and the Advocate General is
different, but in substance they both disclose that the CJEU will not accept the
existence of a common tradition when there is too much diversity in the national law
on a certain issue.
Although this much may be clear, this does not yet answer the question as to how
much consensus is needed for a common tradition to be found. Indeed, the Court
appears to be very vague on this, the same lack of clarity as to the proper standard
of consensus being visible not only in Orkem, but also in other cases. In D, for
instance, the CJEU likewise concluded that, despite developments in an increasing
number of Member States, there was still too much diversity, so no common principle
could be found.121 Again it was not clear what would have been necessary for a
common tradition to arise.
Perhaps the CJEU does not even want to set a standard for consensus. One of
the Advocates General in AM & S refers to a report from another CJEU-judge on
interpretation methods by the CJEU. In this report by Judge Kutscher he states that:
... it [the CJEU] is not obliged to take the minimum which the national solutions have in
common, or their arithmetic mean or solution produced by a majority of the legal systems
as the basis of its decision. The Court has to weigh up and evaluate the particular problem
and search for the best and most appropriate solution.122
Thus, the CJEU does not necessarily look for a ‘common’ solution, but rather for
a solution it considers appropriate.123 Advocate General Slynn in AM & S likewise
stressed that unanimity was not required; a ‘widely accepted’ principle, even if only
a very broad principle, may ‘be found to be part of Community law’.124 In his view,
the CJEU must then decide how this principle works most appropriately in the Com-
120 C-374/87, Orkem v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 03283, Opinion by
Advocate General Darmon, § 122.
121 C-122/99,D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council of the European Union [2001] ECR I-04319, § 35-36.
122 C-155/79, AM& S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 01575,
p. 1649, Opinion by Advocate General Slynn.
123 See also: Lenaerts (2003), p. 883; Hilf(1986), p. 563; Kakouris (1994); Wasensteiner (2004), p. 35;
Šišková (2008), p. 9.




munity context.125 Advocate General Warner has made a similar argument indicating
that differences between Member States are not an insurmountable obstacle for
establishing a common principle.126 Nevertheless, if one considers the abovemen-
tioned reasoning of the CJEU in D or in Orkem, it becomes clear that at a certain
point differences become fatal. It is understandable that the Court does not indicate
when this point has been reached, since doing so would be difficult if not impossible
– the degree of consensus required will obviously depend on the legal landscape in
each individual case and on the perceived appropriateness of reaching a certain
outcome. If, however, the reasoning of the CJEU was more explicit in this respect,
perhaps some clues could be distilled and the transparency of the use of the method
could be improved.
As has been established in the theoretical analysis, legal commentaries have
likewise provided only limited guidance on this point. Legal commentators have made
clear that unanimity or a majority is not required, but it remains obscure what is
sufficient to constitute a ‘common tradition’. HILF has argued that there is no standard
solution in cases where no common principle can be found. The question will be
whether a certain solution ‘conforms to the aims and structure’127 of the EU.128
In this sense, teleological interpretation plays a role in this context as well.129
A separate question is at what level a common principle needs to be found. Is it
sufficient that a broad and rather abstract legal concept is recognized by all Member
States, or is it necessary that agreement or a trend is found on a more concrete level?
Usually, it will be much more difficult to find a common approach on a concrete
level, because at that level differences in form and practice might start to play a role.
Has any indication been given by the CJEU? No, the Court has not provided any
clues, but, once again, one of the Advocates General has. In his opinion in AM&S,
Advocate General Slynn argued that consensus on the level of principle is sufficient:
The fact that proceedings in one Member State may be criminal, in others civil, that judicial
procedures differ, that for historical reasons different practices are adopted, different conditions
apply, makes divergences inevitable. In my opinion, what has to be looked for is a general
principle, even if broadly expressed. If that is widely accepted then it may, if relevant, be
found to be part of Community law. It is then for the Court to declare how that principle
is worked out in the best and most appropriate way, ..., in the context of Community pro-
125 C-155/79, AM& S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 01575,
p. 1650.
126 C-155/79, AM& S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 01575,
p. 1632, Opinion by Advocate General Warner.
127 Hilf (1986), p. 563.
128 Lenaerts (2003), p. 887.
129 See also: Lenaerts (2003), p. 879.
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ceedings. Nor is the fact that in some Member States the general principle may have been
modified or excluded, in certain contexts covered by legislation, fatal to the existence of that
principle.130
Accordingly, the fact that at a more concrete level Member States differ is not fatal
to finding a common principle according to this statement. The broad principle should
thus be recognized by the Member States, but how this recognition is framed in legal
terms is not relevant.
The question when one can speak of common constitutional traditions can thus only
be answered in the extreme situations when there is either no unanimity at all, or
when such unanimity obviously exists. In all situations lying between these extremes,
the case law does not provide any guidance on the question when one can speak of
common constitutional traditions. It is suggested that differences at a concrete level
do not prevent the existence of a common principle at a more abstract level. But the
question when differences become fatal for finding a common tradition cannot be
answered on the basis of the case law analysis undertaken in the context of this thesis.
13.2.2.7 Material
Discussions on comparative interpretation not only focus on the question whether
this type of reasoning is justified. The practical side has received much attention as
well.131 The main questions in this respect concern the origin of the material (who
supplies the comparative material?) and what kind of comparative material is taken
into account. On both questions some indicative answers are provided by the judg-
ments of the Court and by the opinions by the Advocates General.
The first source of information that is identified in the case law is the parties to
a case. In Booker AquacultureAdvocate General Mischo explicitly indicated that one
of the parties had provided references to national constitutional traditions:132
Booker states that the constitutional texts of the Member States, which it reproduces in an
annex to its observations, would enable it to obtain the payment of compensation for all or
130 Opinion by Advocate General Slynn in C-155/79, AM & S Europe Limited v. Commission of the
European Communities [1982] ECR 01575, p. 1650.
131 See 6.1.6.2.
132 C-20/00, Booker Aquacultur Ltd v. The ScottishMinisters [2003] ECR I-07411, Opinion by Advocate
General Mischo. See also: C-155/79, AM & S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European
Communities [1982] ECR 01575; C-341/06, Chronopost SA and La Poste v. Union française de
l’express (UFEX) and Others [2008] ECR I-04777 in which Advocate General Sharpston criticized
the parties for referring to too few Member States.
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part of the losses it has suffered in practically all of the Member States of the Community,
except for the United Kingdom.133
The Advocate General went on to discuss some of the Member States mentioned in
the comparison provided by Booker, but he did so in a critical manner. The Advocate
General in the end did not reach the same conclusion as the party did who supplied
the material. InOrkemAdvocate General Darmon also indicated that the comparative
information in that case was derived from the written submissions by the parties.134
In the view of the Advocate General in Orkem, the parties used this comparison only
to support their own conclusion. Of course, that is a quite natural attitude of parties
in a legal process, but he added that the parties, invoking these references, used them
to find what they ‘had decided to find’.135 This statement seems to imply that the
comparative overview provided was not entirely objective.
This implication touches upon an important question that should be addressed,
namely when comparative references are provided by the parties can they be con-
sidered sufficiently objective and who ensures their correctness? The two examples
above show a critical attitude by the Advocates General towards this material. That
attitude ensures a more objective approach towards the conclusion drawn from the
different materials. In AM & S, a case that was elaborately dealt with in section
13.2.2.2, Advocate General Slynn commented on the information available as well,
this time on the issue of correctness. He admitted that he felt some hesitation in
referring to the report provided by the parties, since there had been some discussion
at the hearing on the correctness of the described legal situation in some Member
States.136 The Advocate General explained that this was not fatal for the usefulness
of the material, but that it indicated the difficulty of describing in detail the situation
in Member States while, at the same time, trying to distil a common principle.137
The critical approach that is visible in the opinions of the Advocates General is a
necessary safeguard that helps to ensure the objectivity of the comparative references.
133 C-20/00, Booker Aquacultur Ltd v. The ScottishMinisters [2003] ECR I-07411, Opinion by Advocate
General Mischo, § 116.
134 C-374/87, Orkem v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 03283, Opinion by
Advocate General Darmon, § 97.
135 C-374/87, Orkem v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 03283, Opinion by
Advocate General Darmon, § 97.
136 C-, AM & S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 01575, p.
1651 Opinion by Advocate General Slynn. In this case the CJEU quite exceptionally reopened the
procedure to hear the parties’ view on the national constitutional traditions. See Lenaerts (2003),
p. 875.
137 C-155/79, AM& S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 01575,
p. 1651 Opinion by Advocate General Slynn, p. 1651.
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Other possible sources of comparative studies have not really been explicitly men-
tioned in the case law itself. One main source, however, appears to be the comparative
knowledge which the CJEU or the Advocate General are able to generate themselves.
In an older case, Vivien Prais, Advocate General Warner complained that the parties
had provided too little information.138 The Advocate General indicated that informa-
tion had only been provided on the United Kingdom and therefore he had to find
information on the other states himself.139 This research apparently had its limits,
since the Advocate General was careful to introduce his findings by stating: ‘From
such researches as I have been able to make, it appears to be as follows.’140 While
it is understandable that an Advocate General cannot undertake a very thorough
analysis of all Member States, especially considering the number of Member States
in the present European Union, it is not very convincing if the materials are only based
on what the Advocate General could find and understand.
Situations like this one will, probably, no longer occur nowadays, since the CJEU
now has a Research and Documentation Unit.141 At the request of the Court or the
Advocate General this unit can undertake comparative research.142 The Advocates
General will therefore no longer be forced to do comparative research themselves
or to depend entirely on the information provided by the parties. In the case of
Laval,143 for example, the comparative information appears to have been provided
by this unit. Advocate General Mengozzi in his opinion to the case referred in general
to the situation in the Member States, mentioning specific Member States in the
footnotes.144 No explanation has been given for the origin of this information,145
as is good practice if the information has been supplied by the parties; hence the con-
clusion might be that it has been supplied by the Research unit of the Court.
138 C-130/75, Vivien Prais v. Council of the European Communities [1976] ECR 01589.
139 C-130/75, Vivien Prais v. Council of the European Communities [1976] ECR 01589, Opinion by
Advocate General Warner, p. 1605.
140 C-130/75, Vivien Prais v. Council of the European Communities [1976] ECR 01589, Opinion by
Advocate General Warner, p. 1605.
141 See Singer & Engel (2007).
142 Singer & Engel (2007), p. 508.
143 C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others [2007] ECR I-
11767, opinion by Advocate General Mengozzi. See also: C-117/01, K.B. v National Health Service
Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health [2004] ECR I-00541; C-117/01, K.B. v National
Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health [2004] ECR I-00541, Opinion
by Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer.
144 C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others [2007] ECR I-
11767, opinion by Advocate General Mengozzi, § 77.




It is clear that the existence of a Research and Documentation Unit may prove
to be an important factor in professionalizing comparative references. It ensures that
references are not tainted by the position of the provider of information in the legal
process, since the sources and materials are put forward by an independent unit.
Moreover, with the expansion of the EU, having a specialized unit will help to ensure
that all Member States are taken into consideration. Private parties or the Advocates
General will, probably, be much more hampered by language and time concerns. This
presumption that the existence of a Research and Documentation Unit enhances the
quality of the references to Member States does not always hold. In a recent case,
the CJEU explicitly referred back to the Advocate General to support the conclusion
that no common principle can be found. In his opinion, Advocate General Mengozzi,
supports this conclusion by referring to only four Member States in a Union of 27.146
He acknowledges that this is not an exhaustive overview, but considers it sufficient
for the conclusion that no common principle can be found. It is not really convincing
that such a conclusion can be drawn on the basis of only four Member States, perhaps
the situation in all other Member States points in the direction of a common principle.
This example indicates that this is still a matter for concern.
One last possibility for the Court to assemble relevant materials is by asking the
European Commission to undertake a comparative study.147 The Commission can
perform this study either as one of the parties to the proceedings or as an amicus
curiae.148 With the creation of the Research and Documentation unit one may won-
der when there is still a need to ask the Commission for a comparative study. This
question is clearly difficult to answer on the basis of case law analysis alone.
The second question to be addressed in this section concerns the kind of material that
is taken into consideration. The reference to constitutional traditions already reveals
the kind of information the CJEU takes into account when trying to establish a
common principle, namely the constitutions or, more generally, the constitutional
principles of the Member States. The CJEU does not refer to the kind of materials
it takes into consideration in finding out what these constitutions contain. However,
the Advocates General often mention in passing the kind of materials that played a
role in their comparisons. In Laval, for example, Advocate General Mengozzi made
reference in a footnote to constitutional provisions of the different Member States.149
In AM & S, Advocate General Slynn indicated that legislation, case decisions and
146 C-279/09,DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land [2010], Opinion by Advocate General Mengozzi, § 76-78.
147 Lenaerts (2003), p. 875; Hilf (1986), p. 564-565.
148 Lenaerts (2003), p. 875.
149 C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others [2007] ECR I-
11767, opinion by Advocate General Mengozzi, footnote 31-32-33.
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opinions of academic authors have been taken into consideration.150 From the Orkem
judgment it becomes clear that these same elements, but also draft legislation, had
been considered in the comparison.151 Thus, the category of materials taken into
consideration is generally rather wide and undefined.152 This does leave a lot of
flexibility to the Court, but for a good comparative study to be made, it is at the least
important that the same or equivalent materials are taken into account for each
individual Member State that is being studied. Unfortunately, it is not clear if this
is really done in practice by either the CJEU research unit or the parties providing
comparative overviews.
13.2.2.8 Conclusion
The different elements mentioned in the introduction to this section (section 13.2.1)
have been addressed as far as possible on the basis of the information provided in
the judgments of the CJEU and the opinions of the Advocates General. Particularly
the discussions on the way in which the CJEU and the Advocates General refer to
national constitutional traditions have provided interesting insights. The CJEU prefers
not to refer to national traditions in an explicit manner at all and, if it ever refers to
them, it prefers to do so in a rather abstract fashion. The Advocates General are
usually more inclined to refer to national traditions and they tend to do so in a more
concrete manner, often by referring to individual Member States. What is perhaps
most striking about this, is that still most authors claim that comparative interpretation
plays an important role for the Court. In their view such comparisons take place more
indirectly. It can be submitted, however, that if such comparisons take place and if
they affect the reasoning of the Court, that should be done explicitly.153 Especially
in a field where the CJEU already is not very willing to elaborate on the concepts
in question, namely the scope of fundamental rights.
From cases like D v Council and Orkem it has appeared that the references to
national traditions indeed do play some role. The Court in those cases attached quite
some weight to the fact that no common principle could be found, implying that in
some cases these traditions can play a strong role in the reasoning of the Court. In
the majority of the cases, however, it has been found that the references to the Member
States play a supportive role often together with a reference to the ECHR.
150 C--155/79, AM& SEurope Limited v. Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 01575,
p. 1651 Opinion by Advocate General Slynn, p. 1651.
151 C-374/87, Orkem v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 03283, Opinion by
Advocate General Darmon, § 97-125.
152 See also: Lutzhoeft (2009), p. 44.
153 See also De Witte (1999), p. 882.
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It has been shown that the frequency of substantive references in order to establish
a common principle has diminished. Several reasons have been provided, one of them
being that the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides a codification of those common
principles. Still, in certain situations references to the Member States can be useful,
and have proven to be useful, to solve an interpretative problem. The value of these
references has therefore not been lost with the drafting of the Charter, but the purpose
of relying on these references has changed. Instead of serving as a basis for establish-
ing a fundamental right, they now provide help to find an answer to ‘common’
interpretative problems. In addition, the references are sometimes used to support
an evolutive interpretation, but only in a limited type of case, as will be shown in
section 13.4.1.
An area for improvement of the Court’s reasoning relates to the question when
one can speak of a common constitutional tradition. It would provide much insight
into the use of this component of comparative interpretation if the CJEU or its Ad-
vocates General would be more open about the existence of a common constitutional
tradition. There is no need to provide an exact standard, but if they would show more
insight into the material taken into consideration for the analysis and the result of
the analysis, this would already provide more insight into the existence of a common
constitutional tradition. A related concern that still needs to be kept in mind when
referring explicitly to a number of Member States is that at least a representative
number of Member States is taken into consideration. Basing a firm conclusion on
only four out of 27 Member States is not a convincing form of relying on common
constitutional traditions.
13.2.3 Role of the ECHR
Apart from the role of national constitutional traditions in the comparative case law
of the CJEU, an important source of inspiration is provided by the European Conven-
tion of Human Rights and the interpretation of the Convention as laid down in the
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.154 One of the earliest references
to the ECHR was made in the case of Rutili,155 where the CJEU held that certain
limitations on the powers of Member States were regarded as:
[S]pecific manifestations of the more general principle, enshrined in Articles 8, 9, 10, 11
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
154 Lawson (2009) argues that the ECtHR is starting to taking more and more account of EU law and
CJEU judgments, but it is not yet as widespread as the reliance from Luxembourg on Strassbourg.
155 C-36/75, Roland Rutili v. Ministre de l’intérieur [1975] ECR 01219.
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signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and ratified by all Member States, and in Article 2
of Protocol No 4 of the same Convention ... .156
The CJEU here thus connected the fundamental rights protection within the EU with
the protection under the ECHR. In later cases this became more explicit and more
prominent and in many cases on fundamental rights at least reference is made to the
ECHR.157 A reference to the ECHR has been included in the standard phrase the
CJEU commonly uses when referring to fundamental rights protection within the EU:
156 C-36/75, Roland Rutili v. Ministre de l’intérieur [1975] ECR 01219, § 32.
157 See for example: C-44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 03727; C-222/84,
Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 01651; C-222/
86, Union nationale des entraîneurs et cadres techniques professionnels du football (Unectef) v.
Georges Heylens and others [1987] ECR 04097; C-46/87Hoechst AG v. Commission of the European
Communities [1989] ECR 02859; C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi (ERT) AE and Panellinia
Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos
Avdellas and others [1991] ECR I-02925; C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football
association ASBL and others v. Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-04921; C13/94, P v. S and Cornwall
County Council [1996] ECRI-02143; C-74/95,Criminal Proceedings against X [1996] ECR I-06609;
C-185/95, Baustahlgewebe GmbH v. Commission of the European Communities [1998] ECR I-08417;
C-299/95, Friedrich Kremzow v Republik Österreich [1997] I-02629; C-368/95, Vereinigte Familia-
press Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs GmbH v Heinrich Bauer Verlag [1997] ECR I-03689; C-249/96,
Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-00621; C-309/96, Daniele Annibaldi
v. Sindaco del Comune di Guidonia and Presidente Regione Lazio [1997] ECR I-07493; C-185/97,
Belinda Jane Coote v. Granada Hospitality Ltd. [1998] ECR I-05199; C-7/98, Dieter Krombach v.
André Bamberski [2000] ECR I-01935; C-17/98, Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v. Aruba [2000] ECR
I-00665; C-274/99, Bernard Connolly v. Commission of the European Communities [2001] ECR I-
01611; C-50/00, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA) v. Council of the European Union [2002]
ECR I-06677; C-60/00,Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR
I-06279; C-94/00, Roquette Frères SA v. Directeur général de la concurrence, de la consommation
et de la répression des fraudes, and Commission of the European Communities [2002] ECR I-09011;
C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Republik Österreich [2003]
ECR I-05659; C-465/00, Rechnungshof v Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others [2003] ECR I-04989;
C-117/01, K.B. v National Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health [2004]
ECR I-00541; C-36/02,Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin
der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-09609; C-263/02, Commission of the European Communities
v. Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA [2004] ECR I-03425; C-540/03, European Parliament v Council of the
European Union [2006] ECR I-05769; C-411/04, Salzgitter Mannesmann GmbH v. Commission of
the European Communities, [2007] ECR I-00959; C-436/04, Criminal proceedings against Leopold
Henri Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I-02333; C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van
de Ministerraad [2007] ECR I-03633; C-370/05, Criminal proceedings against Uwe Kay Festersen
[2007] ECR I-01129; C-432/05, Unibet (London) Ltd and Unibet (International) Ltd v. Justitiekanslern
[2007] ECR I-02271; C-341/06, Chronopost SA and La Poste v. Union française de l’express (UFEX)
and Others [2008] ECR I-04777; C-450/06, Varec SA v. Belgian State [2008] ECR I-00581; C-14/07,
IngenieurbüroMichael Weiss und Partner GbR v. Industrie- und Handelskammer Berlin [2008] ECR
I-03367; C-308/07, Koldo Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso v. European Parliament [2009] ECR I-01059.
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[F]undamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law, the observance
of which it [the CJEU] ensures. For that purpose, the Court draws inspiration from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by
international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have
collaborated or of which they are signatories. The European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950 has special significance
in that respect (emphasis added).158
The ECHR thus has a special status when it comes to the interpretation of fundamental
rights by the CJEU. The CJEU refers to it as a source of inspiration, but the analysis
below will address the question whether that really is the purpose of referring to the
ECHR and the ECtHR case law.
Several questions will be addressed in this analysis on the role of the ECHR in
comparative references by the CJEU. Several explanations on the reason why the
CJEU relies on the ECHR and its case law were discussed in the theoretical analysis,
but the question is whether the CJEU in its case law provides any indication on this
reason as well. Furthermore, it should be addressed how references to the ECHR
feature in the reasoning. How extensive are these references to the ECHR and its case
law? And are they used as support in addition to other arguments or are they used
as a decisive argument in the reasoning? It is also important to realize for which
purpose they are used – as a source of inspiration or do they play a different role?
In addition, the question whether the theoretical distinction made between external
and internal comparative interpretation is visible in the reasoning with regard to the
ECHR and whether the CJEU attaches any consequences to this distinction should
be addressed. The previous section revealed a strong difference between the approach
of the CJEU and its Advocates General. The question is whether the situation is the
same in the context of references to the ECHR. Finally, the practical aspect of who
collects the materials should be addressed.
An important question that warrants attention is why the CJEU has adopted this
approach, i.e. what explanation had been given by the CJEU for this special status
of the ECHR. The statement from Rutili,159 cited above, suggests that the fact that
this treaty has been ratified by all Member States is an important reason to take special
note of this treaty. This seems to be the most important justification provided until
the codification of the special status of the ECHR in the EU Treaty, as explained
in the introductory Chapter 3. Of course, the fact that a treaty has been ratified by
all Member States is an important indication that these rights are widely supported
158 C-309/96,Daniele Annibaldi v. Sindaco del Comune di Guidonia and Presidente Regione Lazio [1997]
ECR I-07493, § 12, but a version of this phrase is visible in many judgments.
159 C-36/75, Roland Rutili v. Ministre de l’intérieur [1975] ECR 01219.
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by the Member States. That does not necessarily mean, however, that respecting that
treaty (in casu the European Convention) involves incorporating so much of the case
law on that treaty literally.
In cases after the codification of the special status of the ECHR, the CJEU often
refers to this codification if it mentions the relevance of the ECHR as a comparative
source:
[A]rticle 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
..., which is among the fundamental rights which according to the Court’s settled case-law,
restated by the Preamble to the Single European Act and by Article 6(2) EU, are protected
in Community law.160
Even in the light of the codification of the special status of the ECHR it is still
warranted to take a critical look at the extent of the references to the ECHR.
An important aspect to further the discussion is how the CJEU refers to the ECHR
and ECtHR. Specifically relevant in this regard is the extent to which references are
made to the ECHR and ECtHR. In some cases the reference does not go beyond the
statement about the importance of the ECHR when interpreting fundamental rights,
but in other cases the CJEU incorporates rather substantive references to the ECHR
into its own judgments. Some examples may be mentioned to clarify this use of the
Convention and the ECtHR’s case law.
In some cases the CJEU only mentions that a certain right has been laid down
in the ECHR, like in the case of Jégo- Quéré.161 Here the CJEU held that:
It should be noted that individuals are entitled to effective judicial protection of the rights
the derive from the Community legal order, and the right to such protection is one of the
general principles of law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member
States. That rights has also been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR [reference to
CJEU cases].162
In the remainder of the judgment the CJEU did not at all refer to the ECHR, so the
reference was only made to indicate that a certain right exists in the ECHR. Given
the special status of the ECHR as recognized in the Treaties, these references seem
understandable as they provide extra support for the recognition of a certain right.
The short references, however, do not provide any information on the scope and
160 See for example: C-60/00, Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002]
ECR I-06279, § 41.
161 C-263/02, Commission of the European Communities v. Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA [2004] ECR I-03425.
See also: C-74/95, Criminal Proceedings against X [1996] ECR I-06609, § 25.




meaning of the right in question. In order to draw any convincing conclusions on
the question whether a right has been violated in a certain case, like the right to
effective judicial protection, the scope of that right should have been made clear. Only
then would a proper discussion on the alleged violation be possible.
In quite a number of cases the CJEU refers to more than just a provision in the
ECHR. Such references include interpretations given to the ECHR in the judgments
of the Strasbourg Court.163 The case of Chronopost is a good and elaborate example
of the approach taken by the CJEU.164 In this appeal case the CJEU had to decide
whether Chronopost – a French postal company, which had been accused of receiving
state aid – received a fair trial, since one of the judges acting as a Judge-Rapporteur
at the General Court had been Judge-Rapporteur and president in a Chamber dealing
with a parallel case. The CJEU endeavoured to answer this question by starting off
with a reference to Article 6 ECHR and some general comments on what the right
to fair trial entails.165 In this discussion on the meaning to the right to fair trial and
impartiality of judges, the CJEU made reference to an ECHR judgment in the same
way as it usually refers to CJEU judgments:166
163 See for example: C-13/94, P v. S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECRI-02143; C-185/95,
Baustahlgewebe GmbH v. Commission of the European Communities [1998] ECR I-08417; C-368/95,
Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs GmbH v Heinrich Bauer Verlag [1997] ECR
I-03689; C-249/96, Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-00621; C-7/98,
Dieter Krombach v. André Bamberski [2000] ECR I-01935; C-17/98, Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV
v. Aruba [2000] ECR I-00665; C-274/99, Bernard Connolly v. Commission of the European Com-
munities [2001] ECR I-01611; C-60/00,Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2002] ECR I-06279; C-94/00, Roquette Frères SA v. Directeur général de la concurrence, de la
consommation et de la répression des fraudes, and Commission of the European Communities [2002]
ECR I-09011; C-465/00, Rechnungshof v Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others [2003] ECR I-04989;
C-117/01, K.B. v National Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health [2004]
ECR I-00541; C-540/03, European Parliament v Council of the European Union [2006] ECR I-05769;
C-411/04, Salzgitter Mannesmann GmbH v. Commission of the European Communities, [2007] ECR
I-00959; C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad [2007] ECR I-
03633; C-432/05,Unibet (London) Ltd and Unibet (International) Ltd v. Justitiekanslern [2007] ECR
I-02271; C-341/06, Chronopost SA and La Poste v. Union française de l’express (UFEX) and Others
[2008] ECR I-04777; C-450/06, Varec SA v. Belgian State [2008] ECR I-00581; C-14/07, In-
genieurbüro Michael Weiss und Partner GbR v. Industrie- und Handelskammer Berlin [2008] ECR
I-03367; C-308/07, Koldo Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso v. European Parliament [2009] ECR I-01059;
C-279/09,DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land [2010].
164 C-341/06, Chronopost SA and La Poste v. Union française de l’express (UFEX) and Others [2008]
ECR I-04777.
165 C-341/06, Chronopost SA and La Poste v. Union française de l’express (UFEX) and Others [2008]
ECR I-04777, § 44-46.
166 C-341/06, Chronopost SA and La Poste v. Union française de l’express (UFEX) and Others [2008]
ECR I-04777, § 46.
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[T]here are two aspects to the requirement of impartiality: (i) the members of the tribunal
themselves must be subjectively impartial, that is, none of its members must show bias or
personal prejudice, there being a presumption of personal impartiality in the absence of
evidence to the contrary; and (ii) the tribunal must be objectively impartial, that is to say,
it must offer guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect (see, to that
effect, in particular, Eur. Court HR, Fey v. Austria, judgment of 24 February 1993, Series
A no. 255-A, p. 12, § 28; Findlay v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 February 1997, Reports
of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I, p. 281, § 73; and Forum Maritime S.A. v. Roumanie,
judgment of 4 October 2007, nos. 63610/00 and 38692/05, not yet published in the Reports
of Judgments and Decisions).
The CJEU thus incorporated the Strasbourg approach to judicial impartiality without
providing any ‘translation’ of this practice into the EU context. That is not necessarily
problematic, but it is a rather striking characteristic of the relation between the CJEU
and the ECHR. The CJEU refers to ECHR cases in the same way as to its own cases.
They are simply included in the judgment and thereby become part and parcel of the
precedents of the CJEU. Given that it is an entirely different court, judging cases in
a very different context, references to the ECHR fall into the category of external
comparative interpretation. In that context this appears to be a quite far-reaching
approach, but that will be discussed in more detail below.
The CJEU in this case went even further, however, by looking at the organization
of the judicial process at the ECHR in order to support their conclusion that Chrono-
post in this case did not receive an unfair trial:167
It must also be observed that, under article 27(3) of the ECHR, when a case if referred to
the Grand Chamber of the Court of Human Rights, on a referral following a Chamber’s
judgment, no Judge from the Chamber which rendered the judgment is to sit in the Grand
Chamber, with the exception of the President of the Chamber and the Judge who sat in respect
of the State Party concerned. The ECHR thus accepts that Judges who heard and determined
the case initially may sit in another formation hearing and determining the same case again,
and that that is not in itself incompatible with the requirements of a fair trial.168
Thus, even the way in which the ECtHR itself is organized provided an argument
for the CJEU to conclude that the circumstances in the case at hand did not involve
a violation of the right to a fair trial.
A similar approach is visible in the case of Connolly, where the CJEU had to
decide whether disciplinary sanctions for an EU employee who published without
permission a critical book on EU policy during his leave was contrary to the freedom
167 C-341/06, Chronopost SA and La Poste v. Union française de l’express (UFEX) and Others [2008]
ECR I-04777, § 59-60.




of expression.169 A large part of the reasoning of the CJEU switched between the
case law of the ECtHR and its own precedents as if they were one and the same
court.170 The CJEU adopts the approach by the ECtHR to the full extent, at least
so it seems.
There are more cases in which this approach is visible.171 Even in the case of
the most elaborate references to the ECHR, ECtHR judgments are not discussed at
great length. One author has noted that the CJEU ‘rarely discusses the facts of those
cases nor discusses the rational basis of those decisions’.172 An explanation for this
approach may be found in that, if the Court would engage in such a discussion on
the rational basis of the ECtHR judgments, this would lead to a much more funda-
mental discussion on the scope of fundamental rights. It would make it much more
obvious why certain rights are protected in the EU and as a result provide more
guidance to the Member States. Simultaneously, however, this might result in de-
viations between the Strasbourg and the Luxemburg case law.
In some cases, however, the CJEU has taken a different approach than Strasbourg.
A clear example is the case of Emesa Sugar.173 Sugar producer Emesa had requested
to be granted the opportunity to respond to the Opinion of the Advocate General,
relying on a judgment of the ECtHR in order to support that request.174 In that case
the ECtHR held that the impossibility of a Belgian national to respond to the sub-
mission of the Procureur Général resulted in a breach of Article 6 ECHR.175 The
CJEU emphasized the distinct nature of the judicial process at the Community level
and the role of the Advocate General therein and concluded that this Strasbourg case
law was not applicable to this situation.176 The CJEU thus deliberately took a differ-
ent approach than the ECtHR in this case, because of the specific nature of its own
system. This is the most obvious example in which the two systems diverge on a
certain issue. Why the CJEU adopted a diverging approach in specifically this case
is not clear.
The discussion on the extent of the references to the ECHR and its case law
indicate that these references play an important role in the reasoning of the CJEU.
169 C-274/99, Bernard Connolly v. Commission of the European Communities [2001] ECR I-01611.
170 C-274/99, Bernard Connolly v. Commission of the European Communities [2001] ECR I-01611,
§ 37-50.
171 Supra note 163.
172 Douglas-Scott (2006), p. 658.
173 C-17/98, Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v. Aruba [2000] ECR I-00665. This case is used as an example
in the literature. See Douglas-Scott 2006, p. 648.
174 ECtHR, Vermeulen v. Belgium, judgment of 20 February 1996, Reports 1996-I.
175 C-17/98, Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v. Aruba [2000] ECR I-00665, § 5-6 referring to ECtHR,
Vermeulen v. Belgium, judgment of 20 February 1996, Reports 1996-I.
176 C-17/98, Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v. Aruba [2000] ECR I-00665, § 10-20.
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The question is whether arguments based on the ECHR were used in addition to other
arguments or whether these references are decisive for the CJEU’s reasoning. The
amount of cases where a substantive reference is made to the ECHR and its case law
seem to indicate that these references play a decisive role.177 Often when setting
out the scope of a fundamental right reference is only made to the ECHR. A clear
example of this phenomenon is the case of Roquette Frères, in which the CJEU
determined that it had to review its own position on the scope of the protection of
privacy afforded to business premises. The CJEU had established in Hoechst that
the right to privacy and inviolability of the home could not be extended to legal
persons. In Roquette Frères it had to revisit that position and the CJEU held that:
For the purposes of determining the scope of that principle in relation to the protection of
business premises, regard must be had to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights
subsequent to the judgment in Hoechst. According to that case-law, first, the protection of
the home provided for in Article 8 of the ECHR may in certain circumstances be extended
to cover such premises (see, in particular, the judgment of 16 April 2002 in Colas Est and
Others v. France, not yet published in the Reports of Judgments and Decisions, § 41) and,
second, the right of interference established by Article 8(2) of the ECHR ‘might well be more
far-reaching where professional or business activities or premises were involved than would
otherwise be the case’ (Niemietz v. Germany, cited above, § 31).178
No other arguments were presented to justify overruling the earlier judgment of the
CJEU. Thus the case law of the ECtHR played a decisive role in the reasoning in
this case. No questions were asked whether this development was in line with develop-
ments within the EU.
In other cases the CJEU refers to other arguments to support a conclusion and
thus the ECHR in those cases plays a more supportive role.179 A clear example of
this supportive role of the ECHR is the case of DEB. The question was whether the
right of legal persons to effective access to justice meant that legal persons should
177 See for example: C-274/99, Bernard Connolly v. Commission of the European Communities [2001]
ECR I-01611; C-60/00,Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR
I-06279; C-94/00, Roquette Frères SA v. Directeur général de la concurrence, de la consommation
et de la répression des fraudes, and Commission of the European Communities [2002] ECR I-09011;
C-465/00, Rechnungshof v Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others [2003] ECR I-04989; C-450/06,
Varec SA v. Belgian State [2008] ECR I-00581; C-341/06, Chronopost SA and La Poste v. Union
française de l’express (UFEX) and Others [2008] ECR I-04777.
178 C-94/00, Roquette Frères SA v. Directeur général de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la
répression des fraudes, and Commission of the European Communities [2002] ECR I-09011, § 29.
179 See for example: C-249/96, Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-00621;
C-540/03, European Parliament v Council of the European Union [2006] ECR I-05769; C-436/04,
Criminal proceedings against Leopold Henri Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I-02333; C-279/09, DEB
Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2010].
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be granted legal aid. In order to answer that question the CJEU relied, among others,
upon textual arguments and arguments referring to both the Member States and the
ECHR. Even though the references to the ECtHR play an important role, they are
not solely decisive for the conclusion in this case, which was that granting legal aid
to legal persons was not excluded from the right to effective access to justice.
In both situations, when the ECHR is used as a supportive reference or as a
decisive reference, it is hard to deny the importance and prominence of the ECHR
and its case law in the reasoning of the CJEU. Can the ECHR in those circumstances
still be considered only a source of inspiration? The use of the ECHR by the CJEU
goes beyond an inspirational use, because the judgments are invoked and referred
to almost as if they are the CJEU’s own. In many cases there is no ‘translation’ of
the ECHR material to the EU context and thus to call it a source of inspiration would
be an understatement. Looking at the different purposes identified in the theoretical
analysis it can be assumed that the purpose of the CJEU of looking at the ECHR is
to keep up with international (in this case European) standards.180 The only peculiar-
ity is that by doing this the CJEU does not keep its own fundamental rights law up
to date, but often solely relies on external materials. Also different from the theoretical
analysis is that the CJEU does seem to take the ECHR and its case law not only as
persuasive, but almost as binding. Though there are of course exceptions, the refer-
ences to the ECHR are taken so seriously and without much criticism that it seems
to border on regarding them as binding. This is interesting given that the CJEU is
not (yet) formally bound by the ECHR. It is even more interesting in light of the
distinction between external and internal comparative interpretation.
The theoretical analysis presented a distinction between external and internal
comparative interpretation.181 According to that distinction references to the ECHR
and its case law should be considered as external comparative interpretation, because
the ECHR as a treaty originates from an organization external to the EU. It was also
argued that a different or additional justification from the one provided for internal
comparative interpretation could be warranted in the context of external comparative
interpretation. The question at present is whether the CJEU acknowledges this dis-
tinction between internal and external comparative interpretation and whether it
attaches any consequences relating to the justification for external references. There
are hardly any indications that the CJEU seems to acknowledge the distinction between
external and internal sources for comparative interpretation. The justification provided
in Rutili that the ECHR had been ratified by all Member States does indicate that
the CJEU was aware that it could not too easily conclude that the ECHR had some
relevance. It would, however, be reading too much into this statement to conclude
180 See section 6.1.4. for a description of various purposes.
181 See section 6.1.3.
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that this is an indication that the CJEU makes a distinction between external and
internal sources of comparative interpretation. In light of this distinction the non-
critical manner in which many judgments have been included in the reasoning of the
CJEU is remarkable, as noted when discussing the purpose of referring to the ECHR
as well. Are there sufficient reasons to justify this approach? At the beginning of this
section some preliminary answers were provided, namely that the ECHR has been
ratified by all Member States and that the special status of the ECHR has been
codified. Given the analysis in the remainder of the section it is important to revisit
the question. The fact that by codifying the role of the ECHR the Member States
and the EU institutions accepted references to this specific external material is signi-
ficant. This is significant, because this means that the EU legislator has approved
the reference to this external source by the CJEU. It resembles the provision in the
South African constitution that encourages the judges to look at (external) comparative
materials. In addition several strategic factors have been discussed in the theoretical
analysis to explain the reliance of the CJEU on the ECHR. The complex relationship
between the EU, the ECHR and the Member States, the fact that the Member States
can be held accountable in Strasbourg and the experience that the ECHR already has
with fundamental rights protection in Europe are all factors explaining the strategic
reliance of the CJEU on the ECtHR. Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in his
opinion in Advocaten voor de Wereld addresses these strategic reasons for relying
on the ECHR in a more covert way by indicating that:
The protective role is exercised in three different spheres – national, Council of Europe and
European Union – which are partly coextensive and, most importantly, are imbued with the
same values. There are many points of intersection and overlapping is possible, but respect
for other jurisdictions does not create any insurmountable problems where there is confidence
that all parties exercise their jurisdiction while fully guaranteeing the system of coexistence.
A dialogue between the constitutional courts of the European Union permits the foundations
to be laid for a general discussion.
Thus, ... the Court may refer if necessary, ... to the judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights concerning ... .182
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer thus also stresses the co-existence of the
different protection systems and the complex relation as a reason for taking account
of the ECHR and its case law.
These special circumstances in which the CJEU has to provide an answer to the
questions put before it, help to explain to some extent the role of the ECHR in the
case law of the CJEU. The codification and the circumstances thus provide the
182 C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad [2007] ECR I-03633, § 81-
82, Opinion by Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer.
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additional explanation needed to justify the reliance on external comparative interpreta-
tion.
Two final questions still need to be answered. These questions played an important
role in the previous section on the reference to common constitutional traditions, but
do not seem to lead to much discussion in the context of the references to the ECHR.
Firstly, it is important to analyze whether a different approach is visible in the opinions
of the Advocates General. While the Advocates General are often more elaborate in
their references to the ECHR, there is much less difference between their opinions
and the CJEU’s judgments when compared to the references to national constitutional
traditions. The Court in some of its judgments refers to case law of the ECHR; so
do the Advocates General. There is not really a difference in the level or quality of
the references, as we have seen for the references to national constitutional traditions.
The main difference concerns the extent of the discussion on the ECHR. That is not
specific for this method, but it is characteristic for the difference between the judg-
ments of the Court and the opinions of the Advocate General, as has been discussed
in Chapter 3.
Secondly, a more practical issue should be addressed, namely who supplies the
relevant information. That question is not often addressed in the case law with respect
to the European Convention. Indeed, it does not appear to be a relevant issue, since
the material is easier to access and is available in the same language as the CJEU.183
That of course is an important difference from the information on national constitu-
tional traditions. Moreover, the material is available from one source; no study has
to be made as to whether a common principle can be found. The reference to the
ECtHR should in this respect perhaps be compared to a national court referring to
the ECHR.
While only some examples have been discussed here, there are many cases in which
the ECHR plays an important role.184 In the vast majority of the cases the CJEU
follows the ECHR and its case law closely. A case like Emesa Sugar, however, shows
that the CJEU does feel free to adopt a different approach which fits the EU system
better. The CJEU thus seems to retain its flexibility by not considering the case law
binding for the CJEU.185 The examples discussed show that the special status of
the ECHR is thus not just a ‘friendly gesture’, but is actually substantiated in many
instances. One may question the far-reaching extent of the references given that the
ECHR can be considered an external source for comparative interpretation, but the
183 See www.echr.coe.int.
184 Supra note 163.
185 Kirsch (2007), p. 20.
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strategic explanations provided in the theoretical analysis and the reference to the
ECHR in the EU treaty seem to provide for a sufficiently strong basis for this form
of external comparative interpretation.
13.2.4 Role of other international instruments
In a limited number of cases the CJEU makes references to international instruments
in the context of interpretation.186 This has been done for a variety of purposes.
In the cases of Defrenne187 and Laval,188 the reference to international treaties
supported the conclusion reached by using other interpretative methods, i.e. that a
certain right should be recognized as a fundamental right under EU law. In both cases
the CJEU referred to the European Social Charter and an ILO Convention. The CJEU
did not elaborate on why it made these references, merely stating that similar rights
or concepts were also protected as fundamental rights under these instruments.189
In a case on the family reunion directive the CJEU likewise referred to international
instruments such as the Convention of the Rights of the Child, in this case to support
its finding that the directive did not violate fundamental rights.190 In the view of
the CJEU, the Convention on children’s rights did not warrant the far-reaching
interpretation that was claimed by the European Parliament.191 In this case the inter-
national reference thus provided support for the CJEU not to recognize a certain
interpretation of a fundamental right. In both cases, however, the purpose was to find
support for a conclusion already reached on other grounds.
186 See C-149/77, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena [1978]
ECR 01365; C-374/87, Orkem v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 03283;
C-249/96, Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-00621; C-540/03,European
Parliament v Council of the European Union [2006] ECR I-05769; C-436/04, Criminal proceedings
against Leopold Henri Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I-02333; C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others [2007] ECR I-11767.
187 C-149/77, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena [1978] ECR
01365, § 28.
188 C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others [2007] ECR I-
11767, § 90.
189 C-149/77, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena [1978] ECR
01365, § 28; C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others
[2007] ECR I-11767, § 90.
190 C-540/03, European Parliament v Council of the European Union [2006] ECR I-05769, § 57.
191 C-540/03, European Parliament v Council of the European Union [2006] ECR I-05769, § 59. In
the case of C-249/96, Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-00621 the CJEU
denied a far-reaching claim based on references to international instruments as well. Similarly in
C-374/87, Orkem v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 03283.
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A different version of this use of international instruments is presented by the
case of Van Esbroeck.192 In this case the CJEU had to interpret the ne bis in idem
principle. This principle has been laid down in Article 54 of the Convention imple-
menting the Schengen Agreement (CISA) and prevents someone being prosecuted
twice for the same acts. The question was how the notion of ‘the same acts’ should
be interpreted. By referring, among others, to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights the CJEU tried to distinguish the terminology used in those
provisions from the terms used in Article 54 CISA:
It must also be noted that the terms used in that article [article 54 CISA] differ from those
used in other international treaties which enshrine the ne bis in idem principle. Unlike article
54 of the CISA, article 14(7) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ...
use the term ‘offence’, which implies that the criterion of the legal classification of the acts
is relevant as a prerequisite for the applicability of the ne bis in idem principle which is
enshrined in those treaties.193
The fact that other treaties used different terms thus seemed to warrant a different
interpretation of Article 54 CISA. The CJEU here thus used a combination of com-
parative and textual interpretation.
These examples show that references to international law have been used to support
interpretative solutions that were also based on other arguments. The documents
referred to varied per case. It is not clear for all cases why certain documents are
invoked or why specifically these international documents are referred to. However,
in some cases it is clear that the sources are derived from the submissions of the
parties.194 That could provide an important explanation for the choice of references;
the CJEU will respond to the documents contained in those submissions. The CJEU,
however, may not incorporate every reference to international instruments made by
the parties to the case into its judgments. It has stated on more than one occasion
that international instruments are also a source of inspiration for the interpretation
of fundamental rights, but that it will only consider those international instruments
that have some connection to the Member States:
192 C-436/04, Criminal proceedings against Leopold Henri Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I-02333, § 28.
193 C-436/04, Criminal proceedings against Leopold Henri Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I-02333, § 28.
194 C-249/96, Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-00621; C-540/03, European
Parliament v Council of the European Union [2006] ECR I-05769.
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... the Court draws inspiration from ... the guidelines supplied by international instruments
for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or to which
they are signatories.195
This raises the question whether the CJEU refers to international instruments on which
all Member States have collaborated or which they have all signed or even ratified,
or whether it is enough that some or a significant number of Member States have
been involved in the drafting and signing of these international instruments. With
regard to some of the international instruments the CJEU has referred to the binding
effect for Member States, seemingly in order to enhance the strength of the reference:
The Court has already had occasion to point out that the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights is one of the international instruments for the protection of human rights
of which it takes account in applying the general principles of Community law [refer to earlier
CJEU cases]. That is also true of the Convention on the Rights of the Child referred to above
which, like the Covenant, binds each of the Member States.196
The international instruments mentioned in this section are binding on all Member
States and they are therefore considered relevant for the interpretation process. How-
ever, even though this seems to provide some clarity as to the situations in which
international instruments can be used as a basis for interpretation by the Court, the
CJEU does not address the generally binding character for each international instru-
ment. So perhaps it is not necessary for each international reference to be binding
in all Member States. The CJEU at least seems to be aware of the need for some
relevant link to the Member States in order to make the reference convincing.
The previous section on the role of the ECHR indicated that the CJEU does not
acknowledge the distinction between internal and external comparative interpretation.
Given that these references can be considered as external comparative interpretation,
it is relevant to question whether the justification provided for these references is
sufficient. The analysis indicated that the CJEU tries to emphasize the link between
the CJEU or its Member States and the international document it cites. That is,
however, not the case for every reference. As indicated in the theoretical analysis,
it diminishes the argument if the CJEU fails to do so. It would thus be an improvement
if the CJEU indicated the relevance of references to international materials in every
case in order to avoid criticism. It should, however, be noted that overall not many
195 C-540/03, European Parliament v Council of the European Union [2006] ECR I-05769l, § 35. See
also: C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der
Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-09609, § 33; C-117/01, K.B. v National Health Service Pensions
Agency and Secretary of State for Health [2004] ECR I-00541, § 27.
196 C-540/03, European Parliament v Council of the European Union [2006] ECR I-05769l, § 37.
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references are made to international materials; thus the impact on the CJEU’s reason-
ing if it fails to provide a justification is relatively minor.
13.2.5 Conclusion
Comparative arguments are regularly used both by the CJEU and the Advocates
General. Most often these comparative arguments consist of references to the European
Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the ECtHR. To a lesser extent
references to common constitutional traditions and other international instruments
are invoked. Comparative references made by the Advocate General are often more
elaborate, which is in line with the general style difference between the judgments
and opinions. The difference between the Advocate General and the CJEU in their
use of comparative arguments is mainly visible in the context of references to common
constitutional traditions. The CJEU in its judgments remains rather abstract and does
not refer to any specific Member State or indicate what kind of material served as
a basis for the comparative analysis and the subsequent conclusion. The Advocates
General, on the other hand, more often refer to specific Member States and mention
the kind of material used to come to their conclusion. Even though the Advocates
General do not provide a complete insight into their comparative analysis and the
following conclusion, they provide more substantiation than the CJEU does in its
judgments. This can, however, be seen as a logical consequence of the judicial setup
of the CJEU, as discussed in the introduction in Chapter 3.
References to comparative materials have been used for all kinds of purposes.
In the early days comparative references mainly served to fill the gap that was caused
by the lack of an EU fundamental rights catalogue. Presently, comparative references
are used to solve regular interpretative problems, but there are also some examples
of comparative interpretation being used to support an evolutive approach. The
discussion in this chapter indicates that the separate categories of comparative argu-
ments are often used for support. This support is, however, often provided by another
category of comparative arguments. Often references to common constitutional
traditions and to the European Convention are combined in a specific reasoning. The
separate categories can thus have a supportive function, but comparative interpretation
in general often plays a decisive or at least rather important role in the reasoning.
The theoretical chapter indicated the importance of a legitimate basis for relying
on comparative arguments and made a distinction between external and internal com-
parative arguments. The analysis has shown that the existence of Article 6(3) TEU
plays an important role in this regard. This codification of the references to the ECHR
is an example of an extra justification that is required in the context of external
comparative interpretation. The references to the European Convention and the case
law of the ECtHR in the cases analyzed in this chapter make clear, however, that
these sources do not only provide inspiration, but that in many cases the interpretation
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of the ECtHR is almost literally copied. The use of the ECtHR is thus taken further
than one might suggest on the basis of Article 6(3) TEU. The justifications for this
that are provided in the literature are all of a strategic nature, arguing that the CJEU
wants to avoid conflicting obligations for the Member States and that referring to
the ECtHR has helped to boost the fundamental rights protection in the EU in the
sense that it added authority. If the CJEU or its Advocates General would have
discussed the justification for relying on the European Convention to the extent that
is currently visible, this would have made it easier to understand why they almost
literally copy the Strasbourg approach. It would also explain why only in exceptional
cases like Emesa Sugar, the CJEU adopts an approach which is not in line with
ECtHR case law.
Even though the justification for relying on the European Convention can be
commented upon, hardly a justification is provided for referring to international
instruments. This form of comparative interpretation does not occur often, but even
then a justification for invoking these instruments that have no obvious connection
to the EU would be welcome.
Finally, some more practical aspect of comparative interpretation warrants attention.
Even though the Advocates General provide more insight into the comparative
analysis, there is one important question, identified in the theoretical analysis that
still cannot be fully answered. When can one speak of common traditions? Even in
the opinions this remains unclear. Unanimity is of course an indication that one can
speak of a common tradition, just like the complete lack of convergence is an indica-
tion that there are no common traditions; however, in the majority of the cases the
answer will lie somewhere in the middle. It would make the reasoning more accessible
or verifiable if more indications were available to understand the conclusions.
The opinions of the Advocates General address another aspect of finding common
traditions, namely at what abstract level these common traditions should be found.
The case law analysis of the ECtHR showed that judges sometimes disagree regarding
at what level a consensus has to be found, at a rather specific level or at an abstract
level. There does not seem to be much discussion on this aspect between the judges
and the Advocates General in the CJEU. It has even been indicated that finding a
common tradition at the level of an abstract principle would be sufficient.
13.3 TELEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION
The CJEU has been called the teleological court with respect to its judicial
approach.197 This is a general statement not related to any specific area of law and
therefore it is interesting to see whether this approach is visible in the area of funda-
197 See for example: Albors Llorens (2000).
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mental rights as well. Teleological interpretation has been defined as the interpretation
of a notion or concept in accordance with the object, purpose, aim or underlying
rationale of the document or the provision in question.198 That description already
indicates a potential problem for the CJEU, at least in the cases before 2000. After
all, before 2000 there was no document at all containing a catalogue of fundamental
rights for the EU. After 2000 the Charter came into being, but it only recently became
legally binding.199 Therefore, for a relatively long time there was no document con-
taining fundamental rights that could be interpreted in a (micro-) teleological manner.
Nevertheless, the case law analysis has disclosed that the CJEU, despite the lack
of an EU fundamental rights text, still sometimes employs teleological arguments.
In one of the early judgments on fundamental rights in the EU, Internationale Handels-
gesellschaft, the CJEU concluded that fundamental rights were an integral part of
the general principle of law protected by the CJEU. These fundamental rights had
to be protected within the ‘framework of the structure and the objectives of the
Community’.200 The objectives of the Community can therefore be regarded as one
of the elements that play a role in determining the scope of fundamental rights. In
subsequent cases, however, this reference to teleological interpretation has not been
repeated. Only in very few fundamental rights cases, teleological arguments have
visibly been used. Not surprisingly, these cases generally involve the interpretation
of a directive, regulation or a provision from the TFEU in relation to which funda-
mental rights have a certain importance.
In some cases the CJEU has considered the objective of a directive or regulation
in order to establish whether actions by Community institutions that were based on
the directive or regulation led to a violation of fundamental rights. This was the case
in National Panasonic, where the CJEU had to address the question whether the
investigative powers of the Commission based on a regulation in an investigation
on infringements of competition law were in conflict with Article 8 ECHR.201 On
the basis of a decision by the Commission an unannounced search took place at the
office of the applicant. The applicant subsequently complained about an infringement
of his right to be informed of the decision and his right to be heard before the decision
was taken. The CJEU concluded that, considering the objective of the provision in
question and of the regulation as a whole, the application of this provision could not
198 See Chapter 5. Henceforth the terms object and purpose will serve as general indicators of a teleo-
logical approach, solely for practical reasons. Indicators like aim or underlying rationale or principle
have, however, been used to discover an explicit teleological approach as well.
199 See Chapter 3 for a more elaborate explanation.
200 C-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und
Futtermittel [1970] ECR 01125, § 4.
201 C-136/79, National Panasonic (UK) Limited v Commission of the European Communities [1980]
ECR 02033.
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be held to constitute a violation of fundamental rights.202 Having regard to the aims
of the investigative stage, it was not necessary that these rights of the defence were
respected.203 The teleological arguments in this case were thus used to limit the
scope of fundamental rights.204
One of the main areas in which the CJEU has resorted to teleological arguments
to determine the scope of a fundamental right is in cases concerning discrimina-
tion.205 In these cases the CJEU often refers to the object or purpose of a directive
or to one of the provisions of the former EC-treaty on the prohibition of discrimina-
tion. The fundamental right at issue in those cases is to a certain extent codified in
a piece of EC legislation, which makes it easier to use teleological argumentation.
In the case of P v. S, for example, the applicant complained that she was fired in
violation of a non-discrimination directive. She claimed that the reason for her dis-
missal was the fact that she underwent a gender reassignment to become a woman.206
The question was raised whether this ground for discrimination was included within
the scope of the directive. The CJEU discussed the purpose of the directive and the
relevant provisions; in combination with some other arguments this led to the follow-
ing conclusion:
The scope of the directive cannot be confined simply to discrimination based on the fact that
a person if of one or the other sex. In view of the purpose and the nature of the rights which
it seeks to safeguard, the scope of the directive is also such as to apply to discrimination
arising, as in this case, from the gender reassignment of the person concerned.207
Thus, the purpose of the directive played an important role in determining the scope
of the fundamental right.
A similar example can be found in the Coleman judgment.208 Here the applicant
complained that she had been subjected to discrimination at work because her son
202 C-136/79, National Panasonic (UK) Limited v Commission of the European Communities [1980]
ECR 02033, § 20-21
203 C-136/79, National Panasonic (UK) Limited v Commission of the European Communities [1980]
ECR 02033, § 20-21
204 A similar example can be found in C-155/79, AM& S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European
Communities [1982] ECR 01575.
205 See for example: C-13/94, P v. S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECRI-02143; C-249/96, Lisa
Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-00621; C-222/84, Marguerite Johnston
v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 01651; C-185/97, Belinda Jane
Coote v. Granada Hospitality Ltd. [1998] ECR I-05199; C-303/06, S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and
Steve Law [2008] ECR I-05603; C-506/06, SabineMayr v. Bäckerei und Konditorei Gerhard Flöckner
OHG [2008] ECR I-01017.
206 C-13/94, P v. S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECRI-02143.
207 C-13/94, P v. S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECRI-02143, § 20.
208 C-303/06, S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law [2008] ECR I-05603.
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was disabled. The question before the CJEU was whether discrimination on the basis
of disability included the disability of someone else. In order to answer that question
the CJEU looked into the purpose and objective of the directive that had been invoked
in this case. On several occasions the CJEU referred to the objective of the directive
as it followed from the provisions and the preamble.209 The CJEU concluded that
discrimination on the basis of disability should not be interpreted restrictively and
it held as follows:
Where it is established that an employee in a situation such as in the present case suffers
direct discrimination on ground of disability, an interpretation of Directive 200/78 limiting
its application only to people who are themselves disabled is liable to deprive that directive
of an important element of its effectiveness and to reduce the protection which it is intended
to guarantee.210
Once again, teleological arguments, in addition to other arguments, played an im-
portant role in this case. What is interesting about the quoted passage is that the CJEU
also referred to the effectiveness of the directive, which can also be regarded as a
kind of teleological argument. After all, inherent to a claim based on effectiveness
is an assumption that the objectives of the directive should be achieved. This example
is a rare one, however – the argument based on effectiveness does not feature in many
other fundamental rights cases and does not seem to play an important role in the
context of fundamental rights interpretation.
Another area in which the CJEU sometimes invokes teleological arguments
concerns the interpretation of the principle of ne bis in idem. This principle has been
laid down in Article 54 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement
(CISA) and protects individuals against double jeopardy. In both Van Esbroeck211
and Bourquain212 the CJEU referred to the objective of this provision in order to
establish the scope of the protection provided by this provision. Other arguments were
also invoked, but in both cases the Court held that the conclusion on the scope of
the protection was ‘reinforced by the objective of Article 54 of the CISA, which is
to ensure that no one is prosecuted for the same acts in several Member States on
account of his having exercised his right to freedom of movement’.213 Teleological
arguments thus provided a source of support in this case.
209 See for example: C-303/06, S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law [2008] ECR I-05603, § 34-38-
47-49.
210 C-303/06, S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law [2008] ECR I-05603, § 51.
211 C-436/04, Criminal proceedings against Leopold Henri Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I-02333.
212 C-297/07, Klaus Bourquain [2008] ECR I-09425.
213 C-436/04, Criminal proceedings against Leopold Henri Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I-02333, § 33;
C-297/07, Klaus Bourquain [2008] ECR I-09425, § 49.
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The theoretical analysis indicated that a distinction can be made between subjective
and objective teleological interpretation.214 Subjective teleological interpretation
takes account of the object and purpose of the original drafter, while objective teleo-
logical interpretation looks at the object and purpose of the rational drafter. The
question is how the object and purpose in these cases is established by the CJEU.
The theoretical analysis indicated that subjective teleological interpretation was
expected to play no or at most a minor role in the case law of the CJEU, given the
lack of publicly available travaux préparatoires. Is this theoretical assumption sup-
ported by the case law?
In some cases, reference is simply made to a specific object and purpose of a
provision or directive, without any indication how this has been established.215 In
most cases, however, some reference is made to the source of the conclusion on the
object and purpose.216 Many of these cases indicate that the object and purpose
of a directive are established on the basis of the first provision of the directive, which
often indicates the main aim of the directive.217 Furthermore, the preamble of a
directive plays an important role as well in establishing the object and purpose.218
A third factor that plays a role in justifying how the object and purpose were estab-
lished is a reference to earlier precedents.219 It is interesting to note that hardly any
reference is made to the intention of the drafters, which warrants the conclusion that
the CJEU mainly relies on objective teleological interpretation.
In those cases where the CJEU indicates the source of the object and purpose
of the provision or directive it seeks to interpret, the reference to the object and
purpose is generally substantiated. This means that the CJEU specifies what the object
and purpose entail in that specific situation. This can be seen as a logical consequence
of the explicit reference to the source of the object and purpose. In Coote, where the
214 See section 5.1.3.
215 See for example: C-249/96, Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-00621.
216 C-436/04,Criminal proceedings against Leopold Henri Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I-02333; C-303/06,
S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law [2008] ECR I-05603; C-13/94, P v. S and Cornwall County
Council [1996] ECRI-02143; C-222/84,Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster
Constabulary [1986] ECR 01651; C-506/06, Sabine Mayr v. Bäckerei und Konditorei Gerhard
Flöckner OHG [2008] ECR I-01017; C-297/07, Klaus Bourquain [2008] ECR I-09425.
217 C-303/06, S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law [2008] ECR I-05603; 222/85; C-13/94, P v.
S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECRI-02143.
218 C-506/06, Sabine Mayr v. Bäckerei und Konditorei Gerhard Flöckner OHG [2008] ECR I-01017;
C-303/06, S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law [2008] ECR I-05603; C-13/94, P v. S and
Cornwall County Council [1996] ECRI-02143.
219 C-185/97, Belinda Jane Coote v. Granada Hospitality Ltd. [1998] ECR I-05199; C-436/04, Criminal
proceedings against Leopold Henri Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I-02333; C-506/06, Sabine Mayr v.




CJEU had to determine whether retaliatory measures against a former employee were
covered by the directive on equal treatment as regards employment, the object and
purpose are stated in the discussion of the legal framework at the beginning of the
judgment, where it was held that:
According to Article 1(1) of the Directive, its purpose is ‘to put into effect in the Member
States the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment,
including promotion, and to vocational training and as regards working conditions and, on
the conditions referred to in paragraph 2, social security. This principle is hereinafter referred
to as “the principle of equal treatment”.’220
In its reasoning the CJEU later referred to the purpose of the directive without sub-
stantiating the purpose, but it had already done so at the beginning of the judg-
ment.221 In Coleman, discussed above, the CJEU included a reference to the purpose
of a specific directive in the legal framework as well, but also explicitly recalled that
purpose several times in its reasoning:
So far as the objectives of Directive 2000/78 are concerned, as is apparent from paragraphs
34 and 38 of the present judgment, the directive seeks to lay down, as regards employment
and occupation, a general framework for combating discrimination on one of the grounds
referred to in Article 1- including in particular disability- with a view to putting into effect
in the Member States the principle of equal treatment. It follows from recital 37 in the
preamble to the directive that it also has the objective of creating within the Community a
level playing field as regards equality in employment and occupation.222
In other judgments the object and purpose are substantiated as well, but not always
when setting out the legal framework. In many other cases or opinions the object
and purpose are set out whenever relevant for the specific teleological reasoning. In
Sabine Mayr the CJEU had to decide whether a woman whose eggs had been fer-
tilized, but not yet transferred into her uterus was considered pregnant within the
meaning of EU law. In order to answer that question the CJEU discussed the object
and purpose of the respective directive and held that:
As regards Directive 92/85, it should be borne in mind that its objective is to encourage
improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have
recently given birth or are breastfeeding.
220 C-185/97, Belinda Jane Coote v. Granada Hospitality Ltd. [1998] ECR I-05199, § 3.
221 C-185/97, Belinda Jane Coote v. Granada Hospitality Ltd. [1998] ECR I-05199, § 24.
222 C-303/06, S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law [2008] ECR I-05603, § 47. See similarly also
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomber in C-297/07, Klaus Bourquain [2008] ECR I-09425;
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomber in C-436/04, Criminal proceedings against Leopold Henri
Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I-02333.
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In that field, the Court has also pointed out that the objective pursued by the Community
law rules governing equality as between men and women in regards to the rights of pregnant
women and women who have given birth, is to protect female workers before and after they
have given birth [reference to earlier judgments].223
The conclusion of the CJEU was that Sabine Mayr could not be considered pregnant
for the purpose of the directive.
The examples given above aim to indicate the way in which the CJEU substantiates
its references to object and purpose. The references remain rather abstract, but at least
they do provide some direction for the interpretative problem at hand. The references
determine the boundaries within which the solution should be found. The purpose
of indicating at what point in the judgment the object and purpose are explained, is
to indicate that even if it is not included in the reasoning itself, in most cases the
legal framework fills this void.
One of the questions that still needs to be asked in order to get a more complete
picture of teleological interpretation is what role this method plays in the reasoning.
Is teleological reasoning used in a decisive manner, whereby it is the only argument
used to reach a specific conclusion? Or is it used in addition to many other arguments
and thus plays a supportive role? It is difficult to tell whether all arguments weigh
equally in a final conclusion, but teleological arguments seem to be used mainly in
addition to other arguments, thus indicating that it mainly plays a supportive role.
Other arguments often refer to textual, comparative or systemic considerations to
support a conclusion.224 The force of the different arguments does seem to differ
per case. In Coleman, for example the focus seems to be mostly on teleological
interpretation, while in the case of Van Esbroeck the different arguments seem to
be more in balance.
A final aspect that should be discussed is whether there is any difference in the
way the Advocate General uses teleological interpretation and the way the CJEU relies
on this method. No real distinction can be noted here. Of course, the Advocate General
is often more elaborate in its discussions, but that is a general feature of the judicial
style of the CJEU. These more elaborate discussions by the Advocates General, like
in the case of Van Esbroeck, provide more insight into the aim or objective of the
provision or directive at hand, but they do not necessarily shed more light on the use
223 C-506/06, Sabine Mayr v. Bäckerei und Konditorei Gerhard Flöckner OHG [2008] ECR I-01017,
§ 31-32.
224 C-436/04, Criminal proceedings against Leopold Henri Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I-02333; see also
the opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomber in this case; C-506/06, Sabine Mayr v.
Bäckerei und Konditorei Gerhard Flöckner OHG [2008] ECR I-01017 and C-303/06, S. Coleman
v. Attridge Law and Steve Law [2008] ECR I-05603 Opinion by Advocate General Poiares Maduro.
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of teleological interpretation.225 The Advocates General also rely on the provisions
of a directive, on the preamble and precedent to establish the object and purpose and
do not discuss other means to establish the object or purpose.
The main examples of teleological arguments in the fundamental rights case law of
the CJEU that have been discussed in this section, all have one important element
in common, namely that in all of them the fundamental right had been laid down
in a written document. This might explain why these arguments do not play a bigger
role in the context of fundamental rights, even though the CJEU is generally famous
for its teleological approach.
13.4 OTHER INTERPRETATION METHODS AND PRINCIPLES
Only two of the selected interpretation methods have been discussed so far. Evolutive
interpretation and autonomous interpretation still warrant a discussion. The fact that
they have not yet been discussed already indicates that these interpretative aids do
not play a very prominent role in the CJEU’s case law. In fact, the case law analysis
has disclosed that they do not really play an explicit role where interpretation of
fundamental rights is concerned. This last section, in which these interpretative aids
are analyzed, will therefore necessarily be brief.
13.4.1 Evolutive interpretation
Evolutive interpretation has been defined in the theoretical literature as interpretation
‘in the light of present day conditions’, as opposed to interpretation of the ECHR
in line with the standards at the time it was drafted. This definition already indicates
why the role of evolutive interpretation is different in the context of the CJEU than
in the context of the ECtHR. Fundamental rights in the EU have only recently been
laid down in a written document, namely the Charter, which was adopted in 2000
and which only became binding in 2009.226 Before that time, fundamental rights
were developed in the CJEU’s case law on the basis of common national constitutional
traditions, with the ECHR as a strong source of inspiration. Consequently, there was
no written document that needed to be interpreted ‘in light of present-day conditions’
and it is therefore logical and understandable that express references to such an
evolutive approach are missing in the CJEU’s fundamental rights case law.
225 C-436/04,Criminal proceedings against Leopold Henri Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I-02333, § 23-36.
See also C-506/06, Sabine Mayr v. Bäckerei und Konditorei Gerhard Flöckner OHG [2008] ECR
I-01017 for elaborate discussions by Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer on the object and purpose.
226 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of this topic.
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This does not mean, of course, that the CJEU does not take an evolutive approach
at all. Introducing the whole concept of fundamental rights as such can be regarded
as the utmost expression of an evolutive approach – this would perhaps never have
happened if the CJEU adopted a purely static approach to interpretation. Thus, it may
be said that the CJEU indeed employs an evolutive approach, even though it hardly
ever refers to it in its judgments and, as a result, this approach is less visible. The
focus of this thesis is on those occasions where the CJEU adopted a visibly evolutive
approach in the sense that it was possible to discern that the CJEU looked at develop-
ments and changes in the Member States or changes in other respects. This choice
has been made, because only in those instances can it be actually assumed that an
evolutive approach is taken and those instances can thus help to understand how
evolutive interpretation is used in the reasoning. If there is no visibly evolutive
approach it becomes the reader’s interpretation that an evolutive approach has been
taken, which makes it difficult to analyze the actual use of evolutive interpretation
by the CJEU.
A rare example of an express reference to the evolutive approach is visible in the
case law with regard to the applicability of the protection of the inviolability of the
home to legal persons. In the case of Hoechst the CJEU held that the right to in-
violability of the home could not be extended to cover legal persons as well, since
no support for that extension could be found in the national constitutional traditions
and the ECHR.227 The CJEU did conclude that interferences with private activities
of legal persons had to have a legal basis and be proportionate.228 After this judg-
ment the ECHR dealt with this similar issue and concluded that the protection of
inviolability of the home could in some situations be extended to cover legal persons
as well.229 In the case of Roquette Frères the CJEU had to address this question
of Hoechst again, but now in the light of the developments at the Strasbourg level.230
The CJEU repeated the principle established in Hoechst, which has been mentioned
above, and it continued to reason as follows with regard to the subsequent develop-
ments:
For the purpose of determining the scope of that principle in relation to the protection of
business premises, regard must be had to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights
subsequent to the judgment in Hoechst. According to that case-law, first the protection of
227 C-46/87 Hoechst AG v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 02859, § 17-18.
228 C-46/87 Hoechst AG v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 02859, § 19
229 The CJEU referred in this context to ECtHR, Société Colas Est and others v. France, judgment of
16 April 2002, Reports 2002-III.
230 C-94/00, Roquette Frères SA v. Directeur général de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la
répression des fraudes, and Commission of the European Communities [2002] ECR I-09011.
375
Chapter 13
the home provided for in Article 8 of the ECHR may in certain circumstances be extended
to cover such premises [reference to ECHR case law] and second, the right of interference
established by Article 8(2) of the ECHR ‘might well be more far-reaching where professional
of business activities or premises were involved than would otherwise be the case [reference
to ECHR case law].231
The CJEU thus adopted a new approach, based on developments in the case law of
the ECtHR. In contrast to the ECtHR the CJEU does not expressly state that they
take an evolutive approach or use evolutive interpretation to justify a new approach
– it simply adopts a new approach.232
Another example of the willingness of the CJEU to take developments into account
is visible in some discrimination cases. In the case of D the CJEU discussed the
situation in the Member States and concluded that there were some developments,
but not enough for an extensive interpretation.233
It is equally true that since 1989 an increasing number of Member States have introduced,
alongside marriage, statutory arrangements granting legal recognition to various forms of
union between partners of the same sex or of the opposite sex and conferring on such unions
certain effects which, both between the partners and as regards third parties, are the same
as or comparable to those of marriage.234
231 C-94/00, Roquette Frères SA v. Directeur général de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la
répression des fraudes, and Commission of the European Communities [2002] ECR I-09011, § 29.
232 An example that is less clear is provided by the case of Orkem (C-347/87), in which the CJEU
determined that undertakings in competition proceedings could be forced to answer (the CJEU
explicitly referred to Article 6 ECHR and argued that this did not include a right not to incriminate
oneself), except to questions that would lead to an admission on its part of the existence of an
infringement which the Commission has to prove. In a subsequent case by the ECtHR (ECtHR, Funke
v. France, judgment of 25 February 1993, SeriesANo. 256-A) it addressed the right not to incriminate
oneself and considered this to be covered by Article 6 ECHR. The General Court (then Court of
First Instance) inMannesmannröhren-Werke (T-112/98,Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG v. Commission
of the European Communities [2001] ECR II-00729) held that the applicant could not directly invoke
Article 6 ECHR which included a right not to incriminate oneself, but that the fundamental rights
recognized within the EU offered equivalent protection. Not the CJEU in this case, but the General
Court, thus provided a more protective approach based on developments in the ECtHR case law.
See also Craig & De Burca (2008), p. 393-394.
233 C-122/99,D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council of the European Union [2001] ECR I-04319, § 35-37.
The case concerned recognition of registered relationships as equivalent to marriage. In the case of
Grant a similar awareness of developments in Member States is visible. C-249/96, Lisa Jacqueline
Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-00621, § 32 & 35.
234 C-122/99, D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council of the European Union [2001] ECR I-04319, § 35.
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The fact that the CJEU notices a development clearly indicates that it takes the present
situation into account and considers such developments relevant to its interpretation
of fundamental rights.
In another case, concerning the question whether discrimination on the grounds
of sex also included discrimination of someone who underwent a gender change,
Advocate General Tesauro also referred to the need to keep an evolutive approach.235
... the law cannot cut itself off from society as it actually is, and must not fail to adjust to
it as quickly as possible. Otherwise it risks imposing outdated views and taking on a static
role. In so far as the law seeks to regulate relations in society, it must on the contrary keep
up with social change, and must therefore be capable of regulating new situations brought
to light by social change and advances in society.236
He thus stressed the need to keep pace with developments in society. He subsequently
referred to clear tendencies in the Member States towards recognition of the rights
of transsexuals.
The role of evolutive interpretation is thus visible to the extent that it does play
a role whenever necessary as indicated by the examples provided above. The examples
indicate that comparative arguments play a role in the context of evolutive interpreta-
tion either in the form of references to the Member States or in the form of references
to the ECHR. It cannot be concluded on the basis of the examples provided above
that this is always the case, but it seems safe to assume that comparative interpretation
and evolutive interpretation are also closely linked in the context of the CJEU. The
number of references is, however, insufficient to warrant any further analysis of the
use of the principle. There can be instances of evolutive interpretation that have not
been explicitly qualified as such by the CJEU.237 However, without an explicit indi-
cation from the CJEU that an evolutive approach has taken place, it is not possible
to use those supposed instances of evolutive interpretation for the present analysis.
For that reason, it cannot be established on the basis of the case law analysis if the
CJEU regards evolutive interpretation as an interpretative principle or rather as a
method of interpretation, where it finds the basis or justification for its use, and what
sources it uses to establish the existence of a (sufficient) evolution.
235 C-13/94, P v. S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECRI-02143.
236 C-13/94, P v. S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECRI-02143, Opinion by Advocate General
Tesauro, § 9.
237 Advocate General Poiares Maduro in C-465/07,Meki Elgafaji and Noor Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris
van Justitie [2009] ECR I-00921, § 20, refers to the dynamic character of the interpretation by the
ECtHR. Even though he mentions that in a different context, it does imply that the CJEU also




Autonomous interpretation has been defined in the theoretical part of this thesis as
interpretation independent from the meaning of a certain term or right in, for example,
the domestic context. The discussion on autonomous interpretation as used by the
ECtHR has centred on autonomy from national interpretations. In the context of the
CJEU an additional ‘version’ of autonomy may be distinguished, namely autonomy
from the ECHR.238 Autonomous interpretation will be discussed from both angles
in this section.
Before discussing autonomous interpretation at the CJEU it is necessary to discuss
what form of autonomous interpretation will be analyzed. The theoretical discussion
on the ECtHR indicated that two forms of autonomous interpretation can be dis-
tinguished, namely weak autonomy and strong autonomy. Weak autonomy means
that every interpretation coming from an international judicial body charged with the
interpretation of a treaty can be considered autonomous. Strong autonomy, on the
other hand, refers to those interpretative solutions that are ‘expressly and intentionally
interpreted in a real ‘European’ way, disconnected from the national qualification’.239
Even though this distinction was discussed in the context of the ECtHR, it certainly
has relevance for the discussion before the CJEU as well. The extra dimension that
needs to be added to the concept of strong autonomy would be to regard strong
autonomy as interpretation in a real ‘European Union’ way, thus disconnected from
the ECtHR interpretation as well. The focus of the present analysis will be on forms
of strong autonomy in the case law of the CJEU. Any interpretation by the CJEU
can be regarded as weak autonomy; thus an analysis focusing on weak autonomy
would not be much help for understanding autonomous interpretation.240 The focus
will therefore be on those instances where the CJEU itself indicated that it would
take an autonomous approach, because those cases provide the most useful information
on the use of autonomous interpretation.
There are not many instances in which the CJEU takes an explicitly autonomous
approach in the context of fundamental rights adjudication. In a recent case concerning
the principle of ne bis in idem the CJEU was challenged by the referring national
court to indicate whether the term the ‘same acts’ was an autonomous concept.241
The German court in question was in doubt whether it could oppose the execution
of a European arrest warrant by Italy against Mr. Mantello. He had been convicted
of a drug-related crime in Italy, but for strategic reasons the prosecuting authorities
238 Douglas-Scott (2006) mentions this form of autonomy.
239 See section 8.2.
240 This is confirmed by Advocate General Mischo in C-122/99, D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council
of the European Union [2001] ECR I-04319, § 44.
241 C-261/09, Gaetano Mantello [2010].
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had not prosecuted him for the crimes laid down in the arrest warrant, while that could
have been possible at the time of his conviction. The referring court first sought to
find out whether the concept of the ‘same act’ had to be interpreted in an autonomous
manner or whether the Italian or German interpretation prevailed. Subsequently, it
requested to find out whether the fact that the prosecution authorities could have
prosecuted Mr. Mantello at an earlier stage was enough to object to the execution
of the arrest warrant.
In answering the first question the CJEU explicitly states that the concept ‘the
same acts’ is an autonomous concept:
In that regard, the concept of ‘same acts’ in Article 3(2) of the Framework Decision cannot
be left to the discretion of the judicial authorities of each Member State on the basis of their
national law. It follows from the need for uniform application of European Union law that,
since that provision makes no reference to the law of the Member States with regard to that
concept, the latter must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the
European Union (see, by analogy, Case C-66/08 Kosz³owski [2008] ECR I-6041, paragraphs
41 and 42).242
The CJEU in this statement also provides the reason for characterizing this as an
autonomous concept, namely the need for uniformity and the fact that the wording
of the specific provision does not refer to national law. In the subsequent paragraph
the CJEU addresses the meaning of this autonomous concept. It refers to Article 54
CISA, which is similar in nature and includes the concept of the ‘same acts’ as well:
It should be recalled that that concept of the ‘same acts’ also appears in Article 54 of the
CISA. In that context, the concept has been interpreted as referring only to the nature of the
acts, encompassing a set of concrete circumstances which are inextricably linked together,
irrespective of the legal classification given to them or the legal interest protected (see Case
C-436/04 Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I-2333, paragraphs 27, 32 and 36, and Case C-150/05
Van Straaten [2006] ECR I-9327, paragraphs 41, 47 and 48).
In view of the shared objective of Article 54 of the CISA and Article 3(2) of the Framework
Decision, which is to ensure that a person is not prosecuted or tried more than once in respect
of the same acts, it must be accepted that an interpretation of that concept given in the context
of the CISA is equally valid for the purposes of the Framework Decision.243
The autonomous concept is thus interpreted by adopting a systemic and teleological
interpretation. This is an important observation in light of the distinction between
interpretative principles and interpretation methods that has been made in this thesis.
Autonomous interpretation in this example seems to be an interpretative principle,
242 C-261/09, Gaetano Mantello [2010], § 38.
243 C-261/09, Gaetano Mantello [2010], § 39-40.
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the content of which needs to be established by resorting to interpretation methods.
This way of viewing autonomous interpretation is in line with the classification of
autonomous interpretation as an interpretative principle in the theoretical discussion.
This one example of autonomous interpretation can, however, not provide a proper
basis for any conclusions on this interpretative principle.
Another recent case provides an example of a situation in which the CJEU does
not find it necessary to adopt an autonomous approach.244 The question was whether
a legal person should be entitled to legal aid in order to provide an effective legal
remedy in situations where the legal person tries to establish state liability under EU
law.245 According to German law the company in this case was not entitled to legal
aid. In answering the question the CJEU could have opted for a uniform autonomous
approach, but instead it opted for a minimalistic approach. The CJEU looked at the
text of Article 47 of the Charter, its place within the Charter and took comparative
arguments into account. It concluded that Article 47 did not leave it impossible for
a legal person to claim legal aid, but that it was up to national courts to determine
whether denying legal aid would violate the core right of access to a court. The CJEU
could have also adopted an autonomous, uniform interpretation indicating that every-
one (including legal persons) fulfilling the criteria under Article 47 of the Charter
should be provided legal aid. It is not entirely clear why the CJEU opted for this more
reserved approach. It could be related to the economic consequences that an auto-
nomous approach would have had in this latter case, but on the basis of these two
cases it is not possible to draw any firm conclusions.
There are also not many instances of an autonomous approach in relation to the ECHR
to be found in the case law of the CJEU. The discussion on comparative interpretation
and the European Convention in section 13.2.3 has shown that the CJEU usually
strictly follows the Convention and the interpretation given to the Convention rights
by the ECtHR. The only case in which the CJEU did not follow the ECtHR is the
case of Emesa Sugar,which has also been discussed in section 13.2.3, which discloses
a clear difference in approach between the CJEU and the ECtHR.246 The applicants
in that case complained about the fact that they were not allowed to comment on the
Opinion of the Advocate General. Emesa Sugar contained a reference to Article 6
of the European Convention and the Vermeulen judgment issued by the ECtHR. In
that judgment the ECtHR held that Belgian law was contrary to the right to a fair
244 C-279/09,DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land [2010].
245 C-279/09,DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land [2010], § 25.
246 See section 13.2.3. C-17/98, Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v. Aruba [2000] ECR I-00665.
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trial as protected by Article 6, because of the fact that Mr. Vermeulen could not react
to the opinion of the Procureur Général. The argument of the applicant was that the
position of the Procureur Général resembled that of the Advocate General and they
should accordingly be given the opportunity to react to the Opinion of the Advocate
General. The CJEU did not agree. It started to discuss the way the position of the
Advocate General is incorporated in the structure of the CJEU and found that:
Having regard to both the organic and the functional link between the Advocate General and
the Court, ... , the aforesaid case-law of the European Court of Human Rights does not appear
to be transposable to the Opinion of the Court’s Advocates General.
The CJEU thus relied on the specific nature and context of the Community judiciary
and concluded from this that the ECtHR case law did not apply in this context.247
In other words it adopted an approach that was really autonomous from the ECtHR.
This is the only clear example of a diverging and independent approach of the CJEU.
Although the CJEU itself did not qualify this as an autonomous approach, it has been
qualified in literature as such. Moreover, the approach taken clearly corresponds to
the description of autonomous interpretation as employed in this thesis.
The example of Emesa Sugar seems to be the main example of diverging
approaches in the interpretation phase. Interestingly, the reasons for the Court’s
diversion have not been considered convincing by everyone.248 The decision thus
raises the question why the CJEU adopted an autonomous approach here, and also
why it has thus far only done so in this particular case. Perhaps it did make this choice
because the approach of the ECtHR threatened the judicial structure of the CJEU,249
but it could also be that the CJEU genuinely considered the two cases to be different.
Since autonomous interpretation in the case law of the CJEU on fundamental rights
is relatively rare, in the sense that the Court usually tends to follow national and
ECtHR interpretations, rather than providing one of its own, few conclusions can be
drawn from the case law as to the use of the principle of autonomous interpretation.
Some very careful assumptions can be made on the basis of the few cases discussed
in this context. The theoretical discussion indicated that uniformity is an important
goal of adopting an autonomous interpretation and the reasoning in the case of
Mantello confirms this underlying goal of autonomous interpretation. That might at
the same time be the reason why the CJEU has not often relied on a strong auto-
nomous approach in fundamental rights cases. Taking an autonomous approach in
those sensitive cases might in many cases have been one step too far for the CJEU.
247 C-17/98, Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v. Aruba [2000] ECR I-00665.
248 Van den Berghe (2010), p. 144, referring to Lawson.
249 Van den Berghe (2010), p. 143.
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The case of DEB is one example where an autonomous approach might have had
far-reaching consequences. It should also be recalled that the area of fundamental
rights has been termed in academic literature ‘one of the least autonomous parts of
European law’.250 It has been suggested however, that more diverging approaches
between the ECtHR and the CJEU can be found in the application phase and that
both courts given their different contextual setting reach a different conclusion on
questions of proportionality.251 To that extent, the application of the rights still seems
to be autonomous – but the phase of application of rights is not under study in this
thesis.
Another interesting aspect of one of the cases discussed above is that Mantello
could have been the textbook example of autonomous interpretation as an interpretative
principle as discussed in this thesis. The autonomous interpretation in this case is
clearly supported by references to interpretation methods. Unfortunately, there are
too few examples to draw solid conclusions on the nature of the autonomous inter-
pretation, but it is interesting to note that at least the potential is present.
13.5 CONCLUSION
The case law analysis has shown that all selected interpretative aids selected for this
thesis are visible in the case law of the CJEU. The extent to which they can be found,
however, greatly differs. Comparative interpretation is often relied upon and to a lesser
extent teleological interpretation can be found as well. Evolutive interpretation and
autonomous interpretation, however, play a much more limited role. As has been
explained this is probably mainly the result of the particular context in which the
CJEU has developed its fundamental rights case law, which lead it to follow closely
either national law or, most frequently, the case law of the European Court on Human
Rights. It may be said, perhaps, that, as a result of this approach, the CJEU interprets
in an autonomous and evolutive manner to the extent that the ECtHR also does so.
Also, it has been concluded that the case law approach of the CJEU may generally
be qualified as evolutive, since it tends to follow changes and recent developments
in national and ECtHR case lawwhen constructing its own body of fundamental rights.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this study it is important that references to an
autonomous approach, independent from that taken by the Member States or the
Strasbourg Court, are extremely rare, just like references to the need to adapt the scope
of fundamental rights to meet the needs of present-day conditions. For that reason,
250 Douglas-Scott referring to Bogdandy. Van de Berghe (2010), p. 150, argues that the CJEU, by referring
to and relying on the ECtHR judgments, itself chose a higher authority in the human rights field
and argues that the CJEU might not consider this as a threat for EU autonomy.
251 Van den Berghe (2010), p. 116.
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hardly any conclusions can be drawn from this case law as to the deeper meaning
these interpretative aids have for the CJEU’s case law, whether this concerns their
classification as principles or as methods of interpretation, the purpose to which they
are used and the way in which a certain interpretation can be found in concrete cases.
The analysis of teleological interpretation indicated that this method mainly plays
a role when the fundamental rights concerned are laid down in a legal text, either
a directive or a treaty concluded in the EU context. In those cases the object and
purpose are generally explained both by the CJEU and the Advocates General. Of
course the discussion on the object and purpose are more elaborate by the Advocates
General, but the CJEU at least provides a short insight into the meaning of the object
and purpose in a specific case and how it has established that meaning. It has proven
difficult to comment on the strength of teleological arguments, because even though
the analysis showed that teleological arguments are often supported by other argu-
ments, it is questionable whether those other arguments are always of equal force.
Comparative interpretation seems to play the most important role in the context
of interpretation of fundamental rights. Given the specific historical position of
fundamental rights in the EU, this is not very surprising. The theoretical discussion
on comparative interpretation revealed that the basis or justification for comparative
references was one of the most important aspects of this method, even more so in
light of the distinction between internal and external comparative interpretation. The
CJEU does not seem to acknowledge this distinction between external and internal
comparative references. The main form of external comparative interpretation used
by the CJEU, namely references to the ECHR, is justified by an explicit reference
to this source in the EU treaty. In addition to strategic arguments advanced in the
literature and only hinted at by the Advocates General, this does provide a strong
basis for this type of external reference. One may question whether these references
should be used to the extent that is presently the case, but that is a different matter.
Another important aspect identified in the theoretical analysis, is the practical use
of comparative interpretation. Is it sufficiently explained what materials have been
used for the comparative references?When relying on the ECtHR the CJEU generally
refers to the specific cases, and also in the context of other external references, the
specific documents are mentioned. In the context of internal comparative interpretation,
however, when looking for common traditions, it is not always clear on what basis
the conclusions are made. The conclusions in this area could becomemore transparent
by indicating the materials that have been taken into account. This approach is visible
in some cases. The most important practical concern also involved the search for a
common tradition and the question when such a common tradition can be found. The
analysis of both the CJEU and the Advocates General approach did not provide a
clear indication of a criterion that shows when there is enough ground to find a
common tradition. The ECtHR analysis showed a similar lack of any guidance as
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to when a consensus can be found. This might be an indication that for both courts
it is extremely difficult to develop any guidelines in that respect. That does leave
the use of this particular form of comparative interpretation open to criticism for lack
of consistency and transparency.
An interesting question that warrants attention after this discussion of the CJEU’s
case law approach is whether the fact that the Charter has become binding will change
anything in the judicial reasoning of the CJEU. The introduction on the CJEU, which
was given in Chapter 3, already dealt with the question whether the fact that the CJEU
will henceforth be dealing with a legally binding text will pose any new challenges.
The conclusion was reached in that chapter that the text of the Charter is so broad
that it probably will not make much of a difference if compared to the present
situation. Moreover, the text mainly contains a codification of rights that already have
been recognized. Nevertheless, the question still remains to be answered whether any
changes are to be expected with regard to the use of the methods and principles that
have been discussed in this chapter. Perhaps the most important question in that regard
is whether the CJEU will continue to rely so strongly on the case law of the ECtHR.
Article 52(3) of the Charter provides that:
In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope
of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision
shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.
Thus, the European Convention and corresponding judgments can be expected to
continue to play an important role. This is even more relevant, because the strategic
arguments mentioned in section 6.3, are still valid, even though the Charter has
become binding. In all probability, however, there will be some changes in the use
of the methods and principles of interpretation. The number of references to common
constitutional traditions will diminish, since the Charter is a codification of those
common traditions and now provides a more direct and concrete basis for the CJEU’s
case law. Thus, comparative analyses may become less prominent than they currently
are. However, the impact of this predictable change should not be overestimated. As
can be seen in the context of the European Convention, the ECtHR still refers to the
Member States in order to see whether developments warrant a new interpretation
even though these rights have been laid down in the Convention. This particular form
of comparative interpretation might start to play a role in the context of the CJEU
as well, but the Charter is of a much more recent date, so the question is whether
that will happen in the near future. In addition, it is likely that teleological interpreta-
tion will start to play a more important role, since the text of the Charter and the
information that is available about the object and purpose provides a good basis for
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doing so. Closely connected to this, it may well be predicted that the CJEU will more
visibly and expressly take up an evolutive approach. It is important to note that the
probable relevance of these methods and principles will also have impact on the
justification for their use, and on the way in which they are practically employed.
To this extent, similar questions may become relevant for the CJEU as have already
been asked in respect to the ECtHR. Indeed, it may be important for the CJEU to
be well aware of the difficulties related to the various methods and to take careful
notice of the way in which both academic literature and the ECtHR itself have
responded to these difficulties.
Whereas it is probable that comparative, evolutive and teleological interpretation
will grow more important in the CJEU’s fundamental rights case law as a result of
the Charter, it remains questionable whether autonomous interpretation will take up
a more prominent approach. The European Convention and its case law remain
important and it is not likely, given the strategic reasons discussed in section 6.3,









The aim of this research project undertaken for the purpose of the present book has
been to analyze the use of four interpretative instruments (teleological, comparative,
evolutive and autonomous interpretation) by the Court of Justice of the European
Union and the European Court of Human Rights: two supranational courts dealing
with fundamental rights cases in a multilevel legal context. This setting poses specific
difficulties for these courts, because, as indicated in the introduction, their effectiveness
depends in large part on the cooperation of national authorities in the Contracting
States / Member States. Therefore it is important for these courts to persuade national
authorities of the need and value to implement their judgments by means of national
legislation, case law and policy. Only then will these courts be able to afford indi-
viduals effective protection of their fundamental rights. A crucial aspect in trying
to engage national authorities is to convince them of the need to adhere to the funda-
mental rights judgments, even if they might not agree with the conclusion in specific
cases. This requires sound, objective and transparent legal reasoning. After all, if
outsiders can understand on which arguments the conclusion is based, it is easier to
accept it.1 The importance of transparency and objectivity of reasoning for the Euro-
pean Courts has been held to raise the question whether the reasoning of both courts
provides sufficient insight into the factors that have led to the adopted conclusion.
In the introduction, it was stressed that such insight is all the more important because
of the multilevel setting in which both courts have to operate. Any subjectivity on
the side of the courts should be prevented, since that might generate criticism of the
courts’ reasoning and therefore weaken the persuasiveness of the conclusions reached.
Thus, the main value on which the analysis in this thesis is based is that interpretation
methods and principles should be used in a such a manner that it is clear how the
conclusion has been reached and what factors played a role in doing so.
The main aim of this research project has thus been to analyze the use of a selected
number of interpretative aids in the context of fundamental rights adjudication at the
European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union
from a theoretical and practical perspective. The first part of the book provides a
theoretical analysis as to how the four selected interpretative instruments ought to
be used in theory in order to provide a persuasive part of the Courts’ legal reasoning.
1 See Chapter 1.
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The analysis focused on a few main questions that have been addressed for each
interpretative aid. What basis or justification can be found for relying on these inter-
pretative instruments? The question how the use of the specific method or principle
has been justified does not play an equally important role for each interpretative aid.
What aspects play a role when courts use these interpretative instruments? The
theoretical analysis indicated for each method and principle, the main aspects that
should be addressed when using this particular interpretative aid. What are the pitfalls
of using these interpretative instruments? What criticism has been expressed in
theoretical literature on the use of these interpretative aids in general or at the use
of these aids in practice? Have any solutions for improvement been suggested? Not
in all situations have improvements been discussed in legal literature, but the aim
has been to discuss all interpretative aids suggestions to enhance the use of inter-
pretative aids in practice. On the basis of this theoretical analysis an image emerged
of the ideal use of all four interpretative instruments. Subsequently, a case law analysis
addressed the actual use of these interpretative aids in the judgments of both courts.
The questions addressed in the theoretical analysis formed a structure for the case
law analysis as well.
Against this background, this final conclusion aims to discuss the main findings of
both the theoretical and the case law parts of this thesis. In particular, attention will
thereby be given to the question to what extent the theoretical analysis can help to
enhance the actual use of the interpretative instruments by the CJEU and the ECtHR.
The consecutive sections will each deal with one of the four interpretation methods
or principles. However, the first section will briefly recall the central theoretical and
practical findings with respect to both courts. The discussion of the proposed frame-
work will then be continued when dealing with the separate interpretation methods
and principles and try to establish whether the CJEU and ECtHR could benefit from
looking at each other. Finally some closing remarks will be made.
14.1 INTERPRETATION METHODS AND INTERPRETATIVE PRINCIPLES
One of the starting points of this thesis is that a distinction should be made between
interpretation methods and interpretative principles. An interpretation method is a
technique that clarifies which substantive argument has been used in order to support
a specific reasoning and which helps the judge to objectify its reasoning. An inter-
pretative principle serves as an objective or aim that can be taken into account when
interpreting a provision with the help of an interpretation method. As explained in
Chapter 4, interpretative principles and interpretation methods have a different function
in the interpretation process. Comparative interpretation and teleological interpretation
have been identified as interpretation methods. In the case of comparative interpreta-
tion the comparative materials used by the respective court constitute the substantive
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argument that justifies the interpretative choice. For teleological interpretation, the
reference to the object and purpose comprises the substantive argument that indicates
on what grounds the interpretative conclusion has been reached. On the other hand,
evolutive interpretation and autonomous interpretation have been qualified as inter-
pretative principles, because both primarily indicate a goal that a court wants to
achieve. The aim of evolutive interpretation is to prevent fundamental rights from
becoming dead letters, while the aim of autonomous interpretation is to prevent
Member or Contracting States from circumventing fundamental rights protection. The
aim of these interpretative principles can be achieved by relying on different interpreta-
tion methods. One could argue that this is not the case for evolutive interpretation,
but that point will be addressed when dealing with evolutive interpretation below.
The distinction between interpretation methods and interpretative principles has
been introduced in the theoretical discussion of interpretation methods and principles,
which raised the question whether this distinction can be seen in the case law as well.
Put differently: Is this distinction actually visible in practice or is its relevance mainly
theoretical? It has appeared from the case law analysis that the ECtHR does not seem
to acknowledge this distinction in its case law, at least not explicitly. Comparative
and teleological interpretation are used in such a manner that it is clear that they are
viewed by the ECtHR as interpretationmethods. However, the potentially controversial
aspect of this distinction is not so much whether comparative and teleological inter-
pretation are recognized as interpretation methods, but whether evolutive and auto-
nomous interpretation are recognized as interpretative principles. Moreover, the
pertinent question is whether they are recognized as principles to the full extent of
the distinction, meaning that the respective court acknowledges that a separate inter-
pretation method is needed to establish the meaning of the evolutive or autonomous
concept. The discussion of the specific interpretative principles below will aim to
answer this question on the basis of the case law analysis of the ECtHR. The CJEU
also employs comparative and teleological interpretation as interpretation methods.
The use of evolutive and autonomous interpretation is hardly visible in the case law
of the CJEU, as will be discussed below. That makes it difficult to draw conclusions
on the question whether the CJEU acknowledges them as interpretative principles.
14.2 TELEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION
Teleological interpretation has played a role at two levels in this thesis, i.e. both at
a meta level and at a micro level. Micro-teleological interpretation refers to the well-
known interpretation method whereby the object and purpose of a provision or treaty
are used to justify an interpretative conclusion. Meta-teleological interpretation is a
concept introduced by LASSER in the context of judicial reasoning by the CJEU. It
refers to the phenomenon that certain interpretative principles are based on an under-
standing of the object and purpose of the treaty system as a whole. These principles
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are thus a reflection of some of the values that underlie the treaty system, in the case
of this thesis either the EU or the Convention system. The case law analysis in this
thesis has endeavoured to establish for both courts to what extent any reasoning based
on such meta-teleological principles or values is visible. Even though the concept
was developed in the context of the CJEU, the CJEU’s fundamental rights case law
did not really show clear signs of meta-teleological reasoning. Perhaps the peculiar
role of fundamental rights in the EU can be regarded as an explanation for this. In
the ECtHR case law, on the other hand, many signs of meta-teleological reasoning
are visible. The overarching, meta-teleological principle of practical and effective
interpretation has provided fertile ground for other interpretative principles, like
evolutive interpretation and autonomous interpretation. Many judgments refer to the
fact that the European Convention, as a human rights treaty, needs to be interpreted
in a way that ensures the effectiveness of these rights and does not render them
theoretical and illusory. Two of these principles have been discussed at length in this
thesis and will be addressed below.
Micro-teleological interpretation is also visible in the case law of both courts.
This method is regularly used to help to solve interpretative problems. An important
question in understanding micro-teleological reasoning is whether the courts explain
the meaning of the object and purpose and how this is established. In this regard,
it is important to note that the theoretical analysis indicated that objective teleological
interpretation can be considered to be the most important form of teleological inter-
pretation in the context of fundamental rights adjudication, meaning that the object
and purpose are mainly established on the basis of a ‘rational’ drafter, rather than
the original drafters. The case law proves to correspond to this theoretical analysis.
The object and purpose of the drafters play only a minor role in the reasoning of both
courts, which is understandable given the importance of evolutive interpretation.
The analysis in the second part of this thesis has further disclosed that micro-
teleological interpretation mainly plays a role in the case law of the CJEU when the
CJEU is dealing with fundamental rights problems that have some basis in a legal
text, like a directive, or a treaty that has been established in the EU context. In those
situations the CJEU mostly substantiates the reference to the object and purpose of
the text or provision in question and explains how it arrived at this conclusion. The
Advocate General is often even more elaborate in explaining the object and purpose.
The fact that micro-teleological interpretation mainly plays a role when a text is
involved, may be regarded as an indication that the role of this method could increase
in the future as a result of the binding nature of the Charter.
Within the case law of the ECtHR, the object and purpose of a particular treaty
provision are not always substantiated, nor is it always explained how the object and
purpose have been established. The reference to the object and purpose often remains
rather vague and its helpfulness to reaching insightful conclusions remains unclear.
In this respect, the ECtHR could take the CJEU as an example and put more effort
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into justifying the meaning of the object and purpose of a specific provision and
explaining how it has been established. This ‘carelessness’ of the ECtHR in establish-
ing the object and purpose has not led to much apparent discussion among the judges
– hardly ever the issue of teleological interpretation is visible in concurring or dissent-
ing opinion.
While in theory, however, it might seem an improvement of the reasoning of the
ECtHR if it would pay more attention to the particular objectives of a Convention
provision, the question is whether aiming to put more flesh on the bones of the object
and purpose would be beneficial in practice. It might also make the Court’s reasoning
more vulnerable, because, if the object and purpose are substantiated to a larger extent,
this opens the floor for more controversy or criticism of those who do not agree with
the chosen path. Thus, the deliberate choice not to apply micro-teleological interpreta-
tion in great detail may have its advantages, even if it results in a lack of transparency
and clarity as regards the way in which the Court has reached its decisions.
14.3 COMPARATIVE INTERPRETATION
Comparative interpretation has proven to be a method of interpretation that plays an
important role in the reasoning of both the CJEU and the ECtHR. This thesis has
taken comparative interpretation to mean a type of reasoning that is based on refer-
ences to foreign materials. The comparative materials provide a substantive argument
that can be used as a basis for a certain interpretative conclusion; for that reason,
this use can be classified as a method of interpretation, rather than an interpretative
principle. It has already been indicated that this is generally recognized in theoretical
literature and the case law analysis seems to confirm the hypothesis that comparative
materials are used as a method to arrive at certain conclusions. The qualification of
comparative interpretation as a method of interpretation thus does not seem to be
disputed.
On the other hand, open to debate appears to be whether comparative interpretation
inevitably includes evolutive interpretation. A difference in perspective on this issue
is mainly visible in scholarly literature on the ECtHR, where some authors consider
comparative interpretation and evolutive interpretation to be one single concept.
Nevertheless, it can also be considered that comparative and evolutive interpretation
are essentially different interpretative aids and that they have different functions for
the courts’ interpretation. It is the latter perspective that has been adhered to in this
thesis. For that reason, evolutive interpretation will be addressed separately in the
subsequent section.
Comparative interpretation has been employed for a variety of purposes by the
European Courts. Both courts use it to solve regular interpretative problems and to
help it to give shape to an evolutive approach. Moreover, the CJEU has also used
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the method to construe fundamental rights when there was not yet an EU catalogue
of fundamental rights. The ECtHR has used comparative interpretation as justification
for its avoidance of certain interpretative matters (e.g. the question as to when the
right to life begins) or to corroborate textual interpretation (e.g. the finding that certain
elements are not included in the text of the Convention).
An important distinction put forward in this thesis is the distinction between external
and internal comparative interpretation. Internal comparative interpretation takes place
when references are made to legal materials or to the practice of the states that fall
within the jurisdiction of the respective court, i.e., in the case of the CJEU, references
to the Member States of the European Union, and, in case of the ECtHR, to the
Contracting States of the European Convention. External comparative interpretation
refers to all other foreign instruments that are used in a judicial reasoning, like
references to UN treaties or judgments of the Canadian Supreme Court. This dis-
tinction is not necessarily only relevant for defining comparative interpretation at
international or supranational courts. In a federal system, like the United States of
America, this could be a useful distinction as well. The following discussion will first
address the use of internal comparative interpretation, before dealing with external
comparative interpretation.
The case law analysis has demonstrated that neither the ECtHR nor the CJEU
explicitly acknowledges the distinction between internal and external comparative
interpretation in their case law. They do, however, mostly refer to materials of the
Member States or the Contracting States in a different manner than to materials from
other jurisdictions or international systems. In the case law of the ECtHR, the internal
component of comparative interpretation is almost exclusively used for the purpose
of establishing a consensus. In many cases, the ECtHR refers to the Contracting States
to show the existence of a consensus or the lack thereof and uses that to support a
specific interpretative conclusion. Within the context of the CJEU, the common
constitutional traditions that flow from theMember States are one of the main sources
of inspiration firstly identified by the CJEU and later codified in the EU treaty. The
purpose of internal comparative interpretation at the CJEU is also to attempt to find
a common ground that can serve as a basis for an interpretative conclusion.
A problem noted in theoretical discussions on the practical side of establishing
this internal consensus or common ground is that for neither court is it clear when
there is sufficient evidence to conclude that one can speak of a consensus or common
ground. There are no numerical guidelines that can help one to understand this process.
The case law analysis of the courts did not provide much more clarity in this respect.
Within the context of the CJEU, several Advocates General have indicated that the
search for a common ground is not necessarily a search for a common solution, but
one for the solution that best fits the EU system. This suggestion has also been made
in academic literature. That would imply that the outcome of the references to the
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Member States, so the outcome of comparative interpretation, is subjected to a teleo-
logical assessment before a final conclusion is reached as to the proper meaning of
a certain fundamental right. Several judgments have demonstrated, however, that there
is a line where there is so much diversity among the Member States that it cannot
be used to support a specific conclusion. Accordingly it must be accepted that the
search for a common ground cannot be equated to a matter of finding the best solution.
The actual criterion remains a mystery, however. Similarly, within the context of the
ECtHR, much remains unclear with regard to the question when one can speak of
a consensus. The case law analysis did not provide much clarification in this respect.
Rather, it revealed that even the various judges sometimes disagree on whether one
can really speak of consensus. This obscurity in both courts when it comes to the
use of an internal consensus or common ground makes it rather difficult to understand
why in some cases a consensus or common tradition has been found, whilst in others
there was not enough support for such a conclusion. This undoubtedly affects the
objectivity of this particular use of this method, as it is not possible to check the
consistency of the use of this method. An important aspect for improvement for both
courts is thus to provide more insight into this aspect of internal comparative inter-
pretation.
The question is, of course, how this should be done. Should the courts provide
numerical guidelines that indicate when one can speak of sufficient evidence depending
perhaps on the sensitivity of the rights in question? That seems hardly feasible and
for strategic reasons it might not be possible or desirable to draft such guidelines.
It is therefore not easy to find a way in which to explain in an insightful manner when
the conclusions that result from an internal comparison should be accepted, and when
they should be considered not strong enough to support a specific interpretation. A
potential solution will be discussed below.
As has been mentioned above, external comparative interpretation refers to the use
of comparative material that springs from all other foreign or international sources.
Such sources may be materials from non-European countries, international treaties,
other international documents (such as soft law), case law from other international
or supranational courts, etc. Thus, a wide range of materials qualifies as a basis for
external comparative interpretation. The case law analysis has demonstrated that both
courts often refer to such external sources, like UN treaties, Council of Europe treaties
or ILO conventions. The ECtHR has also on occasion (more often than the CJEU
or its Advocates General) relied on references to third countries, like Canada or the
United States of America. One specific type of ‘external’ reference is the reference
made by the CJEU to the ECtHR or vice versa. This type of reference plays a more
prominent role in the context of the CJEU than in that of the ECtHR. It is of course
understandable for many different reasons that the CJEU looks at the ECtHR’s case
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law, rather than the other way around, given the latter’s experience with fundamental
rights protection.
References to external sources are used by the courts in a different manner than
references to internal sources. Usually, one or a few individual references are used
to support a specific conclusion. Only the ECtHR in some cases relied on a consensus
derived from external sources to support an evolutive interpretation. Of course, this
raises the same practical problems as a search for an internal consensus. Moreover,
this use of external sources may raise questions as to its legitimacy.
Indeed, the main reason for making the distinction between internal and external
comparative interpretation, is that a different justification may be required for relying
on internal or external comparative interpretation. Relying on internal sources can
be seen as a way to keep a link with the countries in which the fundamental rights
protection needs to be implemented. This justification cannot be used for external
references, which therefore require a different justification. That justification needs
to explain why these materials are relevant in the context of the respective system.
Why is it relevant to look at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, ILO Conven-
tions or UN treaties? Or, in the case of the ECtHR, why is it relevant to rely on
international soft law documents or on judgments of the United States Supreme Court?
There can be different reasons for looking at each document, but the theoretical
analysis indicated that many of these do not suffice to explain why external materials
are relevant. The fact that some materials just seem to be helpful to support a specific
reasoning is not sufficient from a theoretical perspective – indeed, it does hardly
enhance the legitimacy of the judgments based on such interpretation.
Are the CJEU and ECtHR aware of the necessity to justify the use of external
materials? It has been shown in Chapter 13 that the CJEU in some cases mentioned
that the treaties referred to in its reasoning were ratified by all Member States. This
seems to imply that the CJEU wants to stress the relevance of such an international
treaty for all the Member States. The ECtHR, on the other hand, has even accepted
novel interpretations on the basis of international treaties which were not signed or
ratified by the respondent state. It has either not provided any justification for such
reliance on external references, or it has limited itself to referring to the fact that the
European Convention does not operate in a vacuum. That is certainly true and there
can of course be strategic reasons for invoking references to these external materials.
The question is whether these reasons sufficiently explain why obligations arising
from treaties or conventions that have not been ratified by all Contracting States should
be incorporated into fundamental rights obligations under the ECHR.
As was already mentioned, a special category of external comparative interpretation
consists of the references by the CJEU to the ECHR and the corresponding case law.
This form of external comparative interpretation plays a vital role in the case law
of the CJEU. In many CJEU judgments, extensive reference is made to the ECHR
and judgments of the ECtHR. Judgments from Strasbourg are thereby often referred
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to almost in the same manner as precedents from the CJEU itself. Only in rare cases
has the CJEU opted for a different approach than the ECtHR. Since this form of
external comparative interpretation has been incorporated in the EU treaty, as well
as in the EU Charter, a strong justification is given for the use of such ‘external’
material.
It has to be admitted that the use of external comparative interpretation is more
controversial in theory than in practice. However, given the criticism that has been
directed at the ECtHR for its reliance on non-ratified international treaties that had
not been ratified by the respondent Contracting State, there is certainly value in trying
to enhance the justification provided for external comparative interpretation.
The main question is what kind of justification can be provided for the use of
external materials that are presently not sufficiently justified. The theoretical analysis
disclosed a specific mode of comparative interpretation that might offer good prospects
in this regard, namely dialogical interpretation. This mode for external comparative
interpretation was developed by CHOUDHRY and it was subsequently taken up bymany
scholars in the field of comparative interpretation. The main idea behind dialogical
interpretation is that references to external comparative materials should be used to
improve the judge’s understanding of his or her own system. These external materials
should thus be used as a means for self-reflection. By looking at another system or
solution a judge will be triggered to think about his or her own system. As a result
of this self-reflection it will be possible to argue on the basis of the judge’s own
system whether the external solution fits in. The reasons for adopting or refusing a
solution will then come from one’s own system, which enhances the legitimacy of
referring to these external materials.
This approach may be visible in judgments from the Canadian Supreme Court,
but how is this with the case law of the CJEU or ECtHR? It has been found that no
clear signs of this approach to external comparative interpretation are visible in the
case law of these two courts. That prompts the question whether this mode can actually
be relevant in practice, or whether it is mainly an interesting theoretical concept. The
thought that looking at other external solutions can help to increase the understanding
of the values and principles underlying the judge’s own system can certainly be
valuable. If the reasons for looking at external comparative interpretation finally stem
from within the judge’s own system, this conception also may help to avoid some
of the current problems, such as those related to non-ratification of an international
treaty. Moreover, the conception might also be useful when dealing with internal
comparative interpretation. Problematic in the context of finding an internal consensus
is that there is no clear criterion that can justify why certain results of an internal
comparison are relevant in one case and not in another. Of course in the obvious
situations when there actually is a consensus, there is no problem. In the majority
of situations, however, the results of an internal comparison are not that clear-cut.
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Dialogical interpretation in this respect might provide a solution to the practical
problems connected to consensus interpretation. The outcome of the internal com-
parison could force judges to consider whether that solution would be in line with
their own systems (i.e. either the Convention system or the EU legal system). It thus
resembles what two Advocates General have found to take place at the CJEU, namely
finding the best or the most appropriate solution on the basis of inspiration drawn
from the various national constitutional systems.
One of the consequences of a dialogical approach to comparative interpretation
would be that it would lead the judges and Advocates General of the CJEU and the
judges on the ECtHR to develop more fully the principles and values under their
respective systems. The EU and Convention systems and the rights resulting from
it would thus be further developed in terms of substance. It would also be necessary
to consider what the system really stands for in order to make a proper assessment
as to whether a specific foreign solution will fit within the system. In theory this may
be highly desirable, but whether this is feasible in practice remains to be seen. After
all, the ECHR only provides minimum norms and the ECtHR strives to leave sufficient
leeway to the Contracting States to make their own decisions as regards the protection
of fundamental rights. If the ECtHR were to make more substantive choices by
adopting a dialogical approach, this might provide more insight into its reasoning.
As has been submitted earlier, such might be desirable from a theoretical perspective,
but it might also lead to even more controversy. Contracting States might object to
a more substantive approach out of fear of losing even more terrain to the judges
in Strasbourg. Moreover, states (or critics in general) may now not agree with the
foreign sources used in the ECtHR’s reasoning, but if these materials are used for
self-reflection they might end up not agreeing with the Convention system as a whole.
This same risk can be seen in the context of the CJEU. However, given that the CJEU
operates within the context of the EU, which is a legal order with a specific aim and
purpose, it might be easier for the CJEU to use dialogical interpretation as a means
of self-reflection. Thus, the notion of dialogical interpretation might be regarded as
a good way for the CJEU to deal with external instruments and it might be rather
easy to fit in the notion with its current practice, especially since it has already been
seen to form a part of this Court’s approach by some of the Advocates General.
Thus, the preceding discussion should not be understood as an argument against
dialogical interpretation. On the contrary, it is a valuable theoretical option that could
help further the debate on the justification for (external) comparative interpretation.
There is indeed an element of doubt, however, whether in practice this form of





Evolutive interpretation is one of the meta-teleological principles that were central
to this thesis. It indicates that the rights subjected to interpretation should not be
viewed in a static manner and should be adapted to the changes of time. Both courts
rely on this interpretative principle in their reasoning, but the ECtHR refers to it on
a much larger scale than the CJEU. The ECtHR has justified its strongly evolutive
approach by pointing to the need to keep rights practical and effective, rather than
theoretical and illusory. Within the context of the CJEU, Advocate General Tesauro
has also stressed the need to avoid taking a static role and to keep in pace with social
change. Both courts thus recognize the need to take an evolutive approach, but in
the case of the ECtHR this is most clearly linked to a meta-teleological approach by
indicating that adopting an evolutive approach is necessary to attain the meta-purposes
of the European Convention.
The nature of evolutive interpretation as a principle of interpretation did not
become clear from the theoretical analysis. Especially in literature on the ECtHR,
evolutive interpretation is often considered to be synonymous to comparative inter-
pretation and thus it is often considered a method of interpretation. This thesis has
defended the view that evolutive interpretation should be seen as a separate concept
with a different function, namely as an interpretative goal, but not a substantive
argument that can be used as a basis for a specific reasoning. Is this understanding
of the nature of evolutive interpretation as an interpretative principle reflected in the
case law of the CJEU and the ECtHR? The case law analysis of the CJEU provided
too little materials from the CJEU or its Advocates General to provide a sufficient
basis for drawing any conclusions on whether they regard evolutive interpretation
as an interpretative principle. With regard to the ECtHR, it is also difficult to answer
this question on the basis of the case law, since the ECtHR is rather unclear about
the nature of evolutive interpretation. The fact that the use of evolutive interpretation
is justified by referring to the object and purpose of the Convention as a whole in
itself would seem to support the conclusion that the ECtHR considers it to be a meta-
teleological principle. This is, however, a rather small basis for drawing that con-
clusion. Nevertheless, the way in which evolutive interpretation is used, generally
fits the description of an interpretative principle as employed in this thesis, since the
ECtHR almost always relies on a further interpretation method to support its final
conclusion. There is still some reason for doubt as to the exact function of evolutive
interpretation in the Strasbourg case law, however. Given the fact that the ECtHR
most often relies on comparative interpretation, one may wonder whether the ECtHR
views evolutive and comparative interpretation as two distinct interpretative aids (the
one being a principle, the other a method), or just as one interpretative aid.
Why should we consider the distinction between evolutive interpretation as a
principle and comparative interpretation as a method to be important? This may be
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explained by recalling the analysis of the purposes for which comparative arguments
are used by both courts under study. As indicated in section 14.3 of this conclusion,
comparative interpretation is used for several purposes in the case law of both courts,
only one of which is to support an evolutive approach. Comparative interpretation
is often used to solve an interpretative problem without there being any need to
indicate that society has changed since a specific earlier point in time. In the context
of the CJEU, comparative interpretation has also been used extensively to construe
rights, rather than to interpret them in an evolutive manner. For both courts there are
also cases in which comparative interpretation has been used to establish an evolutive
interpretation. To view both concepts as synonymous would thus on the basis of the
case law analysis not reflect the full extent of the various purposes of comparative
interpretation and the justification that might be given for such use.
Even though this thesis argues that evolutive interpretation and comparative
interpretation should be viewed as two separate concepts, there is an undeniably close
relationship between the two. Evolutive interpretation as a principle does not provide
a meaning to rights or terms. It indicates that instead of a static approach a more
dynamic approach can be an important value in a certain legal order. In order to
establish the evolutive meaning of a term or principle at a certain point in time
interpretation methods are needed to provide substantive arguments. Comparative
interpretation provides a useful method to establish an evolutive interpretation. In
particular, internal comparative interpretation is regularly used to determine the
evolutive meaning of a specific right or term. Problematic is that, as a result of this,
the practical concerns related to comparative interpretation (being mainly that it is
not clear when one can speak of a consensus or common ground), may also affect
evolutive interpretation. By acknowledging the different functions of comparative
and evolutive interpretation it at least channels the criticism to the correct interpretative
aid. The close relation between comparative and evolutive interpretation does not
mean that comparative interpretation is the only method that can help to establish
the evolutive meaning of a specific term or right. Arguments based on textual or
teleological interpretation could also be used. The objective purpose of a provision
can change over time or through technological changes terms can gain a different
meaning over time. In practice, however, these justifications for a specific evolutive
meaning have not been provided by the CJEU or the ECtHR.
The theoretical analysis showed that evolutive interpretation is sometimes also
criticized for its lack of a guiding principle that determines its application. However,
in the framework proposed in this thesis evolutive interpretation should be seen as
a guiding principle itself. As such, it is a principle that can be used to help the courts
to make choices between potential conclusions that arise from teleological or comparat-
ive interpretation. Evolutive interpretation can thus help to choose between option




As indicated above, some elements of this use of evolutive interpretation are visible
in the case law, mainly in that of the ECtHR. Nonetheless, if this distinction were
to be more fully embraced and applied in the reasoning of both courts, it would force
the judges to explain more clearly what the evolutive meaning is of a specific term
and, more importantly, to explain how they arrived at that conclusion. Especially in
the context of ever-expanding fundamental rights, sound reasoning is required to
indicate where to draw a certain line. The framework presented here might help to
push for such sound reasoning.
14.5 AUTONOMOUS INTERPRETATION
Autonomous interpretation is an interpretative principle that is generally based on
a desire for uniformity. To take an autonomous approach means that an international
court does not let the qualification of a specific term under domestic law be decisive
for its own interpretation. The international or supranational judge thus develops its
own understanding of a specific term, separate and independently from any outside
qualification, whether it is a domestic qualification or a qualification under another
international regime. The theoretical analysis indicated that legal commentaries also
suggest that there is a strategic reason for these courts to adopt an autonomous
interpretation. By adopting an autonomous approach, the Court in question strengthens
its jurisdictional power by taking explicit control over the interpretation of a specific
term.
The form of autonomous interpretation that has been mostly found in the case
law of the two courts is autonomous interpretation with regard to domestic qualifica-
tions. In the context of the CJEU autonomous interpretation has, however, also been
used in relation to the ECtHR. This form of autonomous interpretation is rather rare.
While autonomous interpretation in relation to domestic qualifications is mainly driven
by the desire for uniformity, autonomous interpretation in relation to the ECtHR can
perhaps best be explained on a more strategic basis, that in some cases the CJEU
wants to keep control.
The analysis in this thesis has focused on those instances of ‘strong’ autonomy,
meaning those cases where the CJEU or the ECtHR expressly indicated that they were
adopting an autonomous approach. Both courts have confirmed, in one way or another,
that the basic idea behind autonomous interpretation is that an autonomous approach
is sometimes necessary to ensure uniform protection of fundamental rights, and thus
to avoid states being able to hide behind domestic qualifications.
The theoretical analysis indicated that autonomous interpretation would mainly
be used to determine the meaning of technical legal terms, like ‘criminal charge’ and
‘property’. The case law analysis of the ECtHR has confirmed this perception, but
it has also shown that, in recent years, autonomous interpretation has been used to
interpret an increasing variety of non-technical legal terms, like ‘home’. However,
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even though the Convention terms interpreted by means of autonomous interpretation
may no longer all classify as solely technical legal terms, autonomous interpretation
does seem to have been reserved for terms that do not have a strong moral connota-
tion.
In the context of the CJEU, too few examples of an autonomous approach in
fundamental rights cases have been found to draw the definite conclusion that it
applies autonomous interpretation to a specific type of term. Nevertheless, the fact
that uniformity is the driving force behind autonomous interpretation at the CJEU
may be considered to imply that the CJEU, too, would avoid applying an autonomous
interpretation to morally contested terms and rights, like ‘life’.
Autonomous interpretation has been qualified as a meta-teleological principle,
but is this nature of autonomous interpretation reflected in the case law of the CJEU
and the ECtHR? There are indications in the reasoning of both courts that they
acknowledge that autonomous interpretation has a distinct nature from regular inter-
pretationmethods. In a rare case where an explicitly autonomous approach was visible,
the CJEU referred to an ‘autonomous concept’. Moreover, the CJEU subsequently
relied on several interpretation methods to establish the meaning of this ‘autonomous
concept’. Such a single case may not ‘prove’ that the CJEU acknowledges the distinc-
tion made in this thesis and the consequences flowing from it, but it at least provides
an indication to this effect.
The ECtHR also seems to realize that the nature of autonomous interpretation
is different from the nature of interpretation methods. It refers to autonomous inter-
pretation as an approach that is justified with a reference to the object and purpose
of the Convention as a whole. As a result it can be regarded as a meta-teleological
principle in the Court’s case law. As already explained, one of the characteristics of
interpretative principles is that referring to an interpretative principle cannot justify
a specific interpretation. It should be used in combination with an interpretation
method. When applying autonomous interpretation, however, the ECtHR has been
shown to invoke an interpretation method only in a few cases. This seems to imply
that, even though the ECtHR acknowledges the special nature of autonomous inter-
pretation, it does not attach the same consequences to this special nature as would
be preferred from the perspective of transparent and clear judicial reasoning. The
example of the CJEU could be instructive for the ECtHR in this respect. Such justifica-
tion of an autonomous meaning by reference to distinct and clear interpretation
methods will be helpful in borderline cases to arrive at a novel interpretation in a
consistent and non-arbitrary manner.
14.6 GENERAL CONCLUSION
Many of the problems discussed in this thesis were more clearly visible in the case
law of the ECtHR. One explanation for this may be found in the historical lack of
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a legally binding catalogue of fundamental rights in the EU, which has resulted in
a very particular approach to establishing fundamental rights. This may certainly
change now that the Charter has become binding. In cases in which the CJEU had
a text as a basis, it has already showed to be more explicit about its interpretative
aids. The discussions of the use of such aids by the ECtHR are therefore certainly
relevant for the CJEU. They are moreover also relevant from the perspective that the
CJEU currently relies heavily on the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR. Flawed
reasoning at the ECtHR will thus resonate in the case law of the CJEU. Therefore,
improvement of the legal reasoning at the ECtHR may also prove to be important
for the CJEU.
The aim of this thesis has been, by analyzing both theory and practice, to point
out the areas where such improvements can be made. The thesis has shown that it
is difficult to suggest any concrete improvements to be made, given the complicated
multilevel context in which both the CJEU and the ECtHR have to operate. Although
it might be desirable to arrive at more transparent and revealing interpretative con-
clusions, this also often means that a more substantive approach has to be adopted.
This could result in resistance from states that do not agree with such a more substant-
ive approach, which raises the question whether that would really improve matters
in the bigger picture. Nevertheless, one of the improvements that can be made without
requiring a more substantive approach is to adopt the distinction between methods
and principles of interpretation. By adopting this distinction courts are automatically
forced to provide a proper explanation for establishing an evolutive or autonomous
approach by relying on relevant interpretation methods. And, moreover, if the courts
should show (express or implicit) awareness of the problems identified in this thesis,




De interpretatie van fundamentele rechten in een veellagig rechtssysteem
Fundamentele rechten zijn notoir vaag en algemeen geformuleerd. Als gevolg van
deze algemene formulering bestaat er veel onduidelijkheid over de exacte betekenis
van fundamentele rechten. De tekst zelf biedt meestal weinig houvast. Daarnaast
hebben vragen over de betekenis van fundamentele rechten vaak betrekking op
controversiële zaken waar zeer verschillend over kan worden gedacht. Door de vage
formulering wordt de invulling van fundamentele rechten overgelaten aan rechters
in individuele zaken. Rechters worden dus regelmatig geconfronteerd met vragen die
betrekking hebben op de reikwijdte van fundamentele rechten. In de interpretatiefase,
die in dit proefschrift wordt onderscheiden van de toepassingsfase, zal een rechter
invulling moeten geven aan de betekenis van het fundamentele recht in kwestie. Een
rechter dient de keuze voor een bepaalde interpretatie van een fundamenteel recht
te verantwoorden, zodat inzichtelijk wordt hoe hij tot een bepaalde keuze is gekomen.
Alleen dan kan er een zinvol debat plaatsvinden over de kwaliteit en de overtuigings-
kracht van de redenering en dus over de interpretatie van het fundamentele recht dat
voorwerp is van het geschil. Interpretatieve instrumenten spelen een belangrijke rol
bij de verantwoording van interpretatieve keuzes.
In dit proefschrift staat een aantal interpretatieve instrumenten centraal. De keuze
voor juist die instrumenten wordt verklaard door de centraalstelling van de twee hoven
die het onderwerp vormen van deze studie. De problematiek van juridische argumenta-
tie wordt in dit proefschrift bekeken vanuit het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van
de Mens (EHRM) en het Hof van Justitie van de Europese Unie (HvJ EU). Van laatst-
genoemd rechtscollege is uitsluitend onderzoek gedaan naar zaken waarin fundamentele
rechten een rol spelen. De hoven zijn gekozen om twee redenen. Allereerst opereren
zij beide in een zeer complexe, veellagige juridische context. Als Europese rechters
dienen zij rekening te houden met zowel de Europese context als de nationale context
van de verschillende lidstaten. Daarnaast speelt het belang van de individuele klager
een rol. Deze verschillende lagen en belangen vormen de complexe achtergrond
waartegen het EHRM en het HvJ EU beslissingen moeten nemen. Vanwege die
achtergrond is het belangrijk dat Europese rechters hun interpretatieve keuzes op
inzichtelijke wijze verantwoorden. Voorts speelt een rol dat de beide hoven veel zijn
bekritiseerd, zowel wat betreft hun algehele functioneren, als – meer specifiek – hun
juridische argumentatie. Juist deze kritiek, gekoppeld aan het feit dat beide hoven
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voor een groot deel afhankelijk zijn van de medewerking van de lidstaten, maakt dat
het relevant is om kritisch te kijken naar een onderdeel van de juridische argumentatie,
namelijk de interpretatiefase.
Voor het onderzoek in dit proefschrift zijn interpretatieve instrumenten geselecteerd
die kunnen helpen een balans te vinden tussen de verschillende belangen die spelen
in een veellagig rechtssysteem. Teleologische, comparatieve, evolutieve en autonome
interpretatie zijn de vier instrumenten die voor beide hoven zijn geanalyseerd. Alle
vier de geselecteerde methoden zijn onderworpen aan een theoretische en een recht-
spraakanalyse. Op grond van de theoretische analyse zijn vragen, hypotheses en
analytische suggesties opgesteld die vervolgens zijn getoetst in de rechtspraakanalyse.
Voor de analyse van de vier interpretatieve instrumenten is een praktische benade-
ring gekozen door te kijken naar de belangrijkste punten van kritiek. Er is, als gezegd,
veel kritiek op de inzichtelijkheid van de redenering van de twee hoven, en, daaraan
gekoppeld, is er ook kritiek op de objectiviteit van de redering. Als niet duidelijk
is hoe een keuze tot stand is gekomen, kan er twijfel ontstaan of subjectieve factoren
die betrekking hebben op de persoon van de rechter een rol hebben gespeeld. Het
uitgangspunt is dat duidelijk moet zijn op welke gronden een keuze voor een bepaalde
interpretatie is gemaakt.
Onderscheid tussen methoden en beginselen
Voorafgaand aan de discussie over de verschillende interpretatieve instrumenten is
een onderscheid gemaakt tussen interpretatiemethoden en interpretatiebeginselen. In
de literatuur wordt, zowel ten aanzien van interpretatie door beide hoven als ten
aanzien van interpretatie in het algemeen, veelal onduidelijk gebruik gemaakt van
de verschillende termen, terwijl er wel degelijk een verschil bestaat tussen de verschil-
lende labels.
Een interpretatiemethode geeft aan op welk inhoudelijk element een argument
kan worden gebaseerd. Bij tekstuele interpretatie wordt een argument bijvoorbeeld
gebaseerd op de tekst, bij teleologische interpretatie op het doel van een bepaling
en bij systematische interpretatie op de systematiek van het verdrag. Een interpretatie-
beginsel geeft daarentegen het doel aan dat wordt nagestreefd bij de interpretatie van
een bepaling, zoals effectieve of evolutieve interpretatie. Vaak wordt dit doel gerecht-
vaardigd door te verwijzen naar de bedoeling van het verdrag in kwestie.
In dit proefschrift wordt ervan uitgegaan dat het belangrijkste verschil tussen
interpretatiemethoden en interpretatiebeginselen is gelegen in de rol die deze instru-
menten spelen in de interpretatiefase. Een interpretatiemethode kan een bepaalde
interpretatie dragen en rechtvaardigen, doordat duidelijk is op welk inhoudelijk element
een argumentatie is gebaseerd. Bij een interpretatiebeginsel is duidelijk welk doel
er wordt beoogd. Daardoor kunnen deze beginselen richting geven bij de interpretatie
van fundamentele rechten, maar kunnen zij niet op zichzelf een interpretatie dragen.
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Moet bijvoorbeeld voor een effectieve, evolutieve of autonome interpretatie worden
gekeken naar de tekst, het doel van de bepaling of naar andere argumenten? De
kwalificaties effectief, evolutief en autonoom bieden hiervoor geen houvast. Interpreta-
tiebeginselen moeten derhalve worden ondersteund door interpretatiemethoden. De
beginselen kunnen vervolgens een rol spelen in de keuze voor een argument gebaseerd
op interpretatiemethode A, B, C of D.
Als gezegd wordt in de literatuur weinig aandacht besteed aan de kwalificatie
van interpretatieve instrumenten en worden, voor zover er al een onderscheid wordt
erkend, de termen interpretatiemethoden en interpretatiebeginselen door elkaar gebruikt.
Bij de bespreking van de verschillende interpretatiebeginselen wordt duidelijk of het
onderscheid in de rechtspraak zichtbaar is en of er op dit punt verbeteringen mogelijk
zijn.
Teleologische interpretatie
Teleologische interpretatie speelt op twee niveaus een rol in de analyse in dit proef-
schrift, namelijk op meta-niveau en op micro-niveau. Meta-teleologische interpretatie
is een concept dat is geïntroduceerd door LASSER. Met meta-teleologische interpretatie
wordt bedoeld dat het gebruik van bepaalde interpretatieve instrumenten wordt
gerechtvaardigd door een beroep te doen op de doelstellingen van het verdrag in
kwestie. LASSER hanteert niet hetzelfde onderscheid tussen interpretatiemethoden en
-beginselen als gehanteerd in dit proefschrift, maar zijn concept van meta-teleologische
interpretatie is met name van belang voor interpretatiebeginselen. In de rechtspraak
van het HvJ EU is meta-teleologische interpretatie niet duidelijk zichtbaar. Het EHRM
daarentegen heeft bijvoorbeeld bepaald dat één van de doelstellingen van het Europees
Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens (EVRM) als mensenrechtenverdrag is dat de
hierin opgenomen rechten op een praktische en effectieve manier moet worden
uitgelegd. Het gebruik van onder andere evolutieve interpretatie wordt onder verwij-
zing naar deze doelstelling gerechtvaardigd. In de rechtspraak van het EHRM is deze
variant van teleologische interpretatie dus duidelijk aanwezig.
Micro-teleologische interpretatie is de benaming die door LASSER wordt gehanteerd
voor teleologische interpretatie als interpretatiemethode. Teleologische interpretatie
is een veelgebruikte methode zowel in nationale als internationale rechtspraak. De
methode an sich is niet controversieel, maar het gebruik van de methode kan soms
leiden tot beschuldigingen dat de rechter zijn taakopvatting te buiten gaat. In dit
proefschrift is daarom met name gekeken naar het gebruik van deze methode.
Teleologische interpretatie gaat ervan uit dat wetgeving of een verdrag met een
bepaald doel in het leven is geroepen. Een belangrijke vraag die opkomt bij teleologi-
sche interpretatie is wiens doel moet worden gerespecteerd: het doel dat de originele
oprichter van het verdrag voor ogen stond of het doel van een rationele oprichter?
In het eerste geval is sprake van subjectieve teleologische interpretatie en wordt
407
Samenvatting
gekeken naar het doel van de oprichter van het verdrag, door bijvoorbeeld sterk
gebruik te maken van de travaux préparatoires. In het tweede geval is sprake van
objectieve teleologische interpretatie en wordt daarentegen gekeken naar onder meer
de preambule, om op grond daarvan vast te stellen wat het objectieve doel is van
het verdrag of de specifieke bepaling. Bij beide hoven is een voorkeur voor objectieve
teleologische interpretatie zichtbaar. Subjectieve teleologische interpretatie is met name
in de rechtspraak van het EHRM nog op beperkte schaal aanwezig. In de rechtspraak
van het HvJ EU is deze variant nauwelijks van belang. De beperkte beschikbaarheid
van de travaux préparatoires speelt daarbij ongetwijfeld een rol.
Voor de analyse van het gebruik van teleologische interpretatie is gekeken naar
de vraag of het EHRM of het HvJ EU verduidelijken waar het doel van de bepaling
uit volgt. Dit is met name van belang bij objectieve teleologische interpretatie, omdat
hierbij het doel van een ‘rationele oprichter’ van het desbetreffende verdrag als
uitgangspunt wordt genomen. Indien niet duidelijk is hoe de rechter heeft vastgesteld
wat het doel is, kan dit tot kritiek leiden.
Het HvJ EUmaakt met name gebruik van teleologische interpretatie op het moment
dat er een juridisch bindende tekst (bijvoorbeeld een verordening) is waarin fundamen-
tele bepalingen zijn vastgelegd. In die gevallen geeft het HvJ EU, vaak aangevuld
door de conclusie van de Advocaat Generaal, duidelijk aan hoe het tot de vaststelling
van het doel is gekomen. Aangezien het Handvest van de Grondrechten van de EU
(het Handvest) met het Verdrag van Lissabon bindende kracht heeft verkregen, kan
worden verwacht dat teleologische interpretatie een grotere rol gaat spelen in de
rechtspraak van het HvJ EU.
In de rechtspraak van het EHRMwordt veelvuldig gebruik gemaakt van teleologi-
sche interpretatie, maar hierbij wordt minder duidelijk aangegeven hoe het EHRM
heeft vastgesteld wat het doel van een bepaling is. Het doel van een bepaling wordt
vaak opgeworpen als een voldongen feit, terwijl niet duidelijk is hoe het EHRM tot
die conclusie is gekomen. Zeker als een extensieve interpretatie wordt gestoeld op
een teleologische interpretatie is het noodzakelijk dat duidelijk wordt uitgelegd hoe
het doel is vastgesteld om beschuldigingen van rechterlijke wetgeving te voorkomen.
Het EHRM zou een voorbeeld kunnen nemen aan het HvJ EU en op een meer
gedetailleerde manier gebruik kunnenmaken van teleologische interpretatie door dieper
in te gaan op het doel van een bepaling en uit te leggen hoe het dat doel heeft vast-
gesteld. De argumentatie van het EHRM zou daardoor inzichtelijker worden. Nadelig
is echter dat het tegelijkertijd ook tot meer controverse kan leiden, indien het EHRM
inhoudelijk dieper op teleologische interpretatie ingaat.
Comparatieve interpretatie
Comparatieve interpretatie houdt in dat bij de uitleg van een bepaling een rechter
kijkt naar materialen uit andere systemen dan zijn of haar eigen systeem. Er is veel
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discussie over deze methode in theoretische literatuur. Meest fundamenteel is de
discussie of comparatieve interpretatie überhaupt wel een rol mag spelen als interpreta-
tiemethode. In deze discussie staat dus de legitimiteit van de methode centraal. Hierbij
speelt met name de vraag waarom materialen uit andere rechtssystemen relevant zijn.
In andere discussies wordt de waarde van deze methode erkend, maar worden er veel
vraagtekens gezet bij de uitwerking ervan in de praktijk.
Om de discussie over comparatieve interpretatie vooruit te helpen is in dit proef-
schrift een onderscheid voorgesteld tussen interne en externe comparatieve interpreta-
tie. Interne comparatieve interpretatie houdt in dat er wordt verwezen naar materialen,
rechtspraak of wetgeving uit staten die binnen de jurisdictie van het desbetreffende
supranationale hof vallen. In het geval van het EHRM zijn dat de verdragsstaten van
het EVRM en in het geval van het HvJ EU de lidstaten van de EU. Onder externe
comparatieve interpretatie vallen alle overige verwijzingen naar andere systemen. Dat
kan variëren van een verwijzing naar de situatie in de Verenigde Staten, tot verwijzing
naar een uitspraak van het Joegoslavië Tribunaal, of een verwijzing naar een verdrag
van de Verenigde Naties. Een verwijzing door het EHRM naar het HvJ EU of anders-
om valt ook onder de externe component van comparatieve interpretatie.
Het onderscheid is van belang, omdat het gebruik van beide versies van compara-
tieve interpretatie een andere rechtvaardiging behoeft. Interne comparatieve interpreta-
tie kan worden gerechtvaardigd door te wijzen op de wens om als supranationaal hof
voeling te houden met de situatie in de lidstaten. Externe comparatieve interpretatie
dient echter op een andere wijze te worden gerechtvaardigd. Waarom is het relevant
om te kijken naar de Verenigde Staten of om in een specifieke zaak een door de
betrokken verwerende staat bewust niet geratificeerd verdrag aan te halen? Het feit
dat deze externe materialen nuttig kunnen zijn, is in de theoretische discussie afgedaan
als geen afdoende verklaring, omdat daarmee niet wordt verklaard waarom het is
gerechtvaardigd om er een beroep op te doen.
Naast bezwaren ten aanzien van de rechtvaardiging van (externe) comparatieve
interpretatie is er veel kritiek op het gebruik van comparatieve interpretatie (zowel
intern als extern). Een veel besproken probleem is dat het bij comparatieve interpretatie
eigenlijk altijd mogelijk is om materiaal te vinden dat een bepaalde interpretatie
ondersteunt. Dit probleem wordt ook wel cherry-picking genoemd en geeft aan dat
de methode vatbaar is voor manipulatie. Dat maakt het des te belangrijker dat het
inzichtelijk is hoe de methode wordt gehanteerd. Een ander veel besproken praktisch
probleem heeft te maken met de specifieke manier waarop (met name interne) com-
paratieve interpretatie wordt gebruikt. In de rechtspraak van beide hoven wordt
regelmatig gekeken of er sprake is van een Europese consensus. Indien er sprake is
van een consensus, dan dient deze veelal als argument voor een bepaalde interpretatie.
Het probleem is dat niet duidelijk is wanneer er sprake is van een consensus. Moet
er sprake zijn van een oplossing die in de meerheid van de staten te vinden is of is
er een andere standaard die wordt gehanteerd? Uit zowel de theoretische als recht-
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spraakanalyse blijkt dat er geen maatstaf voor te vinden is en dat de vraag of er sprake
is van een consensus redelijk willekeurig wordt beantwoord. Beide problemen doen
afbreuk aan de betrouwbaarheid van comparatieve argumenten.
Zowel interne als externe comparatieve interpretatie wordt veel toegepast door
beide hoven. Geen van beide hoven maakt evenwel onderscheid tussen de interne
en externe variant, waardoor het gebruik van deze methode niet in alle gevallen
afdoende wordt gerechtvaardigd. Gelet op het belang van zowel interne als externe
comparatieve interpretatie in een veellagig systeem, is het van belang om oplossingen
te bedenken voor de problemen die deze methode met zich meebrengt, zodat de
betrouwbaarheid ervankan worden vergroot.
CHOUDHRY heeft een voorstel gedaan voor een bepaalde manier van comparatieve
interpretatie om tegemoet te komen aan het bezwaar dat er onvoldoende rechtvaardi-
ging bestaat voor externe comparatieve interpretatie. Zijn voorstel is ook relevant
in het kader van het vaststellen van een consensus, zoals vaak gebeurt bij interne
comparatieve interpretatie. Hij spreekt over ‘dialogical interpretation’. Daarmee bedoelt
hij dat naar andere systemen kan worden gekeken om te bezien of de oplossingen
die daar zijn gevonden binnen het eigen systeem passen. Het over de grens kijken
moet leiden tot zelfreflectie. Door deze zelfreflectie is het mogelijk op grond van
argumenten afkomstig uit het eigen systeem te concluderen of een oplossing uit een
ander systeem wel of niet past. Het dwingt ertoe beter na te denken over de waarden
die ten grondslag liggen aan het eigen systeem. Deze oplossing kan ook worden
gebruikt om te beargumenteren of een oplossing die is gevonden in de lidstaten past
binnen het internationale of supranationale systeem. Op die manier wordt de numerieke
vraag die bij de consensus vaak problemen oplevert losgelaten. In Canada en Zuid-
Afrika zijn voorbeelden van deze wijze van comparatieve interpretatie zichtbaar.
Een nadeel van dit voorstel is echter dat, wanneer rechters worden gedwongen
om beter over hun eigen systeem en de waarden die daaraan ten grondslag liggen
na te denken, zij er niet aan ontkomen meer inhoud te geven aan dat systeem. Dat
leidt onherroepelijk tot meer inhoudelijke of politieke keuzes die binnen een verdeeld
Europa tot controverse kunnen leiden. De vraag is dan wat beter is in een diverse,
veellagige context: onduidelijkheid ten aanzien van een gekozen interpretatie of een
meer inhoudelijke benadering die weer andere problemen zal oproepen?
Evolutieve interpretatie
Evolutieve interpretatie houdt in dat bepalingen worden uitgelegd in het licht van
hedendaagse omstandigheden. Het is een van de meta-teleologische beginselen die
een rol spelen in de interpretatie door beide hoven. Het EHRM motiveert het gebruik
van evolutieve interpretatie door te wijzen op de doelstelling van het EVRM om
fundamentele rechten een praktische en effectieve uitleg te geven. In het kader van
het HvJ EU is een vergelijkbare uitleg gegeven, waarbij is gewezen op het streven
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om geen statische invulling te geven aan fundamentele rechten en bij te blijven bij
sociale veranderingen.
Evolutieve interpretatie wordt vaak gelijkgesteld met comparatieve interpretatie.
Deze visie gaat uit van een beperkte opvatting van comparatieve interpretatie (aange-
zien uit rechtspraak blijkt dat het breder wordt gebruikt dan enkel om een evolutieve
invulling te geven aan een bepaling). Bovendien miskent deze opvatting het verschil
in functie tussen comparatieve interpretatie als methode en evolutieve interpretatie
als beginsel. Een evolutieve interpretatie kan in theorie worden gebaseerd op verschil-
lende interpretatiemethoden. Het objectieve doel van een verdrag kan bijvoorbeeld
in de loop der tijd veranderen. In de praktijk wordt een evolutieve interpretatie echter
vaak gebaseerd op comparatieve argumenten. Ook al zijn het geen synoniemen; er
is dus wel degelijk een hechte link tussen de twee interpretatieve instrumenten. In
de rechtspraak zijn te weinig aanwijzingen te vinden op grond waarvan kan worden
vastgesteld of het EHRM en het HvJ EU evolutieve interpretatie zien als een op
zichzelf staand beginsel of als een variant van comparatieve interpretatie.
Indien evolutieve interpretatie als beginsel wordt erkend en toegepast, dwingt het
beide hoven om beter dan nu het geval is te verantwoorden op grond van welke
argumenten ze tot een evolutieve uitleg komen. Zeker in het licht van de immer
uitdijende fundamentele rechten kan een zorgvuldig gebruik van het beginsel van
evolutieve interpretatie een waarborg bieden tegen de kritiek hierop.
Autonome interpretatie
Onder autonome interpretatie door het EHRM of het HvJ EU wordt verstaan dat
begrippen worden geïnterpreteerd, los van de betekenis die in het kader van andere
internationale verdragen of nationale wetgeving aan deze begrippen wordt gegeven.
Een beroep op autonome interpretatie wordt in de rechtspraak met name gerechtvaar-
digd door de wens om alle burgers in Europa een gelijk, minimaal beschermingsniveau
te bieden. Naast dit streven naar een uniformminimumniveau van bescherming wordt
er in de literatuur ook gesproken over een strategische reden om autonome interpretatie
toe te passen. In dat geval wordt ervan uitgegaan dat het desbetreffende hof dit
beginsel toepast om expliciet de controle over de interpretatie van een bepaald concept
naar zich toe te trekken.
In de grote meerderheid van de gevallen heeft autonome interpretatie betrekking
op autonomie ten opzichte van de (mogelijk afwijkende) nationale kwalificatie. In
de context van het HvJ EU is soms sprake van een ander soort autonomie, namelijk
autonomie ten opzichte van het EHRM. In deze gevallen kiest het HvJ EU expliciet
voor een interpretatie die losstaat van de interpretatie die door het EHRM is gegeven.




Op grond van het onderscheid tussen interpretatiemethoden en interpretatiebeginse-
len wordt autonome interpretatie in dit proefschrift gekwalificeerd als een interpretatie-
beginsel. Het feit dat een autonome uitleg wordt gekozen zegt namelijk niets over
welke argumenten invulling moeten geven aan die autonome uitleg. Er zijn aanvullen-
de interpretatiemethoden nodig om de keuze voor een bepaalde interpretatie te recht-
vaardigen. Dit aspect van autonome interpretatie wordt in de literatuur nauwelijks
onderkend en het is de vraag of het door de twee hoven als zodanig wordt erkend
of toegepast.
Het EHRM lijkt zich te realiseren dat autonome interpretatie geen interpretatie-
methode is, maar het wordt uit de rechtspraak niet geheel duidelijk hoe het EHRM
autonome interpretatie dan wel kwalificeert. In sommige gevallen wordt een autonome
interpretatie ondersteund door een verwijzing naar interpretatiemethoden. In andere
gevallen formuleert het EHRM criteria die helpen om tot een autonome uitleg te
komen. Ook al is vaak niet duidelijk hoe deze criteria tot stand komen, zij geven in
ieder geval enige duidelijkheid over het gebruik van autonome interpretatie door het
EHRM. In de meerderheid van de gevallen is echter in het geheel niet duidelijk hoe
een autonome interpretatie tot stand komt.
In de rechtspraak van het HvJ EU zijn minder gevallen van autonome interpretatie
zichtbaar. Dat heeft, net als bij evolutieve interpretatie, te maken met het gedurende
lange tijd ontbreken van een bindende catalogus van fundamentele rechten. De
voorbeelden lijken de voorzichtige conclusie te rechtvaardigen dat het HvJ EU
autonome interpretatie als een interpretatiebeginsel kwalificeert. In een aantal gevallen
gaat het HvJ EU voorbeeldig te werk en wordt een autonome interpretatie gerechtvaar-
digd door een verwijzing naar argumenten gebaseerd op verschillende interpretatie-
methoden. Die voorbeelden laten zien dat het toepassen van dit onderscheid leidt tot
een meer inzichtelijke interpretatie waar het EHRM een voorbeeld aan zou kunnen
nemen.
Conclusie
De discussies op grond van de theoretische en rechtspraakanalyse van de verschillende
methoden en beginselen in dit onderzoek laten duidelijk zien op welke punten de
huidige praktijk van het EHRM en het HvJ EU tekortschiet. Als rechters zich bewust
worden van deze tekortkomingen is dat al een groot gewin. In dat verband is illustra-
tief dat op het gebied van comparatieve interpretatie al verbeteringen zichtbaar zijn
als gevolg van de theoretische discussies over de met die methode verbandhoudende
tekortkomingen.
Er zijn zowel inhoudelijke als meer instrumentele voorstellen tot verbetering
gedaan. Daarbij is aangegeven dat sommige verbeteringen weer eigen problemen met
zich meebrengen. Dat is met name zo bij een aantal inhoudelijke voorstellen die de
rechters van het EHRM en het HvJ EU ertoe dwingen meer inhoudelijke keuzes te
412
De interpretatie van fundamentele rechten in een veellagig rechtssysteem
maken teneinde beter inzicht te geven in de beslissingen die tot een bepaalde inter-
pretatie hebben geleid. Met name in een veellagig rechtssysteem levert dit in potentie
weer een heel nieuw scala aan problemen op.
Het belangrijkste voorstel tot instrumentele verbetering ziet op de erkenning van
het onderscheid tussen interpretatiemethoden en interpretatiebeginselen en de volledige
toepassing daarvan in de praktijk. Dit voorstel spoort rechters aan stil te staan bij
de rol die de verschillende methoden en beginselen spelen in het interpretatieproces.
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ECtHR (GC), Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, decision of 4 July 2001,
unpublished
ECtHR (GC), Incal v Turkije, judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports 1998-IV
ECtHR, Ireland v. United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A
No. 25
ECtHR, James and others v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986,
Series A No. 98
ECtHR, Johnston and others v Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A
No. 112
ECtHR (GC), Jussila v. Finland, judgment of 23 November 2006, unpublished
ECtHR, Kimlya and others v. Russia, judgment of 1 October 2009, unpublished
ECtHR, Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pederson v Denmark, judgment of 7
December 1976, Series A No. 23
ECtHR, Klass and others v Germany, judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A
No. 28
ECtHR, König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A No. 27
ECtHR, Koua Poirrez v. France, judgment of 30 September 2003, Reports
2003-X
ECtHR (GC), Kress v. France, judgment of 7 June 2001, Reports 2001-VI
ECtHR (GC), Kudla v. Poland, judgment of 26 October 2000, Reports 2000-XI
ECtHR, Leander v Sweden, judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A No. 116
ECtHR, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium, judgment of 23 June
1981, Series A No. 34
ECtHR, Lithgow and others v United Kingdom, judgment of 8 July 1986, Series
A No. 102
ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995,
Series A No. 310
ECtHR (GC), Maaouia v. France, judgment of 5 October 2000, Reports 2000-X
ECtHR (GC), Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005,
Reports 2005-I
ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A No. 31
ECtHR (GC), Martinie v. France, judgment of 12 April 2006, Reports 2006-VI
ECtHR, Matos e Silva, Lda, and others v. Portugal, judgment of 16 September
1996, Reports 1996-IV
ECtHR (GC), Matthews v. United Kingdom, judgment of 18 February 1999,
Reports 1999-I
ECtHR, M.C. v. Bulgaria, judgment of 4 December 2003, Reports 2003-XII
ECtHR McCann and others v United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1995,
Series A No. 324
435
List of cases
ECtHR (GC), Micallef v. Malta, judgment of 15 October 2009, unpublished
ECtHR, Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, judgment of 12
October 2006, Reports 2006-XI
ECtHR, Niemietz v. Germany, judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A
No. 251-B
ECtHR (GC), Öcalan v. Turkey, judgment of 12 May 2005, Reports 2005-IV
ECtHR (GC), Öneryildiz v. Turkey, judgment of 30 November 2004, Reports
2004-XII
ECtHR (GC), Osman v. United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports
1998-VIII
ECtHR, Öztürk v. Germany, judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A No. 73
ECtHR (GC), Pellegrin v. France, judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports 1999-
VIII
ECtHR, P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 September 2001,
Reports 2001-IX
ECtHR (GC), Polacek & Polackova v. Czech Republic, decision of 10 July 2002,
unpublished
ECtHR, Posti and Rahko v. Finland, judgment of 24 September 2002, Reports
2002-VII
ECtHR, Pretty v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 April 2002, Reports 2002-III.
ECtHR, Prokopovich v. Russia, judgment of 18 November 2004, Reports 2004-
XI
ECtHR, Quark Fishing Limited v. United Kingdom, decision of 19 September
2006, unpublished
ECtHR, Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, judgment of 7 January 2010, unpublished
ECtHR, Ringeisen v. Austria, judgment of 16 July 1971, Series A No. 13
ECtHR, Rees v. United Kingdom, judgment of 17 October 1986, Series A
No. 106
ECtHR, Rotaru v. Romania, judgment of 4 May 2000, Reports 2000-V
ECtHR (GC), Saadi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 January 2008,
unpublished
ECtHR, S.A. Dangeville v. France, judgment of 16 April 2002, Reports 2002-III
ECtHR, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, judgment of 24 June 2010, unpublished
ECtHR (GC), Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2), judgments of 17 September 2009,
unpublished
ECtHR (GC), Selmouni v. France, judgment of 28 July 1999, Reports 1999-V
ECtHR (GC), Senator Lines GmbH v. Austria and others, decision of 10 March
2004, Reports 2004-IV




ECtHR, Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A
No. 264
ECtHR, Smirnova v. Russia, judgment of 24 July 2003, Reports 2003-IX
ECtHR, Société Colas Est and others v. France, judgment of 16 April 2002,
Reports 2002-III
ECtHR, Soering v United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161
ECtHR (GC), Stec and others v. United Kingdom, decision of 6 July 2005,
Reports 2005-X
ECtHR, Stjerna v. Finland, judgment of 25 November 1994, Series A No. 299-B
ECtHR (GC), Stoll v. Switzerland, judgment of 10 December 2007, unpublished
ECtHR, Storbråten v. Norway, decision of 1 February 2007, unpublished
ECtHR, Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, judgment of 9
December 1994, Series A No. 301-B
ECtHR (GC), T v. United Kingdom, judgment of 16 December 1999, unpublished
ECtHR, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A No. 26
ECtHR, Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v. Sweden, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A
No. 159
ECtHR (GC), Üner v. the Netherlands, judgment of 18 October 2006, Reports
2006-XII
ECtHR (GC), United Communist Party of Turkey and others v. Turkey, judgment
of 30 January 1998, Reports 1998-I
ECtHR (GC), V v. United Kingdom, judgment of 16 December 1999, Reports
1999-IX.
ECtHR, Van der Mussele v. Belgium, judgment of 23 November 1983, Series A
No. 70
ECtHR, Vanjak v Croatia, judgment of 14 January 2010, unpublished
ECtHR, Vermeulen v. Belgium, judgment of 20 February 1996, Reports 1996-I
ECtHR (GC), Vilho Eskelinen and others v. Finland, judgment of 19 April 2007,
unpublished
ECtHR (GC), Vo v. France, judgment of 8 July 2004, Reports 2004-VIII
ECtHR, Von Hannover v. Germany, judgment of 24 June 2004, Reports 2004-VII
ECtHR, Witold Litwa v. Poland, judgment of 4 April 2000, Reports 2000-III
ECtHR, Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A No. 7
ECtHR, Young James and Webster v. United Kingdom, judgment of 13 August
1981, Series A No. 44
ECtHR (GC), Yumak & Sadak v. Turkey, judgment of 8 July 2008, unpublished
ECtHR (GC), Zolotukhin v. Russia, judgment of 10 February 2009, unpublished
ECtHR, Zwierzynski v. Poland, judgment of 19 June 2001, Reports 2001-VI
437
List of cases
Reports from the European Commission on Human Rights
ECHR, Svenska Lokmannaförbundet v. Sweden, report of 27 May 1974, Series B
No. 18
ECHR, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, report of 14 December 1976, Series B No. 24.
Judgments from the European Court of Justice
C-26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos
v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 1
C-28/62, Da Costa en Schaake NV and others v. Administratie der Belastingen
[1963] ECR 61
C-6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L [1964] ECR 585
C-29/69, Erich Stauder v City of Ulm – Sozialamt [169] ECR 419
C-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle
für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 01125
C-22/70, Commission v. Council (ERTA), [1971] ECR 263
C-4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v. Ruhrkohle
Aktiengesellschaft [1974] ECR 00491
C-17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Commission of the European
Communities [1974] 01063
C-6/75, Ulrich Horst v. Bundesknappschaft [1975] ECR 00823
C-36/75, Roland Rutili v. Ministre de l’intérieur [1975] ECR 01219
C-118/75, Lynne Watson and Alessandro Belmann [1976] ECR 01185
C-130/75, Vivien Prais v. Council of the European Communities [1976] ECR
01589
C-149/77, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne
Sabena [1978] ECR 01365
C-44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 03727
C-136/79, National Panasonic (UK) Limited v Commission of the European
Communities [1980] ECR 02033
C-155/79, AM & S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities
[1982] ECR 01575
C-53/81, D.M. Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1982] ECR 01035
C-283/81,CILFIT v. Ministero della Sanità [1982] ECR 3415
C-63/83, Regina v. Kent Kirk [1986] ECR 02689
C-294/83, Parti écologiste "Les Verts" v. European Parliament [1986] ECR
01339
C-222/84, Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster
Constabulary [1986] ECR 01651
438
List of cases
C-222/86, Union nationale des entraîneurs et cadres techniques professionnels du
football (Unectef) v. Georges Heylens and others [1987] ECR 04097
C-46/87, Hoechst AG v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR
02859
C-374/87, Orkem v. Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR
03283
C-5/88, Hubert Wachauf v. Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1989]
ECR 02609
C-49/88, Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company (Samad) and Saudi Arabian Fertilizer
Company (Safco) v. Council of the European Communities [1991] ECR I-
03187
C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi (ERT) AE and Panellinia Omospondia
Syllogon Prossopikou v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas
and Nicolaos Avdellas and others [1991] ECR I-02925
C-159/90, The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v
Stephen Grogan and others [1991] ECR I-04685
C-168/91, Christos Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig – Standesamt and
Landratsamt Calw – Ordnungsamt [1993] ECR I-01191
C-219/91, Criminal proceedings against Johannes Stephanus Wilhelmus Ter
Voort [1992] ECR I-05485
C-267/91, Criminal proceedings against Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-
6097.
C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL and
others v. Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-04921.
C-13/94, P v. S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECRI-02143
C-74/95, Criminal Proceedings against X [1996] ECR I-06609
C-185/95, Baustahlgewebe GmbH v. Commission of the European Communities
[1998] ECR I-08417; C-299/95, Friedrich Kremzow v Republik Österreich
[1997] I-02629
C-368/95, Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs GmbH v
Heinrich Bauer Verlag [1997] ECR I-03689
C-249/96, Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-00621
C-309/96, Daniele Annibaldi v. Sindaco del Comune di Guidonia and Presidente
Regione Lazio [1997] ECR I-07493
C-185/97, Belinda Jane Coote v. Granada Hospitality Ltd. [1998] ECR I-05199
C-245/97, Germany v. Commission [2000] ECR I-11621
C-7/98, Dieter Krombach v. André Bamberski [2000] ECR I-01935
C-17/98, Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v. Aruba [2000] ECR I-00665
C-310/98, Met-Trans and Sagpol [2000] ECR I-1797
439
List of cases
C-122/99, D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council of the European Union [2001]
ECR I-04319
C-274/99, Bernard Connolly v. Commission of the European Communities [2001]
ECR I-01611
C-20/00, Booker Aquacultur Ltd v. The Scottish Ministers [2003] ECR I-07411
C-50/00, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA) v. Council of the European
Union [2002] ECR I-06677
C-60/00, Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002]
ECR I-06279
C-94/00, Roquette Frères SA v. Directeur général de la concurrence, de la
consommation et de la répression des fraudes, and Commission of the
European Communities [2002] ECR I-09011
C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v.
Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-05659
C-465/00, Rechnungshof v Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others [2003] ECR I-
04989
C-117/01, K.B. v National Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of
State for Health [2004] ECR I-00541
C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v.
Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-09609
C-200/02, Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department [2004] ECR I-09925
C-263/02, Commission of the European Communities v. Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA
[2004] ECR I-03425
C-540/03, European Parliament v Council of the European Union [2006] ECR I-
05769
C-300/04, M. G. Eman and O. B. Sevinger v. College van burgemeester en
wethouders van Den Haag [2006] ECR I-08055
C-411/04, Salzgitter Mannesmann GmbH v. Commission of the European
Communities, [2007] ECR I-00959
C-436/04, Criminal proceedings against Leopold Henri Van Esbroeck [2006]
ECR I-02333
C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad [2007]
ECR I-03633
C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and
others [2007] ECR I-11767
C-370/05, Criminal proceedings against Uwe Kay Festersen [2007] ECR I-01129




C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s
Union v. Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779
C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de
España SAU [2008] ECR I-00271
C-303/06, S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law [2008] ECR I-05603
C-341/06, Chronopost SA and La Poste v. Union française de l’express (UFEX)
and Others [2008] ECR I-04777
C-450/06, Varec SA v. Belgian State [2008] ECR I-00581
C-14/07, Ingenieurbüro Michael Weiss und Partner GbR v. Industrie- und
Handelskammer Berlin [2008] ECR I-03367
C-308/07, Koldo Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso v. European Parliament [2009] ECR
I-01059
C-349/07, Sopropé – Organizações de Calçado Lda v. Fazenda Pública [2008]
ECR I-10369
C-465/07, Meki Elgafaji and Noor Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2009]
ECR I-00921
C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality
and Law Reform [2008] I-06241
C-506/06, Sabine Mayr v. Bäckerei und Konditorei Gerhard Flöckner OHG
[2008] ECR I-01017
C-261/09, Gaetano Mantello [2010]
C-279/09, DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v.
Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2010]
Judgment from the General Court





Terms followed by section
A
Advocate General, role of: 3.3;
13.2.2.3
Application phase: 1.1; 2.4; 3.3;
4.4.1.4; 10.2.1.3; 10.2.2; 13.4
Argumentative burden: 3.1
Article 31 VCLT: 4.2; 4.3.1; 4.3.2;
4.3.3; 4.4.1.2; 4.4.1.3; 5.1.3; 6.1.2;
7.2; 8.1; 9.1; 10.3; 10.6
Article 32 VCLT: 4.2; 4.3; 5.1.3









Broad evolutieve interpretation: 7.1
C
Charter on fundamental rights: 3.1;
3.2; 4.3.1; 4.3.3; 4.4.2; 6.1.4; 7.5;
8.3; 13; 13.2.2.2; 13.3; 13.4
Cherry-picking: 6.1.6.2; 10.4.5; 10.6
Collegiate body: 3.3
Choudhry: 6.1.7
Common ground: 5.2.2; 6.1; 6.2; 8.2;
8.3; 10.1; 10.2.1.3
Common denominator: 6.1.6.2; 7.4.3;
12.5
Comparative interpretation: 4.3.5; 6;
6.1.1; 10; 10.1; 13.2; 14.3
Consensus: 4.3.5; 6.1.6.2; 7.4.3; 7.4.4;
8.2; 10.2.1.2; 10.4; 13.2.2.6
Constitutional court: 2.2; 7; 7.3
Constitutional justice: 2.2
Contractual treaties: 2.1; 4.4.1.2
D
Democracy, principle of: 4.4.1.4
Dialogical interpretation: 6.1.7; 6.4;
14.3
Dynamic interpretation: 4.3.4; 4.4.2.4;
7.4.5; 7.5; 11.1; 11.3; 11.4
E
Emergent purpose: 5.1.2.; 5.3
Effectiveness, principle of: 4.4.1.2;
4.4.2.2
Evolutive interpretation, principle of:
4.4.2.4; 4.5; 5.2.2; 6.2; 7; 9.3; 9.4;
9.6; 10.2; 10.3; 10.5; 11; 13.2.2.5;
13.4.1
External comparative interpretation:
6.1.3; 6.1.5; 6.1.6.1; 6.2; 6.3; 6.4;
10.3; 10.4.1; 10.4.2; 10.4.4; 10.6;










Historical interpretation: 4.3.4; 4.3.6;
7.3





6.1.3; 6.1.5; 6.2; 6.3; 7.4.3; 10.3;
10.4.4; 10.6; 11.6; 13.2.1; 13.2.2;
13.2.2.2; 13.2.3; 13.2.5; 13.5; 14.3
International Law Commission: 4.2.4;
4.3.4; 4.4.1.2
Interpretation phase: 1.1
Interpretative aids: 1.2; 4.1
J
Judicial activism: 4.3.2; 5.1.3; 5.1.4;
5.2.2; 5.3; 6.1.6.1; 7.2; 7.3; 8.2;
8.3;
Judicial law-making: 1.3; 4.3.2;
4.4.1.2; 5.1.4; 5.3; 6.1.6.1; 7.2; 11.3
Judicial style: 3.3; 13.1; 13.3
L
Law-making treaty: 2.1; 2.5; 4.3.1;
4.3.2; 4.4.1.2; 9
Level of abstraction: 4.4.2.1; 5.1.2;
6.1.6.2; 9.4; 9.6
Level of generality: 6.1.6.2
Living constitution: 7.3
Living instrument: 4.1; 4.3.4; 4.4.1.1;
11.1; 11.2; 11.3; 11.4
Living tree: 7.3
M




4.3.2; 4.4.1.2; 4.4.2.1; 5; 7.5; 8.2;
9.1; 9.2; 9.3; 9.6; 11.6; 13.3
Methods of interpretation: 4.1; 4.3
Micro-teleological interpretation: 4.1;
4.3.2; 4.4.2.1; 5; 7.4.3; 8.2; 13.3
Multilateral treaties: 4.3.4; 5.1.3; 6.1.2
Multilevel: 1.2; 2.4; 4.3.2; 4.5; 6.1.7;
6.3
Multilingual treaty: 4.3.1; 4.3.2
N
Narrow evolutive interpretation: 7.1
National constitutional traditions: 3.1;
4.4.2.3; 6.3; 13.2.2
O
Object and purpose: 2.1; 4.3.2; 4.4.1.2;
5.1.1; 5.1.2; 5.1.3; 5.2.2; 7.4.1;
7.4.4; 8.1; 9.1; 9.2; 9.3; 9.5; 12.4;
13.3
Objective teleological interpretation:
4.3.2; 5.1.1; 9.1; 9.3.1; 9.3.2; 13.3
Originalism: 6.1.6.1; 7.1; 7.3
P
Personal autonomy, principle of:
4.4.1.5
Practical and effective rights: 4.4.1.2;
7.4.1; 9.1; 9.3.3; 9.4; 11.2; 11.5;
14.2; 14.3
Precedent: 1.2; 9.3.3; 10.2.1.2
Present-day conditions: 4.4.1.1;
4.4.2.4; 6.2; 7.1; 7.4.1; 7.4.2; 11.1;
11.2; 11.3; 11.5
Primary means of interpretation: 7.4.4




Process of discovery: 1
Process of justification: 1
Publicly argumentative model: 2.3
R
Real purpose: 4.3.2; 5.1.1
Reasonable author: 4.3.2 ; 5.1.1; 5.1.2
S
Separate opinions: 2.3
Sovereignty: 3.1; 6.1.6.1; 6.1.6.2
Special nature: 4.4.1.2; 5.2.2; 7.4.1








Supplementary means of interpretation:
5.1.3; 7.2; 7.4.4
Systemic interpretation: 4.2; 4.3.; 8.2;
10.4.3; 11.4
T
Teleological interpretation: 4.2; 4.3.2;
4.4.2.2; 4.5; 5; 7.4.3; 9; 11.5; 13.3;
14.2
Teleological school: 5.1.1
Textual interpretation: 4.1; 4.2; 4.3.1;
4.3.2; 4.3.3; 9.3.1; 11.3; 13.2.4;
14.3
Textual school: 5.1.1
Travaux préparatoires: 4.3.2; 4.3.4;
5.1.3; 5.2.1; 7.2; 7.4.4; 7.5; 9.3.1;
9.3.2; 9.6; 10.2.1.1; 11.3; 12.5; 13.3
Treaty of Lisbon: 3.1; 3.2; 8.3
U
Unified structure: 2.3
Uniformity: 1.1; 4.4.2.3; 8.1; 8.3
Universalist interpretation: 6.1.7
V
Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties: 4.2; 4.3.1; 4.3.2; 4.3.3;
4.4.1.2; 4.4.1.3; 4.4.2.3; 5.1.1;
5.1.3; 6.1.2; 7.2; 8.1; 9.1; 10.3
W




Hanneke Senden studied European Law School at the University ofMaastricht, where
she graduated in 2004. During her studies she spent one semester at the University
of Uppsala in Sweden. After her graduation she was accepted to the EuropeanMaster’s
Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation in Venice, Italy. In the context of this
Master, she spent one semester in Venice taking part in inter-disciplinary courses
on human rights and one semester in Graz, Austria, to complete her thesis (Reforming
the reforms; securing the sustainability of the European Court of Human Rights).
For her thesis she was awarded an internship (and accompanying grant) at Human
Rights Watch in Brussels, Belgium for the duration of six months. From September
2006 until May 2011 she worked as a PhD candidate at the Department of Public
Law of Leiden University. In the context of her PhD research she spent one semester




School of Human Rights
Research Series
The School of Human Rights Research is a joint effort by human rights researchers
in the Netherlands. Its central research theme is the nature andmeaning of international
standards in the fi eld of human rights, their application and promotion in the national
legal order, their interplay with national standards, and the international supervision
of such application. The School of Human Rights Research Series only includes
English titles that contribute to a better understanding of the different aspects of human
rights.
Editorial Board of the Series:
Prof. dr. J.E. Goldschmidt (Utrecht University), Prof. dr. D.A. Hellema (Utrecht
University), Prof. dr. W.J.M. van Genugten (Tilburg University), Prof. dr. M.T.
Kamminga (Maastricht University), Prof. dr. P.A.M. Mevis (Erasmus University
Rotterdam), Dr. J.-P. Loof (Leiden University) and Dr. O.M. Ribbelink (Asser Insti-
tute).
Published titles within the Series:
1 Brigit C.A. Toebes, The Right to Health as a Human Right in International Law
ISBN 90-5095-057-4
2 Ineke Boerefijn, The Reporting Procedure under the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Practice and Procedures of the Human Rights Committee
ISBN 90-5095-074-4
3 Kitty Arambulo, Strengthening the Supervision of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Theoretical and Procedural Aspects
ISBN 90-5095-058-2




School of Human Rights Research Series
5 Cornelis D. de Jong, The Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion or Belief
in the United Nations (1946-1992)
ISBN 90-5095-137-6
6 Heleen Bosma, Freedom of Expression in England and under the ECHR: in Search
of a Common Ground. A Foundation for the Application of the Human Rights
Act 1998 in English Law
ISBN 90-5095-136-8
7 Mielle Bulterman,Human Rights in the External Relations of the European Union
ISBN 90-5095-164-3
8 Esther M. van den Berg, The Infl uence of Domestic NGOs on Dutch Human
Rights Policy. Case Studies on South Africa,Namibia, Indonesia and East Timor
ISBN 90-5095-159-7
9 Ian Seiderman, Hierarchy in International Law: the Human Rights Dimension
ISBN 90-5095-165-1
10 Anna Meijknecht, Towards International Personality: the Position of Minorities
and Indigenous Peoples in International Law
ISBN 90-5095-166-X
11 Mohamed Eltayeb, A Human Rights Approach to Combating Religious Persecution.
Cases from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Sudan
ISBN 90-5095-170-8
12 Machteld Boot,Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen
Sine Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
ISBN 90-5095-216-X
13 Corinne Packer,Using Human Rights to Change Tradition. Traditional Practices
Harmful to Women’s Reproductive Health in sub-Saharan Africa
ISBN 90-5095-226-7
14 Theo R.G. van Banning, The Human Right to Property
ISBN 90-5095-203-8
15 Yvonne M. Donders, Towards a Right to Cultural Identity?
ISBN 90-5095-238-0
452
School of Human Rights Research Series
16 Göran K. Sluiter, International Criminal Adjudication and the Collection of
Evidence: Obligations of States
ISBN 90-5095-227-5
17 Nicola Jägers, Corporate Human Rights Obligations: in Search of Accountability
ISBN 90-5095-240-2
18 Magdalena Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ISBN 90-5095-260-7
19 Mitsue Inazumi, Universal Jurisdiction in Modern International Law: Expansion
of National Jurisdiction for Prosecuting Serious Crimes under International Law
ISBN 90-5095-366-2
20 Anne-Marie L.M. de Brouwer, Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual
Violence: The ICC and the Practice of the ICTY and the ICTR
ISBN 90-5095-533-9
21 Jeroen Gutter, Thematic Procedures of the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights and International Law: in Search of a Sense of Community
ISBN 90-5095-557-6
22 Hilde Reiding, The Netherlands and the Development of International Human
Rights Instruments
ISBN 978-90-5095-654-3
23 Ingrid Westendorp, Women and Housing: Gender Makes a Difference
ISBN 978-90-5095-669-7
24 Quirine A.M. Eijkman,We Are Here to Serve You! Public Security, Police Reform
and Human Rights Implementation in Costa Rica
ISBN 978-90-5095-704-5
25 Antoine Ch. Buyse, Post-conflict Housing Restitution. The European Human Rights
Perspective with a case study on Bosnia and Herzegovina
ISBN 978-90-5095-770-0
453
School of Human Rights Research Series
26 Gentian Zyberi, The Humanitarian Face of the International Court of Justice.
Its Contribution to Interpreting and Developing International Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law Rules and Principles
ISBN 978-90-5095-792-2
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